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  Propositions relating to the dissertation 
 
 COOPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING 
 OPERATIONS AND ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 By Moritz Peter Moelle 
 
1. The UN should stipulate an instrument prescribing in detail the dispositions of human rights 
law applicable to peacekeeping operations similar to the Secretary-General’s Bulletin entitled 
“Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law”.  
 
2. The UN and regional organisations should conclude agreements on the distribution of 
responsibility for each peacekeeping operation in which they operate and cooperate. On a 
wider scale, this issue raises the question of how to accommodate the interests and concerns 
of troop-contributing countries. 
 
3. The turmoil and armed fights in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic are proof 
of the need for the UN and regional organisations to increase their cooperation and their 
capabilities in the field of conflict prevention.  
 
4. The high amount of cooperation between international organisations in peacekeeping 
operations requires the formulation of a specific criterion of attribution for the purpose of 
holding the involved organisations jointly responsible for violations of international law 
occurring during the deployment of the operation. 
 
5. The fact that the international community is increasingly faced with problems transcending 
national boundaries which can only be addressed adequately by a multitude of actors such as 
states, international organisations, private entities through a variety of channels raises the 
question if for the purpose of attributing conduct the reliance on control over a specific 
conduct can still serve as a satisfactory criterion in the long-term perspective. 
  
6. Syria and the Ukraine are recent examples that a blockade of the Security Council is still 
possible and they challenge anew the legitimacy of the Security Council. Whereas concepts 
such as humanitarian intervention and R2P have not been accepted yet under positive 
international law, it could be argued that regional organisations may be entitled to intervene 
militarily under a progressive interpretation of “enforcement action” in Article 53 (1) second 
sentence of the UN Charter should the Security Council fail to act on its own.   
 
7. The UN should provide more suitable fora for the settlement of claims of compensation in 
peacekeeping operations. The amount of cases before national courts, e.g. regarding the 
cholera epidemic in Haiti, also with regard to the equivalent protection doctrine as it was 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights illustrate that the current system is 
unsatisfactory.  
 
8. The concepts of universalism and regionalism are obsolete in the field of the maintenance of 
international peace and security and have been replaced by what one could call “cooperative 
multilateralism”. 
 
9. The changing nature of armed conflicts and the involvements of international organisations 
necessitates that international humanitarian law is completely revised. 
 
 
10. The collection of “Big Data” by governments and companies alike and their (financial) 
exploitation is violating the core sphere of human rights of individuals and should be 
regulated in an international convention. 
 
11. All good things must come to an end (lekker is maar een vinger lang). 
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The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the regime of international 
responsibility as it is applicable to international organisations cooperating in matters of international 
peace and security and in particular in peacekeeping operations. This covers cooperation under 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter which deals with “regional arrangements”, as well as 
peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.2 
Peacekeeping operations have been essential for maintaining international peace and security and 
they have evolved tremendously over the years. On 20 December 2012, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2085 on the situation in Mali. In this Resolution, the Security Council requested “that the 
Secretary-General, in close coordination with Mali, ECOWAS, the African Union, the neighbouring 
countries of Mali, (…) and all other interested bilateral partners and international organizations, 
continue to support the planning and the preparations for the deployment of AFISMA.”3 The Security 
Council also expressed its gratitude for the efforts in mediation by the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) and to the European Union (EU) which started to plan for the deployment of a 
military training mission for Mali (EUTM Mali).4  
Although Mali is only one example of a crisis in a country that calls for international action to 
guarantee the maintenance of international peace and security, it reflects the current reality of 
cooperation between international organisations.5 Cooperation between international organisations 
is not only at the core of the maintenance of international peace and security, but it applies across all 
areas, starting with the planning of the mission, to the training of forces, and extending to the 
deployment of troops and putting boots on the ground. This increased cooperation is not a feature 
                                                          
1
 There is no deed for which not anybody would be responsible. 
2
 In the practice of the Security Council concerning peacekeeping operations, Chapter VI of the Charter has lost 
its relevance and is – particularly in the recent practice – not invoked anymore.  
3
 Security Council Resolution 2085, UN Doc. S/RES/2085 (2012), para. 11. 
4
 Ibid., Preamble and para.8. 
5
 Cf. D. M. Tull, ‘UN peacekeeping mission during the past two decades. How effective have they been?‘, in J. 





unique to the maintenance of international peace and security, but it is generally a consequence of 
and a catalyst for globalisation;6 international organisations are fora to deal and to cope with the 
increased interdependence between states while simultaneously accelerating the process.7 It is 
therefore surprising that the term cooperation has never been defined by either an international 
treaty or in a resolution of an international organisation.8 
As was stated by Mexico: 
Cooperation among states has become one of the most important factors – if not the key factor – in 
international relations. In that regard, the role of international organisations has assumed increasing 
significance. 
The most ordinary matters of daily life have an international dimension. No longer can we maintain 
the illusion that we can combat environmental threats or organised crime effectively from a purely 
national standpoint. States have come to realise that only through the joint and coordinated action 
made possible by international organisations can we confront these threats, while at the same time 
promoting ties of friendship and cooperation among peoples. Only through such action can we take 
full advantage of the benefits that globalisation offers.  
In keeping with this development, the legal and actual capacities of international organisations to take 
action have been strengthened. As a logical consequence, the likelihood that their conduct (whether 
actions or omissions) may generate international responsibility has also increased.
9 
These observations were made with regard to the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (ARIO) as developed and adopted in second reading by the International Law 
Commission of the United Nations in 2011.10 They capture the developments which have taken place 
in the past decades. On the one hand, an increased number of international organisations exist, and 
on the other hand, the powers and competences entrusted to these entities by their members has 
                                                          
6
 See, e.g., M. Hirsch, ‘Compliance with international norms in the age of globalization: two theoretical 
perspectives’, in E. Benvenisti, M. Hirsch (eds.), The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation. 
Theoretical Perspectives (2004), 166, 168-70.  Hirsch concludes that states, and in particular developed states, 
are actually more likely to comply with international norms in the course of globalisation, ibid., 193. 
7
 B. Dold, Vertragliche und ausservertragliche Verantwortlichkeit im Recht der internationalen Organisationen 
(2006), 1. Generally, on theories on international cooperation, cf. J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International 
Institutional Law (2009), 25-37.  
8
 R. Wolfrum, ‘Cooperation, International Law of’, in R Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2008-), online edition, [www.mpepil.com], para.2. The Friendly Relations Declaration also 
starts from a “preconceived terminology”, ibid. 
9
 General Remarks of Mexico concerning the project of the International Law Commission on responsibility of 
international organisations, International Law Commission, Responsibility of international organizations, 
Comments and observations received from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/547 (2004), 3-4.  
10
 The articles and commentaries are contained in International Law Commission, Report of the International 
Law Commission, Sixty-third session (26 April – 3 June and 4 July – 12 August 2011), General Assembly, Official 




grown. Their increased activity has raised questions concerning the lack of clear and established rules 
of accountability or responsibility, in particular under international law.  
1. Codification projects on the responsibility of international organisations and the 
changing system of international law 
 
The International Law Commission was not the only international body to engage intellectually and 
from a legal point of view with this development of the activities carried out by international 
organisations. 
The Institut de droit international11 and the International Law Association (ILA)12 actively started 
addressing the topic in the mid-1990s, while the Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho 
Internacional engaged with the topic of responsibility of international organisations in the mid-1980s. 
The approach taken by these three bodies varied and the dates of adoption mirrored the changing 
debate on the topic. The Instituto Hispano-Luso-America focused on international organisations as 
bearers of rights and obligations.13  The Institut de droit international added a new layer, realising 
that acts of international organisations can entail the responsibility of the member states of that 
organisation. Finally, the ILA chose a socio-political-legal approach, analysing the topic under the 
criterion of “accountability” which covers both legal and quasi-judicial and other forms of holding 
international organisations responsible for their actions. 
 
It is often said of the relationship between International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and armed conflicts 
that the law always plays catch-up with the respective new forms of conflicts.14 This statement holds 
                                                          
11
 Institut de Droit Transnational, Resolution (Session of Lisbonne – 1995), The Legal Consequences for Member 
States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties, Articles 4-
6. 
12
 International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004), Accountability of International Organisations, 
International Law Association, New Delhi Conference (2002), Committee on Accountability of International 
Organisations, Third Report consolidated and enlarged version of recommended rules and practices (“RRP-S”). 
Generally, on the project, cf. I. F. Dekker, ‘Making Sense of Accountability in International Institutional Law. An 
analysis of the Final Report of the ILA Committee on Accountability of International Organizations from a 
conceptual legal perspective’, in (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 83 – 118.  See also the 
follow-up project of the ILA, International Law Association, Sofia Conference (2012), Study Group on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations.   
13
 Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional , Las organizaciones internacionales y el Derecho 
de la responsabilidad, El XIV Congreso del Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional, San 
José 1985, 2-3, Preamble. The work of the Instituto is limited in its approach focusing on international 
organisations being bearers of rights and obligations and thus falling under the law of responsibility. It does 
however, discuss the possibility that an internationally wrongful act may be attributed to an international 
organisation or to the state on whose territory it operates, 3, para.5. 
14





true equally for the regulation of acts of international organisations. The common feature of these 
studies is the state-centric approach by which they are characterised. Their modus operandi is state-
centric in the sense that the studies focus on the responsibility of international organisations per se 
and the responsibility of international organisations in connection with responsibility of their 
respective members. They therefore ignore the question of inter-organisational cooperation and 
consequently also responsibility of an international organisation with or for the acts of another 
international organisation.15  In academic writing, most attention has been paid to the topic of  the 
distribution of responsibility between international organisations and their member states excluding 
therefore “den Dritten im Bunde” (the third in the alliance)16 which, in the conduct of peacekeeping 
or peace enforcement operations, is often another international organisation.   
A major change emerged through the Articles of the International Law Commission on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations which contain dispositions regulating the responsibility 
of an international organisation in connection with the acts of another international organisation. 17 
The key question is whether these articles reflect sufficiently the complexities of inter-organisational 
cooperation and whether they include the necessary flexibility and marge de manoeuvre in their 
interpretation which allows for the regulation of the highly complex field of peace-keeping 
operations.18   
 
Whereas the Articles on State Responsibility19 were the work of roughly 50 years, the Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organisations were finished within 8 years. As was observed by one 
member of the International Law Commission,  
                                                          
15
 The same critique was also formulated by L. Boisson de Chazournes, Les relations entre organisations 
régionales et organisations universelles, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 347 (2010), 79, 
401-402. 
16
 One has to emphasise that one of the reasons for the disregard of this particular angle is possibly the 
immunity of international organisations which has so far prevented the consideration of international and 
other courts and tribunals with that particular question, besides doing so incidentally in connection with acts of 
states. Another potential reason relates to the issue of judicial review of resolutions issued by the Security 
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The topic currently under consideration was much more complex, for while relations between States 
and international organizations were, in the last analysis, fairly limited, those between international 
organizations themselves continued to evolve, particularly in the area of peacekeeping, where their 
functions and modus operandi were increasingly often called into question.”20 
Furthermore, the forces of globalisation, interconnectivity and interdependence have also moved the 
system of international law further away from being self-contained and applicable exclusively to 
states towards “an intricate network of laws governing a myriad of rights and duties that stretch 
across and beyond national borders.”21 While, in the 1940s, Kelsen’s view of the Reine Rechtslehre 
might have been suitable22, the current understanding of international law can only be that one 
cannot grasp the nature of international law if one limits one’s attention to this specific field. Non-
legal arguments and considerations are equally important. It is particularly true for the context of the 
present study insofar as cooperation between international organisations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security touches not only upon international law, but also upon essential, 
geopolitical, strategic, economic and other interests of states and international organisations which 
necessitates a broadening of the perspective – and while applying the law – to take duly into account 
policy-induced arguments and considerations.23 In addition, “[t]he more essential interests are for 
politics, the more politics are opposed to the penetration of the legal system with its principles of 
legality and equality.”24 Following two disastrous world wars, states and the wider international 
community consider the maintenance of international peace and security to be one of their main 
concerns. Accordingly, the contentions between international law and politics can be particularly 
harsh – one may only think of the Iraq war in 2003 or the current crisis in Syria.  One can therefore 
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duly speak of an ”increasingly politicized legal landscape” and this trend is also reflected in 
jurisprudence which relies heavily on policy documents.25 
2. The proliferation of international organisations and the multiplication of tasks (in 
peacekeeping operations) 
 
The bar is further raised by the very nature of international organisations and their organs of which 
the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations is the most apposite example. Their respective 
constituent instruments, for example, the Charter of the United Nations,26 form the legal basis of 
their existence and their activities. However, the organisations and their organs act through various 
forms of diplomacy and policy; they are political “animals” with a legal skeleton. The Security Council 
is the beacon of the system of global collective security and although a political body per se, its 
actions often have legal consequences.27  Generally speaking, the whole area of international peace 
and security lies at a crossroad between international politics and international law. 
An important area of the activities of international organisations is the maintenance of international 
peace and security. In the past few decades, a plethora of regional and sub-regional, non-universal 
international organisations have been created and evolved of which many have taken over tasks 
previously carried out by universal organisations or they act conjointly with such. This rise of 
regionalism is a global phenomenon and not limited to the area of peace and security,28 but is 
especially true for the field of peacekeeping operations.  Notwithstanding the prohibition of the use 
of force which is enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, armed conflicts still 
occur regularly in various regions around the globe.  Of the 68 peace operations conducted under the 
                                                          
25
P. Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (2013), 80 ;  C-91/05, Commission of the European 
Communities v Council of the European Union [2005], Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 May 2008. 
26
 United Nations Charter (1945). 
27
 As Gowlland-Debbas also points out “[o]ne is highly aware of the political nature of the Security Council 
which may make a legal analysis of its activities sound derisory. It is unquestionable that the mechanisms 
instituted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grant extensive, discretionary powers to an elitist, 
political organ whose primary responsibility is the maintenance of a political conception of international 
ordering, i.e. the maintenance of international peace and security”, V. Gowlland-Debbas, The Security Council 
and Issues of Responsibility under International Law, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 535 
(2012), 185, 206. Boutros-Ghali once remarked that the Security Council is a place where international law and 
international policy “happily mix”, as cited in D. Türk, Impact of International Humanitarian Provisions on the 
Decision-making Process in Crisis Management: The Practice of the Security Council, in S. Kolanowski, Y. Salmon 
(eds.), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium. The Impact of International Humanitarian Law on current security 
policy trends (2001), 97, 97, 100. 
28
 As infra 1.3 and 1.5 will consider, the rise of regionalism has been problematic in the field of maintenance of 
international peace and security as the legal framework under the Charter of the United Nations is an area of 




auspices of the UN in the period of 1945 and 2013, 45 have taken place in the period of 1991 – 
2013.29 
The increased number of peacekeeping operations in the recent decades has been accompanied by a 
multiplication of tasks and functions exercised by those forces which reach from classic peacekeeping 
operations as neutral troops between two opposing states to multifaceted operations including 
military and civil components, amounting even to operations which administer complete territories 
as was seen in Cambodia, East Timor and in Kosovo.30  The UN operation in the DRC lists no less than 
45 different tasks to be exercised by the operation.31 
3. An increasing network of cooperation 
 
In recent years a number of other important developments have taken place in the organisation and 
the conduct of peace operations. The opening paragraph of this study illustrated that cooperation 
has increasingly become common in the planning and implementation of peacekeeping operations. 
The United Nations rely regularly on regional organisations to carry out peace-keeping operations 
under a mandate by the Security Council although the legal framework is not always very clear. 32   
Indeed, it was held by the AU-UN panel: 
The complexity of modern peacekeeping means that no single organization is capable of tackling the 
challenge on its own. More than ever, security threats require a collective approach premised on a 
range of partnerships which should seek to establish coordination both at the strategic and 
                                                          
29
 This figure includes operations authorised by the Security Council. All figures and facts are drawn from the 
United Nations homepage, see, e.g. the homepage of the United Nations Peacekeeping department, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ and www.un.org/events/peacekeeping60; see also. S. R. Lüder, 
‘Responsibility of States and International Organisations in Respect to United Nations Peace-keeping Missions’, 
(2008) 12 International Peacekeeping, 83, 84; Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping  
operations in all their aspects, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. 
A/57/767 (2003), 6, para. 42; R. Murphy, K. Månsson, ‘Perspectives on Peace Operations and Human Rights’, in 
(2006) 13 International Peacekeeping, 457, 457. 
30
 According to Berdal, this development is explained by “these changes in operational (focus on intra-state 
conflict) and normative context (emphasis on ‘humanitarian’ issues broadly conceived)”, M. Berdal, ‘The 
Security Council and Peacekeeping’, in V. Lowe, A. Roberts, J. Welsh (eds.), The United Nations Security Council 
and War (2008), 175, 190. A position paper of the Secretary-General at that time, Boutros-Ghali traces in a 
sublime fashion the developments, General Assembly/Security Council, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: 
Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN 
Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (1995), 3-5. 
31
 Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda. 
Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009), 10. 
32
 Peacekeeping was created by the United Nations and has developed through practice alone. The relevant 
chapters of the UN Charter for peacekeeping operations and cooperation with regional organisations are 




programmatic levels. They should also take maximum advantage of the strengths that respective 
organizations, especially regional organizations, can contribute
33 [Emphasis added]. 
Other reports go further still, and suggest that “hybrid peace operations and other innovative 
approaches to peacekeeping (…) are the way of the future as the strength of such joint ventures 
draws from the universal character of the UN and the advantages embedded in regionalism.”34  
International organisations are generally complex structures, which act through their member states, 
and in turn act through individuals, thereby creating three layers of responsibility. In addition, and 
adding to the complexity, they rarely act on their own, but often in cooperation with other 
organisations and increasingly also with private actors, impeding upon the application of the law of 
responsibility:  “[E]ven, in those rare cases where most would agree that some wrongful act has 
taken place, it is by no means self-evident to whom the wrongfulness can be attributed.”35 
The Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security under 
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, entitled 
“Regional Arrangements”, regulates the relationship between regional arrangements or agencies36 
and the UN for the settlement of local disputes. Cooperation in the area of the maintenance of 
international peace and security may take various forms, for example, the “dual key” arrangements 
between the UN and NATO in Yugoslavia37 for the authorisation of air-strikes or the establishment of 
the hybrid peacekeeping operation between the UN and the AU, UNAMID in Darfur. In the past few 
years the UN has started to enhance inter-mission cooperation by redeploying troops from one 
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peacekeeping operation to another if an urgent need arises or by authorising cross-border inter-
mission activities.38 These activities are also a reaction to the current economic climate and tight 
financial budgets.39 Private military and security contractors have also become more influential in the 
context of peacekeeping operations, being charged with important tasks as well as being involved 
even in the training and planning of UN peacekeeping operations. 40 
It is against this background that the present thesis will set out to examine the scope and content of 
the international responsibility of international organisations cooperating in matters of international 
peace and security41, especially peacekeeping operations. The approach taken and the method of 
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analysis are multipolar, focusing not on one particular organisation, but examining several and their 
interplay.   
4. Research questions of the study and methodology 
 
The central research question of the present study is whether international organisations 
cooperating in peacekeeping operations can be jointly responsible for internationally wrongful acts 
committed by peacekeeping forces. It can be divided into three main questions. The first is: Are there 
internationally wrongful acts which can be attributed to more than one international organisation? 
This involves an examination of the forms and methods of cooperation between the involved 
organisations, first, in abstracto, under the framework of the UN Charter – in particular, Chapters VII 
and VIII – as well as on an inter-organisational level. The legal framework of the UN Charter 
determines the “playing field” on which regional organisations and the UN interact in order to 
maintain international peace and security. In other words, the UN Charter assigns the general roles 
of the UN and regional organisations in this field of international law. The mechanisms and 
arrangements of cooperation as developed on an inter-institutional level further define and develop 
the role of each organisation and the framework of cooperation between the UN and regional 
organisations. They serve simultaneously as the foundation and as the interface for cooperation, in 
concreto, within a specific operation. The analysis of the attribution of conduct operates on the basis 
of an examination of the command and control arrangements in a given scenario. Therefore, any 
analysis of the attribution of conduct of acts arising in the context of international organisations 
cooperating in peacekeeping operations needs to address and examine the inter-institutional and in-
mission cooperation mechanisms existing between the UN and regional organisations. 
The attribution of conduct presupposes the violation of an international legal norm, so the second 
question concerns the applicable legal framework for peacekeeping operations. The present study 
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does not analyse the application of IHL or human rights law to specific circumstances during the 
deployment of an operation because the focus of this study does not include the application of 
primary norms to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the analysis of the applicable legal 
framework is important for two principal reasons. This being said, the analysis of the applicable legal 
framework is important for two principal reasons. First of all, it underlines the complexity of the 
application of IHL and human rights to international organisations and it also allows shedding some 
light on many specific issues whose legal regulation is not sufficiently explored yet. Secondly, the 
applicable legal framework has to be seen as part of the wider picture of a breach of an international 
obligation and it may have repercussions for the attribution of conduct. As the present study will also 
explore further legal bases for a breach of an international obligation, it may be possible that the 
United Nations and one or several organisations might be bound by different legal obligations which 
entail their responsibility under international law. 
The analysis of the applicable legal framework of this study is limited to the conduct of international 
organisations, which – in contrast to states - are not bound by international human rights and 
international humanitarian law treaties and conventions. Customary international law is less 
developed than treaty law and its application to the conduct of international organisations is 
particularly difficult for various reasons, including that most of the customary rules were developed 
on the basis of state practice alone so that they can only be applied mutatis mutandis to 
international organisations. Similar issues are raised by the application of international humanitarian 
law, particularly in the exact nature of the relationship between these two bodies of law. 
Thirdly, against the background of questions 1 and 2, one has to ask whether the Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations by the ILC, by which the current study will be principally 
guided, are appropriate for the specific context of regulating conduct of international organisations 
cooperating in peacekeeping operations or whether a sui generis regime would be more appropriate.  
As the law of responsibility has developed in the context of bilateral relations of states and the 
predominant view still adheres to the idea that cases of joint responsibility are rare, it might, indeed, 
be necessary to rely upon a lex specialis rule of attribution for the specific context of peacekeeping 
operations. 
Such an analysis is particularly relevant because of the pending accession of the EU to the European 
Convention on Human Rights which will have implications on many levels.42 It makes provision for 
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the EU to be held legally responsible and therefore will not only prompt a change in analysis in cases, 
but will also equally contribute to the elucidation and clarification of the applicable legal framework 
to international organisations. It might further encourage the implicit judicial review of acts of other 
international organisations than the EU and it will put pressure on those organisations to submit 
themselves to judicial review. Moreover, the application of another criterion for the attribution of 
conduct by the court in Strasbourg in its case-law in the context of peacekeeping operations, as well 
as the attribution of conduct by a UN authorised operation to the UN, will likewise lead to a new 
discussion of the appropriate criterion of attribution. It will also generally spark a new debate on the 
legal framework applicable to determining the responsibility of international organisations in the 
context of peacekeeping operations.43 
Furthermore, the Articles on State Responsibility and on International Responsibility of International 
Organisations provide a similar legal framework containing references to the other set of articles, but 
they both deal with cases of mutual responsibility in specific cases only. Depending on the 
cooperation arrangements and agreements between the involved international organisations, it is 
not unlikely that cases of mutual international responsibility are feasible for enforcement action 
under Chapter VIII of the Charter. According to Article 53 of the UN Charter, enforcement action can 
either occur through regional arrangements or agencies under the authority of the Security Council, 
or under regional arrangements or by regional agencies with the authorisation of the Security 
Council. These two possibilities allow for command and control by either the United Nations or by 
the respective organisation.   
 
5. Objectives and scope of the present study 
 
The study will examine the applicable legal framework for peacekeeping operations. But reaching 
beyond the legal debate, it seeks to provide practical guidance to relevant practitioners in the field. 
As peace operations operate in difficult areas, and even under conditions of armed conflict in which 
law and order break down, the violation of fundamental rights of individuals by peacekeepers is not 
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imaginary, but a simple fact.44 All evidence suggests that the cooperation between international 
organisations will increase in the future, thus also increasing the potential for the occurrence of cases 
of internationally wrongful acts which could be attributed to multiple international organisations.  
The overall objective is to arrive at conclusions which take into account the different materials, the 
specific features of individual organisations, and allow for the proposition of a reasonable 
responsibility regime for cases of cooperation of international organisations in peacekeeping 
operations, also including a point of view of de lege ferenda.   
 The study focuses on the following international organisations: the European Union (EU), the North-
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN).    
Limiting the discussion to these five organisations is for the following reasons. Firstly, it is necessary 
to find a balance between a comprehensive approach towards the issue and an in-depth analysis of 
the topic.  An analysis of all international organisations which are involved in peacekeeping activities 
risks a superficial analysis of the subject.  Secondly, some organisations are less active than others 
and thereby also less relevant for the present study. The Organisation of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), for example, has only been involved in one peacekeeping operation.45 A third factor is the 
geographic distribution of conflicts and peacekeeping operations. Africa unfortunately remains the 
continent with the highest number of conflicts and is consequently particularly interesting for the 
purposes of this study. Finally, the organisational arrangement of the different organisations is also a 
feature relevant to this study as it has a direct bearing on the existing cooperating mechanisms, and 
thereby incidentally on the law of international responsibility.  
The European Union is a supranational organisation,46  an organisation sui generis, and has been 
involved in roughly 20 military and civil operations since the implementation of the European 
Defence and Security Policy in 2003. The EU not only sends its own troops and people, but it also 
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holds a prominent role in cooperation with other organisations, particularly, for peace operations on 
the African continent.  
The African Union is, next to the European Union, a major regional organisation engaged in activities 
concerning peace and security. This is also due to the high number of conflicts on the African 
continent and it is therefore significant to this study.47 The same assumption applies to the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).   
NATO was founded as a military alliance between certain Western states and is by its mandate a 
“military” international organisation and therefore one of the major players in all matters concerning 
peace and security and peacekeeping operations.   
The comparative methodology used throughout this study has several advantages. Firstly, it allows 
the identification of similarities and differences among the legal frameworks of these organisations, 
in their relations with another, and in the cooperation arrangements during peacekeeping 
operations.  Regarding the framework of the UN Charter, the analysis is conducted both on the basis 
of Chapters VII and VIII. 48 Secondly, on the basis of these findings, it is possible to determine and to 
pinpoint the applicable legal rules of international responsibility to peacekeeping operations in the 
context of cooperation therein by international organisations.  Thirdly, general conclusions can be 
drawn, providing an outlook for the future and recommendations. 
6. Structure of the study 
 
This study is divided in six chapters and follows a top-down approach. Chapter I introduces the legal 
framework applicable under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security and for cooperation with international organisations. The argument made is that the 
compromise solution under the UN Charter between universalism and regionalism is inspiring 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. In Chapter II, the relations between the 
United Nations and NATO, the EU, the AU and ECOWAS are traced in peacekeeping and peace 
                                                          
47
 For example, between 1963 and 1998, 28 armed conflicts erupted in Africa affecting 61% of the continent’s 
population; 75 to 80 conflicts were recorded since 1945, Africa, our common destiny, Guideline Document 
(2004), 11. 
48
 It is moreover necessary because enforcement action under Chapter VII and enforcement activities under 
Chapter VIII may also be intertwined, cf., for example, Security Council Resolution 787, UN Doc. S/RES/787 
(1992), para. 12, in which it is written as follows: “Acting under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, [the Security Council] calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements 
or agencies, to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under 
the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and 





enforcement activities of the United Nations and between these organisations. This analysis allows 
for the formulation of general conclusions regarding the potential distribution of roles amongst 
international organisations as well as the consequences for responsibility arising from wrongful 
conduct. Chapter III analyses the material law applicable to military contingents deployed in 
peacekeeping operations.  
Chapter IV deals specifically with the law of international responsibility as applied to international 
organisations. It specifically analyses the compatibility of the ARIO with the scenario of international 
organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operaitons. It further refines and clarifies the 
methodology used in Chapter V which consists of various case-studies. 
Chapter V contains a comparative analysis of case-studies to ascertain and verify the findings of 
Chapters I – IV as well as developing the proposed special criterion of attribution (lex ferenda).  
Finally, Chapter VI provides the conclusions reached of the analysis in the present study, as well as 




Chapter I: Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
Activities under the United Nations Charter 
 
The architects of the United Nations Charter were  
visionary in foreseeing a world where the United Nations  
and regional organizations worked together  
to prevent, manage and resolve crises. However, it is  
hard to imagine that they could have anticipated the 
interconnected nature of the threats we face today or  
the range of cooperation between the United Nations [sic]  
regional and subregional organizations. 
 
- Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon1 
 
The central research question of this study is the question if international organisations cooperating 
in peacekeeping operations can be jointly responsible under international law. The primary 
foundation for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. In practice, however, the Security Council increasingly resorts solely to Chapter VII to 
mandate peacekeeping operations by regional organisations. This first and introductory Chapter 
therefore traces several developments within the field of collective security as established under the 
United Nations Charter. First of all and to put it into perspective, it analyses the general evolution of 
the system of collective security from the League of Nations and the Dumbarton Oaks conference to 
developments after the end of the Cold War.  
The second part introduces the concept of peacekeeping. It attempts to circumscribe peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement activities. In practice the distinction between both concepts has become 
increasingly blurred, although a distinction is essential as the following third part will illustrate. 
Depending on the qualification of an international military operation as a peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement operation, an authorisation of the Security Council for the deployment of such an 
operation may or may not be necessary. Consequently, the qualification of an international military 
operation as either a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation may also have a direct bearing 
upon the question of international responsibility.  
                                                          
1
 During the debate on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in 
maintaining international peace and security, Security Council, 7015
th
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7015 (2013), 3. 
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An analysis of practice shows that a certain division of labour between the UN and regional 
organisations with regard to the deployment of military forces is emerging as will be also highlighted 
in the second part of this Chapter. 
1.1. Cooperation under the United Nations Charter – between 
Universalism and Regionalism 
1. The emergence of international organisations and the regulation of international 
peace and security 
 
Throughout the history of mankind, peoples have cooperated for military purposes, such as, to 
defend their territory. Early incidences of these cooperation arrangements between peoples are 
evidenced by the Delian League, founded in 477 B.C., the Auld Alliance and the Catholic League in the 
Middle Ages, while more recent examples include the Triple Alliance or the Allied Powers in WWII.2 
The emergence of international organisations as independent legal entities indicates the next level of 
increased cooperation among states and it has fundamentally altered the system of international 
law.3 Beginning as permanent secretariats, with a mandate to monitor the implementation of treaty 
regimes, they have developed into fully-fledged independent international organism. States were 
increasingly confronted with global and complex challenges that transcended national borders. As a 
result it is unsurprising that cooperation between international organisations4 has been recognised 
as an important tool since the first modest steps were taken in this direction within the framework of 
the League of Nations.5 
Mechanisms for the establishment of peace and justice have also been debated in other areas of 
social science, such as philosophy for example. Kant constructed an international system based on 
the ideas of justice and reason, in which peace is not a natural condition of humanity, but rather an 
                                                          
2
 In the 12
th
 Century, P. Dubois, who was the advisor to the French King Philip the Fair suggested cooperation 
with other Christian states in matters of collective security, including the possibility of collective self-defence 
against external threats and collective enforcement measures against members of the coalition who violated 
the rules of the pact, J. P. Lorenz, Peace, Power and the United Nations. A Security System for the Twenty-First 
Century (1999), 9. See also N. Tsagourias, N. D. White, Collective Security. Theory, Law and Practice (2013), 3-5. 
3
 A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind : Towards a New Jus Gentium. General Course on 
Public International Law, Collected courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Volume 316 (2005), 12, 
274-275. 
4
 Ibid., 220. 
5
 It is important to underline that facing these problems, cooperation not only between states, but also 
between international organisations is the key to success: “It is, therefore, critical that regional organizations 
be encouraged and empowered to take actions to restore peace and security in conflicts and areas under their 
respective purview. These actions, however, cannot be viewed in isolation as many actors have a part to play in 
attaining overall global security”, Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United 
Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace 
and security, UN Doc. S/2008/186 (2008), 5, para.3. 
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ideal that must be construed. Kant can be seen as an inspiration in the establishment of the League 
of Nations, writing that  
[t]here is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge from the 
lawless condition of pure warfare. (…) [T]hey must (…) form an international state (civitas gentium), 
which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth. But since this 
is not the will of the nations, according to their present conception of international right (…) the 
positive idea of a world republic cannot be realised. If all is not to be lost, this can at best find a 




Woodrow Wilson, a pre-eminent figure in the promotion of idealism, was clearly influenced by these 
Kantian ideals when he called for the establishment of the League of Nations.7 The Covenant of the 
League of Nations stipulates in Article 21 that “[n]othing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect 
the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings 
like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.” This article, although not 
introducing a framework for cooperation, nevertheless recognises the importance of regional 
arrangements, as they existed at that period, in the area of international peace and security. It is 
significant that, at the founding of the League of Nations, no such disposition on the legitimacy of 
regional arrangements was foreseen.  
On the contrary, President Wilson was opposed to any recognition of regional organisations in the 
Covenant, declaring that “there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and 
understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.”8This characterizes 
Wilson’s general opposition to cooperation in the form of regional arrangements, and indeed it was a 
“Wilsonian tendency to identify regionalism with war-breeding competitive alliances”.9 Based on a 
centralist view of the international community, within and outside the League of Nations, this view 
                                                          
6
 I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795) in the edition of H.S. Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political 
Writings (1992), 105. 
7
 Cf. C. Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen. Grundkonzepte, Theorien und Problemfelder (2008), 14; further, J. 
Kane, ‘Democracy and world peace: the Kantian dilemma of United States foreign policy’, (2012) 66 Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, 292, 296-7, 301-4, D.-E. Khan, ‘Drafting History’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. 
Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume I (2012), 1, 2-3. 
8
 President Wilson Five Needs of Permanent Peace (September 27, 1918), Address to Public Meeting in New 
York, Opening the Fourth Liberty Loan, in A. Bushnell Hart (ed.), Selected Addresses and Public Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson (2002), 275, 279; U. Villani, Les Rapports entre l’ONU et les organisations régionales dans le 
domaine du maintien de la paix, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 290 (2001), 225, 239 ; C. 
Walter, ‘Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements. Article 52’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The 
Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume II (2012), 1429, 1435 mn. 4. 
9
 I. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations (1965), 113. 
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excluded any form of regionalism.10 In the end, it was President Wilson who gave up his opposition 
and who proposed the construction that became Article 21.11 However, the Covenant failed to define 
any of these possibilities in Article 21 and the anti-regionalist tendency of the Covenant is 
furthermore illustrated by the fact that the scope of Article 21 is limited to establishing the 
compatibility of alliances with the Covenant.12 Notwithstanding these difficulties underlying the 
opportunities for institutionalised cooperation, once incorporated into the Covenant, the League of 
Nations tolerated and supported the conclusion of regional assistance treaties.13 
2. The creation of the United Nations – regionalism vs. universalism 
 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the United Nations Charter had already envisioned the 
framework of the Charter as it exists today.14  They were concerned with the legitimacy of regional 
arrangements or organisations to deal with issues of international peace and security on an 
appropriate regional level, provided that they conformed to the legal obligations under the Charter.15 
The proposed principles further included the authorisation for the Security Council to use regional 
                                                          
10
 Another factor was the awareness that WW1 had also been provoked by the tension between two alliances 
of states, Villani, supra note 8, 225, 239 – 40. Generally on regionalism, cf. E. Griep, Regionale Organisationen 
und die Weiterentwicklung der VN-Friedenssicherung seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges (2012), 40-44. 
11
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 240. This was however, also due to domestic opposition within the Senate which 
refused to ratify the Covenant of the Society of Nations without a clause preserving the autonomy of the so-
called Monroe Doctrine, L. Boisson de Chazournes, Les relations entre organisations régionales et organisations 
universelles, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 347 (2010), 79, 160. 
12
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 241. These difficulties, which already existed during the establishment of the 
Society of Nations were an initial precursor of a difficult relationship between the Society of Nations and 
regional alliances, as rightly observed by Boisson de Chazournes: “D’un côté, en se présentant comme la 
solution exclusive pour la sécurité internationale dans l’ordre mondial, la SDN ne laissait pas d’espace à 
d’autres initiatives en matière de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. D’un autre côté, l’échec 
du système de sécurité collective de la Société (inefficacité du système de garanties de sécurité et d’imposition 
de sanctions, impossibilité d’attendre l’objectif du universalité) ne laissait qu’une option : la décentralisation du 
système de la sécurité collective”, Boisson de Chazournes, ibid., 79, 161. This limitation to a mere compliance 
clause of regional alliances with the Covenant also explains the variety of regional initiatives launched, cf. also 
Boisson de Chaournes, ibid., 162. 
13
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 242. Thus, for example, the special Security Committee created by the Conference 
on Disarmament recommended the conclusion of regional agreements of mutual assistance and a European 
pact of security. Nevertheless, a veritably efficient cooperation could never be formed as the Covenant only 
recognised regional alliances in an exemplary manner which prevented it from using these alliances for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, ibid., 242-43.  Article 21 was also only one way in which to 
remedy at least party the lack of universality of the League of Nations due to its limited circle of members, and 
there were a series of specific agreements of assistance concluded that existed – autonomously and outside of 
the League of Nations, cf. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 11, 79, 241. 
14
 For a comprehensive review of the drafting history of the United Nations, see, Khan, ‘Drafting History’, supra 
note 7, 1 – 23. 
15
 As a conclusion from the history of the Society of Nations, one can record that “une conception trop rigide de 
l’universalisme, couplée avec une attitude de mépris à l’égard du phénomène régional, n’a pas renforcé 
l’autorité de l’organisation universelle”, Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 11, 79, 163. Consequently, “les 
rédacteurs de la Charte n’ont jamais eu pour ambition d’anéantir le phénomène des ententes 
particulières/régionales”, ibid. 
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arrangements and organisations for coercive measures, and the obligation for the latter to inform 
the Security Council of enforcement measures taken. 16  
One of the most significant aspects of these propositions, which were only altered slightly before 
they became part of the United Nations Charter in Chapter VIII, is that cooperation with regional 
organisations, as well as the integration of these organisations into universal organisations, became 
legitimate;17 and therefore this integration became the norm rather than the exception. 
Nevertheless, regionalism was placed at a disadvantage by the imposed supremacy of the Security 
Council and its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Charter 
also established that the Security Council should act in the name of all members of the organisation 
while exercising its duties, so that it consequently confirms and reasserts the universalist approach 
favoured by the great powers.18 Regionalist efforts include the conclusion of the Australian-New 
Zealand Agreement 1944, which stipulated the following: 
Pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, 
the two Governments hereby declare (…) that it would be proper for Australia and New Zealand to 
assume full responsibility for policing or sharing in policing such areas in the South West and South 
Pacific as may from time to time be agreed upon.
19
 
Reacting to and rebutting of the proposals of Dumbarton Oaks, Australia proposed an amendment to 
the proposals, anticipating the propositions made approximately 5 years later in the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution. It said the following: 
Si le Conseil de sécurité ne prend pas de mesures lui-même et ne permet pas que des mesures soient 
prises en vertu d’un arrangement ou d’un mécanisme régional en vue de maintenir ou rétablir la paix 
internationale, aucune disposition de la présente Charte ne sera considérée comme abrogeant le droit 
des parties à contacter tout arrangement compatible avec la présente Charte ou d’adopter toutes 
                                                          
16
 United Nations, Documents de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur l’Organisation Internationale, San 
Francisco, 1945, Tome IV, Propositions de Dumbarton Oaks, Commentaires et Projets d’Amendements (1945), 
pp. 17 – 18. 
17
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 244. Churchill and some other realists remained unsuccessful with their idea of 
independent regional agencies for the preservation of peace, Khan, ‘Drafting History’, supra note 7, 1, 15, 
marginal number (henceforth : nm), 40. 
18
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 244. This preference was clearly visible in the conclusions drawn in a debate of the 
U.S. Senate, according to which the UN could have judged an organisation as dangerous and it could have 
prohibited the constitution of the concerned organisation as “illegal”. Furthermore, the Security Council could 
have established if the areas in which a regional organisation operates merited or did not deserve regional 
action, ibid., 246; cf. also P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Les grands secteurs d’intérêt des organisations internationales’, in R.-J. 
Dupuy (ed.), Manuel sur les organisations internationals – A Handbook on International Organizations (1998), 
563, 598-9. 
19
 Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 21 January 1944, available at: 
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vVolume/7E1F98EB7E415F0ECA256B7E001E5C8B , 
para. 15. 
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mesures paraissant justes et nécessaires pour maintenir au rétablir la paix et la sécurité 
internationales en vertu de cet arrangement.
20
  
The Latin-American countries, relying heavily on their tradition of Pan-Americanism, went a step 
further and adopted a Resolution containing the Act on Reciprocal Assistance and American 
Solidarity.21 The treaty stipulated not only the authorisation for the use of coercive measures and 
even military measures in order to defend an American state, but also to prevent an attack, 
contravening consequently Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.22 The supporters of the 
universalist approach, inter alia, the Netherlands, argued that “rien ne semble plus dangereux pour 
la paix mondiale que des groupements régionaux qui, si bonnes que soient les intentions qui les ont 
suscités, pourraient à tout moment se dresser l’un contre l’autre ou contre un Etat donné, faute 
d’une coordination appropriée.”23 
The results of the San Francisco conference can be seen either as a compromise between the 
universalist, centralist approach favoured by the great powers and the regionalist, decentralised 
approach,24 or as a clash between two opposing doctrines, the wartime Churchillian view calling for 
                                                          
20
 The documents of the conference are published in either French or English, the latter version of this 
particular volume is not available online. United Nations, Tome IV, supra note 16, Amendements aux 
Propositions de Dumbarton Oaks présentés par l’Australie, 773, 783. 
21
 Further opposition came, inter alia, from France and the Arab States, Villani, supra note 8, 225, 252. In a 
similar fashion, the Arab States created the Arab League, ibid., whose Pact stipulates in Article 6 that “In case of 
aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with 
attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council. The Council shall determine the necessary measures 
to repel this aggression.” See also for further details, Walter, ‘Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements’, supra note 
8, 1429, 1437 mn. 10 – 1438 mn. 14. 
22
 The Act says the following: “That during the war, and until the treaty recommended in Part II hereof is 
concluded, the signatories of this Act recognize that such threats and acts of aggression, as indicated in 
paragraphs Third and Fourth above, constitute an interference with the war effort of the United Nations, 
calling for such procedures, within the scope of their constitutional powers of a general nature and for war, as 
may be found necessary, including: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; 
breaking of consular relations; breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radio-telephonic relations; 
interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations; use of armed force to prevent or repel 
aggression.”, Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec), 06 March 1945, 
available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chapul.aspThere has been a debate especially since the 
attacks of  11 September 2001 whether self-defense can include “preventive measures”, the traditional 
understanding, which is based on the wording of the article, is that self-defence presupposes the existence and 
occurrence of an armed attack. The High-Level Panel accepted self-defence if “the threatened attack is 
imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate.” This notion seems, in the 
understanding of the Panel, also to include self-defence against a proximate threat. The Panel did not take a 
stance on anticipatory self-defence, but recommended that in such a case, the Security Council should be 
informed and could authorise “such action if it chooses to”, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), 54-55, 
paras. 188-191; T. M. Franck, ‘Collective Security and UN Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible’, in 
(2005-2006) 6 Chicago Journal of International Law, 597, 605-608. 
23
 United Nations, Tome IV, Suggestions du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas sur les Propositions de Dumbarton 
Oaks, supra note 16, 448, 461. 
24
 Walter, ‘Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements’, supra note 8, 1429, 1434; Griep, supra note 10, 60. 
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regional councils and the centralist Wilsonian view.25 The concessions made to the regionalist 
proponents concern primarily the peaceful settlement of disputes,26 but whereas the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals did not contain any disposition regarding a right of (collective) self-defense, the 
conference of San Francisco led to the adoption of Article 51.27 The procedure under the Charter for 
the adoption of decisions by certain organs is another element that prompted an effort towards 
regionalism. In order for states to achieve the necessary majority vote to adopt a decision in a UN 
organ, a certain number of votes have to be mobilised by states, which is easier within a group 
containing common ties.28  
The Cold War and the opposition of the two blocs in the Security Council and on the international 
stage were partly beneficial and partly detrimental for regional organisations and cooperation. 
Whereas the block construction led to the establishment of new regional organisations with the 
objective to secure the sphere of interest, as well as the creation of possible defence mechanisms 
such as NATO, the opposing veto powers in the Security Council also prevented all efforts for 
cooperation, including on a regional basis.  Consequently, the end of the Cold War also constituted a 
veritable break for international cooperation between organisations,29 but the Cold War itself – 
somewhat ironically – allowed regional organisations to emancipate themselves “from any 
                                                          
25
 Claude, supra note 9, 113. 
26
 Either by the parties under Article 33 or by regional organisations under Article 52 (2). 
27
 Under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the Security Council had, consequently, absolute authority in the area 
of the maintenance of international peace and security. The risks included that the Security Council could be 
blocked due to a veto or that it would interfere in certain geographic areas, not to mention taking too long to 
react in cases requiring urgent action, Villani, supra note 8, 225, 254. As underlined by the Turkish government, 
the immediate reaction triggered by the automatic mechanisms of regional arrangements is important as 
procedural hurdles would be disastrous for the attacked country, United Nations, Tome IV, Suggestions du 
Gouvernement Turc relativement aux propositions adoptees à la Conférence des quatres Puissances de 
Dumbarton Oaks, en vue de maintenir la Paix et la Sécurité, supra note 16, 670, 674.The insertion of Article 51 
is due to the insistence of the Latin-American and the Arab States, C. Schreuer, ‘Regionalism v. Universalism’, 
(1995) 6 European Journal of International Law, 477, 478. These states also pushed heavily for the distinction in 
the Charter between regional arrangements and organisations of collective defence leading to the inclusion of 
Chapter VIII, D. L. Tehindrazanarivelo, ‘The African Union’s Relationship with the United Nations in the 
Maintenance of Peace and Security’, in A. A. Yusuf, F. Ouguergouz (eds.), The African Union: Legal and 
Institutional Framework (2012), 375, 375; See also Claude, supra note 9, 106; C. Walter, ‘Hybrid Peacekeeping: 
Is UNAMID a new Model for Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations?’, in H. 
Hestermeyer, D. König, N. Matz-Lück et al (eds.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity. Liber Amicorum 
Rüdiger Wolfrum (2012), 1327, 1328; A. Abass, ‘Extraterritorial Collective Security: The European Union and 
Operation ARTEMIS’, in M. Trybus, N. D. White, European Security Law (2007), 134, 148-49. 
28
 M. Virally, L’Organisation Mondiale (1972), 281. The general practice of the UN has moved to achieving 
common position within a certain regional group, e.g. the EU is already based on a compromise between 
members of this group and thus, more likely, to find support in the wider round of the GA. Consensus in an 
organ of the UN – if it incorporates elements of opinion making on a regional level, can therefore be seen as a 
compromise between universalism and regionalism as well.  
29
 It is also suggested that the “failure of imperfect implementation of the security system set up by the United 
Nations was prompting some regional organizations to fill the vacuum” by changing their original aims, 
International Law Commission, Summary record of the 2755h meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2755 (2003) (Mr. 
Kateka referring to a previous remark of Mr. Brownlie), para. 59; See also, Griep, supra note 10, 30. 
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unwelcome assertion of controlling authority by the Security Council.”30  Notwithstanding the 
identification of a need for greater regional cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security its 
usefulness persisted throughout the Cold War, and particularly in the latter years of this conflict. In 
1988, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration in which it recommended that states who were 
members of regional arrangements or agencies use these mechanisms for the settlement of local 
disputes. Furthermore, significant recommendations were introduced which suggested that the 
Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General should encourage and endorse 
efforts at the regional level to prevent or remove a conflict or situation.31 
3. The end of the Cold War and the rebirth of the Security Council - what role for 
regional organisations? 
 
After the end of the Cold War32 and the apparent rejuvenation the Security Council,33 concerns arose 
on the hand that the Security Council was becoming too active, and on the other hand that it was 
being sidelined by its inability to take enforcement action on its own and, therefore having to rely on 
                                                          
30
 Claude, supra note 9, 116. However, this was often due to one of the two great powers, thus the US has 
consistently resisted the submission of the OAS under the United Nations Charter within the Security Council, 
ibid. 
31
 General Assembly, Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May 
Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field, UN Doc. 
A/RES/43/51 (1988) Annex, paras. 4, 13, 17 and 24. Interestingly, the Declaration stipulates that “States party 
to regional arrangements or members of agencies (…) should make every effort to prevent or remove local 
disputes or situations through such arrangements and agencies” (para.4). Thus, on the first look, this 
Declaration seems to enlarge the competences of regional arrangements and agencies as existing under 
Chapter VIII where the Charter only mentions “local disputes”, by borrowing the language of Chapter VI, but 
that regional arrangements and agencies can act in other circumstances than in local disputes can be inferred 
from Article 52 which states simply that the existence of such arrangements and agencies “dealing with such 
matters relating to international peace and security” is not precluded: T. Rensmann, ‘Reform’, in B. Simma, D.-
E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume I (2012), 25, 34, mn. 
30-31; 50, nm. 87 – p. 51 mn. 90. 
32
 The end of the Cold War was a turning-point in international relations, the break-up of the Soviet Union and 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact led to the creation of new states, decentralisation in an increasingly 
globalised world with other entities gaining influence and powers, such as MNCs and even NGOs. The US was 
left as the hegemonic super-power. Ethnic conflicts which were oppressed in the time of the Cold War erupted 
and the thrive for (regional) power and influence and economic prosperity by states also required ad called for 
new framework conditions for security policy on a global level, Griep, supra note 10, 26, 68-70;  W. Hummer, 
M. Schweitzer, ‘Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. Article 52’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United 
Nations. A Commentary (2002), 807, 831. 
33
 Of the 477 Chapter VII Resolutions adopted until 2009, 456 have been adopted since the end of the Cold 
War, P. Johansson, ‘The Humdrum Use of Ultimate Authority: Defining and Analysing Chapter VII Resolutions’, 
in (2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International Law, 309, 327. As noted by the Secretary-General in 2008, “[u]ntil 
1990, there were no references in Security Council resolutions to regional organizations”, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the relationship, supra note 5, 6, para. 4; A study of resolutions of the Security Council of 
1988 stated that references to regional organisations were, indeed, rare and it only cites two examples in the 
entire period since the foundation of the UN, R. Sonnenfeld, Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council 
(1988), 103-4. See also Rensmann, ‘Reform’, supra note 31, 25, 52, mn. 92. 
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the so-called “coalition of the willing”.34 The form of a coalition serves two main purposes: the 
sharing of costs and the provision of some form of legitimisation.35 The early 1990s were a period in 
which the United Nations struggled to find its identity, being as it was inhibited by the compromise in 
its Charter.  
Thus, in his Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali declared that “[t]he adversarial 
decades of the cold war made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfill”, 
continuing that  
[i]n these past months a conviction has grown among nations large and small, that an opportunity has 
been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining 
international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words 
of the Charter, ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’. This opportunity must 




In his view, there was the necessary time frame to  recommend and to push for the conclusion of the 
agreements under Article 43 of the Charter and for the provision of armed forces, assistance and 
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 C. Gray, ‘The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force: Theory and Practice’, in V. Lowe, A. Roberts, J. Welsh 
(eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War (2008), 86, 90. The SC increased its control over those 
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the use of force; seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of 
consequences which were supported by the Secretary-General in his note, Report of the High-Level Panel, 
supra note 22, 13, 85-86 Recommendation 56; Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
A/59/565 (2004), 2, para. 10. However, this effort was in vain, when the states at the UN World Summit in 2005 
were not willing to adopt these criteria. Gray, ibid., 86, 90. The General Assembly declared in the World Summit 
Outcome Resolution “[w]e reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full 
range of threats to international peace and security”, General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005), para. 79; cf. G. Abi-Saab, ‘The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative 
Forays of the Council’, in L. Boisson de Chazournes, M. Kohen (eds.), International Law and the Quest for its 
Implementation/Le droit international et la quête de sa mise en oeuvre. Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas 
(2010), 23, 26. In this context, the concepts of peacekeeping and authorisations given to coalitions of the able 
and willing were not always fully distinguishable, N. Blokker, ‘The Security Council and the Use of Force: On 
Recent Practice’, in N. Blokker, N. Schrijver (eds.), The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality. 
A Need for Change?  (2005), 1, 15. 
35
 A. J. Bellamy, P.D. Williams, ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace 
Operations’, in (2005) 29 International Security, 157 
36
 Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992), paras. 2-3; cf. also Thematic 
evaluation of cooperation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support 
and regional organizations, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc. A/65/762 (2011), 6-7, 
para. 15. The General Assembly, in its response to the report presented by the Secretary-General also 
emphasised the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements and 
agencies, but limited rather to the field of preventive diplomacy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, early-
warning and confidence-building measures, General Assembly, An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and 
related matters, UN Doc. A/RES/47/120 (1993), Preamble, I. para.4, II. para. 1, IV. Preamble. 
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facilities to the United Nations and “not only on an ad hoc but on a permanent basis.”37 This latter 
proposition did not bear fruit, but the United Nations managed to conclude “stand-by arrangements 
with member states simplifying the provision of troops to the UN.”38 But his agenda had a broader 
aim than simply to boost the capacities of the UN. Part of the vision for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in this new era was the promotion of the role of regional 
organisations. He wrote in the Agenda that “regional action as a matter of decentralization, 
delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the 
Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in 
international affairs.”39 The Secretary-General consequently took a middle course between a 
universal – a strong United Nations with its own troops at its disposal – and a regional approach  
– cooperation with regional organisations – for maintaining international peace and security. This 
approach can be seen as holistic and comprehensive, addressing the issue through various actors, 
but it also reflects the limitations of the Charter by which the United Nations is bound.  
His successor in office, Kofi Annan, took a more accentuated approach.  He argued for an increased 
involvement of regional organisations, saying that 
[a] considerable number of regional and subregional organizations are now active around the world, 
making important contributions to the stability and prosperity of their members, as well as of the 
broader international system. The United Nations and regional organizations should play 
complementary roles in facing the challenges to international peace and security.
40
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 Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, supra note 36, 12, para. 43.  
38
 A. Roberts, ‘Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History’, in V. Lowe, A. Roberts, J. Welsh et al (eds.), 
The United Nations Security Council and War (2008), 99, especially 100-105, 114; Standby-Arrangements for 
Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1994/777 (1994). 
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 Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, supra note 36, 18, para. 64. The Security Council itself issued a 
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President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25184 (1993); See also, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
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S/1995/911 (1995), 2, para. 4. Another important feature of Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda was that he questioned 
the necessity of consent (of the government of the host state) for peacekeeping operations with “potentially 
huge implications regarding what peacekeepers might be asked to do.”, K. Annan (with N. Mousavizadeh), 
Interventions. A Life in War and Peace (2012), 35. 
40
 Secretary-General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, UN Doc. 
A/59/2005 (2005), 52, para. 213. The very same idea is put forward also in Security Council Resolution 1809, 
UN Doc. S/RES/1809 (2008), para. 9. A similar view was expressed by the Security Council in its resolution 1631, 
Security Council Resolution 1631, UN Doc. S/RES/1631 (2005), preamble. Cf also General Assembly, Declaration 
on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in 
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, UN Doc. A/RES/49/57 (1994) Annex. The advantages of 
cooperating with regional organisations were further stressed by the report of the Secretary-General on the 
relationship between the UN and regional organisations: ”There are compelling underlying reasons to 
encourage and support the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping. These include their proximity to the 
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Chapter I: Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Activities under the UN Charter 
26 
 
This idea of a geographic and multipolar distribution of responsibility concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security is not new. Churchill advocated strongly for “a collective security 
system organized around several geographic regions, which would have resulted in a multi-polar 
infrastructure for dealing with threats to international peace and security.”41 
However, Kofi Annan went even further in his report, entitled In larger freedom, in which he said 
clearly that  “the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking 
system of peacekeeping activities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional 
organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships.”42 Consequently, an argument is made for 
synergy between peacekeeping activities, which are based on ad hoc agreements, and cooperation 
with regional organisations.43 This approach conflates the previously proposed standing United 
                                                          
organizations have a keen interest in resolving crises that erupt in their backyard. Nevertheless, regional 
organizations may be caught up in and made less effective because of the complex dynamics of regional 
conflicts. They may also lack substantive political and diplomatic leverage, and/or economic and military 
capacities, to successfully address peace and security challenges, especially in conflicts involving multiple 
stakeholders within and outside the region.”, Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship, supra note 5, 
7, para.9. In another report, he expressed himself similarly “[t]he scope for optimizing the resources and 
stimulating the political will of the international community in serving peace and security through an effective 
operational partnership between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations is vast; and 
the time is also ripe. That is why we agreed upon the vision of a regional-global security partnership at the fifth 
high-level meeting. (…) Overall, it means that the international community stands to benefit in the 
maintenance of peace and security from a balance between the intimate knowledge of a conflict situation 
possessed by a regional organization and the global legitimacy and authority of the Security Council. More 
specifically, it might mean two things. First, that the global security mechanism of the future rests on a 
balanced distribution of capacity and resources across all regions around the world. This will relieve certain 
regions and alliances of the burden they face at present, financial and human, and the risks they confront, 
political and military, in undertaking the principal responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Secondly, 
the Security Council must always retain primary responsibility for that task, but, within that context, it should 
be able to rely upon, and should seek, a willing and capable subsidiary role on the part of regional and other 
intergovernmental organizations in peace and security from every region of the world, without exception.”, A 
regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. 
A/61/204–S/2006/590 (2006), 18, paras. 87-88. 
41
 D. Doktori, ‘Minding the Gap: International Law and Regional Enforcement in Sierra Leone’, (2008) 20 Florida 
Journal of International Law, 329, 330 
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 Secretary-General, In larger freedom, supra note 40, 31, para. 112. One has to note in this context that 
question whether final decisions concerning peace and security are taken on a universal or rather a regional 
level was a source of controversy during the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the League of 
Nations as well as during the San Francisco conference in 1945, Hummer, Schweitzer, ‘Chapter VIII: Regional 
Arrangements. Article 52’, supra note 32, 807, 813 – 15; the rising acknowledgment of relations between the 
UN and regional organisations is also witnessed in another, later report of the Secretary-General, where it is 
said “[w]ith the increase in the interface and synergies between the United Nations and regional organizations, 
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multilateralism is necessary and feasible.”, Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship, supra note 5, 1. 
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 Another argument submitted is that regarding the complexity of attributed tasks to international forces and 
the insufficient means they have at their disposal; indeed, it became difficult for states to carry out the new 
multidimensional operations, which led the Security Council to authorise member states or international 
organisations to come to the help of UN forces, R. Kolb, G. Porretto, S. Vité, L’application du droit international 
humanitaire et des droits de l’homme aux organisations internationales. Forces de paix et administrations 
civiles transitoires (2005), 39. 
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Nations forces, on the basis of agreements concluded under Article 43 of the UN Charter, with the 
practice and structure of peacekeeping as developed in practice throughout the existence of the 
United Nations, and the cooperation with regional organisations. A clear expression of this policy can 
also be found in the Report of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the relationship between the 
United Nations and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.44  
He points out that  
[t]he past decade has witnessed a strengthened relationship, at different levels, between the United 
Nations and regional organizations. Resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Security 
Council signal a deepening recognition of the growing role and influence of regional organizations in 
international peace and security (…) This has yielded interesting perspectives and fruitful cooperation 
between the United Nations and regional organizations. It is, therefore, critical that regional 
organizations be encouraged and empowered to take actions to restore peace and security in conflicts 
and areas under their respective purview. These actions, however, cannot be viewed in isolation as 
many actors have a part to play in attaining overall global security.
45
 
The proposition of the conclusion of agreements under Article 43 and the vision of standing United 
Nations forces with enforcement capacity failed to receive the necessary support by states. As 
Higgins says   
it remains baffling that (…) the Secretary-General (…) suggest[ed] that the UN should establish a rapid 
reaction force (..), when the establishment of what he terms ‘the Security Council’s strategic reserve’ 
required exactly all those commitments of political will that the member states are so manifestly 
unwilling to make.
46  
This lack of will by states was unsurprising, as states have started to rely on regional organisations 
with their more advanced military capabilities for peace-keeping and peace enforcement purposes 
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 This holistic approach is still valid for the relations of the United Nations with regional organisations, see, 
infra 1.3, 1.6. – 1.9. 
45
 Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship, supra note 5, 5, para. 3. Contrary, “[u]ntil 1990, there 
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 R. Higgins, ‘Peace and Security Achievements and Failures’, in (1995) 6 European Journal of International 
Law, 445, 451. The Security Council also reacted to Boutros-Ghali’s Proposal for UN Rapid Reaction Force for 
Peacekeeping Operations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
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(infra. 1.2). In this context, the High-level Panel report welcomed the decision of the European Union 
“to establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions that can reinforce United Nations 
missions” and also mentioned the African Union favourably.47 Arguably, one can speak of the 
establishment of standing UN forces through “outsourcing” to regional organisations which might 
have united proponents of regional organisations and supporters of standing UN forces. The Panel 
also recognised that “in recent years, decisions to authorize military force for the purpose of 
enforcing the peace have primarily fallen to multinational forces” and that  
there has been a trend towards a variety of regional- and sub-regional based peacekeeping missions 
(…) [which] poses a challenge for the Security Council to work closely with each other and mutually 
support each other’s efforts to keep the peace and ensure that regional operations are accountable to 
universally accepted human rights standards.
48 
Boutros-Ghali’s proposal was thus abandoned in favour of more modest ideas and cumulative 
ameliorations, including regional initiatives.49  Consequently, throughout the 1990s the United 
Nations remained unable to deploy forces quickly and effectively on the ground. The Brahimi Report 
stated clearly that “few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly 
acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace 
operation in the future.” It also highlighted other arguments brought forward by Member States 
against standing UN forces, stating that  
[m]any Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or 
police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of 
financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from 
undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted 
specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations 
cannot deploy operations “rapidly and effectively” within the timelines suggested.
50
  
The increased support for regional organisations by Member States was interconnected with 
traditional troop contributors decreasing their support to peacekeeping operations.51 This 
                                                          
47
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development was more initiated by the end of the Cold War and the omission of the conflict 
between the West and the East than by the report of the Secretary-General and his plea.   
Whereas the Charter preserves a compromise between a universalist and regionalist approach 
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the practice of the 1990s 
demonstrates that this task could not be fulfilled differently than through a multilateral, 
decentralised construction in which the Security Council acts primarily as the authorising entity. In 
the new era of cooperation with regional organisations there are new problems and challenges to 
face which necessitate a professional, concerted approach to peacekeeping. The Secretary-General 
said frankly that ”the real challenge for the Security Council is to replace the improvised, at times 
selected, resource-skewed approach with more planned, consistent and reliable arrangements.“52  
The different organisations introduced in this part are all, in one way, sui generis organisations, as 
they were all created under different political circumstances and considerations and with an 
individual legal framework.  This part focused on the framework as well as on the development of 
the broader area of maintenance of international peace and security by the United Nations and 
regional organisations. Thus, the effect of these developments on the applicable legal framework for 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations as well as in practice (infra 1.2., 1.3), and in the 
legal framework applicable in the domain of cooperation between the United Nations and regional 
organisations (infra 1.3), are analysed in the following parts. Chapter II will then focus exclusively on 
the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, and will in particular trace 
the developments since the beginning of this millennium.   
1.2. The legal framework of peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations – Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter 
 
Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter set out the legal framework applicable to the 
peaceful settlement of disputes as well as to action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace and acts of aggression. The United Nations Charter, which was drafted after the atrocities 
of the Second World War, was also conceived with the intention “to save succeeding generations 
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from the scourge of war, which twice in our life has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”53 In order to 
achieve this goal, the drafters of the United Nations Charter, firstly, laid down the prohibition of the 
unilateral use of force by states which is stipulated in Article 2 (4) and, secondly, centralised the 
control of the use of force under the Security Council through Chapter VII of the Charter.54  
The blockade within the Security Council during the Cold War led to the failure of the 
implementation of the agreements under Article 43 (cf., infra 1.1.).55  Nevertheless, “the UN system 
proved sufficiently flexible to allow the Security Council to take force measures not expressly 
provided for in the Charter.”56 As the Security Council could not order the use of force using its own 
standing army, it resorted to either “authorising” or “calling upon” Member States to use force.57 The 
establishment of the concept of peacekeeping was therefore a reaction to both the blockade in the 
Security Council and the lack of agreements under Article 43, “even though there was no express 
basis for peacekeeping operations in the Charter scheme.”58  
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Force’, supra note 34, 86, 86. 
55
 Virally, supra note 28, 469-70 ; Gray, supra note 54, 254; N. Krisch, ‘Chapter VII Action with Respect to 
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Introduction to Chapter VII: The General 
Framework’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. 
Volume II (2012), 1237, 1241 mn. 7.  Another reason was more generally the lack of the possibility to reach 
unanimity of the permament members, M. Bothe, ‘Peacekeeping’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. 
(eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume I (2012), 1171, 1175 mn. 2; General 
Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, 48
th
 meeting, UN Doc. A/49/PV.48 (1994), statement of Malaysia, 6. 
56
 Gray, ‘The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force’, supra note 34, 86, 88. As the first Secretary-General of 
the UN Trygve Lie, noted in his memoirs: “During the spring of 1948, when it was already evident that there 
would be no possibility of implementing Article 43 in the foreseeable future, I cast about with my advisers for a 
new approach that might provide the Security Council with some sort of armed force. The outbreak of 
hostilities in Palestine gave urgency to such thinking, and after much consideration I decided on at least floating 
a trial balloon for the idea of a small internationally recruited force which could be placed by the Secretary-
General at the disposal of the Security Council”, T. Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United 
Nations (1954), 98. Generally regarding UN standing forces, see, Roberts, ‘Proposals for UN Standing Forces’, 
supra note 38, 99 – 130. 
57
 Gray, ‘The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force, supra note 34, 86, 88. 
58
 Ibid. 86, 88. The Legality of Peacekeeping Operations was confirmed in the Certain Expenses Case by the ICJ 
and is now not disputed. The very same reasoning should apply for authorisations of peace enforcement 
operations and it is now widely accepted. Furthermore, it is supported by UN practice N. Krisch, ‘Article 42’, in 
B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume II (2012), 
1330, 1337 mn. 11; N. Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security 
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”’, in (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law, 541, 547-49; E. de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council 
(2004), 260-63; T. M. Franck, Recourse to Force. State Action Against Threats and Armed Attack (2002), 24-31; 
A. Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (2011), 223-26; against, i.e. B. H. Weston, ‘Security Council Resolution 678 
and Persian Gulf Decision-Making: Precarious Legitimacy’, in (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law, 
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Throughout its existence, the Security Council has relied only on the determination of a situation as a 
“threat to international peace and security” or sometimes a “breach of the peace” as the trigger for 
the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. 59 The term “threat to the peace” in particular involves 
wide powers of discretion as  
il s’agit en effet d’une hypothèse très vague et élastique qui, contrairement à l’agression et à la rupture de 
la paix, n’est pas nécessairement caractérisée par des opérations militaires ou en tout cas impliquant 




A determination of an act of aggression would also entail the responsibility of the aggressor state 
under international law, and even individual criminal responsibility61 and both reasons explain the  
political preference of the Security Council to rely on the concept of a “threat to the peace” to 
mandate peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. 
1. The evolution and definition of peacekeeping – peacekeeping vs. peace 
enforcement 
 
An analysis of peace-keeping operations necessitates a definition of peacekeeping and an exploration 
of its origin.62 There is no comprehensive definition of peacekeeping which would comprise all 
operations and functions exercised within an operation, as each operation has its specific mandate 
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and nature,63 despite good arguments made for such an agreed definition.64 Likewise, there has been 
an evolution in the conceptual understanding, as well as in the organisational implementation, of 
peacekeeping operations since the creation of the first mission.65 According to the United Nations 
itself, peacekeeping operations are, 
[o]perations involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the 
United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. 
These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation (…) [achieving] their 




Peacekeeping operations can be separated into two broad categories; “observer missions which 
consist largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed and peace-keeping forces, which 
consist of lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements.”67 Peacekeeping 
operations are traditionally based on the principles of consent of the host-state, neutrality, 
impartiality of the force and non-intervention in the state’s internal affairs and the non-use of force, 
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peacekeeping and related terms.”, A. Gillman, W. Johnson (eds.), Operational Law  Handbook, The Judge 
Advocate General’s Legal Center & School (2012), 56, para. III A. For a general overview, cf. M. W. Doyle, N. 
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except in cases of self-defense.68 Consent of the host-state is necessary as long as the peacekeeping 
mission is not established under Chapter VII of the Charter.69  
Traditionally, the major difference from peace enforcement operations is that the right to the use of 
force is limited to self-defense.70  Some confusion has been inserted by the use of certain 
terminology such as “robust” or “muscled or muscular peacekeeping”. The High-Level Panel gave a 
very good definition of the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement which is 
noteworthy here:   
[The] Discussion of the necessary capacities has been confused by the tendency to refer to peacekeeping 
missions as “Chapter VI operations” and peace enforcement missions as “Chapter VII operations” – 
meaning consent-based or coercion-based, respectively. This shorthand is often also used to distinguish 
missions that do not involve the use of deadly force for purposes other than self-defence, and those that 
do.  
Both characterizations are to some extent misleading. There is a distinction between operations in which 
the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset (e.g., responses to cross-border invasions 
or an explosion of violence, in which the recent practice has been to mandate multinational forces) and 
operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be needed at all (e.g. traditional 
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peacekeeping missions monitoring and verifying a ceasefire or those assisting in implementing peace 
agreements, where blue helmets are still the norm). 
But both kinds of operations need the authorization of the Security Council (Article 51 self-defence cases 
apart), and in peacekeeping cases as much as in peace-enforcement cases it is now the usual practice for a 
Chapter VII mandate to be given (even if that is not always welcomed by troop contributors). This is on 
the basis that even the most benign environment can turn sour – when spoilers emerge to undermine a 
peace agreement and put civilians at risk – and that it is desirable for there to be complete certainty about 
the mission’s capacity to respond with force, if necessary. On the other hand, the difference between 
Chapter VI and VII mandates can be exaggerated: there is little doubt that peacekeeping missions 
operating under Chapter VI (and thus operating without enforcement powers) have the right to use force 




Self-defence in peacekeeping operations covers both cases of individual and collective self-defence 
and may also include “resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its 
duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”72 The right of collective self-defence in the 
peacekeeping context could also serve to delimit peacekeeping from peace enforcement operations. 
Should it be raised as an argument by a state, it indicates – albeit implicitly – that this given 
operation is to be considered as a peacekeeping operation.  
2. Peacekeeping post-Cold War – The ambiguous practice of the Security Council:  
blurring the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
 
The end of the Cold War and the new possibilities for action by the Security Council transformed 
peace-keeping as it had been conceived up until then. As Kofi Annan wrote:  
Only with the end of the Cold War did the proliferation in peacekeeping really begin (…) In these changed 
circumstances, the principles and practices which had evolved in the Cold War period suddenly seemed 
needlessly self-limiting. Within and outside the UN, there is now increasing support for peacekeeping with 
teeth. When lightly-armed peacekeepers were made to look helpless in Somalia and Bosnia, member 
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states and public opinion supported more muscular action; an increasing number of situations seem to 
require it, and the Charter of the United Nations provides the legal authority for it.”73 
In addition to “peacekeeping with teeth”, post 1990 peacekeeping operations were often complex 
and multidisciplinary, including “civilian police, electoral personnel, human rights experts (…) 
involving nothing less than the reconstruction of an entire society and state.”74 The multiplication of 
tasks was attended by a more extensive interpretation of the right to use force in self-defence, 
especially in the so-called “third-generation peacekeeping operations”, allowing the use of force 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations for other specified purposes than self-defence.75  It can also 
be argued that the penetration of international law by human rights law has contributed to the 
changing nature of peacekeeping operations.76 This increasing complexity and the increasing 
demands on a peacekeeping operation and peacekeepers since the end of the Cold War have led to 
missions blurring the previously comparatively clear line between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement;77 indeed, in this vein, one author refers to these operations as “militarised 
peacekeeping” operations.78 Gray specifically mentions the cases of Yugoslavia and Somalia when 
peacekeeping forces were endowed with functions that went beyond the concept of peacekeeping 
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as it had been previously understood.79 However, even during the Cold War, the essential 
characteristics of traditional peacekeeping, such as consent, impartiality, neutrality and the use of 
force being limited to self-defence, were stretched or ignored when the Security Council acted as it 
saw fit: “[I]nvolvement of the United Nations in internal conflicts made the strict adherence to these 
characteristics less feasible and less compatible with the Council’s objectives in various situations.”80 
The vague language of mandates prescribed by the Security Council in particular peacekeeping 
operations does not shed light upon the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
as well.81 While, on the one hand, this practice might be appropriate and necessary to allow the 
troops to react to unforeseen circumstances, on the other hand, it simultaneously further obscures 
the vital difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.  
This practice is also dubious as it might have a direct impact on the question of international 
responsibility. Convoluted and vague mandates without clear and defined roles for the involved 
actors may lead to the authorising entity being considered as responsible for violations of 
international law. The application of substantive law to peacekeeping forces is also affected. These 
unclear mandates impede a determination as to whether international humanitarian law is 
applicable to a peacekeeping operation.82 This being the case, peacekeepers would fall under the 
regime of international humanitarian law, would be bound by these rules and could be attacked from 
the moment of their participation as combatants.83 
Yet another aggravating factor is that whereas traditional operations were often regarded as being 
established under Chapter VI rather than under Chapter VII, the new tasks also mean that the 
Security Council is now relying exclusively on Chapter VII for mandating purposes. 84 Some criticism 
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has been made which suggests that the Security Council is now also blurring the distinction between 
Chapters VII and Chapters VIII and, indeed, there are resolutions which cannot be fitted either into 
the category of peacekeeping or peace enforcement nor be considered as mandated under Chapter 
VII or Chapter VIII:  
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, (…) authorizes Member States participating 
in the ECOWAS forces in accordance with Chapter VIII together with the French forces supporting them to 
take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to 
ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the 
protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation, 
using the means available to them, for a period of six months after which the Council will assess the 
situation on the basis of the reports referred to in paragraph 10 below and decide whether to renew this 
authorization.85 
These developments all increase the complexity and the difficulty in legally analysing the 
phenomenon of peacekeeping operations in the context of the United Nations,86 a phenomenon 
which exists only in unwritten law.87 In addition, this particular cited example illustrates that the 
practice of the Security Council is also problematic with regard to the application of Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter.88 Moreover, they conflate the established practice of the Security Council, which 
distinguished between peacekeeping operations under United Nations command and control, and 
enforcement action or peace enforcement operations as authorised by groups of states or regional 
organisations.89 
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As such, it is not very surprising that, in practice, there has been a great deal of criticism from 
within90 and outside the United Nations regarding these ambiguous, ambivalent, and unclear 
mandates handed out by the Security Council which blur the difference between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement. 
A better criterion to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations would be 
“consent of the host-state”; an operation based on consent is not – per se – violating international 
law, whereas an operation without consent of the host-state is justified by the power and authority 
of the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. The lack of consent would thereby be an 
indicator that the operation holds an enforcement character. Nevertheless, the practice of the 
Security Council is not absolutely consistent and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the Security 
Council acknowledged that in some cases the consent of all parties to the conflict might not be 
necessary.91   
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3. Lessons learned from Bosnia and Somalia; the restoration of traditional UN 
Peacekeeping 
 
As mentioned previously, (infra 1.1), plans to activate the mechanisms foreseen under Article 43 of 
the Charter and the establishment of United Nations standby forces failed and, in contrast, 
cooperation among regional organisations was strengthened. This development has also to be set 
against the background of United Nations operations in Somalia and Yugoslavia, which led to major 
criticism and a crisis in United Nations peacekeeping. The slaughters in Somalia as well as the 
massacre at Srebrenica gave rise to the question as to why the United Nations had not acted to 
prevent these atrocities from happening. Criticism fell upon the lack of an imperative mandate to 
allow peacekeepers to react with force, as well as a lack of equipment. Higgins, referring to Bosnia 
and the mandate of UNPROFOR, stated that peacekeepers were put in a place, with a mandate to 
deliver humanitarian aid and therefore “all realistic prospect of ‘enforcing the peace’ has [sic] gone. 
The enforcement of the peace of the victims of violations of Article 2(4) had already effectively been 
put aside by this selection of method of UN operation.”92 In fact, the United Nations troops found 
themselves in a highly adversarial environment and partly engaged in activities going beyond 
peacekeeping.  Tharoor explains that these activities included, inter alia, the establishment of “no-fly 
zones” and “safe areas”, punitive actions against warlords, “acquiescence in NATO declared 
‘exclusion zones”, and “peacekeepers mount[ing] anti-sniping patrols and call[ing] in air strikes.”93 
The reaction within the United Nations was a readjustment of the policy by the Secretary-General 
and the return to more traditional peace-keeping operations regarding the use of force. It is worth 
quoting from the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: 
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The United Nations can be proud of the speed with which peace-keeping has evolved in response to the 
new political environment resulting from the end of the cold war, but the last few years have confirmed 
that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping are essential to its success.  Three particularly 
important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-
defence.  Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were 
respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not.   
 
There are three aspects of recent mandates that, in particular, have led peace-keeping operations to 
forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was perceived to be partial and/or to use force 
other than in self-defence.  These have been the tasks of protecting humanitarian operations during 
continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to 
achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept.  The cases of Somalia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are instructive in this respect.   
 
In both cases, existing peace-keeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of 
force and therefore could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, 
impartiality and the non-use of force.  It was also not possible for them to be executed without much 
stronger military capabilities than had been made available, as is the case in the former Yugoslavia.  In 
reality, nothing is more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its 
existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so.  The logic 
of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of 
enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-
keeping is intended to facilitate.  To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of 
the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel.
94
  
This return to the traditional values of peacekeeping was welcomed by both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council.95 Consequently, these policy intentions led the Security Council to further 
institutionalise relations with regional organisations96, establishing a general division of labour 
insofar as the Council would mandate regional organisations to conduct operations which take the 
nature of enforcement operations.97 Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations have kept their 
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integrated structures and mandates covering all different kinds of areas and many potential conduits 
for problems to arise. The problem of imprecise mandates has only been displaced by this shift of 
practice by the Security Council from UN operations to UN-mandated operations.98 The recent 
practice of the Security Council underlines the clear separation between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. Reacting to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis and activities of armed groups 
in the DRC, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013 in which it  
decides that MONUSCO shall, for an initial period of one year and within the authorized troop ceiling 
of 19,815, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed 
principles of peacekeeping, include an “Intervention Brigade” consisting inter alia of three infantry 
battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in 
Goma, under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of 
neutralizing armed groups as set out in paragraph 12 (b) below and the objective of contributing to 
reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and 
to make space for stabilization activities
99
 [Emphasis added]. 
                                                          
division of labour between the UN and other actors involved in peace operations has emerged.”, K. E. Sams, 
‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations Involved in International Missions’, in M. 
Odello, R. Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (2011), 45, 49; In other 
words, member states also preferred acting through regional organisations and alliance for the implementation 
of post—Westphalian peacekeeping operations, T. F. Weber, Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Vereinten 
Nationen und Regionalen Organisationen bei Peacekeeping-Einsätzen: Interessengegensätze und ihr 
Management (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Co-Deployment) (2007), 5. 
98
 Kritsiotis suggests that Operation Alba in Albania falls also under this “new concept of peace-keeping, which 
involves a mutation between traditional peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations.”, D. Kritsiotis, 
‘Security Council Resolution 1101 (1997) and the Multinational Protection Force of Operation Alba in Albania’, 
in (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law, 511, 538-39;  Cf. also Dinstein, supra note 58, 309. It should be 
noted, however, that the resolution contained only an authorisation for a multinational operation, but that it 
was not per se a United Nations operation, Security Council Resolution 1101, UN Doc. S/RES/1101 (1997), 
paras. 3, 8-9. 
99
 Security Council Resolution 2098, UN Doc. S/RES/2098 (2013), para.9. The very same formulated as 
highlighted was reiterated in Security Council Resolution 2147, UN Doc. S/RES/2147 (2014), 5, para. 1.  Para. 12 
(b) of Resolution 2098 reads as follows: “In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information 
collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during 
and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade 
referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, 
highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international 
humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to 
prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute 
to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern 
DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.” [Emphasis added] See also the statement of the Russian 
Federation following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2100 on Mali, Security Council, 6952
nd 
meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6952 (2013), 2.  While renewing and modifying the mandate of UNAMID, the Security 
Council followed along the lines of the mandate of MONOSCU and encouraged “UNAMID to move to a more 
preventive and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defence of its mandate (…) without 
prejudice to the agreed basic principles of peacekeeping”, Security Council Resolution 2148, UN Doc. 
S/RES/2148 (2014), 4, para. 9. 
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Although the Resolution emphasises the exceptional character of this extension of the mandate, it 
nevertheless proves again that the threshold between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is 
marginal at most100 and that the application of international humanitarian law is independent from 
the classification as a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, and is rather based on factual 
circumstances.101 The preparatory report by the Secretary-General for a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in Mali likewise adopts a traditional understanding of peacekeeping: 
At the same time, it is critical that a clear distinction be maintained between the core peacekeeping tasks 
of an envisaged United Nations stabilization mission and the peace enforcement and counter-terrorism 
activities of the parallel force that will necessarily need to be established to preserve the hard-won 
security gains achieved so far. Any blurring of this distinction would place severe constraints on the ability 
of United Nations humanitarian, development and human rights personnel to safely do their work. If this 
were to happen, the United Nations would find it difficult to mount the kind of comprehensive system-
wide response required to address the political, social and economic root causes of the multifaceted crisis 
in Mali
102
 [Emphasis added]. 
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 The mandate is congruent with the definition of peace enforcement given in the Peace Support Operations 
Doctrine of the AU which defines these operations as follows: “They are coercive in nature and are conducted 
when the consent of all parties has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or 
re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. (…) It is important to emphasise that the aim 
of the PE operation will not be the defeat or destruction of factions or belligerents, but rather to compel, coerce 
and persuade the parties to comply with a particular course of action, i.e. to desist from abusing the basic right 
to life and dignity, and to support the peace process (…) the long term demands of peace will require that 
coercive techniques are used with restraint and in conjunction with other techniques designed to promote co-
operation and consent (…) the military component must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed to 
enforce compliance whilst also conducting a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign and providing support to the longer-
term peace building process. Should the conflicting parties not be deterred or persuaded and fail to comply with 
the mandate, the military component must be able to react in an appropriate manner, based upon ROE 
compatible with mission accomplishment ”[Emphasis added], Headquarters of the African Union, supra note 
68, Chapter 3, 3-6, paras. 13-14. The statement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the 
DRC and Head of MONUSCO, Mr. Martin Kobler, before the Security Council also suggests strongly that it is a 
peace enforcement operation. He said that “[w]e have been able to conduct more robust military operations. 
We have made it clear that there would be no cohabitation with armed groups – any of them. Our position is 
clear. We are in the [DRC] not to react, but to act, we are there not to deter, but to prevent (…) all armed 
groups are aware now that we have the will and means to take robust action at any time (…) Our rules of 
engagement are clear. Our mandate is clear. Our determination is clear”, Security Council, 7094
th
 meeting, UN 
Doc. S/PV.7094 (2014), 3. See also his Statement in Security Council 7137
th
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7137 (2014), 
particularly p. 3. 
101
 Paragraph 12 (b) of Security Council Resolution 2098 does not only refer specifically to compliance with 
international humanitarian law but also speaks of steps normally taken as preparatory steps in military 
operations before an assault such as information collation and analysis, precautions to protect civilians. The 
most interesting fact is, however, that – following this Resolution – self-defence in the meaning of defence of 
the mandate can now include fully-scaled military operations to which IHL applies. 
102
 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2013/189 (2013), 19, para.100; Also 
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2013/338 (2013), 18, para.83. 
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This quote is also particularly relevant as it highlights the professionalisation103 and diversification 
that has taken place in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War.  Part of this development has 
been economy-driven due to the lack of sufficient funds by the United Nations and the holding back 
of payments by certain states.104 The UN has also developed extensive financial and accountability 
mechanisms for its activities which have contributed further to the professionalisation of 
peacekeeping.105 Notwithstanding, it cannot be emphasised enough how important it is that the 
Security Council adopts resolutions with precise mandates.106 Problems can also arise if the mandate 
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 Since 2007 the UN relies on its Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) as part of the wider 
‘Peacekeeping 2010’ reform. The IMPP provides a coherent and unified framework for the planning of all 
multidimensional UN operations covering three stages: advance planning (pre-mission planning), operational 
planning after authorisation by the SC, review and transition planning. In the advance stage, the Integrated 
Mission Task Force (IMTF) relies also on In-country planning and consultation with regional and other actors 
and partners, S. Wiharta, ‘Planning and deploying peace operations’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, 97,  98, 102. 
104
 As the New Horizon Report states: 
“This new phase may help create the necessary space to realize difficult but all-important transformations 
required to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping. This includes putting into practice 
a new strategy for field support, shifting peacekeeping toward a more capability-driven approach, and 
bolstering systems for identifying and sustaining the range of – often highly specialized – capabilities required 
to implement complex peacekeeping mandates. In this context, it is hoped that advances in the New Horizon 
reform agenda thus far will give greater opportunity to broaden the contributing base for UN peacekeeping. 
The evolving environment also gives impetus for progress in the areas of transition planning, national capacity-
building, oversight and benchmarking to help increase synergies among peacekeepers and other peacebuilding 
actors and to better prepare peacekeeping missions from the outset to build the foundation for transition to 
longer-term peace consolidation and development. While taking into account the risks that increased pressure 
for cost-savings may bring to the reform efforts and the realities of the global financial situation, the Secretariat 
will continue to propose effective and efficient means of matching resources to mandated tasks to ensure that 
the investment in peacekeeping is financially sound and contributes to the long-term sustainability of peace.” 
[Emphasis added], Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, The New 
Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1 (October 2010), 20-21. 
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 See e.g. Budget for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for the 
period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions, UN Doc. A/68/653 (2013), 4, para.17; 5, para.19 and especially 6, para.22 – p. 8, para.29. 
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 The difficulty of a precise delimitation can also be due to a certain ambiguity of the mandate of the 
operation, Villani, supra note 8, 225, 398. Security Council Resolution 501, for instance, defined self-defense for 
the purpose of the operation as follows “self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means 
to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council”, Security Council 
Resolution 501 (1982), para. 3 (d). A deterioration of the security situation might equally call for an adjustment 
of the mandate, including enforcement measures (ibid., 398). The Brahimi Report elaborates upon this matter 
in the following way: “The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in 
self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the 
context of modern peace operations dealing with intra- State/transnational conflicts, consent may be 
manipulated in many ways by the local parties. A party may give its consent to United Nations presence merely 
to gain time to retool its fighting forces and withdraw consent when the peacekeeping operation no longer 
serves its interests. A party may seek to limit an operation’s freedom of movement, adopt a policy of persistent 
non-compliance with the provisions of an agreement or withdraw its consent altogether. Moreover, regardless 
of faction leaders’ commitment to the peace, fighting forces may simply be under much looser control than the 
conventional armies with which traditional peacekeepers work, and such forces may split into factions whose 
existence and implications were not contemplated in the peace agreement under the colour of which the 
United Nations mission operates.”, Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, supra note 50, para.48. See also 
Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations 
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of an operation has to be changed depending on the situation on the ground.107 The UN operation in 
Sierra Leone started as a 70 strong observer mission (UNOMSIL). After the failure of the peace 
agreement, the Council authorised the deployment of more than 17,000 troops with a robust 
mandate adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, deploying a completely different operation on 
the ground (UNAMSIL).108 The debate in the Security Council in June 2014 on new trends in UN 
peacekeeping illustrates, however, that the issue of peacekeeping operations with more of a peace 
enforcement mandate is not yet settled.109  
                                                          
peacekeeping operations, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc. A/68/787 (2014), 11-12, 
para. 28. 
107
 Verdirame states that the change of mandate is problematic if it is combined with an ambiguous mandate 
that produces confusion, uncertainty of interpretation and also leads to a tension between the operation and 
the political command of the operation Verdirame, supra note 86, 198; R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: 
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (2004), 233-38. 
108
 For UNOMSIL, Security Council Resolution 1181, UN Doc. S/RES/1181 (1998), for UNAMSIL, Security Council 
Resolution 1270, UN Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999) and Security Council Resolution 1289, UN Doc. S/RES/1289 
(2000).  
109
 The concept note prepared for the Council under the Russian presidency points out – while referring to Mali 
and the DRC – that these “new circumstances of United Nations Peacekeeping” may not be in full conformity 
with, and even contrary to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping; so far the UN was only able to adopt a 
“fragmented approach” towards “trends that are gaining momentum”, United Nations peacekeeping 
operations: new trends, Concept note, Annex to the letter dated 1 June 2014 from the Permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
A/68/899–S/2014/384 (2014), 3, para. 1. In the ensuing discussion in the Council, it became obvious that the 
opinion of members is split. The Secretary-General himself called Resolution 2098 for MONUSCO “a milestone” 
as an expression of the resolve of the Council to address the changing nature of conflicts and peacekeeping 
operations, Security Council 7196th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7196 (2014), 3. Rwanda (ibid., 3), France (ibid., 9), 
the UK (ibid., 12), the USA (ibid., 19), Jordan (ibid., 16-18) and the EU (ibid., 30) are not opposed to similar 
future mandates for other operations on the basis of a variety of arguments. France and the USA consider the 
mandates to be effective and they emphasise the need to protect civilians which for the latter is also a “moral 
imperative”. In similar fashion, the EU sees MONUSCO as an example that “peace enforcement where 
necessary and under defined conditions can support the success and legitimacy of a United Nations operation.” 
The UK and Jordan do not consider the mandate of MONUSCO to be a radical departure from previous practice, 
pointing to recent examples of the AU (the UK) or regarding the current UN practice as “a repetition of 
previous cycles in peacekeeping.” Jordan goes even so far to call for the establishment of UN standing forces. 
Several states are opposed to any future similar mandates and they also provide various reasons. Some 
countries are afraid that this practice might either turn the UN into a party to the conflict (China, ibid., 20), 
expose peacekeepers to unnecessary risks (India, ibid., 27) or compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeepers 
(Turkey, ibid., 58), a view which is not shared by Ireland (ibid., 59).  Pakistan and Bangladesh believe that 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement should not be conflated (ibid., 33, 60). The Latin-American countries 
(Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay, ibid., 35, 42, 43) remain apprehensive and emphasise that MONUSCO’s 
mandate should not be a precedent for future operations. Ethiopia shares this view (ibid., 45), but is convinced 
– as is Chile (ibid., 6-7) that “some serious thinking” is necessary. Reacting to the developments unfolding in 
Mali in May 2014, the government also asked for a “much more robust mandate under Chapter VII” for 
MINUSCA, Security Council 7179
th
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7179 (2014), 4. To a certain extent that wish was 
fulfilled by the Council with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2164, UN Doc. S/RES/2164 (2014), 6, 
para. 13 a) (i), (iv). With regard to this issue, cf., ICRC, ‘Interview with Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye’, 
(2014), FirstView Article, International Review of the Red Cross, 1, 4, 9-10.  
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4. An emerging division of labour between international organisations in 
peacekeeping operations 
 
The multiplication of tasks in peacekeeping operations has been part of the increased inter-
institutional cooperation between different international organisations during peacekeeping 
operations.  In 2007, 54 peace operations were deployed around the world, of which not less than 40 
involved an element of cooperation with another international organisation.110 The practice suggests 
that there is a general tendency towards the UN focusing on traditional peacekeeping operations 
regarding the level of the use of force authorised, with an emphasis also on the multi-dimensional 
and non-military level and that UN-mandated operations will be provided with more robust 
mandates.111 The massive presence in the field has also contributed to the overstretching in the 
capacities of the United Nations which in 2008 alone deployed 120,000 peacekeepers on the 
ground.112  
The organisations use different terminology. Whereas the UN uses the classic terminology of 
“peacekeeping operations”, the European Union refers normally to “crisis management operations” 
and the African Union speaks of “peace support operations”. In the present study the terminology of 
the United Nations will be used.113  
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 A. S. Bah, B. D. Jones, ‘Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid 
Arrangements’, Center on International Cooperation, New York University (2008), 1.  
111
 Besides political and practical reasons, e.g. the military capacity of each organisation is one of the relevant 
aspects. Secretary-General Annan was very direct in this matter, while addressing NATO Parliamentarians, 
saying that “[i]t is also likely that the year ahead will see other new peace operations in Africa, as well as in 
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European Union deployed “Operation Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a bridging force 
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need arise for localized enforcement tasks.”, Secretary-General’s opening remarks at meeting with Nato 
Parliamentarians, New York, 8 March 2004, available at: http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=808.  
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 M. Derblom, E. Hagström Frisell, J. Schmidt, ‘UN-EU-AU Cooperation in Peace Operations in Africa’, FOI, 
Swedish Defence Research Agency (2008), 30. The significant engagement of resources also put conflict 
prevention and early warning systems under the spotlight. The Security Council adopted, for example, 
Resolution 1625 aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council’s role in conflict prevention, 
particularly in Africa, Security Council Resolution 1625, UN Doc. S/RES/1625 (2005). That resolution includes 
the objective to strengthen likewise regional and subregional capacities for early warning (para. 2 (d)) and it 
stresses the importance of a regional approach to conflict prevention (para. 5). See also, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New 
Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009), Section 1:4. See also, A regional-global security partnership, supra note 
40, 18, para. 88. 
113
 The importance of a common terminology was stressed by the Study of the Lessons Learned Unit which 
state clearly that “[i]t is important that the UN and regional organizations use the same terminology of peace-
keeping and have the same understanding of the terminology, that they understand each other and avoid 
misunderstandings that could undermine the other’s efforts”, Lesson Learned Unit, Department of 
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In the past years, at least three different kinds of cooperation between international organisations in 
the area of peacekeeping have emerged. They are sequential, parallel and integrated deployment of 
troops by international organisations.114 Besides, the strains of international and regional politics are 
“pushing global peacekeeping towards a different future, one in which several different organizations 
–principally the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU – each develop a fuller range of multi-faceted 
capacities, ranging from rapid, robust response to longer-term, civilian peacebuilding functions.”115 
(i) Sequential Operations include, inter alia, the 2003 operation of ECOWAS in Liberia which gave way 
to the long-term presence of the United Nations Operation in Liberia (UNMIL). Normally 
peacekeeping operations transit from being an authorised regional or multilateral operation or an ad 
hoc authorised operation to a United Nations operation. This is explained by the more effective and 
faster decision-making process of small actors, and certain other advantages such as geographic 
proximity, which allow a faster deployment on the ground. However, some recent operations mirror 
a contrary development, the handover of the NATO operation in Bosnia to the European Union, the 
similar transfer of operational power from the UN to the EU in Kosovo and also the transition from a 
UN operation into a Special Task Force of the African Union.116 This development underlines the 
growth of multi-faceted capacities by regional organisations, although one has to keep in mind that 
many of the Member States of these organisations which take part in the new incoming 
peacekeeping operation have already deployed troops as part of the old, outgoing operation. The 
transfer from one operation to the other is then limited to a “re-hatting” and the transfer of 
operational command and control.  
(ii) In contrast, parallel operations have taken various forms. They include temporary, military, 
support operations by one organisation for another, for example, operations of the EU in the 
                                                          
Peacekeeping Operations, Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements 
in a Peacekeeping Environment, Suggested Principles and Mechanisms (1999), Part II A., para. XII. 
114
 Bah, Jones, supra note 110, 2-3; cf. Thematic evaluation of cooperation, supra note 36, 5, para. 5; see also A 
regional-global security partnership, supra note 40, 8, para. 36; Challenges Project, Meeting the Challenges of 
Peace Operations: Coopration and Coordination (2005), 12, para. 5; Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
and Department of Field Support, supra note 112, 9; Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN 
Doc. S/PRST/2010/2 (2010), at 3 which calls for coordination of peacebuilding plans and programmes of 
regional and subregional organisations with United Nations peacekeeping operations and the wider United 
Nations presence on the ground. Other classifications mention, e.g., “subcontracting; bridging operations; joint 
operations; integrated operations; and evolving operations”, W. Pal Singh Sidu, ‘Regional Groups and Alliances’, 
in T. Weiss, S. Daws (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (2007), 217, 218; Balas speaks of 
sequential, parallel and hybrid peace operations, A. Ballas, ‘It Takes Two (or More) to Keep the Peace: Multiple 
Simultaneous Peace Operations’, in (2011) 15 Journal of International Peacekeeping, 384, 393-396. 
115
 Bah, Jones, supra note 110, 1. 
116
 Ibid., 2. Other recent examples follow the traditional pattern; AFISMA in Mali was transformed in 
MINUSMA, pending the improvement of security conditions on the ground, AMISOM will most likely be 
transformed into a UN operation and the operation of ECCAS in the Central African Republic was now 
transformed in an African-led peacekeeping operation. 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo – Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. More common is a 
separation of tasks, from military operations existing alongside observer operations to separated 
civilian and military operations such as KFOR by NATO and UNMIK in Kosovo.117  
UNMIK is also one example of an integrated operation, as UNMIK consisted of four different 
organisations working together: the UN Secretariat, UNHCR, the EU and the OSCE. The general 
structure is that either the organisations share the command between themselves or that one 
organisation subordinates itself to the other.118 The first example was the International Civilian 
Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) which joined the UN operation alongside the operation of the Organisation 
of American States (henceforth: OAS).  The most integrated operation so far is nonetheless the 
hybrid United Nations/African Union operation in Darfur whose structure is completely under unified 
command.   
The Elements of Implementation of the European Security Strategy distinguish first of all between 
national contributions to a UN operation and a “stand alone operation”.119 The “stand alone 
operation” comprises two different models, the “bridging model” and the “stand by model”. As the 
name suggests, the bridging model refers to an organisation “which aims at providing the UN with 
time to mount a new operation or to reorganize an existing one.”120 The challenge is to provide a 
rapid deployment of troops on the ground, but the advantage is that if troops of a previous EU 
operation are “re-hatted” and continue to be deployed on the ground as part of the follow-up UN 
operation, a smoother transfer of power can take place.121 
Whereas the “bridging model” is a temporary arrangement to enable the UN to mandate and initiate 
a peacekeeping operation or to reorganise and restructure such an operation, the “stand by model” 
consists “of an ‘over the horizon reserve’ or an ‘extraction force’ provided by the EU in support of an 
UN operation [which] would be of particular relevance in an African context.”122 Thus, the “stand by 
model” is used in cases in which immediate, short-term support of a peacekeeping operation is 
necessary, calling for the rapid deployment of contingents and this is why there are substantive 
issues of coordination between the UN and the EU.123 
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The different forms of cooperation between international organisations in the area of peace and 
security emphasise anew the complexity of the topic and why an analysis, such as that carried out in 
the present study, is important. It also highlights some of the underlying advantages and 
disadvantages. While cooperation allows organisations to build upon the competence of one 
another,124 there are also shortcomings such as handover challenges and questions of legitimacy and 
ownership in inter-institutional arrangements.125 
The increased activism of regional organisations since the end of the Cold War has also led to a 
reactivation of another chapter of the Charter, namely Chapter VIII, which had also been impaired 
during the Cold War.126  
1.3. The new “old” Chapter VIII of the UN Charter – or the merger of 
Chapters VII and VIII? 
 
“The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and 
responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more productive 
use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than has 
hitherto been the case.”  
- Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004)
 127
 
“The principle of establishing stronger partnerships 
with regional organizations is embedded in the 
very DNA of the United Nations. With great vision 
and foresight, Chapter VIII of the Charter of the 
United Nations lays out the critical role of regional 
Organizations in maintaining international peace and 
Security.” 
- Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2014)
128
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 Bah, Jones, supra note 110, 4-5. One also has to keep in mind that “[r]egional organizations have their own 
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for the United Nations to predict which organizations can and will cooperate and the resources that they will 
bring to the relationship”, Thematic evaluation of cooperation, supra note 36, 5, para. 7. 
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 Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, supra note 36, 17, para. 60; Rensmann, ‘Reform’, supra note 31, 
25, 52, mn. 93. 
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 Report of the High-Level Panel, supra note 22, 70, para. 270. Another argument made in favour is that 
“There are multiple pressures for a wide range of problems to be tackled on a regional rather than global basis 
– an approach that accords with the provisions on regional arrangements in Chapter VIII of the Charter. A UN 
rapid-reaction capability might tilt the balance too far away from regional responsibility, thereby overloading 
the UN and undermining efforts to build up standing force capabilities on a regional basis”, Roberts, ‘Proposals 
for UN Standing Forces’, supra note 38, 99, 128.  
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The previous two sections have traced the development of peacekeeping within the wider 
framework of the United Nations Charter as well as under Chapter VII. They confirmed that the 
maintenance of international peace and security by the Security Council cannot be seen in isolation 
from the larger framework of cooperation with regional organisations. This part therefore analyses 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, which applies to relations with regional organisations in 
the field of the maintenance of international peace and security.  Whereas it is generally accepted 
that peacekeeping is in conformity with the United Nations Charter, the interpretation of Chapter VIII 
is rather disputed. This is firstly due to the very vague language used in Chapter VIII. Secondly, it is a 
result of the interests of various actors in interpreting Chapter VIII in their favour, which is once again 
an expression of the duality between universality and regionalisation: “total formal control by the UN 
Security Council to de facto discretion and arbitrariness of (…) regional organizations; subsidiarity in 
UN-regional relations to complementarity of intergovernmental tasks.”129  
1. The relevance of practice for the interpretation of the Charter and the dispute over 
a definion of “regional arrangements and agencies” 
 
The practice of the United Nations and the involved regional organisations is particularly relevant for 
the interpretation of Chapter VIII. This approach has the additional advantage of guaranteeing the 
flexible interpretation necessary to ensure that the Security Council can exercise its mandate 
effectively and efficiently. Being a political body, this method might also be better at accommodating 
the political implications in the activity of the Security Council. Furthermore, it must be underlined 
that the drafters of the United Nations Charter decided that each organ of the organisation has 
primary responsibility for interpreting the parts of the Charter which regulate its competences and 
functions. The debate on this issue at the San Francisco Conference began with a proposal by the 
Kingdom of Belgium that “[t]he General Assembly has sovereign competence to interpret the 
provisions of the Charter.”130 The “sovereign” notion in this context was intended “to mean that the 
original part lies with the Assembly, but the Assembly may of course consult the International 
Court.”131 Following another proposition by the UK representative, it was decided to refer the whole 
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matter to the Fourth Committee.132 Following a lengthy debate in the subcommittee, the Fourth 
Committee approved the report in which it was stated that  
In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the Organization, it is 
inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular 
functions. This process is inherent in the functioning of any body which operates under an instrument 
defining its functions and powers. (…) Accordingly, it is not necessary to include in the Charter a 
provision either authorizing or approving the normal operation of this principle.
133
 
To safeguard the necessary flexibility for the Security Council, the drafters of the UN Charter also 
decided to refrain from defining “regional arrangements and agencies” for the purposes of Chapter 
VIII. As stated in the Agenda for Peace,  
[t]he Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus 
allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for 
regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Such associations or entities could include treaty-based organizations, whether created before or after 
the founding of the United Nations, regional organizations for mutual security and defence, 
organizations for general development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, 
and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.
134
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This particular point was debated during the San Francisco Conference, and Egypt proposed the 
following definition 
There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a 
given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests 
or cultural, linguistic, historical, or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the 
peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise (…) as well as for the safeguarding of their 
interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations.
135
 
The proposition was however rejected on the arguments that  
on oppose qu’il n’est pas souhaitable d’inscrire une définition dans une Charte générale comme celle 
qui est en cours de préparation ; qu’une telle définition provoquera de longs débats, et qu’on a des 
raisons de douter que cette définition se révèle suffisamment large. On estime qu’il est bien évident 
que le paragraphe additionnel, concernant le droit de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, 
contre une attaque armée, recommandé par le Conseil (…) est suffisamment compréhensif et que son 
application n’est nullement limitées aux accords régionaux. 
136
 
The only sustainable, judicial argument made is the solicitude that the proposed definition would not 
be comprehensive enough;137 the latter part of the argument acknowledges the compromise solution 
between the proponents of the universalist approach and those of a regionalist vision (infra, 1.1). No 
further attempts at clarification have been made during the history of the United Nations. In 1994, 
the General Assembly adopted a Declaration concerning the enhancement of cooperation with 
regional entities in the area of international peace and security, but that declaration merely 
acknowledged the “variety of mandates, scope and composition of regional arrangements or 
agencies.”138  
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It is consequently hard to define the idea and the character of regional arrangements and entities as 
expressed in Chapter VIII of the Charter.  The political arguments which were raised during the 
preparatory conference of the United Nations and the fact that the League of Nations explicitly 
mentioned political constructs such as the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant suggest that the 
concept of “regional” or “regional organisation” is a political, and adjustable one, rather than being 
legal in origin, safeguarding the necessary flexibility to include potentially new regional entities as 
well.  Unfortunately, these political concerns can hardly be reconciled with legal principles such as 
the principle of legal certainty; however, one can argue that legal principles are intrinsic to Chapter 
VIII. Chapter VIII can be interpreted as a mechanism to distribute competences, rights and 
obligations; in other words, it determines whether the United Nations or a regional organisation is 
responsible for action. Therefore, this Chapter has a direct bearing on the law of international 
responsibility which determines responsibility on the basis of the attribution of conduct. 
All in all, it appears that Chapter VIII has to be seen as incorporating the conflict between supporters 
of a universalist and a regionalist view of the system of collective security, as well as an interplay 
between arguments of law and politics. As a result, any attempt of interpretation of Chapter VIII is 
highly delicate. 
2. The unrelenting influence of Chapter VII on Chapter VIII 
 
The influence of universalism versus regionalism as enshrined in the United Nations Charter is 
reinforced by the virtue of Chapter VII. Whilst Chapter VII establishes the universalist perception as 
regards the maintenance of international peace and security – with the Security Council as the 
guardian – Chapter VIII establishes the tradition of the regionalistic perspective:  
There was a reason Chapter VIII was drafted by the Charter’s framers and that reason is as valid today 
as it was 61 years ago. It is to ensure that global and regional collective security is mutually 
complementary and that the total effort of the international community for securing the peace is 
optimized through the collaboration of our various international organizations.
139
 
A joint consideration of Chapter VIII and Chapter VII is required for several reasons.  First of all, 
Chapter VIII does not provide the Security Council with any substantive powers of peace 
enforcement in addition to the powers the Security Council holds under Chapter VII of the Charter.  
Article 53 (1) of the Charter only gives the Security Council the right to delegate Chapter VII powers 
to regional arrangements; thus “[t]he delegation of Chapter VII powers to a regional arrangement (…) 
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takes place by the Council using its specific competences so to delegate under Chapter VIII.”140 
Consequently, there is no legal difference if the Security Council were to authorise states to use force 
under Article 53 of the Charter or simply under Chapter VII as its powers under Chapter VIII derive 
from Chapter VII. Nevertheless, there might be a symbolic importance, given that the use of Chapter 
VIII amounts to recognising the specific role of regional organisations.141  
An analysis of Chapter VIII in the context of peacekeeping is also pertinent as “[a]ny endeavour to 
enhance [and understand] the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations 
under Chapter VIII will need to be based on a clearer definition of the basis and processes of such 
cooperation.”142 The Secretary-General proposed that the Security Council “[d]iscuss[es] the 
desirability and practicability of partner organizations identifying themselves either as regional 
organizations acting under Chapter VIII or as other intergovernmental organizations acting under 
other provisions of the Charter.”143 But, “[t]he question could be asked, however, whether the 
partnership would be operationally more effective if each partner knows under which Charter 
provisions it is functioning.”144 However, from a legal point of view, it does not matter whether a 
regional organisation can be subsumed under Chapter VIII or whether there is acquiescence by the 
regional organisation to be bound by Chapter VIII and a corresponding agreement by the Security 
Council. To offer an example to the contrary, NATO could arguably be considered as a regional 
organisation under Chapter VIII, but it refuses to be considered as such (infra 1.8). 
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For the purposes of analysing the applicability and the procedural framework of Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter to regional organisations, it is firstly necessary to define certain criteria as contained in 
Articles 52 – 54 of the Charter. 
3. Defining the elements in Article 52 of the UN Charter 
 
Article 52 enshrines the priority of regional organisations as regards matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and underlines that they are appropriate for 
regional action. Regional organisations enjoy particular priority for the pacific settlement of “local 
disputes” under Article 52 (2) and (3).145 It suggests that the “regional” criterion is of a geographical 
nature, meaning that in order to qualify as a regional arrangement or agency under Chapter VIII, the 
member states of this agency or arrangement need to be in geographical proximity to each other.146  
Such an interpretation is supported by two other aspects; the feeling of solidarity, and the intimate 
knowledge of the geopolitical conditions in a given situation, which argue both in favour of a 
geographical interpretation of the “local disputes” wording in Article 52 as it concerns the meaning of 
“regional”.147  
The drafting history however shows that a large majority of states were against any specification as 
to the regional criterion.148 Equally, the existing advantages of geographical proximity for dispute 
resolution can be offset by the existence of arbitral or judicial proceedings within a regional 
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organisation, and nor is it indispensable that the states intervening in a dispute are located in the 
same geographic region.149 The General Assembly has also repeatedly granted the status of observers 
to organisations based on political, religious or even linguistic ties rather than on geographical ties, 
such as OSCE, the Commonwealth, the OIC and the Organisation international de la francophonie.150 
Nevertheless, the fact that Chapter VIII speaks of “regional” agencies and supports an interpretation 
of the regional specification as meaning that the organisation or its constituent instrument shall 
concern one specific geographic region; that its rules and competences shall have as their object this 
zone in order to abet the maintenance of peace and security. Otherwise, one could consider the 
organisation to be acting outside of Chapter VIII of the Charter.151   A teleological approach 
underlines the need of “some geographical link” as “activity on the local level, (…) pre-existing 
greater familiarity with the subject-matter of a disputed, enhanced legitimacy, and solidarity are 
factors favouring a peaceful settlement.”152 
Other factors including a shared language or cultural aspects may contribute to the coherence and 
common identity of a given organisation strengthening the “close and reliable ties” between the 
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members of the organisation which generate the expectation that the organisation in question can 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and security.153 
One can however infer, from the “regional criterion” – argumentum e contrario – that the 
membership has to be limited in order to distinguish them from universal organisations falling 
outside the scope of Chapter VIII.  
In academic writing, controversy has also arisen over the question of whether a given regional 
organisation can be qualified as falling under Chapter VIII if under its constitutive instrument the 
organisation can take action – whether under Article 52 or Article 53 – against a non-state member 
(external threat), as these actions are also covered by the right of self-defense as enshrined in Article 
51.154 But there are no indications that such a limitation is imposed by Chapter VIII. Article 53 refers 
to enforcement action against enemy states “whether these states are or are not members of the 
regional organization.”155 That self-defense, as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force, 
also applies to Chapter VIII is evident from the introductory words of Articles 51 and 52: “nothing in 
this Charter precludes”.156 Moreover, this approach is not convincing from a functional perspective, 
since the very same organisation may fulfill quite different tasks according to specific strategic 
requirements given in precise circumstances. The OAS provided for collective security and collective 
self-defence,157 while the re-orientation and expansion of NATO activities following the end of the 
Cold War is another example of an organisation fulfilling different tasks in a simultaneous manner.158 
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The distinction in Chapter VIII between “arrangements” (in French: accords) and agencies 
(organismes) contains, once again, a broad margin for interpretation and the inclusion of regional 
entities under Chapter VIII.  It is probably for this purpose that the distinction was made, which is 
irrelevant in practice as the application of the dispositions of Chapter VIII is identical for both of 
them.159 The term “agency”, as a synonym for “organisation” presupposes a permanent, 
institutionalised structure, although it does not necessarily amount to the definition of “international 
organisation” (infra 2.1.1.).160 The word “arrangements” refers to the less-developed form of acting 
together through an “alliance” or based on a treaty. The intersection with agencies constitutes the 
treaty as organisations, at least those with an international legal personality, are based on such an 
international agreement.  Thus, any-less developed forms of cooperation do not enter the remit of 
Chapter VIII. Therefore, the extensive practice of ‘ad hoc’ authorisations to use all necessary means 
or measures given to a group of states falls outside the scope of Chapter VIII. 
Articles 52 and 53 also imply that organisations subject to Chapter VIII have internal mechanisms to 
resolve disputes (Article 52 (2)) and that they are able to conduct coercive measures (Article 53 (1)). 
In order to enable the United Nations to “maintain international peace and security” and “to take 
effective collective measures” [Emphasis added] and to “bring about by peaceful means (…) 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations”161, any interpretation of Chapter 
VIII has to be done in conjunction with the general rules of the organisation.  To guarantee the 
effective maintenance of international peace and security, it has to be sufficient that a regional 
organisation disposes of either internal dispute resolution mechanisms or that it is able to carry out 
coercive measures.162 As the general requirements for regional organisations are laid down in Article 
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52 (1) it also remains unclear why paragraph 2 should add new requirements; the latter delineates 
competences between the United Nations and a regional organisation.163 
4. The relationship between the UN and regional organisations under Articles 52 and 
53 
 
The effectiveness of the cooperation with regional organisations can, however, be impaired if several 
organisations deem themselves to be competent in a given situation which is “appropriate for 
regional action”. All actions falling short of “enforcement action” under Article 53, are not subject to 
the authorisation of the Security Council, and thus there can be situations in which a regional 
organisation is engaged in activities maintaining international peace and security, and the Security 
Council simultaneously decides to act or to authorise enforcement action.  Generally speaking, 
Article 52 seems to be inspired by the idea of an alternative rapport between the universal level of 
the Security Council and the regional level.164 The practice shows a preference for an increased 
cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations as can be inferred, inter alia, 
from the 1994 Declaration in which states and regional arrangements and agencies are encouraged 
to cooperate further with the United Nations in the whole area of the maintenance of international 
peace and security.165 An example of joint action by the Security Council and regional organisations 
was the crisis within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In its Resolution 1234, the Security 
Council not only expressed its support for the mediation process of the OAU and the Southern 
African Development Community, but simultaneously, the Security Council requested all parties to 
                                                          
organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security is not limited to these activities, but can 
take various forms.  
163
 Walter, ‘Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements’, supra note 8, 1445, 1455 mn. 30-31. 
164
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 318 ; The practice is unclear as to whether there is a priority for regional action. In 
several cases the United Nations and regional organisations have been active, it “seems to reject clear 
alternatives between universal or regional jurisdiction” Walter, ‘Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements’, supra 
note 8, 1445, 1470 – 77, 1476 mn. 106 ; See equally Wolfrum, supra note 158, 576, 579-80. 
165
 General Assembly, Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation, supra note 40, Annex, 4-5, especially 
paras. 8 – 10.  Nevertheless, increased cooperation in practice means that the Security Council might decide 
whether to act itself or whether to delegate and support the actions of a regional organisation. In the case of 
the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Security Council expressed its support for the actions of the OAU 
and called upon the parties to fully cooperate with the latter,  Villani, supra note 8, 225, 319; Security Council 
Resolution 1177, UN Doc. S/RES/1177 (1998), 2, paras. 4-5. This organ of the UN strengthened its supports for 
the mediation efforts of the OAU in the two follow up resolutions, Security Council Resolution 1226, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1226 (1999), 1, paras. 1, 3; 2, para. 4, and Security Council Resolution 1227, UN Doc. S/RES/1227 (1999), 
1, paras. 4-5. After fights restarted, the Security Council issued a resolution under Chapter VII demanding the 
states to resume peace-talks under AU auspices, Security Council Resolution 1298, UN Doc. S/RES/1298 (2000), 
2, paras. 4-5. Furthermore, it imposed an embargo on weapons (see, in particular paras. 6-8), thus putting 
pressure on the two states so that they would accept the proposed settlement by the OAU. 
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cooperate fully with its special envoy by also reaffirming the readiness of the UN to help with the 
application of a ceasefire agreement.166 
In comparison to Article 52, the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations 
is reversed in Article 53. The priority of regional organisations under Article 52 is replaced by the 
priority of the Security Council.167 
The Security Council keeps its broad margin of discretion, which it disposes in maintaining 
international peace and security under Chapter VII also within Chapter VIII, as it shall utilise “where 
appropriate” regional arrangements or agencies. Any other interpretation would only add more than 
was intended by the drafters of the Charter.168 In practice, the Security Council normally refers to all 
“relevant international organisations” in its resolutions rather than to pick up a specific one.169 
5. The interpretation of “enforcement action” in Article 53 
 
Another problem of interpretation is the question as to which circumstances the Security Council can 
rely upon regional organisations. Article 53 (1) speaks of enforcement action, which seems to exclude 
other coercive measures which can be found in the United Nations Charter such as “preventive 
action” (Article 5) or “preventive measures” (Article 50).170  The logical consequence is to presume 
that the application of Article 53 is limited to cases in which the coercive measures are a reaction 
rather than an action, similar in nature to self-defense which is applicable only in cases of an actual 
armed attack to repel invaders.  
Another argument of systematic interpretation, while referring to Article 1 of the Charter which 
mentions “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” 
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 Security Council Resolution 1234, UN Doc. S/RES/1234 (1999), paras. 11-15. 
167
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 325.  Kelsen said therefore, that “Article 52 and 53 of the Charter refer to regional 
agencies which may be considered to be – at least indirectly – organs of the United Nations in so far as 
Members of the United Nations are authorised by the Charter to constitute such agencies for purposes of the 
United Nations (…) Regional agencies are neither principal nor subsidiary organs within the meaning of Article 
7” and “[r]egional organisations may act as organs of the United Nations not only in settling local disputes, but 
also in taking enforcement action under the authority of the Security Council”, H. Kelsen, The Law of the United 
Nations. A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1950), 145-6, 326. 
168
 Cf. Villani, supra note 8, 225, 327. 
169
 Ibid., 328. However, as always in the context of peace-keeping and peace-keeping operations which are all 
unique in their individual make-up, it depends on all the relevant circumstances, Resolution 2085 refers 
expressly to some specific organisations, Security Council Resolution 2085, UN Doc. S/RES/2085 (2012). 
170
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 329. But in the Spanish version of the Charter, Article 42 speaks of ”medidas” and 
not of “acción” and action is equally used in non-military contexts in other articles, e.g. Article 2 (5) and Article 
11. Taking into account of other differences in the English, French and Spanish versions, no positive conclusion 
can be drawn from the terminology, C. Walter, ‘Article 53’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The 
Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume II (2012), 1478, 1482 mn. 2-3. 
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supports the view of a broader interpretation of “enforcement action”.  The powers of the Security 
Council under Chapter VIII are derived from Chapter VII and its actions under Chapter VIII are based 
on the existence of a situation under Article 39, so that a broad interpretation of enforcement action 
is justified.171 In practice, the Security Council has in most cases in its resolutions either referred to a 
“threat to international peace and security” or even abstained from giving any determination, but 
decided “to act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”. This practice allows the Council to 
keep a greater margin of discretion and appreciation and this non-distinction between the three 
different scenarios in Article 39 should accordingly be applied to Article 53 as well.172 
Furthermore, what kinds of measures are comprised by “enforcement action” under Article 53 
should be determined. Article 39 does not distinguish between measures taken under Article 41 and 
42 but qualifies both as measures to restore international peace and security. Articles 50 and 5 also 
show that enforcement measures can be of a non-military nature.173 Thus, enforcement action under 
Article 53 comprises all measures which can be coercive upon a state. That interpretation is 
supported by the principle of effectiveness; in order that the enforcement action is effective, the 
international organisations have to be able to use all means necessary. Moreover, as established, the 
power of the Security Council under Chapter VIII derives from Chapter VII so that they comprise per 
se all possible forms of enforcement measures under Chapter VII should the Security Council decide 
to authorise a regional organisation to act. 174  
This interpretation also finds support in the practice of the Security Council. In its resolution 757, the 
Security Council imposed a ban on the import and export of all goods from Yugoslavia, which was 
binding for international organisations.175 Limitations of enforcement action arise in the form of the 
respective constitutional framework of each regional arrangement or agency which either permits 
them to carry out a certain action (the action would be intra vires) or prohibits them from doing so as 
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 Another supportive argument is the effectiveness and proper functioning of the organisation. Against this 
view, for instance, Wolfrum, supra note 158, 576, 581-82; Argument a maiore ad minus, if the Security Council 
can use regional organisations for military purposes, it can most certainly do so in cases involving non-military 
measures, Walter, ‘Article 53’, ibid., 1478, 1497 mn. 53. 
172
 Security Council Resolution 883 which imposed an embargo against Libya was based on a qualification of the 
situation as a “threat to international peace and security” and called upon all states and international 
organisations to act accordingly with the resolution, Security Council Resolution 883, UN Doc. S/RES/883 
(1993), 1, Preamble; 4, para. 12. 
173
 Including economic measures (under Article 50) or the suspension of rights and privileges of membership 
(under Article 5). 
174
 Cf. also Villani, supra note 8, 225, 331-32 ; Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping  
operations in all their aspects, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/54/87 
(1999), 14, para. 116, 118. 
175
 Security Council Resolution 757, UN Doc. S/RES/757 (1992), para. 11. The resolution contains many other 
measures which international organisations are asked to apply. 
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this would be tantamount to acts ultra vires.176 This inherent limitation is recognised in the 1994 
Declaration according to which “Cooperation between regional arrangements or agencies and the 
United Nations should be in accordance with their respective mandates, scope and composition.”177  
On the basis of the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt which is enshrined in Article 34 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Security Council likewise cooperates with regional 
organisations, for example in the form of recommendations and consultations, as the Security 
Council cannot create obligations for non-members of the United Nations.178 D’Aspremont makes a 
very similar argument with regard to regional organisations which have not submitted themselves at 
least formally under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, e.g. NATO.179 
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 Similarly, Villani, supra note 8, 332. As Villani correctly says “toute la matière de la compétence de 
l’organisation régionale se situe en dehors de la portée et des pouvoirs du Coseil de sécurité et doit être 
appréciée uniquement par rapport au statut de l’organisation”, ibid., 335-6. Article 48 (2) of the Charter 
likewise stipulates that “decisions [of the Security Council] shall be carried out by the Members of the United 
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are 
members.” In practice, the question as to whether a regional organisation has the constitutive rights to engage 
in peacekeeping has been discarded, but the question of the legality of action has been examined on the basis 
of the UN Charter and general international law.  The argument made, especially during peacekeeping action in 
the Cold War, is that what states can do separately, they can also do together, notwithstanding the question as 
to whether the formal procedures of the respective internal law of the organisations were respected, Gray, 
supra note 54, 391-2. In practice, some organisations have later adopted instruments allowing them to conduct 
such operations, see C. Gray, ‘The Use of Force and the International Legal Order’, in M. D. Evans, International 
Law (2010), 642; Cf. also Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping  operations in all their 
aspects, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/53/127 (1998), 15-16, paras. 
107, 110; Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping  operations in all their aspects, Report 
of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/54/839 (2000), 18-19, paras. 156, 160 
177
 General Assembly, Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation, supra note 40, Annex, 4, para. 4. 
178
 Articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter stipulate that the members of the organisation confer primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council, that the Council 
acts on their behalf and that they agree to accept and carry out its decisions. One cannot forget however that 
the organisations are bound indirectly by their respective members which are also free to choose in which form 
they execute the decisions of the Council on the basis of Article 48 (2) of the Charter and bearing in mind that 
the Security Council often leaves the decision to the states in which form they act. In its Resolution 794, it held 
“[a]cting under Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter, calls upon States, nationally or through regional agencies 
and arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5”, 
Security Council Resolution 794, UN Doc. S/RES/794 (1992), 4, para. 16. In Resolution 770, the Security Council 
equally called upon “States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures to 
facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian 
organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo.”, Security Council Resolution 770, UN Doc. 
S/RES/770 (1992), 2, para. 2. Further examples can be found, inter alia, in Security Council Resolutions 787, UN 
Doc. S/RES/787 (1992), 4, para. 12 and Security Council Resolution 820, UN Doc. S/RES/820 (1993), 4, para. 17; 
6, para.29. In some limits, one could imagine an obligation for regional organisations to carry out decisions of 
the Security Council in the form that the Security Council could impose on its members the need to act through 
the regional organisations of which they are members, cf. Villani, supra note 8, 225, 345 – 9. 
179
 J. d’Aspremont, ‘The Law of International Responsibility and Multilayered Institutional Veils: The Case of 
Authorized Regional Peace-Enforcement Operations’, in SHARES Research Paper 24 (2013), ACIL, 2013-10, 
available at www.sharesproject.nl and SSRN, 6-7. In his view, such a scenario has also an impact on the law of 
international responsibility. By the lack of submission to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter by a given regional 
organisation, the application of Article 17 ARIO to a peace enforcement operation conducted by this 
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Another requirement of Article 53 is that the enforcement action is taken under the authority of the 
Security Council which corresponds to an adoption of coercive measures by the Security Council in 
the form of a resolution.180 Should the Security Council authorise enforcement action, it nevertheless 
keeps control of the activities as it is specified under Article 54 of the Charter.181 In this way, the 
Security Council acts upon its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, that is conferred on it by virtue of Article 24 of the Charter.182  
Various forms of control exist and are used by the Security Council. The committees created by the 
Security Council in order to supervise sanctions are one form of supervision at its disposal, but the 
Secretary-General can also be included in the control mechanism as e.g. in Resolution 787 in which 
the “[s]tates concerned [are requested], nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to 
coordinate with the Secretary-General inter alia on the submission of reports to the Security Council 
regarding actions taken.”183 With regard to the operational level, the authority of the Security Council 
is normally limited to the examination of reports presented to it by states or directly by the regional 
organisations, as the latter regional organisations conduct the enforcement action.184 
6. A different interpretation of “enforcement action” for Article 53 (1) second 
sentence: the practice of sanctions by the UN and regional organisations 
 
In the case of regional organisations taking enforcement action under their own initiative, according 
to Article 53 (1), second sentence, “enforcement action” has to be interpreted more restrictively 
than in the alternative scenario of the Security Council utilising regional organisations for 
enforcement actions under its authority. Otherwise, regional entities would have to ask for the 
authorisation of the Security Council for all kinds of acts that were potentially coercive in nature 
possibly coercive nature, such as diplomatic, economic, political, financial and military measures.  
                                                          
organisation authorised by the Security Council would be precluded if the effect of the authorisation on the law 
of international responsibility extends only to the fulfilment of the obligations under the UN Charter., ibid., 17-
18. 
180
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 349. 
181
 Article 54 stipulates that the Security Council shall be kept fully informed of all activities undertaken or in 
contemplation by regional organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
182
 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 349 – 50. 
183
 Security Council Resolution 787, UN Doc. S/RES/787 (1992), 4, para. 14. Villani, supra note 8, 225, 350-1. In 
the case of Sierra Leone, the Security Council attributed the power to the sanction committee to coordinate 
with its counterpart at ECOWAS, Security Council Resolution 1132, UN Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997), 4, para. 10 
(h).Even more comprehensive, in Resolution 1196, the Security Council encouraged the chairmen of the 
established sanction committees imposing arms embargos on Africa to “seek to establish channels of 
communication with regional and subregional organizations and bodies.”, Security Council Resolution 1196, UN 
Doc. S/RES/1196 (1998), 2, paras. 3-4. 
184
 Cf. Villani, supra note 8, 225, 352-3. So, KFOR, e.g. submitted regular reports directly to the Security Council.  
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On the basis of Article 31 of the VCLT, a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.” Taking into account that the terminology is identical to the first sentence of 
Article 53, not to mention that the first sentence is contextualised by the second sentence, any other 
interpretation does not seem to be reasonable.  
Yet, the object and purpose are different. As explained, in the first sentence, the purpose is to allow 
the Security Council to utilise – in an effective way – regional organisations for the maintenance of 
international peace and security which permits and justifies a broad interpretation, whereas in the 
second alternative, the authorisation renders an otherwise illegal action legal.185 Moreover, by 
applying once more the principle of effectiveness, a stricter interpretation of enforcement action is 
preferable for the second alternative; otherwise the Security Council would have to authorise all 
manners of measures and the resulting work-load and delay would not be insignificant. A stricter 
interpretation further allows the regional entities to keep a certain autonomy, rendering their 
performance more effective.186  
This later interpretation is confirmed by the practice of the Security Council and the relevant 
organisations. 187 The European Union imposed an embargo on weapons and military equipment 
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 F. L. Morrison, ‘The Role of Regional Organizations in the Enforcement of International Law’, in J. Delbrück 
(ed.), U. E. Heinz (ass. ed.), Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System. Proceedings of 
an International Symposium of the Kiel Institute of International Law, March 23 to 25, 1994, 39, 43. 
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 Cf. also for similar arguments, Villani, supra note 8, 225, 356-7. ; Also in favour of a restricted interpretation, 
J. Frowein, ‘Zwangsmaßnahmen von Regionalorganisationen’ in U. Beyerlin, M. Bothe, R. Hofmann (eds.), Recht 
zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung. Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt (1995), 57, 66-7; A. Abass, Regional 
Organizations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (2004) 43, 45-
46, 49, 53-54;  Article 2(4) also only prohibits states and consequently, group of states to use military force 
against each other, but permits other forms of coercion.  This is supported by Schreuer, supra note 27, 477, 
491, who says “[t]here is nothing to stop a group of States from joining efforts in the framework  of a regional 
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not involving the use of force.” This presupposes however a permissive ground in international law to apply 
other coercive measures such as a violation of an obligation erga omnes, Frowein, ibid., 67. The very same 
argument was already made by the Columbia Chairman of Committee III/4 in San Francisco: “Enforcement 
action, with the use of physical force, is obviously the prerogative of the Security Council (…) [b]ut the other 
measures, those of Article 41, are not; (…) it is with any State – withouth necessarily violating the principles of 
the Charter – to break diplomatic, consular and economic relations or to interrupt its communications with 
another State”, as cited in F. V. Garcia-Amador, The Inter-American System, ,Its Development and Strengthening 
(1966), 190; N. Tsagourias, ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’, in M. Trybus, N. D. 
White (eds.), European Security Law (2007), 102, 127; Orakhelashvili, supra note 58, 310; Also supporting an 
authorisation for the use of force, M. Roscini, ‘L’articolo 17 del Trattato sull’Unione europea e i compiti delle 
Forze di pace’, in N. Ronzitti (ed.), Le Forze di Pace dell’Unione Europea (2005), 49, 58. 
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 Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 11, 79, 265. Another argument in favour of this interpretation is, that 
when states can use such measures individually without an autorisation of the Security Council, the very same 
has to apply, mutatis mutandis, when they act collectively through an international organisations, ibid., 266; 
Gray, supra note 54, 403-4.  In the Cuba Crisis, sanctions by the OAS were considered not to be “enforcement 
action” under alternative 2, necessitating an authorisation of the Security Council, M. G. Goldman, ‘Action by 
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against Yugoslavia without asking for the permission of the Security Council which persisted even 
after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 713. The European measures were actually more 
restrictive and went beyond what was required by the resolution of the Council.188 In 1999, by its 
own initiative, the European Union adopted common position 1999/624/CFSP which imposed a ban 
on arms, munitions and military equipment against Indonesia. The permissive foundation in 
international law for the introduction of such measures was the massive violations of human rights 
(erga omnes obligations) and international humanitarian law by Indonesia in East Timor.189 Seven 
years earlier, ECOWAS had imposed an embargo on weapons on that part of the territory of Liberia 
which was controlled by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). ECOWAS then proceeded to 
ask the United Nations for assistance in the application of the sanctions which was granted by 
Security Council Resolution 788.190 Another important resolution is Security Council Resolution 841, 
in which the Council decided to implement the trade embargo recommended by the Organisation of 
American States against Haiti and to make it consequently universally compulsory unless  
                                                          
the Organization of American States: When is Security Council Authorization Required under Article 53 of the 
United Nations Charter?’, in (1962-1963) 10 UCLA Law Review, 837, 849-51. Measures taken regionally would 
be subject to the Security Council's ratification only if they called for the use of armed force”, Security Council 
Official Records, Fifteenth, 893
rd
 meeting: 8 September 1960, 6 para. 32. Similarly Venezuela stated “It is the 
Venezuelan Government's view that the authorization of the Security Council would be required only in the 
case of decisions of regional agencies the implementation of which would involve the use of force, which is not 
the case with this resolution of the American states”, ibid., 13 para. 77. See also, Akehurst, supra note 137, 175, 
195; White, ‘The EU as a Regional Security Actor’, supra note 153, 329, 340-41. 
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 Villani, supra note 8, 225, 361-2.  
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 Council Common Position of 16 September 1999 concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of 
Indonesia (1999/624/CFSP), Preamble, Article 1. 
190
 M. Weller (ed.), Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (1994), 226-233. 
In the letter, ECOWAS requested “United Nations assistance in connection with the application by the 
international community, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter, of sanctions against those parties to the conflict that do not respect the provisions of the 
Yamoussoukro IV Accords.”, Letter dated 28 October 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/24735 (1992), para. 4. In its 
resolution, the Security Council decided “under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States 
shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and 
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia”, Security Council Resolution 
788, UN Doc. S/RES/788 (1992), 3, para. 8 ;  See also Walter, ‘Article 53’, supra note 169, 1478, 1485 mn. 19-20. 
Although in another example, regarding sanctions against Sierra Leone by ECOWAS, this organisation was 
authorised to use sanctions by virtue of Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), an analysis of the debate in 
the Council as well as of the text of the resolution show that the decisive factor for the mandate was the fact 
that the implementation of the non-military sanctions might lead to situations involving the use of military 
force, ibid., 1486 mn. 21-22. France referred to the “authorisation as being exceptional in nature, but 
legitimized by the past experience of cooperation between the United Nations and ECOWAS.” Poland 
considered the situation to be threatening international peace and security”, moreover “[t]he relevant 
paragraph of the draft resolution related to the enforcement of measures stipulated therein authorizes the 
regional organization —ECOWAS —to ensure strict implementation of Security Council decisions. It is our 
sincere hope that by creating such an enforcement mechanism this draft resolution will contribute to resolving 
the crisis in Sierra Leone and immediately terminating the plight of its people, thus preventing possible adverse 
implications for peace and stability in the whole region.” [Emphasis added], Security Council, Fifty-second Year, 
3822
nd
 meeting, Wednesday, UN Doc. S/PV.3822, 6, 8. 
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the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of the 
American States, has reported to the Council that, in light of the results of negotiations conducted by 
the Special Envoy for Haiti of the United Nations and the Organization of American States Secretaries-
General, the imposition of such measures is not warranted at that time.
191
 
Thus, the Security Council can, by its discretionary power, reverse the relationship of Article 53 and 
act as an executor of decisions taken by a regional organisation of measures not involving the use of 
force.192 Whereas this practice underlines the pragmatic approach taken by the Security Council, it 
has to be added, however, that the non-application of Article 53 paragraph 1 to non-military 
sanctions by regional entities does not mean that these sanctions or actions are automatically legal. 
These actions are justified if they have a valid basis under (general) international law. The one 
exception is if the regional organisation receives an authorisation of the Security Council which 
would render actions which were otherwise not justified under international law, legal, on the 
premise that the Security Council has assessed that the respective situation fulfills the criteria under 
Article 39 of the Charter.193  
Recent examples of non-military sanctions by regional organisations  not having an authorisation by 
the Security Council include those adopted by the Arab League and the EU against Syria in 2011 with 
“no indication that (…) any member of the UN maintained that these measures were illegal.”194 The 
Security Council likewise only took note of the decisions of ECOWAS and the AU to adopt targeted 
sanctions in Mali.195 
Should the Security Council decide to act itself, the legality of actions by regional organisations is 
more difficult to assess.  Measures taken by regional organisations going beyond the measures 
imposed by the Security Council could affect the efficiency of the latter and the reestablishment of 
international peace and security.196 Additionally, in the event that the Council decides to stop or to 
lift the imposed sanctions and the regional entities continue to maintain or establish enforcement 
action under their authority, this would contravene first of all the assessment of the Security Council 
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 Security Council Resolution 841, UN Doc. S/RES/841 (1993), paras. 1, 3. 
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 Depending on the specific operation, the Security Council might decide to let a regional organisation 
intervene and then take over the operation or vice versa. It cannot be strengthened enough that the practice of 
the Security Council shows a high degree of flexibility. cf. Griep, supra note 10; Villani, supra note 8, 225, 364. 
193
 Villani, ibid., 225, 364-7. 
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 Walter, ‘Article 53’, supra note 169, 1478, 1487 mn. 24-25; EU Council Decision, ‘concerning restrictive 
measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/273/CFSP’ (1 December 2011), 2011/782 CFSP (2011). 
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 Security Council Resolution 2056, UN Doc. S/RES/2056 (2012), 3, para. 6. 
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 It is also in that regard that one can separate “authorisation” from “delegation of powers”. Whereas in the 
case of an authorisation of the use of force, the Security Council effectively delegates some of its own powers 
to the regional organisation, in other cases, the Security Council may authorise or impose measures which if 
executed by the Security Council itself would be ultra vires, such as the creation of the ICTY, see Boisson de 
Chazournes, supra note 11, 79, 271-4. 
Chapter I: Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Activities under the UN Charter 
66 
 
of the existence of a situation under Article 39 as well as contravening its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security on the basis of Article 24 of the Charter.197   
Concerning Yugoslavia, the EU adopted severe sanctions which went far beyond all measures 
imposed by the Security Council. Villani views these sanctions as not legitimate; he considers them to 
be incompatible with the primary responsibility conferred on the Security Council by the members of 
the organisation.198 It seems nevertheless to be correct to consider them as legitimate under certain 
circumstances199 and it is preferable to rely upon the self-regulation mechanisms of the Security 
Council. As the primary guardian of international peace and security, there would be a reaction in the 
form of a resolution, or informal or formal consultations in the case of enforcement measures, 
contravening the efforts of sanctions by the Security Council.200 In practice, there would normally be 
informal or formal consultations between the UN and regional organisations before the adoption of 
sanctions by the latter, and even more so in these cases where members of the Security Council are 
also engaged in enforcement actions by regional entities given that their dual membership allows 
them to assess the enforcement actions and to oversee their compatibility. 201 
There may be situations in which a regional organisation recommends the use of force against 
another state, and in such a case, the authorisation of the Security Council is also necessary as it 
would be illogical to require an authorisation by the Council for a binding decision of the regional 
organisation, but not for recommendations issued by the regional organisation.202 
The general practice of the United Nations and the Security Council regarding the authorisation of 
the use of force by regional organisations also confirms that the Council continues to exercise its own 
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responsibility to maintain international peace and security by supervising enforcement operations.203 
Resolution 816, for example, authorises Member States, “acting nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to 
close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary means in the airspace of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (…) to ensure compliance with the ban on flights.”204 
Although this resolution refers to Chapter VIII in the preamble, it was adopted under Chapter VII and 
it therefore connects both Chapters of the Charter.205 Moreover, it effectively blurs the difference 
between Article 53 (1) first sentence and Article 53 (1) second sentence as any authorisation under 
Chapter VII can be equated rather to an authorised enforcement action taken by a regional 
organisation under Article 53 (1) second sentence. The repetition of “under the authority” in the 
resolution however points towards Article 53 (1) first sentence and thereby to an enforcement action 
by a regional organisation taken under the authority of the Security Council. Nevertheless, it proves 
that in practice, the distinction between the two options for enforcement action in Article 53 is less 
relevant.206 
7. Peacekeeping operations of regional organisations and the application of Article 
53 of the UN Charter 
 
Peacekeeping operations conducted under the auspices of a regional organisation based on the 
consent of the host-state are exempt from the requirement of an authorisation by the Security 
Council.207 The consent given renders their deployment on the ground legal under international 
law.208 Another requirement is that their use of military force is limited to cases of self-defence. The 
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ICJ held in the Certain Expenses case that “the operations known as UNEF and ONUC were not 
enforcement actions within the compass of Chapter VII of the Charter.”209  
However, the possible coercive nature of recent third-generation peacekeeping operations 
challenges that premise and an examination of whether Article 53 of the UN Charter is applicable for 
these operations is thus necessary.210 Article 53 does not per se apply to peacekeeping operations by 
regional organisations which were not foreseen during the preparation of the United Nations 
Charter; as Boutros-Ghali expressed “Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United 
Nations. It has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world.”211 Thus, 
the precise question is whether regional operations conducting peacekeeping operations, which can 
include the potential use of military force, need an authorisation to conduct these operations or if 
they can operate independently and autonomously from the Security Council.212  
Peacekeeping operations, as classically conceived, which are based on the consent and cooperation 
of all parties and with a conservative mandate such as the supervision of a ceasefire, only allow for 
the use of force in cases of self-defense. As such, these kinds of operations do not fall under the 
requirement of authorisation of the Security Council as the use of force is not intended to be 
employed against a particular party and as self-defense is one of the exceptions to the prohibition of 
the use of force under the regime of the Charter.213 Consequently, should an operation include or 
assume a coercive character, it enters into the field of application of Article 53 and can consequently 
only be implemented with the authorisation of the Security Council.214  
Now, it has to be defined under which conditions a peacekeeping operation can be considered 
coercive under Article 53 of the Charter. Obviously, this includes military operations conducted 
without the consent of the concerned parties, but more often, the operations are established on the 
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basis of consent of the parties and implying a mandate to use force. Notwithstanding the consent of 
all parties, do these operations nevertheless enter into the field of application of Article 53 or, in 
other words, does the consent render enforcement action legitimate?215  
In situations of internal crisis or civil war, it can be difficult, first and foremost, to identify the 
respective parties and the de facto government. Nevertheless, as it has been highlighted in the 
Brahimi report, there are no guarantees that the consent will not be revoked or given for insidious 
reasons.216 The 1994 Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations 
and Regional Arrangements or Agencies emphasises in this regard that “peace-keeping activities 
undertaken by regional arrangements or agencies should be conducted with the consent of the State 
in the territory of which such activities are carried out” and that regional organisations are 
encouraged to build up and assemble troops “for use as appropriate, in coordination with the United 
Nations and, when necessary, under the authority or with the authorization of the Security Council, 
in accordance with the Charter.”217 The reference to “when necessary” can only be interpreted so 
that as long as the regional organisation conducts a classic peacekeeping operation which does not 
involve any form of (military) enforcement action, an authorisation by the Security Council is not 
necessary; should the regional agency or arrangement however implement an operation with 
coercive elements, an authorisation under Article 53 is required.218 The practice of the Security 
Council regarding states or groups of states confirms and validates that interpretation, inter alia, in 
Security Council Resolutions 940 and 1080.219 In practice, it can be problematic if there are different 
interpretations of a mandate provided by the Security Council for a military operation of a regional 
organisation. The very recent practice (infra 1.3.8. and Chapter II) suggests that regional 
organisations increasingly tend to ask for an authorisation by the Security Council notwithstanding 
the qualification of the planned operation as a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. 
Should the Security Council hand out a rather imprecise mandate which may be interpreted 
differently by the Security Council and the regional organisation, the question would arise what 
consequences this different interpretation could entail in terms of the law of international 
responsibility if there is a violation of international law occurring during the deployment of the 
operation.  It could be necessary to inquire if the different interpretation of the mandate by the 
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regional organisation would correspond to a failure of supervision by the Security Council. If that 
were to be answered in the affirmative, one could at least theoretically also engage the responsibility 
of the United Nations and not only the responsibility of the regional organisation conducting the 
operation. 
8. Towards a merger of Chapter VII and Chapter VIII in the practice of the Security 
Council 
 
There have been cases when regional peacekeeping operations were conducted without the 
authorisation of the Security Council, but the very recent practice shows that these operations have 
been carried out either with a prior authorisation or approbation by the Security Council in the early 
stages of the peacekeeping operation.220 The IFOR operation in Yugoslavia was based on the Annex 
to the Agreement of Paris and was authorised by a Security Council Resolution with a mandate to use 
all means necessary to guarantee the implementation of the Peace Agreements.221 These examples 
are very important as the Security Council considered it to be necessary to give its authorisation, 
though all the parties had already agreed to the establishment of the peacekeeping operation.222 
Overall, the conclusion is that any assessment will depend on the specific circumstances and the 
specific mandate given by the Security Council. Confronted with the situation in Mali, the Security 
Council passed Resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2086 (2012) of which not one refers to 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, including Resolution 2086 which established AFISMA, an African-led223 
operation with a clear enforcement mandate.224 In this regard, Walter argues that  
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[w]ith the original concept of using troops under Art. 43 for military enforcement measures having 
generally been replaced by a concept of authorization, the distinction between Chapter VII and Art. 53 




Other authors offer similar arguments, for example, Boisson de Chazournes sees Article 53 as a 
precursor of the trend towards the decentralised use of force on the international level.226 One 
explanation for the use of Chapter VII rather than Chapter VIII is the fact that many regional 
organisations are reluctant to be subjected to Chapter VIII and the obligations it entails.227 From a 
legal perspective, the shift to Chapter VII does not involve fundamental changes as the practice 
continues to be based on an authorisation by the Security Council and as the Security Council 
continues to keep global and ultimate control.228  
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As beneficial as this pragmatic approach by the Security Council may be to prevent tensions arising in 
its relations with the regional organisations, the potential disadvantages may not be ignored. It may 
be asked whether this development does not illustrate the gradual impairment of the authority of 
the Security Council; the stronger and more resourceful – particularly in a political and economic 
sense – the regional organisations in question are, the more they can dictate the conditions for the 
deployment of their troops under the authority of the Security Council.229 Furthermore, as pragmatic 
as the approach of the Security Council is, these acts of improvisation contribute to the conceptual 
misunderstandings whose repercussions may influence the legal analysis of the relationship existing 
between the United Nations and regional organisations.230  
Another reason offered for this practice of the Security Council is to return to the raison d’être of 
Chapter VIII, which is “to make available the specific contributions of regional organizations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security which result from the specific ties which bind their 
members.” So, if a regional organisation decides to act outside its region as defined in broad terms, 
“there are no reasons to assume that such action occurs within the framework of Chapter VIII.”231 
Such an interpretation opens up the possibility of reliance on Article 48 (2) of the Charter.232  The 
distinction between Chapter VIII and Chapter VII is even less relevant for Article 53 (1), second 
sentence, which can be equated more closely with authorisations by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII. 233 
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This evolution has been characterised as a migration of regionalism from Chapter VIII to Chapter 
VII,234 but Chapter VIII has, notwithstanding, real relevance in the practice of the Security Council. As 
the Secretary-General pointed out: “The complex challenges in the world today require a revitalized 
and evolving interpretation of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.”235 Even more 
striking is the argument made by the President of the Security Council in the debate on cooperation 
with regional and subregional organisations:  
More than six decades ago, when the Charter was drafted, there was no practical example of how this 
cooperation would be structured and executed. However, Chapter VIII of the Charter was 
groundbreaking in that, in spite of the fact that there were no regional organizations at the time, it 
provided for flexibility in cases where such regional organizations would be established.
236
 
The reactivation of Chapter VIII following the end of the Cold War has led to flows of activity within 
the UN but also on an inter-organisational level with the aim to further institutionalise relations via 
established, permanent organs such as the United Nations-European Steering Committee on Crisis 
Management.237 Various studies and reports on the reform of peacekeeping and the relationship of 
the United Nations with regional organisations have been carried out. In 1993, the Security Council 
invited, within the framework of Chapter VIII, regional arrangements and organizations to study 
“ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within 
their areas of competence, paying due regard to the characteristics of their respective regions.” 
Furthermore, it asked them to analyse ways and means to improve the coordination of their efforts 
with those of the United Nations.238  Therefore,  
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In all areas not involving the use of force, notably as far as cooperation on matters of peacekeeping in 
the African context is concerned, Chapter VIII has witnessed an enormous boost, which is largely due 
to limited resources, both at the regional and the universal levels. It is certainly also favoured by the 
fact that the antagonism between universalism and regionalism which was formative for the 




The aim of all these efforts is to institutionalise relationships, away from relations on an ad hoc, case-
by-case basis (infra 2.1.-2.6.). 
9. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter began by analysing the thesis that the general framework of the UN Charter for 
maintaining international peace and security had been shaped by supporters of both a universalist 
and a regionalist view of the system of collective security.  
Indeed, by examining the documents of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, it became clear that 
Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter were codified by the founders as a compromise between 
universalism – Chapter VII – and regionalism – Chapter VIII; maintaining the primary responsibility of 
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII while 
allowing for regional action under Chapter VIII.  This dichotomy between universalism and 
regionalism is mirrored within the specific dispositions of Chapter VIII. Article 52 of the Charter 
grants, on paper, a high degree of autonomy to regional organisations for the pacific settlement of 
disputes. In contrast, Article 53 of the Charter retains the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council may look to regional 
organisations for enforcement actions under its authority, and enforcement actions under the 
authority of the latter have to be authorised by the Security Council.240  
In practice, however, a much more complex picture has emerged of the system for maintaining 
international peace and security under the UN Charter which, prima facie, is very much removed 
from the tension characterized by Chapters VII and Chapters III. The analysis revealed that the 
practice of the UN and regional organisations for maintaining international peace and security is very 
flexible and pragmatic and that, overall, the practice of the United Nations and regional organisations 
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gravitates around the epicentre of universalism and regionalism – cooperation between the UN and 
regional organisations.241   
 
Regarding the specific context of peacekeeping operations, a division of labour is emerging between 
the UN and regional organisations which, once again, constitutes a compromise between 
universalism and regionalism. The UN focuses on traditional peacekeeping operations based on the 
consent of all parties and allowing only a very limited amount of military force whereas 
peacekeeping operations with a more robust mandate, as well as peace enforcement operations are 
delegated to and conducted by regional organisations.242 This practice was possibly also catalysed in 
response to criticism that the UN would be incapable of mounting “militarised” peacekeeping  
operations.243As part of the cooperation of the UN with regional organisations in peacekeeping 
operations, the former would also focus on the broader spectrum of activities surrounding the 
concept of peacekeeping, e.g., peacebuilding, state-building and the reconstruction of the political 
system within the state. 
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Legally speaking, this emerging practice between the organisations led to a shift in the mandating 
practice of the Security Council from authorising regional peacekeeping operations solely under 
Chapter VIII for which there are several reasons. First of all, traditional peacekeeping operations of 
regional organisations do not require the authorisation of the Security Council in contrast to robust 
peacekeeping operations which do require a mandate from the Security Council. Furthermore, the 
nature of peacekeeping operations and the nature of “situations” in which peacekeeping operations 
are deployed have evolved. In the majority of cases, peacekeeping operations are now deployed in 
situations of volatile, armed conflicts in which the enduring consent of all parties to the conflict 
concerning the deployment of a peacekeeping operation is not deployed. An authorisation under 
Chapter VII is therefore preferable as it would enable the peacekeeping operation to respond with 
military force if unforeseen circumstances make it necessary. The emerging practice of the UN to 
mandate regional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII corresponds with the UN’s practice as 
regards its own peacekeeping operations which are now routinely mandated under Chapter VII as 
well.  
 
Nevertheless, this shift in the mandating practice of the Security Council does not equate to a 
convergence of power in the Security Council at the expense of regional organisations. It has to be 
emphasised strongly that, in practice, the gap between universalism and regionalism is bridged by 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.  It has to be further underlined that there is 
no blueprint to define – including from a legal point of view – the relations between the UN and 
regional organisations in the exercise of their functions under Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter. 
Indeed, the cooperation arrangements of the involved organisations are solely dependant on the 
specific circumstances of the situation.  
 
One can draw three conclusions from the analysis carried out in this Chapter on the law of the 
responsibility of international organisations.  
 
Firstly, the emerging practice of the Security Council and regional organisations which is based on 
cooperation and the division of labour or an “institutional balance” is an impetus for a scenario in 
which the United Nations and regional organisations might be jointly responsible. 
 
Secondly, any criterion of attributing conduct to international organisations for acts or omissions 
arising in the context of peacekeeping operations needs to be constructed in such a way so as to take 
into account the varied nature of cooperation arrangements between the United Nations and 
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regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. In other words, it must be able to capture the 
casuistic approach used by the United Nations and regional organisations.  
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, while examining the attribution of conduct, it is necessary to 
embark upon an analysis of the legal foundation of the relationship and cooperation between the UN 
and regional organisations. As was mentioned rather briefly in this Chapter, regional organisations 
are per se not bound by the United Nations Charter and thereby also not by Chapter VIII which serves 
as the framework for the relations between the UN and regional organisations for maintaining 
international peace and security. Therefore, it needs to be analysed if that fact influences the 
interaction between the regional organisations and the United Nations, as well as the potential 
distribution of international responsibility. It is also important, as despite the shift in the mandating 
practice of peacekeeping operations by the Security Council to Chapter VII, Chapter VIII is repeatedly 





Chapter II: The (emerging) system of collective security consisting of 
the United Nations and regional organisations 
 
Now the evolution of United Natons peacekeeping 
missions is such that the organization, planning and 
execution of related operations are transcending the 
primary normative framework mentioned in Chapters 
VI, VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Peacekeeping missions, in their multidimensional  
design, now rely on a normative framework that brings 
together the relevant provisions of the Charter and the 
international legal instruments for human rights and 
international humanitarian law, as well as of regional 
and subregional organizations. 
 




2.1. Relations between the United Nations and regional organisations and 
among different regional organisations  
 
The previous chapter traced the evolution of peacekeeping within the framework of the UN Charter 
and the general practice of the UN with respect to Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter. It showed that 
the framework for maintaining international peace and security under the Charter is based on a 
compromise between universalist, unipolar and regionalist, multipolar views, thereby increasing the 
potential for joint and common action by several entities.  This Chapter will first of all analyse 
whether the findings of Chapter I can be further corroborated by examining the relations between 
the UN and regional organisations. Furthermore, such an exercise on the basis of the various 
cooperation agreements, partnerships and declarations among international organisations can shed 
light on the potential distribution of responsibility among them or even allow the formulation of a 
presumption of joint responsibility between two specific organisations. If these documents are 
conceived solely as part of the internal law of the respective organisation(s), they nevertheless 
“[provide] guidance in determining issues of attribution of conduct and responsibility” as they define 
the relational context on whose basis international organisations interact with each other in 
                                                          
1
 Security Council, 6903
rd
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6903 (2013), 11. 
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maintaining international peace and security,2 as well as in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, their 
inter-institutional cooperation may also shape financing procedures, command and control 
arrangements, operational practices, as well as accountability or reporting mechanisms.3 
Various factors influence the relations between universal and regional organisations. Virally suggests 
that these relations pivot on three main ideas: collaboration or cooperation, competition, and 
“chasse gardée.”4 Cooperation can be based on formal arrangements and agreements or also simply 
on practice.5 Formalised cooperation often implies an orientation of the regional organisations 
towards the activities of the universal organisation, which may also include the execution of 
decisions by the latter.6 Cooperation allows organisations to define their roles from each other, 
thereby preventing redundancies and duplications of conduct, according to each organisation’s 
means. However, should the interests of international organisations diverge, the potential for 
competition may lead to the creation of organisations with opposite mandates on a regional level, 
e.g. the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.  These opposed organisations might even bypass 
regulation on a global level or sideline an existing universal organisation.7  
Although competition may have beneficial effects such as pushing the agenda on certain issues, 
negative effects can equally arise; especially if a regional organisation chooses to ignore the 
involvement of a universal organisation in a particular domain. Finally, a regional organisation may 
even go so far as to claim the exclusive responsibility for a specific issue within its own ranks to the 
detriment of the universal organisation.8  
In practice, relations between regional organisations and universal organisations rarely subscribe to 
one idea alone, but they stretch across various, complex areas, while taking into account the specific 
circumstances in each situation. The network of relations among organisations is normally relatively 
flexible, practice-driven and external factors such as the lack of resources and means often prompt 
organisations to seek cooperation rather than confrontation. In addition to burden sharing, 
cooperation between international organisations can be used as a strategy to allow a holistic or 
                                                          
2
 L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘United in Joy and Sorrow : Some Considerations on Responsibility Issues under 
Partnership among International Financial Institutions’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of International 
Organizations. Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie (2013),  213, 218. 
3
 Cf. T. Tardy, ‘Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges’, in (2014) 20 Global Governance, 95, 97. 
4
 M. Virally, L’Organisation Mondiale (1972), 295. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Ibid., 295-96. 
7
 Cf., ibid., 296. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation did not sideline the UN, but the blockade within the 
Security Council  effectively contributed to their creation by the two opposing blocks during the Cold War.  
8
 Ibid., 297. 
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comprehensive approach towards peacekeeping or to allow flexibility and selectivity in engaging in 
peacekeeping operations.9 
Moreover, the complexity of the current issues the international community faces has also changed, 
not only in terms of the way in which they are perceived but also how these crises are understood. 
Today, it is generally accepted, that one organisation, be it regional or universal, may not be able to 
tackle a given issue on its own, but rather cooperation between international organisations and a 
multilayered response is necessary.10 
Chapter II introduces the various organisations, their peacekeeping activities, and their normative 
and political framework. It also analyses the internal and external challenges facing each organisation 
which affect their ability to carry out peacekeeping activities. It further explores the relations among 
these organisations. Throughout the past two decades, the United Nations has continuously 
strengthened its relations with regional organisations; and in all events many questions remain open. 
A report of the Secretary-General from 2008 highlights some of the open questions with respect to 
the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, of which those relevant for 
the purposes of this thesis shall be addressed in the following analysis: 
With a view to clarifying the critical role of regional organizations in maintaining international peace 
and security, (…) the Security Council could consider: 
(a) Defining the role regional organizations play in the maintenance of peace and security, in 
particular the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; 
(…) 
 (c) Discussing common approaches and frameworks that can be designed to ensure that the 
nature of the collaboration and cooperation between the United Nations and regional 
organizations is clarified, (…) 
(d) Discussing how to make a distinction between regional organizations for Chapter VIII 
activities and all other regional organizations’ activities (…) 
                                                          
9
 Tardy, supra note 3, 95, 99-104. 
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 Ibid., 95, 100. 
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(e) Engaging in consultations on options for a structured cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional organizations involved in regional peace operations, including a possible 
mechanism aimed at enhancing interactions with the Security Council.
11
 
This passage from the report underlines that the cooperation arrangements and methods between 
the UN and regional organisations are still in statu nascendi.  The following analysis traces the 
development of the relations among the UN and the regional organisations, but focuses on the 
current situation and the current status of relations among these organisations. Past developments 
might help to give indications for the future and similarly references to specific operations may 
equally contribute to the assessment; but any such practice merely serves for the purpose of defining  
the inter-institutional relationship between the two (or more) organisations in question.  
As cooperation among international organisations in peacekeeping operations becomes more 
frequent, the deployment of military troops by one organisation does not “tak[e] place in a vacuum”, 
but ideally – presupposes coordination and cooperation with other organisations – in a setting of 
“reciprocal interaction”12 – an emerging system of regional security with “explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in [this] given 
area of international relations.”13 
It cannot be underlined strongly enough that each peacekeeping operation is unique in its mandate, 
composition and implementation. Many factors, including political factors, combine to determine the 
way in which an operation is conducted. As the examples mentioned in the previous chapters show, 
the Security Council uses its mandate in a very flexible manner so that the relationship between the 
United Nations and regional organisations is never static. Whereas the cooperation between the 
United Nations and a given regional organisation X might take a relationship in the form of a 
partnership based on coordination, in another operation Y, coordination might be replaced by the 
subordination of one organisation to the other.14  Thus, the relationships are not static in respect of 
the mission level; nor are they static on an inter-organisational or institutional level as they 
continuously develop and evolve. All these factors contribute to raise the level of difficulty in legally 
                                                          
11
 Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, 
in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc. S/2008/186 
(2008), 20, para. 71. 
12
 M. Brosig, ‘The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU’, in (2011) 16 European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 107, 109-110. 
13
 S.D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, in S.D. Krasner 
(ed.), International Regimes (1982), 1, 2. 
14
 It goes without saying that the cooperation of the United Nations with one of these organisations or in 
between the latter might be different in other areas than in the field of international peace and security. 
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assessing the attribution of conduct for violations of international law occurring in peacekeeping 
operations. 
As pointed out, the degree of diversity in terms of institutional structures and capabilities means 
“that no simple or singular global pattern for future development can reasonably be proposed.”15 
Nevertheless, it is helpful to distinguish between institutional partnership and operational 
collaboration, as the former constitutes a long-term effort, whereas the latter is essentially ad hoc.16  
The present analysis will therefore combine both elements in order to facilitate a thorough 
examination of the relations existing among the organisations. The focus will nevertheless remain on 
inter-institutional relations, as operational cooperation will be examined in the case studies in 
Chapter V of this study. It is advantageous to analyse the relationship of the United Nations with 
each individual organisation. Following this approach, this study explores two regional organisations 
from both Europe and Africa17, which is beneficial as the links are traditionally particularly strong 
among regional organisations from the same continent. They often share the very same cultural 
heritage and as they exercise their activities within the same geographic region, their respective roles 
are often more defined than towards other international organisations.18 
  
                                                          
15
 J. Morris, H. McCoubrey, ‘Regional peacekeeping in the post-cold war era’, in (1999) 6 International 
Peacekeeping, 129, 147. 
16
 H. Yamashita, ‘Peacekeeping cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations’, in (2012) 
38 Review of International Studies, 165, 167. 
17
 The vast majority of NATO’s members are European and the cultural ties are strong with their transatlantic 
fellow NATO members. 
18
 As such it is said, that “we must establish the necessary link between NATO reform and the process of 
deepening and at the same time broadening European integration. NATO and the European security and 
defence identity are not at odds with one another; rather, they are complementary”, V. Rühe, ‘Adapting the 
Alliance in the Face of Great Challenges’, (1993) 41 (6) Nato Review, 3-5. NATO-EU cooperation is based on the 
Berlin-Plus Agreements whereas ECOWAS and the AU are connected through the African Peace and Security 
Architecture. 
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2.2. NATO: a Euro-Atlantic pillar for peacekeeping or a security actor with a 
broader agenda? 
 
 “NATO possesses unique capabilities to contribute to peacekeeping operations.” 
- NATO Defence Planning Committee
19
 
1. The Foundation of NATO 
 
NATO was effectively born out of the power-play between the USSR and the United States and its 
allies in the times of the Cold War. The blockade in the Security Council led to a strange form of 
regionalism as the two sides attempted to safeguard and expand their spheres of interest and 
influence by creating regional organisations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in 
1949, in the same year as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). 20 It was clear that 
international peace and security could not be guaranteed within the Security Council, and NATO was 
seen as a way out of the stalemate.21  The founding of NATO was preceded by the Brussels Treaty 
which led to the creation of the Western European Union.22 However, what was lacking, in order to 
counter the military strength of the USSR, was US participation.  
After consultations and negotiations to establish a new military alliance, the North-Atlantic Treaty 
was signed in Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949.23 NATO was created with the understanding that it 
would operate within the framework of the United Nations and accepts the latter’s role in 
maintaining international peace and security. This role clearly derives from the preamble to the 
North-Atlantic Treaty which says: “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and 
all governments.”24 This subordination to the primacy of the UN Charter is mirrored throughout the 
whole North Atlantic Treaty.  
                                                          
19
 Final communiqué of the Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, 11 December 1992, para. 4. 
20
 Comecon was the economic counter-part to the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, “Warsaw Pact” which was established in 1955. 
21
 P. Sands, P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), 195; also with further references, S. R. 
Lüder, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit bei Teilnahme an „Peace-keeping”-Missionen der Vereinten Nationen 
(2004), 141. 
22
 ‘The Brussels Treaty’, Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 17 
May 1948. The Western European Union was abolished in 2010 by a common decision of its member states 
after the competences were completely transferred to the European Union, taking effect by 30 June 2011. 
23
 The North-Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949.  
24
 See also articles 1, 7. The latter states that “This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the 
United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace 
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Article 1 reiterates the prohibition of the use of force as enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, 
stating that the parties undertake “to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”   
This reference to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter which prohibits the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, does nevertheless not allow NATO to take 
a more flexible approach in the area of maintenance of international peace and security.  Article 7 of 
the North-Atlantic Treaty equally refers to the UN Charter and to the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council for maintaining international peace and security.25 Despite these close links to the 
United Nations system, the question whether NATO qualifies as a regional arrangement or agency 
under Chapter VIII of the Charter has been the subject of great controversy.  
2. NATO and its formal submission under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
 
NATO is generally considered as an international organisation with separate legal personality under 
international law26 and it arguably fulfils the criteria to qualify as a regional organisation under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.27 Nevertheless, NATO itself has always rejected any qualifications as a 
regional arrangement under Chapter VIII.28 Until the end of the Cold War this opposition was 
                                                          
and security.” For an overview of NATO’s relations with the United Nations, see 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm.  
25
 The notions of territorial integrity and political independence are also commonly interpreted as covering any 
possible kind of trans-frontier use of armed force, see with further references, A. Randelzhofer, O. Dörr, ‘Article 
2 (4)’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume 
I (2012), 200, 215-16, mn. 37. 
26
 See, for instance, Plea by France in Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others, Admissibility, Decision of 12 
December 2001, para. 32, German Constitutional Court, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 22. November 2001, 2 
BvE 6/99, Fraktion der PDS im Deutschen Bundestag und Bundesregierung, BVerfGE 104, 151, 155. 
27
 See, infra Chapter I. 
28
 Appearing before the Security Council, the Deputy Assistant Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Robert F. 
Simmons, stated that “[a]lthough the alliance does not consider itself formally a regional organization under 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, NATO’s transition from a purely collective-defence organization into 
a security manager in a broad sense has enabled it to act in the same spirit, first in Europe and now beyond” 
[Emphasis added], Security Council, 5007
th
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5007 (2004), 24-25. One can only note 
however the qualification of “formally” which seems to suggest a general agreement to the spirit of Chapter 
VIII, but an equal will to remain autonomous. Equally, Zwanenburg says that “even if NATO is a regional agency, 
it does not necessarily feel constrained by Article 53 of the Charter in certain circumstances”, M. Zwanenburg, 
‘NATO, Its Members and the Security Council’, in N. Blokker, N. Schrijver (eds.), The Security Council and the 
Use of Force: Theory and Reality. A Need for Change? (2005), 189, 195. The aim of NATO to keep a certain 
autonomy regarding a qualification as a regional organisation has also found an expression in NATO’s Strategic 
Concept of 1999 in which it is stated “NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent 
conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, 
(…) NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its 
own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council  (…) Taking 
into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission 
will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.”, The Alliance's 
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primarily motivated by NATO’s intention not to submit to a Security Council whose members 
included the USSR, as well as to the reporting requirements under Article 54 of the UN Charter, than 
by a position of opposition against cooperation with the United Nations.29 Generally, NATO’s 
relations with the UN were limited during the Cold War. This changed in 1992 when “their respective 
roles in crisis management led to an intensification of practical cooperation between the two 
organizations in the field.”30 In the 1991 Strategic Concept, it was already expressed that “Allies 
could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for 
United Nations missions.”31 
Another reason for NATO’s opposition to a qualification under Chapter VIII was, of course, to 
safeguard NATO's autonomy of action. However, it had been argued in 1949 that there are “no 
reasons of logic or precedent stand[ing] in the way of attributing to the North Atlantic Treaty the 
character of regional arrangement.”32 As the statement by NATO shows33, the position has changed 
since the end of the Cold War and this seems to be equally recognised by the United Nations. 
Security Council Resolutions 781 (1992) and 787 (1992) upon which NATO acted in Yugoslavia refer 
explicitly to states acting through regional arrangements or agencies.34 Arguments brought forward 
against a qualification of NATO as a regional organisation rely, for example, on Article 12 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, which suggests that NATO was not considered to be a regional arrangement under 
                                                          
Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 24 April 1999, para. 31; concerns about such a possible qualification were 
previously raised during the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty. Any such suggestion was seen as 
justifying “the argument that all action taken (…) should be subject to the veto of the Security Council”, N. 
Henderson, The Birth of NATO (1983), 102. In fact, the delegates all agreed upon omitting any specific 
reference in any part of the Treaty to Chapter VIII of the Charter, ibid., 103. 
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 D. S. Yost, ‘NATO and International Organizations’, Forum Paper 3, NATO Defense College, September 2007, 
34. 
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 NATO’s relations with the United Nations, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm 
31
 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 07 November 1991 – 08 November 1991, para. 41. 
32
 E. N. van Kleffens, ‘Regionalism and Political Pacts’, (1949) 43 The American Journal of International Law, 
666, 679.  
33
 NATO’s relations with the United Nations, supra note 30. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, supra note 
31, para. 41. 
34
 Security Council Resolution 781, UN Doc. S/RES/781 (1992), 2, para. 5; Security Council Resolution 787, UN 
Doc. S/RES/787 (1992), 4, para. 14. Boutros-Ghali referred also explicitly to NATO as a regional arrangement 
and so did the Security Council, Letter Dated 9 April 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25567 (1993), 1 first paragraph; Security Council, An Agenda for 
Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, UN Doc. S/25996 (1993), 3 para. 3 (d). The 
response of NATO to the Agenda for Peace leaves the question once again unanswered, ibid., 18-19.  Some 
authors interpret these resolutions as “it is clear from the context that NATO was regarded as such an regional 
arrangement.”, G. Ress, J. Bröhmer, ‘Article 53’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A 
Commentary (2002), 854, 862, see also Security Council Resolutions 1031, UN Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995), point 
II.4 which refers indirectly to NATO and also Security Council Resolution 1022, UN Doc. S/RES/1022 (1995), in 
which the Security Council pays tribute to, inter alia, NATO and also the WEU. 
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Chapter VIII of the UN Charter at the time of the conclusion of the North-Atlantic Treaty. This article 
states:  
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of 
them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the 
factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of 
universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. [Emphasis added] 
Others who are skeptical of qualifying NATO as falling under Chapter VIII remark that the structures, 
as well as the objectives of an organisation of collective defence such as NATO, are different from 
those of a regional organisation under Chapter VIII.  They submit that collective defence mechanisms 
act against external aggressors whereas regional organisations act internally in relation to their own 
members. The latter also need an authorisation of the Security Council to carry out coercive 
measures, whereas organisations established for the collective defence of its members only have to 
report to the Security Council the measures taken under Article 51 of the Charter.35 These objections 
are not convincing as nothing in the drafting history or in the Charter suggests any such limitation 
(infra 1.3.).  
The interplay between Article 51 and Article 54 signifies that only coercive measures not taken as a 
response to an aggression, which would be based on Article 51, necessitate a prior authorisation of 
the Security Council. Apart from this, there is no point of contact between Article 51 and Chapter VIII 
in their substance.36 In practice, this tension has lost all relevance due to the flexibility, if not 
unpredictability, of the Security Council’s action and its utilization of both Chapter VIII, as well as 
Chapter VII.  
3. NATO: Rising like a phoenix post the Cold War? A new strategic alignment 
 
NATO underwent a massive transformation after the end of the Cold War. Article 5 sets out the heart 
of the system of collective security and self-defense according to which an armed attack against one 
or more members shall be considered an armed attack against the whole alliance, triggering the right 
of individual or collective self-defence.  The end of the Cold War saw NATO lose its principal purpose 
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 U. Villani, Les Rapports entre l’ONU et les organisations régionales dans le domaine du maintien de la paix, 
Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 290 (2001), 225, 287. 
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 Article 52 may be considered closer Article 49 than to any other disposition in the Charter. As explained, 
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of existence as a Western military alliance against the Soviet bloc.37 The organisation was forced to 
transform and to take on new tasks and responsibilities as well as to defend its continuing 
existence.38 
NATO declared that for the attainment of its objectives it would no longer act solely through the 
military dimension, but also through the political dimension under Article 2 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.39 These political tools and the new agenda of “comprehensive political guidance” opened up 
new political courses of action for NATO. They enabled the organisation to expand military crisis 
management from reaction to action and to include wider elements in its agenda such as conflict 
prevention.40 Part of this new comprehensive security notion within NATO was the establishment of 
regular dialogues with states who were part of the former Soviet Union as well as cooperation with 
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 See also The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, supra note 31, para. 1. 
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 As recalled by the Assistant Secretary-General of the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO in 
2005 “During the first 40 years of its existence, NATO had a very specific role in the historic context of what we 
call the period of the cold war. Those times are long gone, and the once static and passive alliance of European 
and North American democracies has changed profoundly. 
Today, NATO is no longer focused on deterrence. Instead, we have embarked on a journey to turn the alliance 
into a provider of stability in Europe and even beyond. This journey began in response to a brutal act of 
violence in the Balkans. Ten years ago, in 1995, the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina became the 
symbol of a tragedy that could have been avoided if the international community had acted more resolutely. 
Srebrenica was a wake-up call. It was a turning point for Europe, and it was a defining point for NATO. 
Srebrenica has taught us that we have to face challenges earlier. It spurred NATO allies to engage themselves 
more resolutely in the search for a solution to the Bosnian conflict. The result was a major peacekeeping 
operation — first the Implementation Force (IFOR), later the Stabilization Force (SFOR) — the first even in 
NATO history (…). 
That is, so to speak, the past. NATO has become an organization that defends the security of its members and 
provides stability far beyond its own borders. Although not a regional organization per se, but an international 
intergovernmental organization, the alliance has evolved over the years into a security manager in a broad 
sense, first in Europe and now beyond.”, Statement by Mr. Martin Erdmann, Assistant Secretary General of the 
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO, Security Council, 5282nd meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5282 
(2005), 25;  Cf. A. Hyde-Price, ‘NATO’s Political Transformation and International Order’, in J. Ringsmose, S. 
Rynning (eds.), NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS Report (2011), 45, 45-46. 
39
 Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council “The London Declaration”, 05 July 1990 – 06 July 
1990, especially paras. 1-7; J. Woodliffe, ‘The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe’, (1998) 47 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 174, 174. 
40
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March 2013, an international group of experts adopted the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare (2013), prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It is rather likely that as cyber warfare becomes increasingly 
common in future armed conflicts that states and international organisations will be forced to increase their 
cooperation in this new area and one can presume that it will be used as a tool to facilitate, as well as hinder 
peacekeeping operations. Indeed, in 2008, during the war between Russia and Georgia, Russia attacked the 
websites of Georgian institutions as well as of the local bases of international organisations and news 
organisations, R. D. Admus, A Little War that Shook the World – Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West 
(2010), 166-68. 
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all states in Europe41 based on the principles contained in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe.42 On 
the basis of the partnership for peace and other programmes43 NATO consequently transformed into 
an organisation with a broader mandate, “including fostering peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
region through crisis management and involvement in peace-keeping operations.”44 The organisation 
consequently gained renewed credibility and legitimation as an exporter of stability even outside the 
North-Atlantic area. In a speech in November 2012 by NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, the core 
roles of NATO were stated as “collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” 45 
In its Strategic Concept set out in 1999, NATO, while referring to the United Nations, declared that 
“[m]utually reinforcing organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.”46 
Moreover, the evolving activity outside of the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond the more traditional 
area in which armed attacks feature, is equally mirrored in the 1991 and the 1999 Strategic Concepts. 
In respect of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “Alliance Security must also take account of the 
global context (…) [it] can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism (…) 
organised crime.”47 The interpretation of Article 5 was further expanded in the new Strategic 
                                                          
41
 Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of States and Government participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The Rome Declaration”), 08 November 1991, para. 4. 
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st
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(2011), para.2. 
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the borders of Europe”, Speech by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Defense 
College, Rome, 28 May 2009., see also Sands, Klein, supra note 21, 195; The Alliance's Strategic Concept, supra 
note 28, para. 31. 
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 NATO in 2020: Strong capabilities, strong partnerships. Keynote speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General 
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the international conference “NATO and the global structure of security: 
the future of partnerships”, Bucharest, Romania, 10 November 2012. 
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 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, supra note 28, para. 12. 
47
 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, supra note 28, para. 24; The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, supra note 
31, para. 12. The 1991 concept does not speak of organised crime, but instead of the risk of proliferation of 
weapons of mass-destruction. An example of an Article 5 operation against terrorism is Operation Active 
Endeavour (OAE), cf. Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 20 November 2010, para. 6. The representative of the 
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Concept, which was issued in November 2010. This document asserts that “NATO will deter and 
defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they 
threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole”48[Emphasis added].   
4. Assuming new tasks of security proliferation and projection – in accordance with 
the NAT? 
 
The new Strategic Concept also abdicates the territory requirement in case of an armed attack.49 The 
Lisbon Strategic concept thus conveys the collective will of NATO member states to transform NATO 
into a more globally acting organisation, alone or in combination with the increasing network of 
partnerships and cooperation arrangements.50 This transformation is based on three identified core 
tasks of NATO, “defence and deterrence”, “security and crisis management” as well as “promoting 
international security through cooperation.”51 This is somewhat astonishing as NATO has not 
considered it to be necessary to amend the North Atlantic Treaty accordingly.52 Consequently, this 
                                                          
Daalder, permanent representative of the United States to NATO, Transatlantic Forum, Berlin, 1 July 2009; J. M. 
Goldgeier, ‘The Future of NATO’, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 51, February 2010, 8; 
Speech by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 28 May 2009. 
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 Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, 
Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 2010, para. 4. a.  
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aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective 
action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The 
forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far 
forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly 
by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's 
military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus 
contribute to peace and stability in Europe” [emphasis added], The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, supra 
note 31, para. 35. The Bucharest Summit Declaration of 2008 lists as one of the aims that “[t]hese forces must 
be able to conduct, upon decision by the Council, collective defence and crisis response operations on and 
beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at a strategic distance, with little or no host nation support”, 
Bucharest Summit Declaration, supra note 42, para. 44. [Emphasis added] 
50
 J. Ringsmose, S. Rynning, ‘Introduction. Taking Stock of NATO’s New Strategic Concept’, in J. Ringsmose, S. 
Rynning (eds.), NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS Report (2011), 7, 7-8, 14. 
Nonetheless, the main priority is given to the defence of NATO territory. In contrast to the will to act more 
globally, NATO has limited its consideration of international security crises to those in which NATO is actively 
involved, thereby narrowing “NATO’s political horizons (…) and consultations”, J. Shea, ‘What does a New 
Strategic Concept Do for NATO?’, in J. Ringsmose, S. Rynning (eds.), NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A 
Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS Report (2011), 25, 26. 
51
 Cf. K. Wittmann, ‘An Alliance for the 21st Century? Reviewing NATO’s New Strategic Concept’, in J. 
Ringsmose, S. Rynning (eds.), NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS Report (2011), 
31, 33. The Concept does not prioritise between these three main tasks, but adopts a holistic approach. 
Prevention and crisis management also contribute to defence and deterrence. Seee also Wales Summit 
Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Wales from 4 to 5 September 2014, para. 3. 
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may question whether an amendment to the North Atlantic Charter might not have been preferable. Two 
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new Strategy gives NATO a great degree of leeway, if not close to carte blanche to act in matters of 
international peace and security.   Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty also provides the legal basis 
for the peacekeeping operations if NATO is engaged in “crisis management operations”, falling within 
the scope of the broad interpretation which was given to that article through the practice of the 
organisation and the recent Strategic Concepts.53   
Although evolutionary interpretation through practice has been recognised in international law,54 the 
broadening interpretation raises questions regarding its compliance with other dispositions in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Article 7 supports the new interpretation of Article 5 as the establishment of 
NATO-run operations, such as IFOR and SFOR, is based on resolutions of the Security Council.55 
Another pertinent aspect of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 4. This article prescribes that NATO 
members will consult each other in cases of threats to territorial integrity, political independence, or 
security of any members. In the post-Cold War period, a broader interpretation has been given to 
that article based on the recognition that threats to members of NATO can arise from other sources 
than armed attacks by a third state.56 Consequently, that disposition cannot be interpreted as a 
limitation of NATO’s competences to mere consultations, but it includes other reactions, including 
the participation of NATO in peacekeeping operations, as well.57 
                                                          
authors suggests that member states have amended the NATO constitution through practice, see E. de Wet, 
‘The Relationship between the Security Council and Regional Organizations during Enforcement Action under 
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53
 These operations clearly do not fall under the rubrique of self-defence, F. Naert, International Law Aspects of 
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(2010), 26. 
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(2006), 36. 
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A potential weak point in the legal framework is NATO’s tendency to adopt all decisions by consensus 
which in an organisation with 28 member-states can be problematic.58  As consensus amounts to 
decisions being taken without a vote, technically speaking each member state has a veto right, as a 
threat not to agree to a consensus amounts to a veto.  
5. NATO, peacekeeping and its relations with other organisations 
 
1. Beginnings/History – NATO and the UN 
 
The new strategic orientation of NATO as established in the 1991 Strategic Concept was fully 
implemented in the Yugoslavia crisis. NATO’s involvement in the Balkan crisis also triggered the 
“Alliance’s increasingly extensive cooperation with other international organisations.”59 
NATO ships were engaged in monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of the arms embargo 
which was imposed by the Security Council against all republics of the former Yugoslavia.60 Whereas 
these operations fall under UN sanctions or peace enforcement operations, NATO declared in 
December 1992  
the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own 
procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the 
primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to respond positively to 
initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation 
of UN Security Council Resolutions
61
 [Emphasis added]  
and 
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support for peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of the UN Security Council), 17 December 1992, 
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In this spirit, we are contributing individually and as an Alliance to the implementation of the UN 
Security Council resolutions relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For the first time in its 
history, the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations. The 
Alliance, together with the WEU, is supporting with its ships in the Adriatic the enforcement of the UN 
economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and of the arms embargo against all republics of 
former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR is using elements from the Alliance's NORTHAG command for its 
operational headquarters. NATO airborne early-warning aircraft - AWACS - are monitoring daily the 
UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina. [Emphasis added]
62
 
Following the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreements, NATO deployed its first peacekeeping 
forces, the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of a mandate of the 
Security Council under Security Council Resolution 1031.63 IFOR was replaced a year later by SFOR on 
the basis of another resolution by the Security Council.64 
NATO is a military organisation so that the range of its activities is clear and defined and cannot be 
compared with the range of activities of organisations with general competence such as the 
European Union and the African Union.  It would however be shortsighted to consider NATO’s 
potential limited to the military area. It combines the military capabilities and the economic power of 
the United States with the collective European political influence and weight, making it a significant 
global actor.65 
The ties between NATO and the UN concerning crisis management and maintenance of international 
peace and security were increased in the following years. NATO cooperated with the UN throughout 
the Kosovo crisis and on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1244 it established KFOR.  According 
to the resolution, KFOR was designated as the military component of the broader multidimensional 
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 Security Council Resolution 1031, UN Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995), 3, paras. 12, 14-16; The General Framework 
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NATO lacks generally a strong civilian side to peacekeeping.  An internal UN report noted that “NATO sought to 
cooperate with the United Nations partly to enlarge its available tools for peacekeeping. While NATO has 
substantial military assets under its command, interviewees at NATO noted that it lacked other civilian 
capacities. As peacekeeping missions become increasingly more multidimensional, with broadened mandates 
that include, for example, protection of civilians and reform of the justice sector, it is imperative that NATO 
engage in cooperation with other bodies in order to enhance its response to the complex security challenges.  
Cooperation with organizations such as the United Nations could provide NATO and its partners with a broader 
set of tools in responding to complex conflicts”, Thematic evaluation of cooperation between the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support and regional organizations, Report of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc. A/65/762 (2011), 10, para. 28. 
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operation, under the authority of the United Nations Special Representative and working closely with 
the civilian component which was set up by the United Nations (UNMIK).66 
2. Between autonomy and approximation, NATO and its relations with the UN 
 
 In 2008, the UN and NATO issued a joint declaration concerning UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation, 
“reaffirming [their] commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security” and 
providing for further, increased, but flexible consultation and cooperation between the two 
Secretariats.67 Nevertheless, NATO retains its autonomy as regards the United Nations, and there is 
no institutionalised representation of NATO at the UN through a mission, nor does NATO possess 
observer status in the General Assembly. The 2008 joint declaration is also a step backwards from 
the envisaged UN-NATO framework agreement including a joint declaration and a memorandum of 
understanding, which was drafted in September 2005 by the Alliance. These did not gain approval 
within the UN before Kofi Annan left his office and no further action has been taken since then in this 
matter.68 The 2008 declaration was also only possible after a lengthy struggle between NATO’s main-
contributors in favour of signing the declaration and important states voicing their concern about 
such a declaration; in the end the UN Secretariat urged NATO not to publish the accord.69 
Nevertheless NATO remains committed to expanding its institutional ties with the UN and its 
practical support to UN peacekeeping operations as confirmed by the organision during the Wales 
Summit 2014.70 
The relationship between the two organisations has developed along two main lines of cooperation 
in peacekeeping operations.71 Under the first option, NATO is subcontracted by the United Nations 
and subscribing to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
relying on an authorisation of the Security Council “for collective security purposes.” Alternatively, 
NATO acts on its own without a formal authorisation of the Security Council, for example through 
NATO airstrikes in Kosovo in 1999, and in accordance with its primary purpose for which it was 
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established, collective defence against external threats.72 This did not cause a rift in their relations, 
largely as a result of their mutual pragmatic approach, and there was no “political punishment”. 
NATO was even included in the plans for the reconstruction of Kosovo in Resolution 1244.73 Griep 
submits that NATO and the United Nations complement each other well: NATO with its unique 
robust military potential and the United Nations with their mandates providing globally unique 
legitimation.74 In addition, NATO has more than 60 years of experience in how to prepare and lead 
countries in complex multinational and inter-service operations.75  In 2011, NATO contributed 
through the UN mandated operation “Unified Protector” and with the support of the Arab League to 
the protection of the civilian population in Libya, an example once again that NATO “can quickly and 
effectively conduct complex operations in support of the broader international community.”76 The 
NATO Operation in Libya, as well as in Afghanistan, further suggest also that NATO will in the future 
rely on an authorisation of the Security Council instead of acting on its own. This is, in particular, 
because NATO’s increasing circle of partners will insist on such an authorisation.77 An essential part 
of NATO’s strategy to rely on a continuously growing network of partners was the realisation that 
military operations must not only combine various tools and initiatives covering all elements of a 
conflict, but also that they need a civilian and a military response. The organisation learnt – the hard 
way – in Bosnia as well as in Kosovo “that it could not win peace on its own, and that success in 
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peace and stabilisation operations ultimately depends on civilian instruments that the Alliance does 
not possess.”78 Instead of developing a comprehensive approach of its own, NATO conceptualised its 
role as that of a catalyst between the various organisations engaged, fostering “cooperation and 
coordination between all the relevant actors involved in such operations.”79 Moreover, it precisely 
allows NATO to leave the “driver’s seat” as regards overall coordination for the needed 
comprehensive approach to the United Nations while focusing on its own area of expertise.80 
Nevertheless, NATO continued its “two-pronged approach” regarding cooperation in peacekeeping 
operations by enhancing its own capacity to conduct military operations from a comparatively 
holistic point of view.81 
3. NATO and the AU 
 
NATO’s relations with the African Union are fairly limited, which could be perceived as surprising 
given that NATO’s military capacities could well contribute to the peacekeeping operations 
undertaken by the African Union. One principal reason is that NATO, despite its various partnership 
programmes with countries outside of the Euro-Atlantic zone, remains primarily committed to this 
area, as well as the immediate neighbourhood.82 Therefore, NATO intervened in Libya on the request 
of the Security Council but it is currently not participating in the crisis management in Mali. 
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Furthermore, as the case of Mali has demonstrated again, the former colonial powers have 
maintained a certain solidarity and responsibility for their former realms and leave open the 
possibility to intervene on their own – at the request of the respective government.83  Finally, NATO 
attempts to avoid duplication with the European Union which has institutionalised relationships with 
the African Union. Consequently, NATO is not proactive, but is rather responsive in its relations with 
the AU, providing the latter “with operational support, at its request.”84 This cautious position of 
NATO is fueled by internal pressure to justify its operations. Governments of NATO members need to 
be able to tell their parliaments that they have been asked to assist. In this scenario, a request from 
the United Nations is taken very seriously due to its legitimising function. The consequence is 
“widespread ignorance in the United Nations, the African Union, and other organizations about 
NATO’s capacities.”85 Even notwithstanding these explanations of NATO’s defensive stand, one may 
still ask whether such a NATO policy of more or less completely excluding any element of conflict 
prevention on the African continent is beneficial for the long-term strategy of the organisation.86 
Regarding inter-organisational and intra-operational cooperation, NATO is providing support to the 
African Union Mission in Somalia in providing strategic airlift and sealift support, as well as through 
the secondment of some experts to the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division’s desk on AMISOM.87 
Furthermore NATO has been assisting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).88 During a visit of 
the AU High Commissioner for Peace and Security to NATO in 2007, he stated that the AU is looking 
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for long-term cooperation with NATO,89 but it appears that no further efforts have been undertaken 
by both organisations regarding such a plan.  
6. Conclusions 
 
One can conclude that NATO has evolved from a collective defence organisation to a global security 
actor, which is independent in its actions, despite maintaining strong connections with the United 
Nations and the European Union.90 The analysis of NATO’s cooperation with the UN showed that 
NATO is interested in safeguarding its autonomous role while respecting the primary responsibility of 
the Security Council for maintaining international peace and security. The institutionalised 
arrangements for cooperation between NATO and the UN have not developed further since the joint 
declaration of 2008.  
First, this stagnation might be explained by NATO’s impulse for autonomy. Furthermore, NATO-UN 
relations might not be developing further because NATO appears to prefer fostering relations with a 
plurality of other partners through its various partnership programmes.  NATO’s More Efficient and 
Flexible Partnership Policy foresees the streamlining of its partnership tools, opening all cooperative 
activities and exercises to all partners as well as harmonising partnership programmes.91 The 
consequences are significant also from the perspective of international responsibility as it means that 
the operational partners will “be consulted and offered the opportunity to put forward views on all 
relevant issues and be fully involved in the discussion of documents in particular Concepts of 
Operations, Operations plans, Rules of Engagements and their revisions.”92 Thus, the input of these 
partners in the operational activity of NATO will be tremendous. Nevertheless, in its Chicago Summit 
Declaration, NATO emphasised that it would develop stronger institutionalised relationships with the 
UN, the EU and the AU and other global and regional actors in the near future.93 
As regards the general strategic direction of NATO, the organisation appears to oscillate between a 
broad global outlook on strategic security issues and a narrower Euro-Atlantic-centered one, which 
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attempts to consolidate the status quo of “an Atlantic alliance focused on the globe.”94 Other authors 
submit that the rift within NATO regarding the strategic orientation runs deeper in reality; that it 
resurfaced and was intensified by NATO’s post-Cold War expansion of tasks and missions.95 This 
question is even more relevant in the context of the ISAF operation ending in 2014, when the troops 
will return to their barracks: one must ask not only what the principal purpose of the existence of 
NATO will be but also what its main purpose of activity will entail.96 One author suggests that due to 
the geopolitical shift of US interests in the Pacific region, the global economic crisis and NATO’s 
operational experiences, the organisation would be inclined in the near future to limit its military 
operations to smaller scale and short-term missions, in contrast to the scale and length of the 
operations of ISAF and KFOR for example.97 Indeed, these operations have drawn strongly on the 
financial and military reserves of the Alliance and they have only been met with limited success or 
possibly even failure, thereby “dampen[ing the] enthusiasm [of NATO members] for undertaking 
comparatively ambitious and exhausting tasks in the future.”98 
The problem with the latest Strategic Concept of NATO is its preoccupation with multiple or abstract 
threats, and that it lacks the political vision necessary to design the future of NATO.99  It was 
suggested by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, upon his leaving of office that NATO should focus on “the new 
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agenda of human security”100, the 2010 Strategic Concept is also considered as a tool to re-engage 
NATO member states with the core principles of the organisation.101  
Consequently, NATO appears to be currently at a crossroads and it is hard to predict its further 
development on the international and global security agenda. So, what are the legal implications of 
NATO’s activities in the specific context of cooperation with other international organisations in 
peacekeeping operations? 
In the peacekeeping context and in its relations with the AU and the UN, NATO generally keeps an 
autonomous role, acting on its own, although now normally with a Security Council authorisation, or 
by responding solely to specific requests for support, e.g. by the AU. Even within a framework of 
cooperation such as the KFOR operation, NATO tends to focus on its own operative role and is not 
seeking a leadership position. It is therefore not very likely that the activities of NATO in cooperation 
with the AU and the UN will amount to cases of joint responsibility under international law – at least 
not beyond a scenario of aid and assistance in terms of international responsibility. It appears more 
likely that cases of joint responsibility could arise for NATO on the basis of its partnership 
arrangements.   
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2.3. The EU: an emerging strong actor within the system of collective 
security? 
 
"The enlarged European Union has the power and the capability to shape global 
order. During the last fifty years, we built a peaceful Europe based on freedom 
and solidarity. In the future, to guarantee and to reinforce such achievements, we 
need to influence and to shape the world around us….We will not live in peace if 
we do not face the external threats to our security and the instability in the 
regions close to Europe." 




“With the creation of a European military capacity, the question of the EU’s 
possible contribution to UN-mandated peacekeeping and peace-making 
operations becomes more urgent than ever.” 




“The European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) are 
natural partners. They are united by the core values laid out  
in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations.” 
- The partnership between the UN and the EU104 
1. The Foundation of the EU and its normative and political framework  
 
The origins of the European Union can be traced back to the European Coal and Steel Community as 
well as the European Economic Community which were both established in the 1950s. The 1992 
Maastricht Treaty created the European Union under its current name. A common and foreign 
defence policy started to develop in the 1970s.105 Member states of the European Communities 
started intergovernmental consultations and cooperation mechanisms on foreign policy and law and 
order.106 The Reactivation of the WEU in the 1980s carved the way for the European Security and 
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Defence Policy (ESDP) through the adoption of the Platform on European Security Interests, 
containing the commitment “to build a European Union in accordance with a Single European Act” 
on the basis of the conviction that “the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete 
as long as it does not include security and defence.”107  
The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union, replaced the European Political 
cooperation with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which was pinned in the 2nd pillar 
of the Union. Simultaneously, the treaty paved the way for the development of a European defence 
policy within the EU.108 The failure of the member states to agree upon a common stance and to 
prevent the massacres in the wars in Yugoslavia prompted a change in policy; they increased their 
activity through the EU in the area of the CFSP.109 The elaboration and implementation of decisions 
and actions of the European Union in this area was allocated to the Western European Union (WEU). 
The Council of the European Union was only empowered to adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements in this regard, jointly with the WEU110, leaving untouched the obligations of member 
states under the North Atlantic Treaty.111 It was a political compromise between a majority of 
member states in favour of an independent European defence identity and a minority supporting the 
continuation of the “old” system under which NATO should be responsible for all defence 
questions.112 The Maastricht Treaty underlines that priority was given to national policies in the area 
of defence, considering the framing of a common defence policy only as an “eventual aim” and the 
establishment of “common defence” as a mere potential idea for the future.113 Nevertheless, it 
signified “both the growing confidence of the Union as an international player and the incremental 
widening of the scope of its activities.”114  
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The objectives of the CFSP therefore contained, inter alia, “the safeguard[ing of] the common values, 
fundamental interests and independence of the Union” as well as the “strengthen[ing of] the security 
of the Union and its Member States in all ways.”115 The annexed “Declaration on Western European 
Union” set out in detail the plan to develop the WEU as “the defence component of the European 
Union and as a means to strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”116  Interestingly, an 
awareness was already evident within the WEU of the need to decentralise the maintenance of 
international peace and security and of the emergence of peacekeeping undertaken by regional 
organisations.117   
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) introduced further changes to the European security architecture.  
The framing of a European defence policy became a reality118 and the European Council was 
empowered to “set up a common defence that might result from the progressive – thus no longer 
eventual – framing of a common defence policy.”119 In this treaty, the scope of common defence 
activities at the disposition of the EU is set out explicitly for the first time under Article 17 of the 
revised treaty in the form of the so-called Petersberg tasks: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” 120  
The intergovernmental conference that prepared the Treaty of Amsterdam also debated the future 
of the relations between the EU and the WEU121, which led to the integration of several functions of 
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the WEU in the Treaty on European Union.122 The Crisis management functions of the WEU were fully 
absorbed in the European Union in 1999.123 Consequently the EU “decided to develop a (C)ESDP that 
should enable it to carry out the Petersberg tasks, either with or without recourse to NATO 
assets.”124  In a similar way to the intended arrangements under Article 43 of the UN Charter, the 
ESDP provides for availability of national military and police forces to the European Union so that the 
latter may carry out “crisis management” and military actions.  
The next reform steps were taken on the basis of the Helsinki European Council Presidency 
Conclusions, transforming the legal framework and establishing different bodies of a civilian and of a 
military nature, firstly on an interim, then on a permanent basis; these include for example the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS).125 The Treaty of Nice consolidated and affirmed the reform steps.126 The annexed 
Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy established a time-frame for the full 
implementation of the ESDP.127 It was declared fully operational by the Council during its meeting in 
2003.128 
A year later, in 2004, the EU founded the European Defense Agency which has the mandate to 
“support the Member States in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of 
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crisis management and to both sustain the ESDP as it stands now and to develop it in the future.”129 
The 2003 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament held 
that “[g]iven that EU actions in this area will invariably be consistent with, and in many cases 
complementary to, decisions and frameworks developed by the UN, the need for effective 
complementarity with the UN is also crucial.”130 Article 21 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union 
stipulates that  
[t]he Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:  
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and 
with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders. 
2. Interpreting the legal framework of the EU in the area of the CFSP/CSDP 
 
The legal framework, as it was amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, regarding the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy is very short and vague in parts, and, as a result, intrinsically prone to problems of 
interpretation, which is only heightened by the absence of authoritative interpretation through case-
law.131 Article 24 (1) provides that  
[t]he Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of 
foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy that might lead to a common defence. 
Whereas, the “area of foreign policy” is not defined further in the treaty, matters relating to the 
Union’s security are covered in the “Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy” 
(CSDP).132 Article 42 of this section is also the base for EU peacekeeping operations and states that 
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[t]he common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security 
policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. 
The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member 
States
133
 [Emphasis added]. 
Article 43.1. specifies that  
The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military 
means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. 
As such, it appears that, whereas the CSDP objectives are rather precise, the specific CFSP objectives 
as they existed in the EU treaties ante-Lisbon have been replaced by a set of overall objectives for 
the wide area of EU external action.134 Moreover, the distribution of competences in the area of CFSP 
is not clear.135 Article 2 (4) TFEU stipulates simply that the “Union shall have competence, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.” 
In contrast, the preceding paragraphs of the very same article provide for either shared or exclusive 
competences.  Prior to the Lisbon Treaty it was also never disputed that the CFSP does not fall under 
the exclusive competence of the EU, but that it is rather in the domain of shared/concurrent 
competences and these latter concepts were invoked while referring to it.136 Therefore the silence of 
the treaties on this particular issue attracts attention. It is suggested that any such characterisation 
might have had a “pre-emptive effect”; being seen as falling under the area of “shared/concurrent 
competences and thereby trigger action (by member states) accordingly.”137 A better explanation 
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might be the attempt to safeguard a margin of appreciation not only for member states but also for 
the European Union per se, which has now emerged as even more of an independent legal actor.138  
According to a similar argument the broad wording of these dispositions reflects the “more 
ambitious” CSDP of the EU, but it also acknowledges the central role of member states which “may 
draw [on] the policy they want the Union to carry out.”139 However, there are indeed indications that 
the CFSP includes elements which suggest an exclusive competence of the EU, for example in the 
exclusion of the possibility to adopt legislative acts within the scope of the CFSP on the basis of 
Article 24 (1) TEU140 as well as its “autonomous administrative structure and the development of its 
working methods.”141 
Overall, it seems that the regulation of the CFSP and the CSDP within the Treaty of Lisbon was a 
“face-saving” compromise to guarantee the autonomy and influence in this area of member states 
and the EU alike. From a legal point of view, however, it leaves unanswered the question of who is 
responsible in cases of violations of international law by activities undertaken in this particular field – 
at least from the internal EU point of view. 
3. The relevant organs and the implementation of the CFSP 
 
This part introduces the relevant organs and the procedures to implement the CFSP of the EU. 
Concerning the activation and execution of the CFSP under the treaties, the Council shall adopt 
decisions relating to the task referred to in Article 42 (1), defining their objectives and scope and the 
general conditions for their implementation (Article 43.2.). The decision-making process is based on 
unanimity, which increases the challenge to agree upon the deployment of an operation as the 28 
                                                          
corroboration of the distinct nature of the Union’s competence in the area.” Distinct legal mechanisms for the 
exercise, management and enforcement of the CFSP further support this view, Koutrakos, supra note 108, 27. 
138
 Also because of the clarification about its legal status under international law as an international 
organisation. 
139




 Declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty prohibits the adoption of legislative acts in the area of 
CFSP, Declaration on Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon 
does not contain the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts as it was foreseen in the 
Constitution for Europe, but it retains the distinction between ordinary and special legislative procedures for 
the adoption of legal acts by the EU all of which involve the participation of the Parliament and the Council, cf. 
Eeckhout, ‘The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon : From Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism’, 
supra note 131, 265, 279-80. The duty of member states to “unreservedly support” CFSP and to “refrain from 
any action which is contrary” may also be considered to some extent as another indication of supranationalism 
and thereby an exclusive competence of the EU, but it seems more accurate to consider it as an expression of 
the loyal duty of cooperation existing in all international organisations, ibid. The German Constitutional Court 
similarly confirmed that the CFSP will not fall under supranational law, “Lissabon-Urteil”, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 
vom 30.6.2009, paras. 342, 390. 
141
 Koutrakos, supra note 108, 64-67. See also especially Thym, supra note 136, 453, 460-67. 
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Ministers of Foreign Affairs all have to agree.142 The High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant 
contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and 
military aspects of such tasks.  The decision to initiate a crisis management mission is adopted by the 
Council either on proposition of the High Representative or a member state according to Article 42.  
The Political and Security Committee, which consists of representatives from the 28 member states 
in Ambassadorial rank, exercises the political and strategic direction of the crisis management 
operations under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative (Article 38 Treaty 
on the European Union).143 The Council can authorize the Committee for the purpose and for the 
duration of a crisis management operation, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political 
and strategic direction of an operation (Article 38.3).144 But it is also the “eye and ear” of the EU’s 
foreign policy institutions, acting as an early warning system with the right to deliver opinions to the 
Council, as well as monitoring the implementation of policies.145  
The established chain of command is similar to the one used in United Nations operations.  An 
appointed EU special representative carries out his mandate under the authority of the High 
Representative whereas the actual military control of the operation rests with the EU Operation and 
the EU Force Commanders.146 In that regard, the decision of the military headquarters is taken ad 
hoc, made amongst the choice of five locations in five different Member States,147 whereby the state 
whose headquarters are chosen will act as the framework state for the implementation of the 
mission.148 In March 2012, the EU decided to activate for the first time the EU Operations Centre in 
Brussels which can – by its mandate – act as the headquarter in the case of joint military and civil 
operations. 149  
                                                          
142
 This can be problematic as the European Union’s inherent weakness is the “difficulty of member states to 
agree and talk with one voice when it comes to foreign and security policy.”, M. Derblom, E. Hagström Frisell, J. 
Schmidt, ‘UN-EU-AU Cooperation in Peace Operations in Africa’, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency (2008), 
18. One only has to think of the contrary positions of the United Kingdom and Germany and Italy regarding the 
invasion in Iraq in 2003.  
143
 N. Tsagourias, ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’, in M. Trybus, N. D. White (eds.), 
European Security Law (2007), 102, 114. 
144
 For a list of respective competences of the Council and the PSC for EU-led military operations, cf. also 
Council of the European Union, EU Concept for Military Command and Control, Brussels, 24 September 2012, 
15-16, para.16. 
145
 Koutrakos, supra note 108, 64; Thym, supra note 136, 453, 465. 
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 Council of the European Union, EU Concept, supra note 144, 9, para. 9 b.; Tsagourias, ‘EU Peacekeeping 
Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’, supra note 143, 102, 114. 
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 Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP of 23 March 3012 on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa; Council Decision 
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As the CFSP and especially the CSDP continue to evolve in practice, it is possible that a greater 
number of EU operations in the future will be directed from the EU operation centre as it allows to 
professionalise, as well as to streamline proceedings, guidelines and mechanisms.  In addition, its 
geographical proximity to all the other EU bodies is advantageous to guarantee the necessary 
military command and control arrangements. Once again, however, there are political implications as 
some member states prefer to be in control and “to be seen to be in control.”150 Following the 
proposition in 2011 by Ashton, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs, to establish a 
permanent headquarters in Brussels, the UK threatened to veto any such proposal, declaring that 
“the UK will block any such move now and in the future” and that the proposal amounts to a “red 
line.”151 The UK which has always been a strong proponent of the transatlantic alliance feared that 
the establishment of a permanent headquarter would be to the detriment of NATO and would 
duplicate the latter’s structures and capabilities152 and therefore preferred a plan to locate the EU 
Operational Headquarters at NATO SHAPE.153 Nevertheless, the “Big Five”154 urged Ashton to bypass 
the British veto by using the permanent structured cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty and to 
proceed urgently with the planning for a permanent EU military headquarter as “’it remains the most 
comprehensive basis for further work on all the issues: capabilities, including civil-military planning 
and conduct capability, battle groups and EU/Nato [sic] relations.’”155 France was, however, not 
willing to jeopardise the Lancaster bilateral defence accord with the UK government, and backed 
down. The French government is now pursuing a policy of accomplishing a fait accompli by 
establishing a permanent Operational Headquarters through the deployment of the EUTM in Mali 
and the extension of Operation Atalanta.156 
The provision of troops to EU military operations resumes the flexible framework for the 
implementation of the CFSP under the TEU. Generally speaking, member states are obliged under 
                                                          
2008/298/CFSP of 7 April 2008 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of 
the European Union, 4. 
150
 Factsheet, the Activation of the EU Operations Centre, 2; Koutrakos, supra note 108, 102; M. Norheim-
Martinsen, ‘Our work here is done: European Union peacekeeping in Africa’, in (2011) 20 African Security 
Review, 17, 20. 
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Europe’s Security’, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 2806, June 6, 2013, 10. 
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 R.H. Ginsberg, S. Penska, The European Union in Global Security (2012), 191-192. 
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Article 42(1) and (3) to provide military and civilian capabilities for the performance of these tasks.157 
But the European Union and the Member States have discretion regarding the provision of troops to 
these operations as the Council under Article 44.1 “may entrust the implementation of the task to a 
group of Member States who are willing and the have the necessary capability for such a task.”158 
4. The EU’s Security Policy – A global actor or rather a great dream? 
 
In 2003, the European Union adopted a European Security Strategy.  The document clarified that the 
European Union perceives itself as a global actor and even obligated it to act in such a role; thus, 
“Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better 
world.”159  This pledge was implemented in practice in the very same year by the deployment of the 
first peacekeeping operation of the EU in Macedonia. Since then the capabilities of the EU to launch 
military and civilian crisis management operations have been strengthened extensively. The Brussels 
European Council 2008 Presidency Conclusions contain the pledge of the EU to augment its 
capabilities to a level where the EU can deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days for a major operation, as 
well as to enable the organisation to conduct several operations simultaneously.160 These pledges 
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 The scope of this disposition also remains vague, Koutrakos, supra note 108, 63. 
158
 Article 44.1. Treaty on European Union. That article therefore corresponds to Article 48 (1) of the UN 
Charter, which authorises the Security Council to determine a group of states to carry out its decisions for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. As observed by Catherine Ashton in her final report for the 
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160
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– two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by a 
maximum of 10 000 men for at least two years; 
– two rapid response operations of limited duration using inter alia the EU's battle groups; 
– an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the 
primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept; 
– a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; 
– a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; 
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sound impressive, but they are, in reality, a reiteration of the policy formulated 9 years beforehand. 
In 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goal envisaged that these troops be operational by the end of 2003.161 
In 2004, however, the deadline was extended to 2010, but was once again not met.162 In fact, as 
recently as 2012, the EU was unable to deploy two battlegroups simultaneously and, as a result, not 
a single battlegroup was deployed.163 The future of EU battlegroups is generally unclear, as is the 
political will to deploy them. Whereas Germany proposed to allow the deployment of at least one of 
the two standing EU battlegroups for other purposes, such as training foreign militaries, other 
countries prefer the expansion of EU battlegroups and the EEAS proposed even an additional navy 
and airforce component.164 A month before the European Defence Council of December 2013, the 
Council of the EU underlined that the “need for concrete improvements in EU military rapid response 
capabilities, including the EU Battlegroups” which includes the enhancement of their operational 
deployability and usability.165   
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1, 2;  Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B – Policy Department - , Note, The EU 
Battlegroups, 12 September 2006, 4-5; EU Council Secretariat ~Factsheet~, EU Battlegroups, February 2007, 1-
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Sharing and Smart Defence. Making a virtue of necessity?’, CEPS Special Report (2012), 3; Ginsberg, Penska, 
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In a similar way to NATO, the EU entertains various partnership programmes with other states and 
regions, e.g. the European Neighbourhood Policy or the Black Sea Synergy within the Union’s 
neighbourhood framework. 166 In 2008, the European Council also issued the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy which – going beyond its title – updated and 
adapted the main strands of the European Security Strategy.167 It is suggested that it was foreseen to 
adopt a new Security Strategy but political pressure by the governments of Germany and the United 
Kingdom prevented such an achievement.168  
The advantages of the European Union are that its broad structure and competences allow it to 
respond to a multitude of threats and challenges, which require political, economic, judicial, military, 
etc, responses.169 Given this flexibility, the European Union has been able to carry out 20 civilian and 
military operations since 2003, which nearly amounts to one third of all UN peacekeeping operations 
since 1945.170  It proves de novo that the European Union will increasingly play a more important role 
in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security. 
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5. The EU and the United Nations – between submission and self-reliance 
 
“The UN stands at the apex of the international system. The long standing and unique 
co-operation between the EU and the United Nations spans many areas, and is 
particularly vital when it comes to crisis management. At the operational level, 
cooperation with the UN is dense and fruitful.” 
 
-High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, October 2013171 
 
“The United Nations and the European Union increasingly work 
side-by-side on the ground in peacekeeping and civilian 
crisis-management operations, and through preventive diplomacy.” 
 




The foundations for the institutionalised relations between the EU and UN were first laid down at the 
European Council of Nice in 2000 and the 2001 Gothenburg Summit.173 In 2003, the EU and the UN 
issued the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management. Part of this declaration 
was the establishment of the UN-EU Steering Committee174 with the mandate to “examine ways and 
means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility” in the areas of planning, training, 
communication and best practices framework for cooperation.175 The European Union, thereby, 
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clearly recognises, that “the United Nations has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”176 but it also asserts its willingness to bear its burden, 
acknowledging that “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security.”177 The 
EU, as a result, sees its role not only as a partner, but also as an auxiliary organisation for the UN to 
carry out its mandate effectively.178 The Security Strategy thus introduced the notion of “effective 
multilateralism” which was featured equally in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
Security Strategy.179  
The Lisbon Treaty followed in the footsteps of this careful balancing act of the EU.180 On the one 
hand, the EU is committed to the concept of responsibility within the international security system 
established under the United Nations Charter; on the other hand, the EU is committed to effective 
multilateralism which is perceived as one of the pillars of the EU’s international perception and of the 
understanding of its role in the world.181 References to the United Nations and its Charter feature 
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prominently throughout the Treaty of Lisbon182 prompting some authors to speak of a “constitutional 
attitude [of the EU] towards the UN system, rather than an instrumental attitude grounded in 
traditional foreign policy objectives.”183 However, the simultaneously existing “autonomy streak” 
diversifies the picture.  
It is argued by Griep that the quest for autonomy is due to the institutional history of the EU.   As an 
organisation sui generis, the European Union is a mosaic of competences on the international 
level.184 More and more competences of the member states on the internal and external sphere have 
been transferred to the organisation as otherwise the Member States could have damaged the 
internal process of integration by contracting individually with third states or international 
organisations.185 Whereas the European Community and the European Union used to act 
independently, within their respective competences, as entities of distinct legal personality, the 
Treaty of Lisbon created an entity which has – in comparison to an individual Member State – 
competences in a variety of areas, but on a larger scale.186  
Likewise, the European Union has refused to submit itself – at least formally – to Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter.187 At the start of the cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations, 
a number of resolutions referred to Chapter VIII,188 but now authorisations given to the EU are 
usually rooted on Chapter VII.189 One has, however, to interpret this fact with caution as the general 
practice of the Security Council in its relations with regional organisations has moved towards 
Chapter VII. The EU could, arguably be considered as falling under Chapter VIII of the Charter as a 
successor to the WEU which was considered to be a regional organisation within the meaning of 
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Chapter VIII.190 Under Declaration 13 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon the EU per se, and its Member 
States remain bound by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of International Peace and Security. 191 The 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon converted the representation of the EU at an institutional 
level in New York from the European Commission Delegation and the EU Council Liaison Office to a 
merged European Union Delegation under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy.192  
The balanced position of the EU in the perception of its role to maintain international peace and 
security and in its relations with the UN can be also found in its practice – specifically, in its crisis 
management operations. In 2004, the EU adopted the Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN 
Joint declaration which provides two options for EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping operations.193  
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As the decision to provide military contingents rests with the national states, these could assign 
forces to United Nations operations whereby the EU might act as a “clearing house” mechanism.194 
The other option is the launching and conducting of an EU operation in support of the United 
Nations, under the political control and strategic direction of the EU, and authorised by a Security 
Council Resolution.195 In this context, it is argued that “there is no legal or political undertaking that 
the EU will defer to the UN organs. On the contrary, one may trace an independent and assertive 
streak in EU relations with the UN.”196 There are  
more cogent and political reasons (…) subordination to the UN will weaken such control [over EU 
operations] but also undermine the Union’s aim of visibility in security and defence. Secondly, when 
NATO resources are used, the EU will be even more cautious in submitting to UN control, considering 
the fact that NATO has resisted such control. Thus, the subcontracting model appears to be the only 
viable option because it offers flexibility and independence.
197  
                                                          
e) Lessons Learned - Further work on enhancing EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping operations should be 
based on relevant lessons learned from previous experiences. 
f) Consistency with UN reform - Cooperation should be in line with existing peacekeeping reform efforts 
endorsed by the Member States. This includes the various elements of the New Horizons initiative, including 
the capability-driven approach and the Global Field Support Strategy. 
g) Increasing EU Member States Direct Contributions – An important purpose of our cooperation should be to 
increase direct contributions by EU Member States to peacekeeping operations, in particular as Police 
Contributing Countries (PCC) or Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). 
h) Coordinated support to regional and sub-regional organisations and southern partners Collaboration 
between the UN and EU should go beyond EU support to the UN. It should focus equally on collaboration in the 
provision of support and capacity building to regional (e.g. AU) and sub-regional organisations and southern 
partners, Actions to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping, Brussels, 24 November 2011, 3-4. 
194
 EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations, supra note 175, 2-3 paras. 3-6; Actions to 
enhance EU CSDP support, ibid., 4-6. 
195
 EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations, ibid.; H. Krieger, ‘Common European 
Defence: Competence or Compatibility with NATO’, in M. Trybus, N. D. White (eds.), European Security Law 
(2007), 174, 186; C. Major, ‘EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD 
Congo in 2006’, Occasional Paper, n°72, September 2008, EUISS, 11. Four different scenarios are envisaged for 
operations under EU command and control: a stand alone mission, specialised support in a confined area 
(modular approach), a bridging operation or a over the horizon reserve, M. Brosig, D. Motsama, ‘Modeling 
Cooperative Peacekeeping. Exchange Theory and the African Peace and Security Regime’, in (2014) 18 Journal 
of International Peacekeeping, 45, 59-60.  With regard to EU civilian operations, the EU and its members 
envisage an option 3: a coordinated EU contribution to a UN operation, J. Wouters, ‘The United Nations, the EU 
and Conflict Prevention: Interconnecting the Global and Regional Levels’, in V. Kronenberger, J. Wouters (eds.), 
The European Union and Conflict Prevention. Policy and Legal Issues (2004), 369, 388. 
196
 Tsagourias, ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’, supra note 143, 102, 129. 
197
 Tsagourias, ibid., 102, 129. One also has to take into account the financial weight of the EU in the UN, 
providing the largest share of the UN peacekeeping budget (~39 percent in 2003) and more than half of the 
world’s development assistance (56.9 % in 2002), European Union, The enlarging European Union at the United 
Nations: Making multilateralism matter (2004), 5,7, 28; The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, Ladous perceives an emerging trend towards “an increasing deployment of UN and EU operations 
alongside each other, within the same political contexts, but with separate mandates.”, UN peacekeeping chief 
welcomes growing links with European Union in crisis management, 30 November 2012, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43649#.UWBSy1fGHYE ; M. Mubiala, ‘Cooperation between 
 
Chapter II: The (emerging) system of Collective Security  
117 
 
The UN, in need of external partners, does not hesitate from satisfying the EU in order to ensure 
their support. In 2008, following the failure of a political settlement on the Kosovo question, doubts 
arose regarding the legitimacy of the European Union’s Rule of Law mission. It was suggested that it 
lacked an express authorisation from the Security Council.198 The reaction of the UN was to welcome 
the mission in two reports.199  
An EU operation in support of the UN includes two further scenarios calling for special attention: 
rapid response operations in the form of either a “bridging model” or a “stand by model”.200 The 
bridging model aims at buying time for the UN to mount a new operation or to reorganise an existing 
one, e.g. Operation Artemis.201 
6. The EU and peacekeeping 
 
When the United Nations approached the EU to support MONUC during the election process in 2006, 
the EU did not only insist on political control and strategic direction by the EU, but also requested 
autonomy to decide upon the use of force.202 This shift towards more autonomy by the EU is partly 
based on the expanding autonomous military capabilities of the EU as well as the wish – being the 
biggest financial contributor for peacekeeping operations – to effectively be involved in shaping the 
peacekeeping agenda on a global level.203 The model of sub-contracting was first used outside of 
Europe in Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (henceforth: DRC). The departure 
of Ugandan troops in the Northeastern Province Ituri and the capital led to a void in political power 
with subsequent violent clashes between Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. Deteriorating human 
security, a flow of refugees and the inability of UN peacekeepers to stop the violence led to the 
Security Council endorsing an additional EU-led intervention.  1800 troops were deployed in the DRC. 
                                                          
the United Nations, The European Union and the African Union for Peace and Security in Africa’, in (2007) LX 
Studia Diplomatica. The Brussels Journal of International Relations, 111, 116. 
198
 Koutrakos, ‘The European Union in the Global Security Architecture’, supra note 179, 81, 84. 
199
 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2008/211 (2008), 2, para.5; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2008/354 (2008), particular 2, para.8; 3-4, para. 13. 
200
 EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations, supra note 194, 3-5, paras. 8-14. Statement 
on behalf of the EU, Security Council, 7015
th
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7015 (Resumption 1) (2013), 17-18. 
201
 Ibid., 4, para.9. 
202
 Letter dated 28 March 2006 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria addressed to the Secretary-
General, Annex II to Letter dated 12 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/2006/219 (2006), 4, paras. 1-2; Actions to enhance EU CSDP support, supra note 
193, 7. Cf. also for a more comprehensive overview of the relations between the EU and the United Nations, 
Security Council, 6306th meeting, supra note 173, 3;  Security Council, 6477th meeting, supra note 173; B. 
Charbonneau, ‘What is So Special about the European Union? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in 
Africa’, in (2009) 16 International Peacekeeping, 546, 549-550;  
203
 Major, supra note 195, 13. 
Chapter II: The (emerging) system of Collective Security  
118 
 
Based on Security Council Resolution 1484, Operation Artemis was deployed in close coordination 
with MONUC in anticipation of a strengthened United Nations military deployment which arrived on 
1 September 2003.  Several European leaders stressed that the operation constituted the litmus test 
for the European Security and Defense Policy. It not only proved the military capacities and strength 
of the European Union, but also constituted evidence of emancipation from NATO: “The EU has a 
genuine military operational capacity at its disposal.”204   
However, this appraisal has to be qualified. Indeed, the operation achieved its objectives with only 
minor casualties, but practical problems persisted throughout the implementation of the operation; 
the troops had to deal with obsolete equipment, a lack of common communication channels as well 
as the lack of strategic transport.205 These problems were not inimitable for Operation Artemis, but 
also appeared in Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, when the EU had to rely on external contributions for 
strategic airlift by Russia.206 
In the context of Operation Artemis, the EU member states adopted the European Union action plan 
to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy support for United Nations peacekeeping 
activities.207 The United Nations, in return, emphasised in the New Horizon Agenda, that for any new 
mission to be deployed in complex situations, it will take into account the capacities of regional 
actors for supporting action to “expedite mission deployment, including political measures as well as 
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strategic lift and other operational support.”208  The United Nations welcomed the development of 
EU’s peace facility for Africa and encouraged the development of further mechanisms to support the 
AU.209 Therefore, it appears that there is a mutual interest for both organisations to cooperate, as 
well as to increase their cooperation. It is a “mutually reinforcing link”, in that the EU can offer both 
the financial and military support not provided by the UN and thereby “achieve its ambition to 
become a central security player.”210 In exchange, the UN can provide political and legal legitimacy 
and endorsement of EU operations.211 In summary, an alternative view to EU-UN relations, is one of 
“an affair of transatlantic cooperation” with both the UK and France as the driving forces within the 
EU and the UN.212  
7. A limited military engagement on the African continent – or an emerging division 
of labour? 
 
Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, however, speculations arose whether the aims of the EU 
might have been too ambitious and if a certain re-evaluation of its active role was necessary. The EU 
has only launched two training missions since 2007, namely EUTM Somalia, training 2000 Somali 
soldiers213 and EUTM Mali.214 In January 2014, the EU decided to deploy a small-scale peacekeeping 
operation in the Central African Republic for a period of up to six months.215 Plans were established 
for an EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya, but the plan 
                                                          
208
 Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda. 
Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009), 9. The same applies even more so in cases when United 
Nations operations are deploying alongside or in parallel with regional organisations, ibid., 34. 
209
 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, 2004 substantive 
session (New York, 29 March-16 April  2004), UN Doc. A/58/19 (2004), 13, para. 75; Enhancement of African 
peacekeeping capacity, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/591 (2004), 4 paras. 14-15. 
210
 Koutrakos, ‘The European Union in the Global Security Architecture’, supra note 179, 81, 85. See also 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2014/4 (2014), 
211
 Major, supra note 195, 9. 
212
 Charbonneau, supra note 202, 546, 551-552. 
213
 Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010 on a European Union military mission to contribute to 
the training of Somali security forces.   
214
 Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to 
the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali); Council Decision 2013/87/CFSP of 18 February 2013 on 
the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces 
(EUTM Mali). 
215
 Council conclusions on the Central African Republic, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 20 January 
2014. The Central African Republic granted its consent to the deployment of the EU operation in a letter to the 
Security Council of the UN, Letter dated 27 January 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, Annex, UN Doc. S/2014/34 (2014). In Resolution 2134, the Security Council 
authorised the deployment of the EU operation for the CAR, Security Council Resolution 2134, UN Doc. 
S/RES/2134 (2014), 11, paras. 43-50. On 10 February 2014, the EU military operation in the CAR was 
established, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 10 February 2014, 6249/14, EU military operation in the 
Central African Republic established. 
Chapter II: The (emerging) system of Collective Security  
120 
 
was ultimately not implemented.216  Disagreement within the EU, including the abstention of 
Germany in the Security Council might explain why several EU states participated in the airstrikes 
against Libya outside of the EU framework.217 Criticism also arose over the EU’s passive role in the 
Arab Spring and its long tolerance of autocratic regimes. Several reasons have been given to explain 
the passivity of the EU. First of all, it is argued that there is certain lack of leadership at the top of the 
CFSP,218and second is the focus of member states on the financial crisis, which has affected their 
willingness and capacity to contribute to the implementation of the CFSP.219  
However, like the United Nations, and other international organisations, the EU depends on its 
members for the fulfillment of its mandate, and disagreement amongst the latter hampers the 
effective implementation of the EU’s mandate.220 There might also be a preference in some countries 
to pay for the maintenance of global peace and security rather than to deploy their own troops 
because of various domestic issues, including pressure by the electorate or the opposition.221 Syria is 
another example of the failure of member states to agree upon a common position. Most certainly 
the principle of unanimity in the Council is not beneficial for the implementation of an effective CFSP 
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and a CSDP. On the macro-level, however, one has also to notice the absence of any longer-term 
reflection on the grand strategy of the CFSP following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.222 
The 2013 December Defence Council, the first thematic debate on defence since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, also left many of the difficult questions open. These questions include, for 
example, the funding of CSDP activities or the future of the EU Battlegroups.223 The Defence Council 
followed an extensive report by High Representative Ashton which provided more substantial 
propositions, but nonetheless failed in defining a long-term strategy for the development of the 
CSDP.224 
Notwithstanding the limited ambition of the EU, refusing to mount fully-fledged large-scale 
peacekeeping operations on the African continent is in fact part of the general strategy of the EU. In 
practice, EU peacekeeping strategies in Africa have been precisely “developed around these models 
of compensating UN shortcomings in the rapid deployment of troops on a short-term basis.”225 The 
EU therefore favours “short-term, geographically limited support operations under its direct political 
and military control in selected cases.”226 Also, the EU strategy has to be seen in the wider context of 
EU-UN, EU-AU and UN-AU relations (infra, 2.3.9., 2.5.4).227 The absence of new EU peacekeeping 
operations on the African continent can consequently be explained by the broader framework of 
cooperation existing within the organisations. African ownership and the “primary responsibility of 
the AU” for the maintenance of international peace and security are key issues in distributing the 
roles of players on the field on the African continent. Hence, the 2012 Plan of Action to Enhance EU 
CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping stipulates that a joint EU-UN coordination mechanism on 
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assistance to the AU and other regional organisations shall be defined through various actions within 
a year following the adoption of the plan. These actions include: 
- Enhanced coordination and information-sharing at operational/ technical level in Addis Ababa 
between the EU Delegation to the AU and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU); 
 
- A yearly coordination meeting of EU and UN with the AU Peace and Security Department to discuss 
benchmarks, goals, needs and timelines for operationalization of the African Peace and Security 
 Architecture and possible adjustment of strategies as necessary; 
 
- Possible synergies between the African Peace Facility capacity-building program and the technical 
assistance and training implemented by UNOAU for the African Standby Force (ASF) and within the 
larger African Peace Support Architecture (APSA); EU and UN support to the AU for ASF should take 
into account the results of the Amani Africa cycle; 
 
- Cooperation between EU, UN and AU, building on the EU-AU 2010 assessment of the APSA readiness, 
with an eye to identifying the support required to make the African Standby Force operational; 
 
- Continued EU assistance to AU in the preparation of African forces for deployment on UNPKO.
228
 
This framework of cooperation between the EU and the UN therefore suggests that, indeed, a 
triangular relationship among these two organisations and the AU is emerging for maintaining 
international peace and security which will be further examined in the parts on EU-AU and on AU-UN 
relations.  
8. The EU and NATO – NATO and the EU – Complementarity, competition and 
compromises 
 
NATO maintains closer relations to the EU than to any other organisation.229 The overlaps in 
membership of NATO and the EU have led to a condition of “cultural symbiosis” and general mutual 
trust between the two organisations. Shared interests and the identity of political and military 
agendas and objectives230 have equally contributed to advancing this relationship.231 The beginnings 
of NATO and EU cooperation can be traced back many decades. The envisaged European Defence 
Community Treaty of 1952 included general and specific rules on close cooperation by the inclusion 
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of a mutual defence clause with NATO, as well as an integrated European army.232 The clauses on 
cooperation between the EU and NATO in the TEU derive from the treaty on the EDC and are nearly 
identical.233 While the incorporation and absorption of the WEU by the EU was slow, this ultimately 
led to increased interaction between the two organisations. In fact, institutionalised links between 
NATO and the European Union have existed since 2001, but they are based on previous 
developments in the 1990s.  NATO itself recognises the importance of developing the European 
Security and Defence architecture, the role of the WEU and the need for both organisations to 
develop complementary roles in the security architecture.234  In subsequent years the cooperation 
between NATO and EU/WEU increased, further developed,235 and was fully implemented in 1999236 
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Reference to the defence obligation of certain EU Member States was also made in the Protocol on Permanent 
Structured Cooperation Established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (2007), Preamble. 
234
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Alliance”, Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Copenhagen, Denmark 6-7 June 1991, para. 3. The aim 
was to strengthen European defence capabilities within and outside of NATO. 
235
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after the heads of state and government of NATO decided to develop the arrangements known the 
“Berlin-plus agreements.”237  
In December 2002, NATO and the EU signed the Declaration on ESDP238 and in March 2003 the 
Agreement of the Framework on Cooperation.239 These arrangements give the EU assured access to 
NATO’s planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations. This includes access to 
NATO’s collective assets and capabilities, including command arrangements and assistance in 
operational planning; in “effect they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO 
as a whole is not engaged.”240  The “Berlin Plus” agreements include various components:  
Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led 
operations; 
The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for 
use in EU-led operations; 
Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the 
role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; 
The further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the 
availability of forces for EU-led operations.
241
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Regarding the early stages planning of EU operations, NATO may contribute to the work on the 
military strategic options via SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. If a decision is taken on the basis of ‘Berlin 
Plus’ agreements, operational planning by NATO will be furnished for the implementation of the 
mission. While NATO military assets are not guaranteed for an EU operation, it is presumed that they 
are available. Furthermore, NATO should make available a European command option for EU-led 
operations. The Operation Commander should be NATO's Deputy SACEUR, playing thereby a pivotal 
role between both organisations.242 From a current perspective, however, the relevance of the 
agreement has to be relativised. The two organisations did not anticipate that the need may arise to 
deploy troops cooperatively or even jointly in the same conflict region.243 
The European Security Strategy (2003) also recognises the important ties with NATO. It states that 
the transatlantic relationship strengthens the international community as a whole and that “NATO is 
an important expression of that relationship.”244 On a practical level, there are regular meetings of 
both the EU PSC and the NATO North Atlantic Council.  The EU established a small cell at NATO’s 
SHAPE and NATO formed a liaison team at the EU Military Staff.245 
Nevertheless, the progressing relations between NATO and the EU were not free of competition.246 
Both organisations expanded their competences in various areas in the 1990s which were 
                                                          
d. Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and 
Capabilities 
e. Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO 
f. EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and 
capabilities 
g. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements”[Emphasis added], Berlin Plus 
agreement, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf. The 
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traditionally within the competences and mandate of the other organisation. The European Union 
was pursuing the development of the CDSP, including the absorption of the WEU, while NATO was 
transforming in and expanding as a more political organisation.247 Moreover, the construction of the 
CSDP was an expression of the political will of the EU to act outside of NATO. 248 This reposition was 
triggered by the shift of position of the UK government; the “sea-change” towards EU defence at the 
Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in 1998.249 The United States was in favour of a European pillar 
within NATO, although the position of its government was ambiguous as it was simultaneously a way 
“to hinder the creation of a European defence policy outside NATO.”250 A compromise was found a 
year later at the Helsinki European Council where it was decided that the EU could launch and 
conduct EU-led military operations in response to an international crisis and “where NATO as a whole 
is not engaged.”251 The official positions of NATO and the EU are that the EU is not taking the lead if 
the US intends to participate; if the US does not want to be involved, the EU may start an operation 
with recourse to NATO assets if the NATO Council agrees.252 This safeguarding compromise was also 
facilitated by increased cooperation between the two organisations following the US government’s 
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war against terrorism post 11 September 2001.253 However, the clause aims primarily at safeguarding 
the compatibility of the CSDP with NATO: “The alliance shall not be endangered by some of its 
Member States which prefer to conduct crisis management operations by excluding other NATO 
members. This is emphasized by the formula ‘NATO as a whole’.”254 It is important to underline that  
the EU stresses, in principle, its equality as a security actor in ESDP documents. Consequently, in line 
with the primary obligations of the TEU, the clause stresses the primacy of NATO missions and 
contains a prohibition against circumventing NATO. EU Member States shall only use the ESDP as a 
framework for military operations when NATO agrees or is not willing to act in a manner which is, in 
principle, consistent with European policy goals or is simply not interested in a mission. Thus ESDP 
documents show that the ESDP is complementary to NATO and not conceived as a forum for 
competition.
255 
In practice, controversies have arisen out of these envisaged mechanisms to prevent competition. 
The EU launched Operation Artemis in the DRC fully independent of NATO, acting with its own 
facilities and assets, but even further, the EU adopted the decision to deploy troops without 
previously consulting NATO.256 One author argues that the following two independent NATO and EU 
operations in Sudan where a consequence of and a reaction to the lack of NATO consultation for 
Operation Artemis. 257 In contrast, other examples underline a good degree of cooperation between 
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the two organisations, also based on the Berlin Plus agreements. EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-
Herzegovina took over from NATO’s IFOR operation on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1575.  
This operation has profited from NATO planning expertise and also drew on other Alliance assets and 
capabilities and is under the command of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.258 In 
practice, the “Berlin-Plus”-Arrangements were likewise applied when the EU-led “Operation 
Concordia” took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission “Allied Harmony” on the territory 
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Regarding future operations, a further use of the 
Berlin Plus Agreements is nevertheless rather implausible as NATO-EU relations continue to be 
impaired by Turkey and Cyprus over the whole Cyprus issue;259 NATO has not concluded a security 
arrangement with Cyprus thereby barring it from meetings and from access to NATO documents, 
whereas the EU has excluded Turkey from participating in the European Defence Agency on the basis 
of the lack of a similar security agreement.260 
As the US is refocusing its geopolitical interests on Asia and on other challenges predominantly 
outside of Europe, the US will also play a less dominant role within NATO, prompting an increase in 
the financial but also logistical burden for the European States within NATO261 after the percentage 
of the US contribution to NATO has increased from 63% to 77% in the decade since 2001.262  
However, the EU remains the closest partner for NATO. The financial crisis of the past years, 
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ironically, was beneficial for NATO-EU relations. The decreased military spending by member states 
fueled the willingness of NATO members to increase their cooperation in military matters within 
NATO under the concept of “Smart Defence”263 as well as with the EU under its “Pooling and Sharing 
initiatives.”264 The motivation to cooperate is further reinforced by defence cuts in many (European) 
countries; Germany alone will reduce its defence budgets by 25% until 2016 while the UK’s budget 
will be reduced by 8% until 2015.265 Many of the initiatives of “Smart Defence” are carried out, 
however, on a smaller multinational and not on an Alliance level.266 An additional incentive is 
obviously the shift of policy of the United States towards a stronger focus on the Pacific area and 
their decision to decrease their support for Europe within the NATO.267 
The conflict in Libya created anew resentments between the two institutions. In need of swift action, 
EU member states, i.e. France and the UK chose to rely upon NATO and not upon the EU, prompting 
some commentators to declare that the EU’s security and defence policy is dead or that is has “failed 
miserably.”268 Despite these apparent failures, other authors paint a more optimistic portrait for the 
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European Union’s future.269 Indeed, whereas NATO is mostly focused on securing the common 
defence and security of its own members and becomes involved occasionally in “international crisis 
management”, the EU’s objectives are “to promote an international system based on strong 
multilateral cooperation and good global governance.”270  
The recent conclusions of the Council of the EU just before and during the European Defence Council 
2013 confirm that the EU adheres to its ties and its cooperation with NATO and even intends to 
strengthen the institutional links. The Council envisaged the development of a proposal for synergies 
between both organisations for the rapid deployment of troops while safeguarding the institutional 
decision-making autonomy of both the EU and NATO.271 It also encouraged “further implementation 
of practical steps for effective EU cooperation with NATO while keeping the overall objective of 
building a true organization-to-organization relationship.”272 NATO, in its turn reconfirmed its 
intention at the September 2014 Wales Summit to “continue to work side-by-side in crisis 
management operations” with the EU and to expand political consultations and cooperations.273 
9. The EU and the African Union – an effective partnership 
 
Since the launch of the CSDP in 1999, the EU’s strategy towards Africa has been based on the idea of 
“African ownership” and the premise that the “primary responsibility for prevention, management 
and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves”, while the Security 
Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.274 The 
EU expressed its intention to work towards more formalised relations with the AU in 2005.275 Two 
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years later, in 2007, the European Union supported its pledge and adopted – with the AU – the Joint 
Africa-EU-Strategy in Lisbon.276  
The Joint Africa-EU strategy consists of eight pillars of which one is devoted to Peace and Security. It 
provides, inter alia, for financial support in fully implementing and operationalising the African Peace 
and Security Architecture.277 The Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa of 2004 
mentions further that the EU stands ready to consider other forms of support that may include, 
“training, the provision of equipment, operational support and possibly even ESDP advisory or 
executive missions in the framework of African-led operations or United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
operations.”278  The specific goals of the Joint Strategy were laid down in two Actions Plans, covering 
the years 2008-2010 and 2011-2013. Both recognise and emphasise three items as priority actions: 
“Enhanc[ing] dialogue on challenges to peace and security”, “Full operationalization of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture” and “Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support 
Operations”.279  
To implement the first priority the two organisations sought to develop common positions and 
implement common approaches on the basis of inter-institutional meetings, regular triennial AU-EU 
summits, joint annual meetings of the PSC and the EU Political and Security Committee280 as well as 
meetings at the ministerial and ambassadorial level.281 The second action plan noted positively the 
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progress made on this particular issue. 282 Thus a network of cooperation on a political level through 
meetings has been established, including the appointment of an EU Special Representative to the AU 
and the establishment of the EU Delegation to the AU in 2008.283 
Regarding the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the EU has undertaken specific steps 
after the originally envisaged time frame for the operationalisation of the APSA could not be kept; 
expected to be fully operational in 2010, it will not be fully functional before 2015. The EU appointed 
a Special Advisor for African Peacekeeping Capabilities in 2008 acting as a focal point in liaison with 
the EU Delegation and the Special Representative for capacity building programmes.284 The Joint 
Africa EU Strategy Action Plan (2011-2013) emphasised the need for further efforts for the 
operationalisation of the APSA,285 following the critique contained in the 2010 Assessment Study, in 
particular of the “mandate-resource gap” of the AU.286 Capacity-building through training of groups is 
also part of the Joint Africa-European Union Strategy to operationalise the APSA and to ensure “its 
effective functioning to address peace and security challenges in Africa.”287  
The effective functioning of the APSA includes a further involvement of the regional economic 
communities, such as ECOWAS, in the process of making the APSA operational whereby the AU will 
provide the overall leadership.288 One of the measures which were launched is the Euro Recamp – 
Amani Africa initiative in 2008 with a three years timeframe. The programme delivered – through 
civil-military activities – provides seminars and workshops on strategic planning, particularly on how 
to establish a decision-making plan for crisis management, and it supports the AU Peace Support 
Operations Divisions accordingly in the exercise of their activities. Furthermore, it also supported the 
AU Peace Support Operations Division in order to enable it to function and to work effectively from 
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the political decision up to the commitment of forces.289 The Amani Africa initiative culminated in a 
10 day command post exercise (CPX) in October 2010 involving more than 120 African military 
components and police forces along with various EU partners, which “aimed at determining and 
furthering the force’s operational capacity.”290  
The second three-year cycle covering the period 2011-2014 named “Amani Africa II has the overall 
objective of validating the capacity of the AU to mandate and deploy Rapid Deployment Capability of 
the ASF and to run multidimensional peace support operations. An EU permanent Planning Team 
(EUPT) was formed on 23 April 2012 and mandated by the Political and Security Committee to 
continue this second cycle of training together with a team from the AU Commission.291 
The African Peace Facility (APF), established by the EU to confront the third priority action, has 
provided more than 600 million Euros to date, which have been on peacekeeping operations under 
AU auspices.292 A further 750 million Euros have been committed for the APF under the new Three 
Year Action Programme covering the period from 2014 – 2016.293 The AU is consequently not only 
dependent on financial support of the EU, but it also must submit to the conditions dictated by the 
EU - under the EU’s internal law. Therefore, every AU intervention financed by the African Peace 
Facility shall be “subject to prior approval by the Political and Security Committee.”294 Furthermore, 
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the Action Programme contains a reporting requirement for the AU.295 The EU also expects that the 
AU acts under a UN mandate and as the APF is financed through the European Development Fund 
(EDF), any financial contribution to the AU cannot be used for military or arms expenditure.296 
Therefore, the EU could effectively block any AU operation if it so wished, but the African Peace 
Facility also raises issues under the law of responsibility. First of all, the EU exercises a high degree of 
control not only over the financing but also over the envisaged AU operation per se.297 The EU PSC 
determines the “political appropriateness” of the AU operation and the EU could therefore easily 
demand that various specific, political parameters are fulfilled during the deployment of the 
operation in order that it grants the AU the necessary funding for the operation.298 Thus, the 
question is whether the EU could control the AU to such a degree that its contributions to the AU 
under the APF regime would fall under the ambit of the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations.299 The fact that the EU contributes not only financially to AU operations could, 
however, also open up the application of other areas of the Articles – aid and assistance as well as 
the wider issue of joint responsibility. Nevertheless, the controversial issue of financing of 
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peacekeeping operations is not limited to the EU-AU context. Both organisations cooperate on the 
issue of establishing a UN mechanism, under Chapter VIII to provide funding for peacekeeping 
operations undertaken by the African Union or under its authority and with the consent of the 
Security Council.300  
The Action Plan (2011-2013) likewise underlined that the AU and regional mechanisms are not 
sufficiently financially independent yet to conduct peacekeeping operations of their own, 
necessitating further exchanges and efforts.301 In this context, the EU emphasises the need for “more 
concerted action between the AU, the EU and the UN” on the basis of the recommendations 
formulated in the Prodi Report.302 
10. A slow shift towards an equal standing in EU-AU relations 
 
The policy of the EU seeks to move away from a donor-receiver relationship towards a relationship of 
equal standing in which the African Union can also fully accept the responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security on the African continent without being dependent upon financial 
contributions by the industrialised countries. Although the EU gives priority to “African ownership”, it 
is nevertheless prepared to become involved, when necessary, with its own troops in crisis 
management on the African continent.303 However, the EU’s involvement in peacekeeping operations 
of its own has very defined limits; the EU prefers limited engagements with their own troops in the 
form of bridging operations which has prevented joint EU-AU peacekeeping operations or the take-
over of one operation by the other organisation.304 It is, indeed, as it was just argued, more likely that 
responsibility of the EU in the context of AU peacekeeping operations will arise due its manifold 
contributions, including on the political level to the AU, rather than on the basis of a joint 
peacekeeping operation. 
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As the AU also tends to deploy bridging operations, recent examples include Mali and Somalia,305 the 
AU and the EU cooperate more closely with the UN during the deployment of operations than with 
each other.306 The lack of resources of the AU means that “African ownership” can often not be 
generated,307 but the EU is forced to step in and engage in capacity-building or may be forced to wait 
for the AU to develop its capacities in this area.308 The EU’s response to the Darfur crisis and the 
deployment of the EU’s Support Operation AMIS II309 was, in essence, a response to the shortcomings 
of the AU operation310 and it sidelined the general capacity-building work of the EU, forcing the 
organisation to do on-the-job capacity building for AMIS.311 The Support Operation provided planning 
and technical assistance to AMIS II command, military observers as well as training of African troops 
and observers and strategic and tactical transportation.312 Altogether, the EU and its member states 
spent more than one billion Euros for humanitarian aid and capacity-building for AMIS.313 EU support 
ended with the transition to the hybrid UNAMID operation, proof once again that the EU’s 
preference is to act on short-term engagements alone with clear exit options.314 EUFOR Chad/CAR is 
another example of the EU’s political parameters of its peacekeeping strategy on the African 
continent. The operation was set up for a period of one year, it was based on the consent of the host 
countries, it included only a limited military contingent,315and it was executed in multilateral 
cooperation with the UN and with a clear exit option.316 
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 Brosig, supra note 12, 107, 120. But EUFOR Chad was also affected by problems of force generation and 
equipment. It was in the Fifth Force Generation conference when France finally agreed to volunteer the 
essential assets for the deployment of the operation, Norheim-Martinsen, supra note 150, 17, 24.The EU 
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The cooperation between the EU and the AU in the area of maintaining international peace and 
security illustrates very well how the CFSP has been stimulated by other areas of the EU’s external 
actions and particularly the broader development agenda.317  
The institutionalised cooperation agreements between the European Union, the United Nations and 
the African Union were also welcomed by the Security Council in its Resolution 1809.318 The 
engagement of the EU was comparatively more limited regarding AMISOM; it persisted beyond 
cooperation on a political level and financial support as the EU is also engaged in the training of 
African troops of the ASF in an operational context, for example in Mali as part of the ESDP support 
policy.319 This policy also comprises, the provision of equipment, operational support and “possibly 
even ESDP advisory or executive missions in the framework of African-led operations or United 
Nations peacekeeping operations.”320  
As the African Union is at the head of the African Peace and Security Structure, it is also the point of 
entry for cooperation between the European Union and other organisations with the sub-regional 
organisations in Africa; the CSDP Policy is therefore to consult with the African Union in response to 
requests from sub-regional organisations on the African continent.321 Thus, there is no systematic EU 
strategy to support capacity-building for RECs, but the EU has led individual support for specific 
RECs.322 
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From the early small steps of developing a common foreign security and defence policy, the EU has 
evolved to become a global actor within the system of collective security with vast military and non-
military tools at its disposal. An analysis of the EU’s relations with other organisations facilitates a 
corroboration of some of the findings which were made regarding NATO, as well as the 
ascertainment of certain general developments.  
Firstly, a division of labour or a complementarity of roles has emerged between the EU and NATO 
regarding their relations with the UN and the AU. It was argued previously (see, infra 2.5.3.) that 
NATO’s engagement on the African continent is very limited due to the preference of, in particular, 
European, NATO members to engage in activities for maintaining international peace and security in 
Africa through the EU. Furthermore, the analysis of NATO’s relations with the AU illustrated that 
NATO provides principally in-mission support to the AU upon the specific request of the latter. In 
contrast, the EU has developed an impressive framework of institutional relations with the AU 
covering an array of areas, including the training of troops and the financing of peace operations. 
Cooperation between the EU and the AU during the peace operations is a consequence of the 
institutional cooperation arrangements between the two organisations and has to be assessed 
accordingly. Generally speaking, “operational cooperation in peacekeeping missions [between the EU 
and the AU] is hardly existing.”323 
Although NATO and the EU therefore seem to have reached a division of labour and an 
understanding regarding their role on the African continent, it is not clear what the future of their 
relationship will be, despite their long institutional history and the existing ties and channels. The 
December 2013 Defence Council emphasised the need to develop a true organisation-to-
organisation relationship, but it failed to indicate the necessary steps for such an evolution. It is 
noteworthy that the conclusions of the Defence Council emphasise the decision-making authority of 
both organisations. This fact could imply a renunciation of the previous policy between the two 
organisations that the EU would act if NATO as a whole is not engaged or it is recognition of the 
emerging division of labour between the two organisations. Another interpretation of the decisions 
making authority of both organisations points towards the termination of the Berlin plus agreements 
which were not even mentioned in the documents of the Defence Council.   Reichard, however, 
argues that there has been no reliance on NATO assets by the EU for many years because the recent 
engagement of the EU with military operations is low-key and the EU distinguishes between two 
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types of military operations, those requiring NATO assets as larger scale operations and those of a 
lower scale and intensity.324  
EU-UN relations for maintaining international peace and security have developed along the same 
institutionalised path as EU-AU relations and they cannot be seen in isolation from the relations of 
the EU and the UN with the AU. The relations between the EU and the UN comprise an institutional 
framework on various political levels between the two organisations.  Both organisations now 
interact as partners of equal standing with each other and they have fostered a partnership for 
maintaining international peace and security on the African continent and for their respective 
engagement with the AU. A division of roles between the AU, the EU and the UN seems to have 
emerged, an aspect which will be examined further in the part of this Chapter dealing with AU-UN 
relations.  
In another aspect, the EU has followed in the footsteps of NATO. The EU has abandoned the practice 
of acting as a “clearing-house mechanism” for a UN peacekeeping operation in favour of launching its 
own short-term and small-scale operations under a Security Council mandate in support of UN 
operations or in the form of a bridging operation until a UN operation can be deployed.  
All these specific developments are of course also fuelled by internal constraints such as resource 
problems. These problems, of which the EU is not spared, are not, once again, the only driving factor 
in increasing the networks of cooperation between the EU and the other international organisations, 
but also drive the EU to act in a comprehensive and thorough manner by using other means and 
tools to remedy for any lack of resources in other areas.325 According to an estimation in 2008 by the 
first Chief Executive of the EDA, “the total number of troops deployed today (…) constitutes less than 
one third of one percent of European military manpower.”326 Nevertheless, the main limiting factors 
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for the engagement of the EU remain an unwillingness to engage327 and political inactivity among the 
EU member states to further develop the CSDP.328 
An analysis of the relations of the EU with other international organisations allows the drawing of 
two conclusions regarding the assessment of their activities in the peacekeeping context under the 
law of international responsibility. 
Firstly, the criterion for the attribution of conduct has to be constructed in such a way as to take due 
account of institutionalised cooperation between international organisations; the criterion has to 
reflect the influence, power and control or the “normative power” that international organisations 
execute over other international organisations based on their institutionalised cooperation 
arrangements and even independent of any specific in-mission elements of cooperations. It has 
already been highlighted that the EU’s African Peace Facility, in particular, raises various points under 
the law of responsibility. 
Secondly, the analysis of the EU’s relations showed that a certain triangular framework of relations 
between the AU, the EU and the UN appears to be emerging. It is therefore important that the 
criterion of attribution allows the attribution of conduct not only to two but also to more 
international organisations simultaneously.  
2.4. ECOWAS and peacekeeping: The role-model for other subregional 




The Economic Community of West African States (henceforth: ECOWAS) was set up in 1975 on the 
basis of the Treaty of Lagos and it is thus the oldest, continuously existing regional organisation on 
the African continent. Its mission was to promote economic integration and collective economic self-
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sufficiency in this part of Africa. Its aims were originally strictly economic; the treaty from 1975 does 
not contain any dispositions for collective security. In 1978 and 1981 ECOWAS adopted two protocols 
on non-aggression, prohibiting cross-border attacks, and on mutual assistance in defence, according 
to which “economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the necessary security are 
ensured in all Member States.”329  Economic growth can be hindered in conflict regions for a variety 
of reasons, such as problems with supply due to captured transports, a lack of qualified personnel 
whom have fled the conflict region, and a general lack of human security.  
In 1990, ECOWAS appointed a Commission of Eminent Persons with the task to submit proposals for 
a review of the treaty which led to the signature of the revised ECOWAS treaty in Cotonou in 1993, 
adding security policy elements to the mandate of ECOWAS.330  
2. The Normative Framework 
The new revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 was also created with the aim 
to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West 
Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, 




Thus, prima facie it is rather surprising that ECOWAS became involved in peacekeeping activities. 
However, the revised Treaty follows the road ECOWAS had begun to move along on with the 
adoption of the two Protocols.  Article 58 of the Treaty of ECOWAS entitled Regional Security sets out 
general objectives concerning the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region.332 
The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
Keeping and Security of 1999 (henceforth: MCPMRPS) established an appropriate framework.   
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 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981), Preamble. See also A. T. Soma, ‘Les relations 
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maintien de la paix’, in  (2012) 18 African Yearbook of International Law, 345, 352-353. 
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 Griep, supra note 73, 332-33; International Peace Academy in partnership with Economic Community of 
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 Article 3 of the Treaty of ECOWAS.  
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 Article 58 Regional Security  
   “1 . Member States undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance 
of peace, stability and security within the region.  
   2. In pursuit of these objectives, Member States undertake to co-operate with the Community in establishing 
and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-
State conflicts, paying particular regard to the need to (…) 
f)  establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate.” 
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The Protocol created the Mediation and Security Council and the Council of Elders. Whereas the 
functions of the Mediation and Security Council are similar to the responsibilities of the Security 
Council of the United Nations, the Council of Elders is a new mechanism unique to ECOWAS.  It is a 
list of eminent personalities who may be asked by the Mediation and Security Council to deal with a 
given conflict situation.333  The Authority (of Head of states) remains the highest decision-making 
body in the domain of peace-keeping and conflict-management,334 but the Mediation and Security 
Council is mandated by the Authority to take appropriate decisions for the implementation of the 
Mechanism.335 Under Article 10 of the Protocol, the Mediation and Security Council shall decide  
(a) decide on all matters relating to peace and security; 
(b) decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping 
and security; 
(c) authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military 
missions; 
(d) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions; 
The Protocol also prescribes the composition of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) which is “a structure composed of several Stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and 
military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment.”336 ECOMOG or the 
ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) as it is also called337 is charged, inter alia, with peacekeeping and the 
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restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster and preventive 
deployment (Article 22).  The ECOWAS Standby Force thereby implements the decisions of the 
Mediation and Security Council under Article 10 of the Protocol. As such, in a similar way to the 
African Union, ECOWAS possesses the mandate to intervene to “alleviate the suffering of the 
populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.”338 In contrast to 
the United Nations which was unable to implement the agreements under Article 43 of the United 
Nations Charter, ECOWAS member states make available to ECOMOG composite stand-by units 
which are under the direct control of the Mediation and Security Council.339 
Article 52 (3) of the Protocol regulates the relationship with the United Nations, and it stipulates that 
in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations 
of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of the mechanism established 
under the Protocol, usually the information requirement is executed on the basis of submitted 
reports.340 Although Chapter VIII of the United Nations only refers to of agencies and arrangements, 
the United Nations has accepted that this includes sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS.341 
The organisation has been implicitly recognised by the Security Council in Resolution 788. 342 It is also 
argued that the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence made ECOWAS “both a defense 
alliance and a regional system of collective security under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.”343  
Although the MCPMRPS does not stipulate explicitly that the Mediation and Security Council shall 
seek the authorisation of the Security Council before ordering military intervention, other parts of 
the Protocol state that ECOWAS accepts the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.344 Article 27 of the Protocol seems to suggest that 
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an authorisation of the Security Council is not required. Under that disposition, the submission of a 
report on a situation to the UN or the OAU (now: AU) is only one of six procedures by which the 
Mechanism may be applied.345 In contrast to Article 27, Article 26 MCPMRPS submits ECOWAS 
completely to the authority of the Security Council as the latter may put into effect the mechanism 
upon its request.346  That article therefore corresponds principally to Article 53(1) of the UN Charter 
according to which the Security Council may utilise regional organisations under its authority for 
peace enforcement authority.347 In practice, and as it will be explained in length in the following part, 
ECOWAS has intervened twice in conflicts without an authorisation of the Security Council, but both 
interventions happened in the period before the Protocol existed. In summary, it is not clear under 
ECOWAS law, whether the organisation is required to seek the authorisation of the Security Council 
to intervene militarily in a conflict.348 
3. ECOWAS, Peacekeeping and its relations with the United Nations  
 
The relations between ECOWAS and the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping operations 
began with a bad start in 1990. Liberia was devastated by a civil war and ECOWAS had requested 
technical assistance by the United Nations to establish a peacekeeping force.  Although the Liberian 
Ambassador had tried to bring the conflict to the attention of the Security Council in June 1990, the 
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Security Council did not consider the issue until January 1991.349 The Cold War was just over and the 
United Nations and the Security Council were trying to find and assert their new role in this post-
bipolar world. Political implications, national interests as well as procedural traditions hampered any 
decisiveness, assertiveness and readiness by the Council to take action so that ECOWAS intervened 
on its own;350 however the Security Council issued a statement commending the efforts of ECOMOG 
once unity had been reached.351 Also, within ECOWAS there was opposition to the intervention. First 
of all, many ECOWAS members opposed a UN presence in Liberia in the early stages as they were 
afraid that the UN troops would take credit for ECOWAS’s sacrifices.352 Moreover, political splits 
within ECOWAS came to light as several francophone states had not been in favour of a Nigerian-led, 
intervention of Anglophone states in the civil war in Liberia.353 The main reason of the opposition was 
however political as Nigeria dominates ECOWAS as the biggest economic player in the region which 
evoked resistance.354  
In the absence of a Security Council mandate, the intervention by ECOWAS occurred in violation of 
the United Nations Charter,355 but it was welcomed by the United Nations and the international 
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community of states.356 For the first time, the UN “sent military observers to support an already 
established sub-regional force”357 and in a statement laid down in a Note by the President of the SC, 
the Security Council also commended the efforts of ECOMOG.358 This note can be considered as a 
post facto authorisation to intervene.  The relations between the United Nations  and ECOWAS  
strengthened from 1992 onwards, coinciding with the publication of Boutros-Ghali’s report, An 
Agenda for Peace, in which he called for increased cooperation with regional organisations (infra, 
1.2).359 After the Cotonou accord in 1993, a joint cease-fire monitoring committee was established 
which was chaired by the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).360 Nevertheless, the cooperation 
between ECOMOG and UNOMIL remained difficult. ECOMOG’s ill-equipped peacekeepers 
complained about UNOMIL not giving them the right to use their helicopters and other vehicles and 
felt that the better paid UN troops left the difficult tasks to them. The problems were exacerbated 
with the publication of the seventh report by then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali about Liberia in 
which, inter alia, he mentioned the rather likely involvement of ECOMOG personnel with rebels in 
one attack.361 
As ECOMOG continued to struggle with financial difficulties and political divisions, the Secretary-
General proposed the establishment of a large United Nations peacekeeping operation under which 
ECOMOG would be subsumed. Unfortunately, that proposal was met by “eloquent silence” as “the 
most powerful members of the Council (…) [were] increasingly wary of proliferating peacekeeping 
missions amidst the disasters of Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994”.362 The Security Council then 
issued Resolution 1001, after receiving the report by the Secretary-General, in which it was stated 
that the mandate of UNOMIL would not be extended if serious progress would not be made until 
September 1995. In response, ECOWAS members “warn[ed] that any UN withdrawal would 
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compromise ECOMOG’s efforts and could lead to the further destabilization of the West African sub-
region.”363  
UNOMIL consisted of only 62 observers. The warning by the ECOWAS states was enunciated for 
reasons of international legitimacy and attention rather than for security concerns as the small UN 
observation mission was largely symbolic. But it also underlined the complex relationship existing 
between the United Nations and ECOWAS. Whereas the latter wanted the political legitimacy of the 
UN as well as their greater military and economic resources, they were once more concerned about 
the UN coming “late in the day to steal ECOMOG’s thunder after several years of lonely 
peacekeeping.”364 However after the second civil war in Liberia started and ECOWAS intervened 
again, the United Nations ultimately established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 
the basis of Resolution 1509.365 
A jointly chaired Implementation Monitoring Committee which included representatives from the EU 
and the AU366 started meeting in November 2003 to oversee the disarmament of the factions.367  In 
addition to Liberia, ECOWAS intervened, in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, amongst others. In all 
three missions, the United Nations were forced to take over given that the ECOWAS peacekeepers 
were logistically ill-equipped and under-resourced, as the following analysis will show. In these 
scenarios, a partition of labour was finally agreed upon under which ECOWAS provided the core of 
the UN peacekeepers while the Security Council took charge of the political oversight and 
contributed additional troops and financial means.368 The crisis in Sierra Leone was the second time 
that ECOWAS intervened without an authorisation of the Security Council, but as in the previous case 
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in Liberia the non-authorised intervention was not met with any criticism, and rather ECOWAS was 
commended afterwards by the Security Council for its role and efforts.369 The tasks were once again 
divided, the Security Council limited itself to travel restrictions and a petroleum and arms embargo 
on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1132.370 This operation is once-again a striking example of 
the interlacement between Chapter VII action of the Security Council and cooperation under Chapter 
VIII and the evolutionary practice of the Security Council regarding this matter.371 When the failure of 
the Conakry Peace Agreement became apparent, 13000 troops were deployed by ECOMOG.  The 
United Nations itself played only a very limited role with the establishment of the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). As in Liberia, the ECOMOG troops appeared to resent 
the better equipped and particularly better paid United Nations military observers.372   
These two ECOWAS operations preceded the adoption of the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security which in the view of some 
authors institutionalised the appropriation of powers from the United Nations by ECOWAS.373  
In Liberia, ECOMOG was eventually replaced by a UN force (UNAMSIL) following Nigeria’s intention 
to withdraw 2000 of its 12000 peacekeepers each month, though this was accompanied by a 
conditional offer to redeploy some troops under a new United Nations operation.374 The United 
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S/1999/1003 (1999), paras. 35-52; Security Council Resolution 1270, UN Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999). Nigeria also 
rejected a proposal by the Security Council to ECOMOG to continue the protection of Freetown and to 
undertake enforcement action against rogue rebel elements, realising that ECOMOG would be a useful 
scapegoat if something went wrong while being entrusted with these difficult and dangerous tasks. 
Consequently, Nigeria refused to remain in Sierra Leone as part of ECOMOG in a situation in which there would 
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Nations turned down ECOMOG’s request to finance the entire force; however 4000 of its 
peacekeepers were subsumed under the new UN force. ECOWAS and some other sub-regional 
organisations continued to question why, on the one hand, they should be responsible to the United 
Nations, if, on the other hand, the UN does not finance their operations.375 ECOWAS is nevertheless 
less dependent on external funding than the AU since about 80% of its budget for conflict prevention 
and management, which includes, for example, military exercises and election observer missions, is 
financed through a Community Levy of which a certain percentage is dedicated for the ECOWAS 
Peace Fund.376 Problems continued to exist on the ground. A United Nations assessment mission sent 
to Sierra Leone in June 2000 gave a rather disastrous judgment, criticising the “serious lack of 
cohesion within the mission as well as some other shortcomings.” These included, for instance, the 
lack of a “commonly shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement, as well as other 
problems in command and control.”377 After the monitored elections 2002, the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security was transferred to the government of Sierra 
Leone in 2004 and in the following year the United Nations operation was completed.378 
One can say that ECOWAS was afflicted with political animosities between its members and that it 
lacked not only financial resources but also military and other equipment, amongst other things 
around the turn of the millennium. In addition, its soldiers were poorly trained and had an 
insufficient understanding of the applicable law, rules and standards. It is thus not surprising that 
ECOWAS has sought cooperation with the United Nations and other international organisations from 
an early stage. In fact, where one organisation lacks resources it is often the case that it seeks 
cooperation with other organisations. The DPKO reported in 2004 that cooperation with ECOWAS 
had intensified and that they had, at the request of ECOWAS,  
provided logistical and financial advice to the Community regarding the development of support plans 
and cost estimates for the establishment of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI). The 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) also provided valuable technical assistance to 
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ECOWAS for the planning of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and played a critical role in the 
deployment and sustainment of the first ECOWAS troops in Liberia.
379
  
The African understanding was, however, that “the UN Security Council has primary responsibility for 
international peace and security and simply shifted its responsibilities to ECOWAS due to the 
reluctance of the Council, after debacles in Somalia and Rwanda, to sanction UN missions in 
Africa.”380 The United Nations reacted, inter alia, by creating the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA) 
upon the recommendation of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on West Africa whose mandate 
includes capacity building of regional and subregional mechanisms to address threats to international 
peace and security.381 
4. A new era of relations between ECOWAS and the UN 
 
The emergence of the African Union in 2002 led, however, to a profound shift in the relations 
between ECOWAS and other organisations in the area of international peace and security. The 
continuing operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (henceforth: APSA) 
under the AU focused cooperation arrangements as well as communication between the different 
organisations gradually on the AU as the primary responsible organisation on the African 
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Continent.382  The same evolution could be seen in the context of peacekeeping operations in Africa 
in which the AU slowly gained influence. 
 In the Côte d’Ivoire crisis, the AU became increasingly involved as a Mediator in the conflict.383 In 
Resolution 1633, the Security Council urged the AU as well as ECOWAS to consult with the Ivorian 
parties in order to ensure that a new Prime Minister acceptable to all the Ivorian parties shall be 
appointed, in accordance with the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.384 Following 
that resolution, there was gradually more cooperation between the AU, the United Nations and 
ECOWAS in the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire.385  
Clearly, the AU strengthened its role in the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire, not only in relations with 
ECOWAS but also in its relations with the United Nations The following peace agreement of 
Ouagadougou was transmitted to the United Nations by the AU on the basis of ECOWAS 
recommendations.386 The African Union commended the efforts of ECOWAS to promote 
reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire and “[called] on all the parties (…) to extend full cooperation to the 
ECOWAS, the AU and to the United Nations”387 [Emphasis added].  
Moreover, the African Union urged the UN to act “to expedite the deployment of the UN operation 
in Côte d’Ivoire”388 and it mandated ECOWAS “to take necessary action to ensure full restoration of 
operations of states in Côte d’Ivoire immediately.”389 The Security Council decided then to create an 
international consultative organ which included among its members, the EU, the AU and ECOWAS.390  
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But this partial loss of direct cooperation between ECOWAS and the United Nations was remedied to 
a certain extent by the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The gradual 
operationalisation of all the 5 standing brigades of the African Standby Force contributed to an 
increased cooperation between ECOWAS and the United Nations and it transformed ECOWAS into a 
supporter of peace and security beyond their geographic region in Africa,391 drawing on their 
strength as the African organisation with the most experience in peacekeeping operations.392 
However, efforts at capacity-building are still necessary to improve the functioning of the 
organisation and communication within its institutions.393 
Regarding the crisis in Mali, The Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali met under the 
joint chairmanship of the AU, the UN and ECOWAS and “ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and the EU [were 
encouraged] in cooperation with Mali and other stakeholders, to expedite the finalization of the joint 
planning to respond to the request (…) of Mali for an African-led International Force.”394  
5. ECOWAS and the European Union 
 
The same observations regarding the relationship between ECOWAS and the United Nations are valid 
for the relations between ECOWAS and the EU. The latter cooperates predominantly with the “big 
brother” of ECOWAS, the African Union. One example of direct cooperation is the grant agreement 
of 76 Million Euros to support the African-led International Mission in Mali (AFISMA) signed between 
ECOWAS and the EU.395 
6. Conclusions 
 
ECOWAS has generally emerged as a serious actor for maintaining international peace and security. 
The analysis demonstrates an evolution of the relations ECOWAS entertains with other international 
organisations. In contrast to the relationship of NATO and the EU between each other and towards 
the UN, the relations ECOWAS has maintained with these three organisations have not been further 
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institutionalised.  This is primarily due to the continuing operationalisation of the APSA of the AU. 
Non-African international organisations focus their organisations on the AU which has the mandate 
to provide security on the whole African continent. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of ECOWAS relations further illustrate that relationships between the UN 
and regional organisations for maintaining international peace and security, as well as for deploying 
peacekeeping operations, seem to have evolved from the early and also competitive stages if one is 
to adopt Virally’s classification system as regards relations based on collaboration and cooperation.  
From the legal analysis under the law of responsibility, ECOWAS and its relationships prompt the 
formulation of three further conclusions.  
First of all, concerning the specific question of joint responsibility, ECOWAS might be acting in a 
subsidiary – rather than an equal – role in the context of peacekeeping operations, although the 
example of Mali suggests that ECOWAS is emerging as an independent actor alongside the AU. 
Moreover, the analysis of ECOWAS further emphasises the need to base the attribution of conduct 
on a criterion which incorporates the casuistic approach taken to peacekeeping operations as well as 
in relations among international organisations.  
Finally, the lack of any substantive relations between ECOWAS and either NATO, or the UN or EU 
suggests that there is a security-facilitating triangle of actors evolving, consisting of the AU, the EU 
and the UN. 
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2.5. African Union peacekeeping activities 
 
  “[W]hat is happening in Darfur  
is extraordinary. We see there the African Union, the 
United Nations and Europe, working for peace. And 
who here can say that either of those organizations 
would have succeeded alone? We are able to make 
progress because we are all together, helping Africa, 
which will believe once again in its future.” 
  
- Statement of H.E. President Sarkozy, during the 5749th meeting, 25 September 2007, of the Security Council 




“Africa is no longer a 
private hunting ground; it is no longer anyone’s 
backyard; it is no longer a part of the Great Game; and 
it is no longer anyone’s sphere of influence: Those are 
the few simple rules that will allow the continent to 
shoulder its responsibility and to demonstrate inter- 
African solidarity.” 
 
- Statement of H.E. Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairman of the African Union Commission, replying (partially) 
also to the Statement of President Sarkozy, in the very same meeting of the Security Council.
397
 
1. Introduction  
 
The African Union was established in 2000 succeeding to the OAU and “[c]onscious of the fact that 
the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development 
of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the 
implementation of our development and integration agenda.”398 The establishment of a new 
organisation was also motivated by the African trauma of the “1994 genocide in one small country 
[which] ultimately triggered a conflict in the heart of Africa that has directly or indirectly touched at 
least one-third of all the nations on the continent.”399  In its conclusions, the International Panel of 
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Eminent Personalities, investigating the genoice in Rwanda, was convinced that the Organisation of 
African Unity needed “to establish appropriate structures to enable it to respond effectively to 
enforce the peace in conflict situations.”400  
It required the financial backing and guidance of Libya to move to end the OAU and “to replace it 
with the African Union which incorporates powers which go beyond what had earlier been 
appropriated by ECOWAS.”401 The objectives of the African Union laid down in Article 3 include to 
“encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and to “promote peace, security, and stability on the 
continent.”402  In the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, the Member States of the AU reconfirmed 
their determination to “end all wars in Africa by 2020.”403 
2.  The AU’s normative framework for the maintenance of international peace and 
security 
 
The normative nramework and the political aims of the African Union are partly based on those of 
the OAU. The regime for maintaining peace and security in the African Union is decentralized, the 
power to act “is delegated to various actors, they act in conjunction with the Peace and Security 
Council which is the pivot of the system”,404 including the Assembly and the Executive Council.  
The Assembly of Head of States and Government shall – under Article 9(1)(b) of the Constitutive Act 
“receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from the other organs of the 
Union”. In the rules of procedure of the Assembly405 it is specified in Article 4 that the Assembly shall  
d) give directives to the Executive Council, the PSC or the Commission on the management of conflicts, 
wars, acts of terrorism, emergency situations and the restoration of peace; 
 
e) decide on intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances namely, war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity; 
 
Article 9(2) of the Constitutive Act says that the Assembly may delegate any of its powers and 
functions to any organ of the Union which contrasts with the Solemn Declaration on a Common 
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African Defence and Security Policy which provides that the Peace and Security Council “is the 
appropriate organ to which the Assembly will delegate its powers relating to peace and security.”406  
The AU has established a whole framework for maintaining international peace and security on the 
African continent in the form of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) going beyond the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which already existed in the OAU 
and the competences of the organisation under its Constitutive Act. Indeed, the AU effectively 
amended the Constitutive Act in 2002, two years after its foundation with the adoption of the 
Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU, conscious that the previous 
mechanism with its focus on preventive diplomacy was not sufficient to confront and deal efficiently 
with current security challenges on the African continent.407 The OAU which strongly adhered to the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention was ill-equipped in facing new security challenges in 
the form of intra-state conflicts involving violent civil wars and mass atrocities.408 The African Peace 
and Security Architecture (APSA) comprises the Peace and Security Council as the highest authority 
of the African Union.409 Other components imply the Common African Security and Defence Policy, 
the Military Staff Committee, the African Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise. 
The preamble of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council410 articulates a 
commitment to the principles of the United Nations, but also to the importance of developing 
international cooperation between the United Nations, other international organisations and the 
African Union: 
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, (…) on the role of regional 
arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to 
forge closer cooperation and partnership between the United Nations, other international 
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organizations and the African Union, in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and 
stability in Africa; [Emphasis added]411 
The Peace and Security Council has a fairly broad mandate reaching from anticipation and prevention 
of conflicts to peace-building and post-conflict construction,412 some of the functions of which are 
exercised by the Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations. As stated in the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union, cooperation with the United Nations and other (regional) international 
organisations is a key issue in the agenda for maintaining international peace and security. 
Consequently, the Peace and Security Council has the mandate to “promote close harmonization, co-
ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa” and it shall also “promote and develop a 
strong partnership for peace and security between the Union and the United Nations and its 
agencies; as well as with other relevant organizations.”413 The predecessor of the African Union, the 
OAU, was explicitly recognised as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter on the basis of Security Council Resolution 199414  and there are no contrary arguments why 
the African Union does not fall under Chapter VIII.415 
  
                                                          
411
 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002). 
412
 Article 3 of the Protocol. 
413
 Article 7 j., k. of the Protocol. In detail it is set out in Article 17 which is as follows: 
ARTICLE 17 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
1. In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, 
the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, 
which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and 
Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of 
peace, security and stability in Africa. 
2. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical 
and military support for the African Unions’ activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and 
stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional 
Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
3. The Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission shall maintain close and continued 
interaction with the United Nations Security Council, its African members, as well as with the Secretary-
General, including holding periodic meetings and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and 
stability in Africa. 
4. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant international 
organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited to address 
the Peace and Security Council on issues of common interest, if the latter considers that the efficient discarge 
of its responsibilities does so require. Cf. also Article 13 (4). 
414
 Security Council Resolution 199 (1964), Preamble and para.6. 
415
 Hummer, Schweitzer, ‘Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. Article 52’, supra note 190, 807, 828-38. 
Chapter II: The (emerging) system of Collective Security  
158 
 
3. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the UN and the United Nations Charter 
 
The objectives of the African Union in the domain of peace and security include the defence of “the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States”. In Article 4 of its 
Constitutive Act, these broad aims are qualified and specified. The principles of the African Union in 
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act comprise 
(d) establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent; 
(e) peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate 
means as may be decided upon by the Assembly; 
(f) prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union; 
(g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; 
(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; 
(i) peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security; 
(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and 
security. 
The codification of these principles by the AU in its framework for maintaining international peace 
and security is once again explained by the shock about the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and by the 
passive attitude of the “international community” which prompted notably the elaboration and the 
wording of Article 4 (g):416 It “provided clear evidence, in the view of African states, that [sic] they 
should seek to rely on their own forces in such circumstances.”417   
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The Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union led to the addition of a fourth 
alternative and a qualification to Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act, which is the “right of the Union 
to intervene in a Member state (…) in respect of grave circumstances, namely (…) a serious threat to 
legitimate order.”418 The first three options for intervention are based on crimes as defined under 
international law. Nevertheless the amendment with regard to the inclusion of a fourth option raises 
concern as both the AU’s Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol fail to indicate by whom, how and 
when the existence of these “grave circumstances” has to be determined.419 As to the application of 
the first three options of Article 4 (h), any intervention by the AU prior to a legal determination of the 
commission of crimes would not be lawful under AU law.420 However the fourth new cause for 
intervention raises even more questions as it is itself undefined. Two former legal counsels of the AU 
suggest that it covers, inter alia, severe violations of human rights amounting to crimes under 
international law, but that it would then be necessary to establish the threshold triggering its 
application,421 a point which is taken up by the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence 
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420
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and Security Policy.422 The indeterminate nature may nevertheless prove to be beneficial for the 
work of the organisation. In a similar fashion, the Charter of the United Nations does not define 
“threat to the peace”, “breach of the peace” and “act of aggression”, which has enabled the General 
Assembly and the Security Council to interpret the Charter in ways that “facilitate fulfillment of the 
purposes for which the organisation was established.”423 A similar approach can be expected by the 
African Union, which is also subject to other constitutional limitations.424 It is also argued by the legal 
adviser of the AU that the fourth alternative allows the Assembly to decide upon an intervention 
when the requirements of the other three provisions are not applicable, making it a mere emergency 
solution.425 This does not cover cases such as “intervening to keep in power a regime that (…) 
commits gross and massive violations of human rights or refuses to hand over power after losing 
elections [which] is not in conformity with the values and standards that the Union has set for 
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itself.”426 On the contrary – argumentum a forteriori – the African Union should intervene in such 
cases to guarantee the transfer of power to the newly elected governments.  
A much more heated debate, particularly within the legal scholarship has however been caused by 
the question of whether the provisions of Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act are in conformity with 
the United Nations Charter and particularly Article 2 (4). It has to be accepted that the constitutional 
framework of the AU does not expressly refer to the use of force or armed military intervention,427 
but bearing in mind that any intervention under Article 4 (h) will respond to war crimes or to the 
existence of grave circumstances, which is considered to cover similar severe violations of human 
rights law, one may presume that any such intervention will involve the use of force.428 The UN 
Charter prohibits the use of force except in self-defence under Article 51 and enforcement action 
under Chapter VII. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act does not stipulate that an authorisation of the 
Security Council is necessary in order for the AU to intervene in a Member State on the basis of 
Article 4 (h).429  
One author refers implicitly to the debate on universalism and regionalism during the drafting of the 
Charter and states quite harshly that this empowerment of enforcement action by the African Union 
is “the first true blow to the constitutional framework of the international system established in 1945 
predicated on the ultimate control of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council.”430 
According to this view, the right to intervene of the AU corresponds to the denial of the AU vis-à-vis 
the Security Council’s primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security as 
enshrined in Article 24 of the UN Charter.431 
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Other authors have interpreted this disposition as an internal authorisation clause which establishes 
the constitutional competence of the AU to undertake such an operation in the case of the existence 
of an authorisation from the Security Council.432  
In the specific context of this debate, it is also disputed whether the consent of the state in which 
intervention takes place, has a bearing upon the legal determination of the intervention as legal or 
illegal. 
On the one hand, Article 3(a) of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact is 
more restrictive than Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, as it covers the prohibition of 
the use of force “in matters between [states] and within them.”433 It so seems that this disposition 
prohibits the African Union from conducting an intervention that is as prohibited under Article 2 (7) 
of the United Nations Charter, but with the difference that the latter allows for intervention in cases 
of an authorisation granted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.434  
On the other hand, it is also argued in legal writings that the AU can intervene, in similar fashion as 
the United Nations under Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, in cases of where no consent is given by the 
concerned state.435 Upon closer inspection, this view cannot, however, withstand legal scrutiny.436 
First of all, a distinction of a peremptory and a non-peremptory part of the prohibition of the use of 
force in this specific case, with the latter being based on consent by being a member of the regional 
organisation whose charter authorises such an action would exempt all organisations from the 
requirement of seeking an authorisation by the Security Council and it would run “clearly against the 
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435
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purpose of Art. 53 (1)” of the UN Charter.437 Moreover, the AU members per se would be violating 
Article 103 of the UN Charter while intervening in an AU member state on the basis of Article 4 (h), 
without Security Council authorisation.438 
Nevertheless, one has to take into account that Article 4 and especially its paragraph (h) are at the 
core of the system of maintenance of peace and security as set up by the different instruments of the 
African Union. As it is argued by one author, the competences the African Union is endowed with 
under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act are broader than the competences of the Security Council 
allocated under Chapter VII of the Charter, in the sense that even if the African Union were to comply 
with the UN Charter, it could nevertheless act in that area which is outside the jurisdiction of the 
Security Council. The Security Council can only authorise the use of force on the basis of a 
determination of the existence of one of the three possibilities under Article 39 of the Charter so that 
the question  
whether the AU subordinates itself or not (…) is immaterial to the possibility of the UN Security Council 
authorizing actions with respect to the provisions of Article 4 (h) as these four pretexts allowing for the 
use of force go beyond the Council’s competence to act under Chapter VII.
439  
Indeed, further dispositions of the legal framework of the AU suggest that a right to intervene 
without a Security Council authorisation might have been envisaged by the drafters something that is 
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not surprising if one bears in mind that the failure of the UN to act in Rwanda was one of the reasons 
which motivated the transformation of the OAU to the AU.440  
This eagerness for independence of the African Union vis-à-vis the Security Council is clearly 
abdicated in the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. The Preamble of the Protocol 
stipulates the determination to enhance the “capacity to address the scourges of conflicts on the 
Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about 
peace, security and stability on the Continent” [Emphasis added]. The intentions of the drafters are 
made even clearer in Article 16 of the Protocol according to which “[t]he Regional Mechanisms are 
part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for 
promoting peace, security and stability in Africa” [Emphasis added]. This is a blunt and honest 
contradiction to Article 24 of the UN Charter but it can be questioned whether it truly “makes plain 
the dislodging of the United Nations Security Council from its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security” as it is suggested by Allain. 441   
First of all, the Article refers to the primary responsibility of the AU for the maintenance of 
international peace and security only in the context of its relations with the Regional Mechanisms; 
the (sub)-regional organisations on the African continent.442 
This apparent contradiction of Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act with the UN Charter is 
weakened or even remedied also by other clauses in the legal framework of the AU. According to 
Article 17 of the 2005 African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, no position taken 
by the AU shall be considered as “derogating in any way from the obligations of Member States 
contained in the United Nations Charter (…) and from the primary responsibility of the United 
Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.”  
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The Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council also ascertains that “the 
Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security 
Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”443  Thus, it is argued – on the basis of a harmonious interpretation – that these references 
to the United Nations Charter qualify the right of intervention of Article 4 h).444 While it is unclear 
whether under AU law, the AU has to seek an authorisation from the Security Council, “this does not 
necessarily suggest that the intention was for Article 4 (h) to operate ouside of the limits set under 
the UN Charter.”445  
On the contrary, distinguishing between the internal law of the AU of which the Protocol is part446 
and general international law, it is submitted that the authorisation of the AU to intervene under its 
internal law is necessary as the AU would be otherwise acting ultra vires under its own law should it 
be authorised by the Security Council to resort to enforcement action against one of its members.447 
An additional benefit of that harmonious interpretation is that an authorisation of the Security 
Council given to the AU to intervene will, arguably, help the latter to shed some light on the meaning 
of “a serious threat to legitimate order.”448 Other interpretations of the right to intervention argue 
for a necessity of an ex post authorisation only or an emerging customary norm which – given the 
lack of sufficient practice and its obscurity – is not convincing.449 Without an authorisation of the 
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Security Council, the AU’s right to intervene under Article 4 (h) is “in breach of the collective security 
system as envisaged under Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, in particular Article 53.”450 
The practice of both organisations also illustrates very clearly that an authorisation of the Security 
Council for intervention by the AU for measures going beyond traditional peacekeeping operations is 
considered to be necessary. In a statement by the President of the Security Council it was stressed 
that “in some cases, the African Union may be authorized by the Security Council to deal with 
collective security challenges on the African continent.”451 The Security Council and several of its 
members have repeatedly emphasised the role that the Council holds at the apex of the collective 
security system.452 
Moreover, in practice, Article 4 (h) has never been invoked by the AU, not even in Darfur nor in 
respect of Libya in 2011, despite deliberate and systematic attacks on civilians in both countries.453 
Two authors argue that the inactivity of the AU was due to the fact that the organisation recognises 
the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, but simultaneously upholds state sovereignty, leaving 
the AU in a predicament.454 It might be more plausible that the inactivity of the AU was due to 
pragmatic reasons such as political disagreement within the AU or simply the lack of financial and 
other resources to act independently. Indeed, the financial burden of the AU as well as the troop 
contributions to peacekeeping operations rest on the shoulders of a few African states, whereas 
most of the African states “have been reluctant to substantiate their political and financial 
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commitment vis-à-vis the AU.”455 In any case, the practice shows that the African states themselves 
have defended the view that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security which includes any possible consideration of a military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes. 456 In similar fashion, individual African states have expressed the 
necessity to remain within the ambit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter with regard to any right of 
intervention;  the extensive analysis by Corten  in this context contains references to statements by 
not less than 20 African states.457 Among these states are some which are also members of 
ECOWAS.458 The AU itself states that it acts under Chapter VIII for the purpose of peacekeeping 
operations and therefore adheres to the system of the Charter. 459 Consequently, despite the 
apparent contradiction between Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU and international law, 
this appears to have little impact in practice; the latter demonstrates an adherence to the system of 
collective security as was envisioned by the drafters of the UN Charter in 1945.  
The most relevant feature is nevertheless that the AU PSC, in terms of the organisation’s internal law 
and policy also, “constitutes a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
In this regard, the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcements actions. 
Similarly, the RECs/Regions will seek AU authorisation of their interventions.”460 [Emphasis added] In 
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this sense, the AU therefore acts as the intermediary between the United Nations and ECOWAS for 
the purposes of maintaining international peace and security.461  
4.  The African Union and the United Nations 
1. The early steps – defining their roles in the relationship 
 
The analysis of the legal framework of the AU showed that the AU’s mandate to maintain 
international peace and security is innovative as well as ambitious. However, whether the ambitions 
of the AU to be the leading figure in maintaining international peace and security on the African 
continent can be implemented in practice, and especially vis-à-vis the Security Council and on the 
basis of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, deserves closer examination. The United Nations had already 
cooperated with the OAU from the mid 1990s onwards and helped it to develop its capacity for 
peacekeeping operations and the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
through financial and technical assistance.462 This tradition of reliance on the United Nations was 
brought within the AU when it was established in 2000. Indeed, the AU adopted a comparable if not 
parallel attitude to that of ECOWAS towards the United Nations. The perception was that in so far as 
the AU safeguards the maintenance of international peace and security on the African continent, the 
United Nations will provide financial, logistic and military support. The Declaration on a Common 
African Defence and Security Policy sees the UN in a supportive role towards the AU stating that 
“[w]here necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, 
logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion of maintenance of 
peace and security.”463 This approach illustrates that African leaders were willing to “push the 
standards of collective stability and security to the limit without having any regard for legal niceties 
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such as the authorization of the Security Council”464 and that they held a somewhat depreciatory 
view of the Council and its role within the system for maintaining international peace and security. In 
their opinion, the Security Council was “meant to assist the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Council [and] not vice versa.”465 
In contrast to the early AU policy towards the UN, the latter’s policy towards the African Union has 
been and remains to support the African Union in the maintenance of international peace and 
security in Africa and to further develop the “interorganisational” relationship, while nonetheless 
emphasising that the United Nations and in particular the Security Council have the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.466 One of the motives for the 
United Nations is to prevent the perception that the United Nations is subcontracting or “out-
sourcing” peacekeeping to the African Union.467 A clear expression of this policy is the recognition by 
the United Nations of the lack of resources at the disposal of the African Union: “While regional 
organizations have demonstrated commendable political will to deal with existing and emerging 
conflicts, timely responses have often been hampered by the lack of critical logistics and financial 
resources.”468 As four African Union or ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations have been reassigned to 
United Nations Peacekeeping operations,469 there is a conviction within the United Nations that 
“[t]he African Union’s basic assumption is that the African Standby Force will undertake 
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peacekeeping activities with a view, in due course, to handing them over to the United Nations.”470  
Primarily due to the support of the EU through the African Peace Facility, the African Standby Force 
attained Initial Operational Capacity in 2010 and is expected to achieve Full Operational Capacity in 
2015.471 
2. The World Summit as the catalyser for more institutionalised relations 
 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome document laid the basis for more institutionalised relations 
between the United Nations and the African Union using the cooperation between the UN and the 
EU as a blue-print for fostering a similar relationship.472 The United Nations pledged to “support the 
development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building with the AU.” 473 The start 
of this support came in the form of a Framework Declaration which was adopted a year later in 
2006.474 The main objective is “to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and African 
subregional organizations to act as effective UN partners in addressing the challenges to human 
security in Africa.”475 [Emphasis added] This objective is significant for several reasons. First of all it 
stressed that the United Nations and the African Union are seen as partners rather than in a 
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subordinate-superior relationship.476 The Security Council, in contrast, again demonstrated its 
flexibility and pragmatic approach in its relations with regional organisations:  
In Africa, integrating the strengths of the United Nations and the African Union has become an 
indispensable part of the international community’s response to crises on the continent. It has proven 
essential for the United Nations to work in tandem with regional or subregional actors, at times in a 
lead role, in a supporting role, in a burden-sharing role, in sequential deployments and in joint 
operations.
477 
In its report on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security to the Security 
Council, the Secretary-General gave a more detailed description of the necessary pragmatic and 
flexible policy: 
[a]t the operational level, lessons and experience indicate that there is no generic model for 
cooperation between the two organizations that can be applied to any situation, and that each 
situation requires innovative solutions. It is therefore important to ensure that the conceptualization, 
mandates, rules of engagement and institutional arrangements for each peacekeeping operation are 
based on the strategic and operational requirements to support a peace process or the effective 
implementation of a peace agreement. Such arrangements should be predicated on a shared vision of 
the political process and preserve unity of command and strategic direction, while ensuring the 
provision of critical resource and capability requirements. To ensure a more coherent framework for 
global peacekeeping, the United Nations is committed to working with the African Union to harmonize 
peacekeeping standard operating procedures, including with respect to force generation, planning and 
mission start-up.
478
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Moreover, this objective underlines the fact that the United Nations– just as the AU – has very high 
incentives for the AU to transform into an organisation which can effectively implement its mandate 
as the UN was itself overstretched and reaching the limits of its capacities given the volume of 
peacekeeping operations with which it had been involved.479 The regional consultative mechanism 
established between the United Nations and the African Union provides for consultation and 
cooperation in different clusters of which one is dealing with peace and security.480  
3. Aid for self-help by the UN 
 
Two years later, in 2008, the United Nations established a Liaison office facilitating support to the 
African Union. 481 Particularly relevant for the present study is that specific priorities within the AU-
UN cooperation were given to the development of logistical and financial reserves for the AU’s rapid 
deployment capabilities as well as to help the AU in ensuring a common “doctrine and procedures for 
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joint planning and operational validation in its coordination with subregional economic 
communities.”482 The UN Secretariat continues  
to provide operational and planning support and long-term capacity-building support to the African 
Union Commission for its peace support operations (…) [which] includes support to the planning and 
management of ongoing operations such as AMISOM and potential future operations, as well as 
technical advice and support in the development of the policies, guidelines, doctrine and training for 
the African Standby Force.
483
  
This fraction of the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union raises questions 
from the point of view of responsibility for wrongful acts conducted in peacekeeping operations to 
be discussed in Part 3.484  
The Policy Framework on the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff 
Committee as adopted in 2004 by decision of the Assembly of the AU foresaw the establishment of 
five standby brigades by 2010, forming the African Standby Force (ASF) for the five subregions on the 
African continent to be deployed rapidly under the auspices of the AU, ECOWAS or other subregional 
organisations485 under one of the six conflict scenarios envisaged.486 The interest of the United 
                                                          
482
 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, supra note 472, 29 
paras. 178-79; See also Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, supra note 209, 8, para. 35; 
Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/694 (2004), 16, para. 84. 
483
 Furthermore, “UNOAU provides advice and mentoring to the African Union Commission on a daily basis in 
the areas of: mission planning, development of doctrines and policies, military, police, logistics, medical, human 
resources, procurement and other mission support.”, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-
African Union cooperation, supra note 478, 7, para. 22; See also generally on UN partnerships, Report of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, 2008 substantive session (10 March-4 
April and 3 July 2008), UN Doc. A/62/19 (2008), 25-26, para. 156. According to the Budget Report, “[t]he 
priorities of the Office are to directly support the planning and strategic direction of African Union 
peacekeeping operations, to help build the capacity of the African Union Commission and the regional 
economic communities/regional mechanisms to plan, staff and deploy such operations, and to provide 
coordinated short-term operational support, in coordination with departments within the United Nations and 
with other partners. As part of this support, the delivery of technical expertise and the continued facilitation of 
donor coordination for the development of the African Standby Force, the provision of advice and assistance to 
the African Union in the overall planning and management of AMISOM with support from DPKO and DFS, and 
proposed operations (…) will remain priorities for the Office. In this respect, (…) the Office will continue to 
support the long-term development of the Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture.”, Budget for the 
support account for peacekeeping operations (2012), supra note 480, 20-21, para. 51.  
484
 “With respect to AMISOM, as part of the overall United Nations strategy for Somalia and in accordance with 
various Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009) and 1910 (2010), the 
United Nations has worked with the African Union Commission in the planning, deployment and operations of 
AMISOM through the logistics support package provided by the United Nations Support Office to AMISOM 
(UNSOA) and through UNOAU (previously through the United Nations planning team”, Support to African 
Union peacekeeping operations (2010), supra note 475, 8, para. 29. 
485
 Policy Framework on the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, AU 
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.35 (III) (2004), Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, supra note 209, 3, 
paras. 8-9, Experts’ Meeting on the Relationship, supra note 460, 1, para. 3. 
Chapter II: The (emerging) system of Collective Security  
174 
 
Nations to establish this capacity is particularly profound because regional organisations are better 
equipped for the rapid deployment of troops.487 The ASF comprises a maximum of 25000 troops and 
its operationalization will therefore only facilitate the burden of the UN in Africa which deployed 
68027 peacekeepers in Africa alone in May 2013, excluding military observers, police, and other 
staff.488 The United Nations as well as the European Union and NATO are engaged in training of the 
ASF:  
As part of the African Peace and Security Architecture, an AU continental-level peace support 
operation exercise code named AMANI AFRICA was conducted with UNOAU support, in close 
coordination with the European Union and NATO, to assess the operational readiness of the African 
Standby Force (ASF). This brought to a close the ASF Road Map II. UNOAU is currently assisting with 
the development of the African Standby Force Road Map III, which should culminate in the 
operationalization of the Force by 2015.
489
 
As a result, the United Nations and other organisations are not only contributing to the mission and 
operational planning of the AU, but they equally contribute to the training of its troops. 
Consequently, it has to be examined whether this part of the cooperation between the organisations 
is relevant for an analysis of the responsibility of the organisations for conduct arising out of 
peacekeeping operations. It is even more so as the question of financing and financial support to AU 
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peacekeeping operations could also entail the responsibility under international law of the 
supporting organisations. So far, AU peace-keeping operations authorised by the Security Council are 
funded primarily through voluntary contributions, especially the European Union’s African Peace 
Facility (infra, 2.3.9.) as well as through United Nations assessed contributions.490 Financial problems 
have so far seriously encroached upon nearly all if not all AU peace operations and e.g. hampered the 
rapid deployment of troops.491 
4. Support packages for AU peace operations and the possibility of control by the 
Security Council 
 
The UN-AU Panel was well aware of the fact that the various cooperation packages for the AU raise 
questions regarding the responsibility and oversight of these operations. Referring to the operations 
in Somalia and Darfur, the panel  stated that “[w]hile the lack of resources put the operations at 
serious risk of failure, the dependency on external support for deployment and sustainment put the 
African Union in the position of having the potential responsibility for missions over which it has little 
institutional or managerial capacity or control.”492 Although the statements refer rather to political 
than legal responsibility, it is clear that these cooperation packages also raise questions regarding the 
international responsibility of the involved organisations. The United Nations has generally resisted 
allowing the distribution of a United Nations support package financed through “assessed 
contributions” to AU peacekeeping operations despite calls by the latter on various occasions.493 The 
Secretary-General stressed that the “current financial framework for partnerships in peacekeeping 
operations are not conducive to building a sustainable long-term strategy.”494 The Prodi report called 
likewise for contributions to AU peacekeeping operations based on assessed contributions.495  The 
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implications also on a level of responsibility are severe as “the provision of a United Nations support 
package financed by United Nations assessed contributions would entail a case-by-case authorization 
by the United Nations Security Council.”496 Moreover, the understanding was that United Nations 
support packages financed by assessed contributions would be allowed only for short-term periods, 
ensuring sustainability and for peacekeeping operations of the AU before the eventual transition to a 
United Nations operation.497 The Security Council retains a high degree of control over the allocation 
of a support package, as well as over the to be deployed AU peacekeeping operation since “United 
Nations support should only be considered in cases where consultations between the (…) Security 
Council and the (…) Peace and Security Council take place to ensure the political and security 
objectives of these operations are aligned prior to either body authorizing the establishment and 
deployment of such an operation.”498 Therefore, the Security Council factually retains a certain 
                                                          
provide predictability which is sustainable over whatever period is necessary. The primacy of the Security 
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ibid.  
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influence if not a veto about the deployment of an AU operation499, whereas a lack of financial means 
constitutes the main problem preventing the AU from effectively acting upon its mandate.500 In 
practice, the AU seeks authorisation for all its operations501, including peacekeeping operations 
which – as it was established502 – do not fall under the authorisation requirement of Chapter VIII of 
the Charter, so that it was suggested that the AU may only anticipate UN support of its envisaged 
operation if it actually seeks an authorisation of the Council.503 
A second mechanism in the form of a voluntary funded multi-donor trust fund was established to 
fund activities in the area of capacity-building for conflict prevention and resolution.504 It is also 
highly likely that the UN finally gave in for pragmatic reasons and due to self-interest. The AU-UN 
Panel on the modalities to support AU peacekeeping observed that: 
It is simply undesirable to expect peacekeeping missions to deploy into uncertain situations without 
the necessary means. It is a recipe for failure. We are deluding ourselves if we believe that having 
something on the ground is better than doing nothing. In the absence of the necessary capabilities, 
such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising people’s expectations 
that cannot be fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peacekeeping and weakens the 
organization that is responsible.
505
  
All, in all, there are more than “130 different contributions channeled to the African Union – each 
with its own reporting and monitoring requirements.”506 Nevertheless, the initial objective “’to 
financially enable the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct Peace Support Operations 
has not been fully achieved, it “remains a need for more concerted action between the AU, the EU 
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and the UN.”507 The financial contributions of the UN to the AU in the form of assessed contributions 
raise the very same questions under the law of responsibility as the contributions of the EU via the 
African Peace Facility.508 The UN could also make the provision of financial contributions depending 
on specific political points or on the inclusion of particular incentives in the concept of operations. 
5. Further institutionalisation of AU-UN relations: Moulding the relations towards a 
division of labour and stronger cooperation 
 
In 2010, a further step was undertaken by the United Nations and the AU to enhance the strategic 
partnership with the establishment of the United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace 
and Security.509 Another new mechanism which was created is the Desk-to-Desk mechanism bringing 
together the senior leadership and focal points for specific issues of the two organisations.510 It 
resorts from recent statements on behalf of the African Union and the 2012 Report of the 
Chairperson of the Commission that the organisation is willing to take on more responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security on the basis of certain principles including “African 
ownership and priority-setting; consultative decision-making, division of labour and sharing of 
responsibilities.” 511  
Another important principle to foster cooperation for the future is “[d]ivision of labour underpinned 
by complementarity”; establishing a “mutually-agreed division of labor to foster coherence and limit 
competition.”512 The establishment of AFISMA in Mali proves that the AU is committed to live up to 
                                                          
507
 Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011-2013 Introductory Part, 15; Cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional and other organizations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/67/280-S/2012/614 
(2012), 4, para.4. 
508
 See, infra 2.3.9. 
509
 Several meetings on the level of Under-Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Commissioner for 
Peace and Security of the AU have taken place so far. In 2011, the meetings of the Task Force discussed 
cooperation in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, the Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General on 
United Nations-African Union cooperation, supra note 478, 4, para. 12. 
510
 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African-Union-United Nations Partnership: The Need 
For Greater Coherence, PSC/AHG/3.(CCCXCVII) (2013), 1, para. 2. 
511
 He equally said that:“[i]t is critical to provide more effective support to the African continent and its 
institutions, especially as Africa has demonstrated renewed determination to deal with peace and security 
issues on the continent and provide the leadership that is required”, Security Council, 6702
nd
 meeting, supra 
note 459, 7. In order to achieve these goals, it is also necessary to rely on a “flexible and innovative application 
of the principle of subsidiarity” under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Peace and Security Council, 307
th
 
Meeting, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVII) (2012), para.11 (ii); Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, supra note 
460, 24-25, para. 91. The primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international 
peace and security is now undisputed by the AU, see, for example, Annex to the letter dated 14 October 2013 
from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, Joint communiqué of the seventh annual consultative meeting between members of the 
Security Council of the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, UN Doc. 
S/2013/611 (2013), 2, para. 2. 
512
 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, supra note 510, 2, para.4 (iv). 
Chapter II: The (emerging) system of Collective Security  
179 
 
its role and to shoulder the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security on 
the African continent. Nevertheless, Mali confirms a certain division of labour in the practice of the 
AU, the UN and the EU according to which the AU intervenes early in a conflict under conditions in 
which “the UN and the EU as well declined to take action”, thereby acting as an early responder and 
in a bridging role for a consecutive deployment of a UN operation.513 Mali highlighted, however, that 
the AU still lacks the rapid deployment capacities necessary to respond quickly to a crisis when the 
armed groups conquered further territory in Mali, leading to the French intervention in the form of 
“Operation Serval”.514 The AU therefore decided to improve its quick reaction capacities through the 
African Immediate Crisis Reponse Capacity (AICRC).515 A high priority for the UN not to intervene is 
the security situation on the ground as well as the set mandate, the UN now generally focuses on 
traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (infra 1.2.3.)516. Security Council Resolution 
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2100 therefore stipulates that the deployment of MINUSMA “shall be subject to a further review by 
the Council (…) of the security situation in MINUSMA’s area of responsibility, specifically with respect 
to the cessation of major combat operations by international military forces in the immediate 
vicinity.”517 Nevertheless the mandate of MINUSMA is comparatively robust and allows for the use of 
military force.518 Part of this division of labour is this extensive interplay on various levels as it 
facilitates equally the transition from a peacekeeping operation run by one organisation to an 
operation run by another organisation.519  
The same interplay can be witnessed in Somalia. The Security Council agreed in Resolution 2093 
“with the Secretary-General that the conditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate for the 
deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, and requests that he keeps this under 
review.”520 In the mean-time, the UN Political Office in Somalia shall be replaced with a new 
expanded Special Political Mission521 which will also include the UN Support Office for AMISOM 
(UNSOA)522 and which will operate alongside AMISOM523 “until conditions permit a peacekeeping 
operation.”524 The Secretary-General proposed four options for the deployment of such a new 
operation, either as a Joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation, a fully integrated UN peacebuilding 
mission, a more limited United Nations assistance mission or a UN peacebuilding mission separate 
from UNSOA.525 All options focus on civilian measures and foresee the continuation of AMISOM as 
part of a joint AU-UN operation or independently. Whereas the African Union recommended a joint 
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AU-UN operation, the Secretary-General gave a contrary recommendation and it is worthwhile 
quoting his reasoning: 
My advice remains that the time has not come for these approaches. In the current context of combat 
operations, the African Union has comparative advantages as a provider for military support. Rehatting 
forces as a United Nations operation would necessitate changes to the concept of operations and rules 
of engagement that would be likely to compromise effectiveness of the military campaign, potentially 
resulting in a backslide in security gains and undermining the environment for peacebuilding. A merger 
of African Union military and United Nations political functions in the current phase would create 
constraints to the effectiveness of both organizations. The option of United Nations or joint African 
Union/United Nations peacekeeping should be revisited, as conventional combat operations against 
Al-Shabaab end, in consultation with the Somali authorities.”
526
 [Emphasis added] 
Thus, the statement underlines the division of labour between the two organisations on the basis of 
“comparative advantages.”527 The Report of the Chairperson of the Commission draws upon this very 
same idea recommending that the Security Council should give “due consideration to the decisions of 
the AU and the PSC” because of the proximity and familiarity of the AU with conflict dynamics in its 
member states.528 The pledge of the Secretary-General likewise demonstrates that peacekeeping 
operations have become more professional, and indeed; effectiveness appears to be the key. This 
division of labour is also enshrined in official AU documents, which likewise underline the need to 
“achieve approximate coherence between AU and UN integrated management structures.”529 Finally, 
the statement is in line with the traditional doctrine of peacekeeping as any peacekeeping operation 
will be only deployed in consultation with the Somali authorities. The Secretary-General’s 
recommendation was therefore the creation of a United Nations assistance mission for the current 
situation in Somalia.530 Cooperation and coordination with the AU will be guaranteed, inter alia, 
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through a joint planning team and a joint leadership team comprising, inter alia, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the Director of Mission Support, the AMISOM 
Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the AMISOM Force 
Commander.531 
The remaining challenges for the AU and the UN are how they apply Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
without prejudicing the role of the Security Council, nor undermining or curtailing the efforts 
undertaken by the African Union to develop its own operational crisis response capacities and to 
provide adequate resources. The key-question is:  
What is the appropriate consultative decision‐making framework, division of labor and burden‐sharing 
that should be put in place? To date, this question has not been addressed in a consistent manner and, 
as such, cooperation between the UN and AU has been forced by the exigencies of time.
532 
As for now, the lack of resources of the African Union does not allow them at this stage to fully 
engage large-scale operations and for the time being this means that even more operations of the 
African Union might be taken over by the United Nations.533 Nevertheless, the UN also remains 
committed to the operationalisation of the APSA as it was  confirmed by the Secretary-General in a 
meeting of the Security Council in February 2014: “The United Nations is keen to deepen the 
partnership with the AU Peace and Security Architecture.”534 
5. The African Union and ECOWAS 
 
1. The normative framework of the APSA regulating the relations between the AU and 
the sub-regional organisations 
 
The relationship between the AU and ECOWAS in the area of the maintenance of international peace 
and security developed on the basis of the African Peace and Security Architecture which “emerged 
out of a desire by African Leaders to establish an operational structure to execute decisions taken in 
accordance with the authority conferred by Article 5 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African 
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Union.”535 The legal framework for the relationship between the AU and Regional Economic 
Communities or, in other words, the subregional African organisations, is the Memorandum of 
Understanding concluded in 2008.536 The objectives of the Memorandum which is based on the 
principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and competitive advantage,537 include a pledge to 
contribute to the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture.538 In this context, the Memorandum also commits to fostering closer partnerships 
between the Parties to the Memorandum as well as with the United Nations, its agencies and other 
relevant international organisations.539 All Parties thereby pledge “scrupulous observance” with the 
Constitutive Act of the AU, the PSC Protocol and “other related instruments agreed to at continental 
level” and they thereby recognise the primary responsibility of the AU for the maintenance and 
promotion of peace, and security and stability in Africa.540  
Article XX sets out the modalities of interaction for peace support operations. In accordance with the 
interpretation of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, subregional organisations are 
encouraged “to anticipate and prevent conflicts within and among their Member States and (…) to 
undertake (…) efforts to resolve them, including through the deployment of peace support 
operations.”541  This provision is analogous to Chapter VIII and; Article XX (2) prescribes an 
information requirement for the RECs as regards the Chairperson of the Commission, and through 
him, the PSC, similar to Article 54 of the United Nations Charter. 
As the use of regional organisations for peace enforcement operations is within the competences of 
the United Nations Security Council alone, paragraphs 3 and 4 allow the Union to have recourse to 
the resources of the RECs including their regional brigades to facilitate the deployment of a peace 
support operation or as part of a peace support operation outside their areas of jurisdiction 
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undertaken by the African Union. Therefore, in contrast to Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter, the element of cooperation is increased within the framework of the APSA as it regulates 
the relations between the AU and (sub)regional organisations; the former cannot only acquire 
military contingents to conduct peacekeeping operations under its own leadership, but the AU also 
has access to all “assets and capabilities, including planning” to facilitate the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation and it can equally request the RECs to make them available to other RECs.  
2. Weak institutional links, ECOWAS as the stronger actor? 
 
On a political level, the Memorandum also stipulates that the AU shall coordinate the harmonisation 
of views of the parties in respect of the Memorandum to ensure that African interests and positions 
as defined at a continental level are effectively pursued in relevant international fora including the 
United Nations. In this way, the AU can be also seen as occupying “a coordinative instead of [an] 
executive and implementation role” and therefore “lacking significant executive powers over its 
member states.”542 The AU is very keen to establish stronger institutional linkage with ECOWAS and 
other RECs, as evidenced by its 2010 recognition that despite the existence of the Protocol and the 
MoU, the institutional relationship remains weak, creating “a critical gap” between the AU and 
RECs.543 
This critical gap between the two organisations is strengthened by the fact that ECOWAS’ internal 
structure and resources for maintaining international peace and security are particularly well or even 
better developed than these of the AU.544ECOWAS is comparatively influential within the African 
Standby Force as three of the centres of excellence are based in its member states545 and it is well 
aware of its capacities in comparison to the other RECs, stating that it “has developed a comparative 
advantage in the area of peace-keeping and peace enforcement” and that it “has become a model 
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for the continent (…) [being] well placed to be the first REC to deliver its brigade” for the ASF.546 
ECOWAS was forced to develop these capacities in particular and thereby made a virtue out of 
necessity. The prevalence of intra-state conflicts and instability within the region required ECOWAS 
to foster its capabilities in maintaining peace and security. The organisation then focused on conflict 
management and resolution as a key activity of its agenda to the detriment of ECOWAS’ agenda of 
economic cooperation and trade liberalization.547  
In addition to the fact that Mali is a member of ECOWAS, the latter’s well developed capabilities also 
explain why the African Union authorised ECOWAS under the African Peace and Security Architecture 
to put in place the required military and security arrangements for a military operation in Northern 
Mali.548 This authorisation by the AU was in conformity with AU policy which allows for the 
deployment of peacekeeping operations on a regional level, whereby the AU and the UN should 
provide “direct financial and logistical assistance and assistance to mobilise material and financial 
support.”549 However, it is suggested that the PSC authorised ECOWAS to intervene after finding 
itself too slow to respond.550  
It is also possible that the common efforts made by the two organisations are a reaction of the 
uncoordinated action by the organisations in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011.  ECOWAS envoys issued public 
warnings that military force would be used if diplomacy did not succeed whereas the AU was holding 
on to political efforts, leading an ECOWAS spokesman to declare publically that “African disunity on a 
solution was undermining the efforts of the regional organization.”551 Indeed, there seems to be the 
awareness in both organisations that they need to coordinate more and cooperate better in 
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maintaining international peace and security. In April 2013, the PSC requested the AU Commission, in 
consultation with the President of the ECOWAS, to take the necessary steps for a Lesson Learnt 
exercise “on the African role in the resolution of the Mali crisis, with a view to reinforcing future 
coordination and facilitating the operationalization (…) of the joint AU-ECOWAS office in Mali.”552 
These contradictions stem from a certain disjuncture in the understanding of the roles of the RECs 
within the APSA. On the one hand, relations shall be based on the idea of comparative advantages,553  
but on the other hand, the RECs are seen as subsidiary to the authority of the AU.554 Despite several 
proclamations in internal documents of the AU that RECs shall seek the authorisation of the PSC for 
the deployment of peacekeeping operations (Infra 2.5.3.), they are not legally required to do so.555 
Consequently, in practice, the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS is one of equality, in 
contrast to the normative framework of the AU’s relations with the RECs which creates a superior-
subordinate relationship. 
2.6. Conclusions of Chapter II  
 
The analysis of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, on the one 
hand, and among regional organisations, on the other hand, reveals a variety of forms of 
coordination and cooperation which can hardly be classified.  
In many cases, the United Nations acted before or simultaneously with regional organisations, which 
have priority for the settlement of local disputes under Article 52 of the UN Charter.556 It is again an 
illustration of the flexibility and pragmatism of the Security Council in practice. Some authors speak 
in this context of a true variable geometry and that it is proof of the difficulty, even the impossibility 
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to systematise the relations between universal and regional organisations.557 However, there is a 
very clear trend or rather a development towards a veritable moulding of relations between the 
involved organisations in the form of a division of labour benefitting all organisations and 
simultaneously allowing them to develop further their respective comparative advantages. The rise 
of enhanced cooperation between the organisations has changed their relationship in a fundamental 
way. Whereas some relations were – in the early stages – not free of certain competitive attitudes, 
the organisations have now realigned their policies towards cooperation instead of confrontation. As 
all of the five organisations examined in this study had to confront and face a scarcity of materials, 
troops and funding, this development might not have been driven entirely by the political will of the 
organisations, but it does not negate the fact that there is now an increased trend towards 
cooperation. Part of this development is that all four regional organisations seek increasingly the 
authorisation of the Security Council which includes both the AU and ECOWAS whose constitutional 
frameworks contain dispositions for military intervention which, if they were to be acted upon with a 
Security Council authorisation, were to be in clear violation of the UN Charter and international 
law.558  
In the broader context of universalism v. regionalism, it can be argued that the conclusions drawn in 
Chapter I are valid. The two poles of universalism and regionalism within the UN Charter were not 
only conducive to cooperation, but they have led in the practice of the organisations to a 
sophisticated framework of relations and cooperation arrangements between all of them in whose 
context competition has been replaced by cooperation. 
Moreover, cooperation now covers all levels from the training of troops to pre-planning to 
deployment on the ground. UN-AU and EU-AU relations are the most institutionalised, but they have 
also developed primarily through the practice of the organisations in peacekeeping operations and a 
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clear long-term strategy is only visible to some extent in the EU-AU policy and in the EU-UN policy in 
support of the AU. For all other relationships, they are entirely based on practice, and the role taken 
by each organisation has varied depending on the specific conflict situation the organisations were 
confronted with.  The nature of the conflict also determines which actors will be involved; the recent 
example of Guinea-Bissau demonstrates elements of cooperation between not less than five 
different international organisations in the form of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN Assessment 
mission.559 
As regards the nature of peace operations in Africa, those following a comprehensive peacekeeping 
and peace-building approach are mostly conducted by the UN.560  This is because the EU has refused 
to be engaged with larger scale operations which would definitely overstretch its capacity and the AU 
has yet been unable to run more demanding operations on its own.561 Thus, “reciprocal dependence 
between them (…) has triggered the emergence of a loose security system”562 in the “triangle of 
interorganisational relations between the AU, EU and UN.” 563 But once again,  
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“looking at all peacekeeping missions deployed in Africa, (...) a security system is developing between 
these three actors (…) that (…) are dominating this multi-actor game of peacekeeping by forming a 
variety of different cooperation modes ranging from bridging operations and co-deployment of troops 
to fully integrated or hybrid missions.”
564
 
Whereas the UN-AU and EU-AU relations are predominantly partnerships for African capacity-
building, the EU-UN partnership is aimed at better operational linkage between the two 
organisations.565 The AU and ECOWAS remain prone to being “dominated” in their peacekeeping 
activities – to a certain extent and not only financially – but also in operational matters by the United 
Nations and the European Union and in a more limited way by NATO.566 NATO’s positioning towards 
being an active security provider, including the deployment of military operations in the Euro-Atlantic 
area, whilst simultaneously acting as a security actor on the global stage through other means such 
as its various partnership programmes, make it unlikely that NATO will play a more active role in 
peacekeeping operations on the African continent in the near future.567 It can be rather expected 
that NATO will continue to provide limited support to peacekeeping operations in Africa if actively 
requested by the UN or a regional organisation.  
Despite already quite extensive cooperation activities on the African continent between the UN, the 
AU, the AU and ECOWAS, a formulation of long-term relationships based on a clear strategy remains 
necessary. 568 The same call was made by Secretary-General Ban to the SC to generally define the role 
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of regional organisations with the UN.569 The Argentine Presidency of the Security Council in August 
2013 put the topic on the agenda of the Security Council once again, emphasising that the topic had 
not been comprehensively evaluated by the Council since 2010.570 The ensuing debate in the Security 
Council highlighted the need to strengthen relations between the UN and regional organisations in a 
pragmatic, result-oriented manner.571  
The Council finally adopted a Presidential Statement in which it expressed “its intention to consider 
further steps to promote closer and more operational cooperation.”572 In this comparatively long 
Statement, the Council likewise emphasised its willingness to enhance the institutional cooperation 
between the UN and regional and subregional organisations – via the Secretariat573 –and it especially 
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underlined the importance of regional and subregional organisations to strengthen their 
peacekeeping capabilities and the “value of international support to their efforts.” The Security 
Council also made clear that despite the recent practice of UN support packages, regional 
organisations have “the responsibility to secure human, financial, logistical and other resources for 
their organizations.”574 In the end, the Council also responded to Secretary-General’s call and 
requested that he provides in his next biannual report to the GA and to the Council 
recommendations on ways to enhance cooperation between the UN and relevant regional and 
subregional organisations.575 
The analysis of the relations among the international organisations within this Chapter allows the 
drawing of several conclusions regarding the law of international responsibility and its application to 
peacekeeping operations conducted in cooperation with international organisations. First of all, on a 
general level, the institutionalisation of relations among these international organisations indicates 
that it is rather likely that conduct arising in the context of a peacekeeping operation and in violation 
of international law will entail the responsibility of two or more international organisations.  In this 
context, the legal analysis can only be carried out in the form of a casuistic approach – which 
simultaneously requires that the criterion for attributing conduct to international organisations is 
defined in such a way as to include various potential scenarios. Depending on the specific conflict and 
the involved organisations, the legal significance accorded to specific parts of the cooperation 
arrangements has to be adapted. In particular, the large degree of control the UN and the EU can 
exercise over the AU in the form of the financing of AU peacekeeping operations not only raises the 
question as to whether these actions would be sufficient per se to attribute responsibility to both 
organisations, but it might also justify the holding of these two organisations responsible despite a 
lack of cooperation or an insufficient basis of cooperation in other areas of a given mission. The 
triangle of relations between the UN, the EU and the AU also suggests that it is more likely that these 
three organisations will be jointly responsible in the context of a peacekeeping operation on the 
African continent. In contrast, ECOWAS and NATO play more of a supporting role in the context of 
African peacekeeping operations. Outside the framework of APSA, ECOWAS’ relations with the other 
organisations are limited and entirely based on spontaneous practical arrangements. Moreover, 
NATO’s policy is not to engage on the African continent unless asked to do so. 
These “predictions” are, however, of a general nature, and cooperation in a specific operation is 
likely to have a variety of consequences as regards international responsibility of illegal conduct.  
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Chapter III: The Law Applying in Peacekeeping Operations 
 
3.1. International organisations: Definition, classification, legal personality 
 
This Chapter explores the law applying to the conduct of peacekeeping operations during 
deployment in a conflict situation. The multidimensional nature of current peacekeeping operations 
means that peacekeeping troops engage in a variety of different activities of which many involve 
direct interaction with the local population. It was established in the previous chapters that current 
peacekeeping doctrines emphasise the protection of individuals as well as their basic rights, 
particularly under human rights and humanitarian law.  Nevertheless, violations of international law 
occur as the following examples from practice illustrate. In 1999, three British soldiers serving in 
KFOR were investigated for the murder of two men and the malicious injury of three others.1  In the 
same year, German soldiers were attacked by two Serbs riding in a passenger car and they killed one 
and wounded another in self-defence. Several British soldiers were attacked by a Ministry of the 
Interior police man.2  
In 2000, the US authorities conducted an investigation regarding abuse committed by members of 
the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment which was deployed as part of KFOR.  Whereas one Staff 
Sergeant was sentenced in Germany to life in prison for the murder and rape of an 11 years old girl, 
the classified report also contains the information that several other members of the platoon beat, 
threatened and illegally detained civilians in Kosovo; acts which were accepted as facts by both the 
prosecution and the defence.3  
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In Darfur, peacekeepers of UNAMID have been directly attacked and killed,4 on 17 October 2012 a 
UNAMID patrol was attacked by unidentified armed men using mortars, resulting in the death of one 
peacekeeper and a further three being wounded.5  In other instances, UNAMID convoys carrying 
civilian and military staff were attacked, leading to the death of one peacekeeper and to two 
peacekeepers being injured; another attacked was executed by armed men dressed in civilian 
clothes, also killing two peacekeepers.6 In South Sudan, a Misseriya youth opened fire on a UNISFA 
convoy killing the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief and a UNISFA peacekeeper, the assailant was killed in 
the ensuing exchange of fire and three other UNISFA peacekeepers were wounded.7 Finally, 
regarding Mali, the report of the Secretary-General speaks of attacks on AFISMA and Malian Armed 
forces.8  
The law applicable to the conduct of peacekeeping operations constitutes the primary rules upon 
which the law of international responsibility, as a system of secondary rules, is based. Therefore, any 
analysis of the international responsibility of a state or an international organisation requires an 
examination of the applicable primary rules. Consequently, this chapter examines the specific bodies 
of law applicable in peacekeeping operations and some of the intrinsic problems regarding their 
application.  
An analysis of the law that applies in peacekeeping operations presupposes an examination of the 
notion of “international organisation” under international law as well as its special characteristics.  
                                                          
4
 The Guardian, ‚Seven UN peacekeepers killed in Sudan ambush‘, 13 July 2013, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/13/seven-un-peacekeepers-killed-sudan . 
5
 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur, PSC/PR/2.(CCCXLVIII) (2012), 5, para.22. 
6
 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Mohammed Chande 
Othman, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/41 (2010), 14-15, para.58. Yet another attacks on peacekeeping convoys led to 
several wounded and 11 dead peacekeepers, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2013/607 (2013), 7-8, paras. 29-33. 
7
 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei, UN Doc. S/2013/294 (2013), 3, para.9. This incident 
actually resulted in the establishment of a joint investigation following the 374
th
 meeting of the AU PSC 
composed of the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan, the AU and the UN, Report of the Secretary-General 
on the situation in Abyei, UN Doc. S/2013/450 (2013), 2, para.5. 
8
 “These [extremist armed] groups are, however, increasingly resorting to asymmetric tactics, including suicide 
bombings. The Mouvement unicité et jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest and other extremist groups have carried out a 
number of suicide attacks throughout the north. On 30 March, a suicide bomber struck a Malian armed forces 
checkpoint in Timbuktu, followed a few hours later by an insurgent attack on the city. On 12 April, a suicide 
bomber detonated his explosive device in a marketplace in the city of Kidal, killing four AFISMA Chadian 
soldiers and injuring another three. On 4 May, a complex attack involving a vehicle laden with explosives, small 
arms fire by the passengers in the vehicle and a motorcyclist wearing a suicide vest targeted a Malian armed 
forces convoy north of Gao, killing two soldiers. On 10 May, another suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
device attack took place at the entrance of the camp of the Niger contingent of AFISMA in Ménaka”, Report of 
the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2013/338 (2013), 5, para.19; 6, para. 24.  
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When the ILC started working on the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, it 
had to define “international organisations” as a legal term for the purposes of the project. According 
to the Articles, the term international organisation refers to “an organization established by a treaty 
or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal 
personality.  International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other 
entities.”9  A similar definition is proposed in a book by Schermers and Blokker, which defines 
international organisations as “forms of cooperation founded on an international agreement usually 
creating a new legal person having at least one organ with a will of its own, established under 
international law.”10 The common feature in these various definitions is the criteria of “international 
legal personality” of international organisations.11  
                                                          
9
 G. Gaja, First Report on responsibility of international organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532 (2003), 18. This 
definition was not changed in the following years, cf. International Law Commission, Report on the work of its 
sixtieth session (5 May to 6 June and 7 July to 8 August 2008), General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-third 
session, Supplement No.10 (A/63/10) (2008), 263. This definition is in contrast to the original proposition of 
Special Rapporteur Gaja which was as follows “an organization which includes states among its members 
insofar it exercises in its own capacity certain governmental functions”, cf. H. G. Schermers, N. M. Blokker, 
International Institutional Law (2011), 32, para. 29; Gaja, ibid., 18. In contrast, the Institut de Droit International 
limited its definition “international organisations” in its Resolution on “The Legal Consequences for Member 
States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties” to “an 
international organization possessing an international legal personality distinct from that of its members” 
(Session of Lisbon – 1995), the resolution is available online at: http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1995_lis_02_en.pdf. It has to be kept in mind, as emphasized by the International Law 
Commission that ”The definition of “international organization” given in article 2, subparagraph (a), is 
considered as appropriate for the purposes of draft articles and is not intended as a definition for all purposes. 
It outlines certain common characteristics of the international organizations to which the following articles 
apply. The same characteristics may be relevant for purposes other than the international responsibility of 
international organizations”, International Law Commission, Report on the work of its sixty-first session (4 May 
to 5 June and 6 July to 7 August 2009), General Assembly, Official Records, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement 
No. 10, UN Doc.  A/64/10 (2009), 44, para.1. The reason for this limitation was previously laid down in the 
report of the Commission in 2002 in which it said “The definition of international organizations (…) comprises 
entities of a quite different nature. Membership, functions, ways of deliberating and means at their disposal 
vary so much that with regard to responsibility it may be unreasonable to look for general rules applying for all 
intergovernmental organizations, especially with regard to the issue of responsibility into which States may 
incur for activities of the organization of which they are members. It may be necessary to devise specific rules 
for different categories of international organizations.”, International Law Commission, Report on the work of 
its fifty-fourth session (29 April - 7 June and 22 July - 16 August 2002), General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-
seventh session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10) (2002), 230, para. 470. 
10
 H. G. Schermers, N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2004), 26, para. 33. A very similar definition 
was proposed by Virally: “[u]ne organisation international est une association d’Etats établie par accord entre 
ses membres et dote d’un appareil permanents d’organes chargés de poursuivre la realization d’objectifs 
d’intérêts communs par une cooperation entre eux”, M. Villary, ‘Définition et classification des organisations 
internationals: approche juridique’, in G. Abi-Saab (ed.), Le concept d’organisation international (1980), 45, 52. 
See generally on this issue, M. Mendelson, ‘The Definition of ‘International Organization’ in the International 
Law Commission’s Current Project on The Responsibility of International Organizations’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), 
International Responsibility Today. Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (2005), 371-389. 
11
 One can argue that it is implied in the definition provided by Schermers and Blokker as “creating a new legal 
person” and “one organ with its own will” implies, the creation of a separate legal entity, Schermers, Blokker, 
ibid., 21, para. 29A; H. G. Schermers, N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2011), 37, para. 33.  The 
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International organisations can be subdivided into universal and non-universal organisations.  The 
latter group includes regional, subregional and other organisations. Two criteria allow differentiating 
between these two types of international organisation; a criterion ratione personae and a criterion 
ratione materiae. Universal organisations are generally open to all states if not even to other entities. 
Universal also means that these organisations act in the interests of the international community of 
states, even if their competences are limited to a certain specific area.12   
Universal organisations are consequently relatively homogenous in contrast to the heterogeneity of 
regional organisations whose conditions for membership and whose competences may be more 
diverse. It is also difficult to conceptualise regional organisations because the relations they entertain 
with universal and other regional organisations cannot be analysed from one point of view alone, but 
necessitate a comprehensive examination;13 which is reaffirmed by the dynamic and evolving 
character of these relations.14  
The definition of international legal personality is important as  
[r]esponsibility is at one and the same time an indicator and the consequence of 
international legal personality: only a subject of international law may be internationally 
responsible; the fact that any given entity can incur responsibility is both a manifestation and 
the proof of its international legal personality.”15 
                                                          
focus on legal personality, especially in the definition of the International Law Commission is due to its trigger 
mechanism of responsibility given that “responsibility under international law may arise only for a subject of 
international law”, Gaja, First Report, supra note 9, 8-9. Thus, a breach of an international obligation entailing 
international responsibility presupposes international legal personality of the breaching entity.  
12
 Cf. L. Boisson de Chazournes, Les relations entre organisations régionales et organisations universelles, 
Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 347 (2010), 79, 102. Virally prefers a categorisation 
according to « organisations universelles » and « organisations partielles » as the term “regional” would be 
misleading and imprecise, e.g. other factors may be also determinative as the basis for the existence of 
“regional” organisations, M. Virally, L’Organisation Mondiale (1972), 294-95. 
13
 The different kinds of relations can include elements of cooperation or coordination, autonomy, supervision 
up to control, interdependence etc., Boisson de Chazournes, ibid, 104. 
14
 Ibid., 103. The emergence of regional organisations on the international level contains ramifications for the 
whole international order. An important point is the question as to whether the increased emergence of 
regional cooperation contributes to global governance or whether it weakens the coherence of the 
international order and its universalization (ibid., 104); a trend which can be witnessed similarly in a purely 
legal sphere through the creation of new, not necessarily regional, legal institutions and the so-called 
fragmentation of international law. Equally the formation of regional alliances can be seen as an expression of 
strengthening the diplomatic, economic and other influence and weight of the concerned states at the 
international level, ibid. 
15
 A. Pellet, ‘The Definition of Responsibility in International Law’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, S. Olleson (eds.), The 
Law of International Responsibility (2010), 3, 6; See also R. Kolb, G. Porretto, S. Vité, L’application du droit 
international humanitaire et des droits de l’homme aux organisations internationales. Forces de paix et 
administrations civiles transitoires (2005), 321 ; Schermers, Blokker (2011), supra note 11, 1008, para. 1583; N. 
M. Blokker, ‘Preparing articles on responsibility of international organizations: Does the International Law 
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The first time the question of the international legal personality of international organisations was 
dealt with by the International Court of Justice was in the advisory opinion submitted to the Court by 
the General Assembly concerning Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations.  
After an analysis of the intention of the founders as well as the text of the United Nations Charter, 
the International Court of Justice said 
the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying functions 
and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane.
16
 
The Court then continued to conclude that “it is a subject of international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims”.17 In its advisory opinion concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 
                                                          
commission take international organizations seriously? A mid-term review’, in J. Klabbers, A. Wallendahl (eds.), 
Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (2011), 313, 316 ; J. Crawford, Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law (2012), 203; J. D’Aspremont, ‘The Limits to the Exclusive Responsibility of 
International Organizations’, in (2007) 1 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 217, 218; For a quite 
comprehensive examination of the question of legal personality and examples, cf. C. Eagleton, International 
Organization and the Law of Responsibility, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 
076 (1950), 320, 326-45. 
16
 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (11 April 1949), 9. That 
international organisations possess international legal personality was already recognised earlier. In 
Oppenheim’s treatise on international law, it was stated that “the conception of International Persons is 
derived from the conception of the Law of Nations. As this law is the body of rules which the civilised States 
consider legally binding in their intercourse, every State which belongs to the civilised States, and is, therefore, 
a member of the Family of Nations, is an International Person. And since now the Family of Nations has 
become an organised community under the name of the League of Nations with distinctive international rights 
and duties of its own, the League of Nations is an International Person sui generis besides the several States. 
But apart from the League of Nations, sovereign States exclusively are International Persons – i.e. subjects of 
International Law”, R. F. Roxburgh (ed.), ‘International Law: A Treatise. Vol. 1 - Peace’ by L. Oppenheim (1920), 
125, para. 63. But Oppenheim nevertheless held on to a state-centric system of international law with the 
League of Nations as the only exception: “Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of 
Individual States, and not of individual human beings, States solely and exclusively (apart from the League of 
Nations) are the subjects of International Law”, ibid. 17-18, para. 13. The accompanying footnote qualifies the 
League as a bearer of rights and duties. The slow emergence of international organisations as legal persons on 
the international level is equally illustrated in Oppenheim’s work, as the first edition of the Treatise omits the 
qualification in brackets regarding the League of Nations (1
st
 edition, 18, para. 13). 
17
 Reparation, ibid., 9. Possession of international legal personality also entails an autonomous position of the 
international organisation towards its member States. The ICJ declared in this matter that the “object [of 
constituent instruments] is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which the 
parties entrust the task of realizing common goals”, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, Advisory Opinion (8 July 1996), para. 75; See generally, see T. Gazzini, ‘Personality of International 
Organizations’, in J. Klabbers, A. Wallendahl (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of International 
Organizations (2011), 33-40 and especially, 38. It is therefore also generally accepted that international 
organisations are bound by customary international law, C. Janik, Die Bindung internationaler Organisationen 
an internationale Menschenrechtsstandards (2012), 424. Several cases of human rights abuses in the past years 
committed by staff of international organisations also raise the question as to whether such independence is 
necessary or desirable, see generally, N. M. Blokker, ‘International Organisations as Independent Actors: Sweet 
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March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, the Court, while referring to the Reparations decision, 
elaborated upon this and commented that “International organizations are subjects of international 
law, and as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are 
parties”18, thus recognising explicitly that international organisations have obligations under 
international law and implicitly that those obligations can be invoked by an injured party.19  
Nevertheless, the specific features of the international legal personality of international 
organisations have to be kept in mind while analysing their responsibility under international law. 
The International Court of Justice declared in its Reparation advisory opinion that the fact that an 
international organisation has legal personality is “not the same thing as saying that it is a State, 
which it is certainly not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a 
state”20 and “[w]hereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by 
international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its 
purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in 
practice.”21 In this sentence the Court developed two fundamental principles applicable to 
international organisations. First of all, the ICJ established the “principle of speciality” which is the 
limitation of the powers of an international organisation to those enshrined in its constitutive 
instruments.22 The doctrine of “implied powers” is connected to the principle of specialty; the 
powers of international organisations on the basis of their constitutive instruments include these 
implied powers as well, which are necessary for an international organisation to exercise its 
functions.  
                                                          
Memory or Functionally Necessary?’, in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations by International Organisations (2010), 37-50. 
18
 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion (20 
December 1980), para.37.  
19
 The concept of an obligation comprehends the invocation of the non-respect of the obligation by the injured 
party, cf. B. Amrallah, ‘The International Responsibility of the United Nations for Activities Carried Out by U.N. 
Peace-keeping Forces’, (1976) 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International, 59, 374-5. The Court left open the 
extent and identity of norms by which an international organisation is bound, which has often been 
misinterpreted in practice, cf. B. Dold, Vertragliche und ausservertragliche Verantwortlichkeit im Recht der 
internationalen Organisationen (2006), 55-56. 
20
 Reparation, supra note 16, 9. 
21
 Ibid., 10.  
22
 P. Daillier, A. Pellet, Droit international public (2002), 593. The first time the ICJ explicitly referred to it as the 
“principle of speciality” was in the Legality of the Use, supra note 17, para. 25. 
The notion of personality is merely descriptive, “neither rights nor obligations flow automatically from a grant 
of personality”, J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002), 57. Generally on the issue 
of international legal personality, see A. Clapham, ‘The Subject of Subjects and the Attribution of Attribution’, 
in L. Boisson de Chazournes, M. Kohen (eds.), International Law and the Quest for its Implementation/Le droit 
international et la quête de sa mise en oeuvre. Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (2010), 45, especially 47-
53. 
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However, the attribution of responsibility in a specific situation has to be distinguished from the 
determination of the legal personality of the respective entity: “[S]eparate personality is [not] 
necessarily determinative of whether member states have a concurrent or residual liability.”23 On the 
basis of the fact that the UN and the four regional organisations which are part of this study possess 
international legal personality,24 the following parts will examine the extent to which and in what 
ways they are bound by international norms during the deployment of peacekeeping operations.25 
3.2. The applicable international law to peacekeeping operations of 
international organisations 
  
1. Introduction: the dual nature of peacekeeping operations 
 
In the case of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under the authority of international 
organisations, members of the military personnel are under “double control” as troop contributing 
states retain their control and authority regarding matters of discipline, finances, promotions and 
punishment, despite having transferred operational command and control over their troops for the 
conduct of the operation to the respective international organisation. Therefore, the “organic link” 
between the peacekeeping forces and their sending states is normally not completely dissevered and 
the troops remain bound by the international law obligations of their state even while exercising 
functions of the international organisation, as long as the former continues to exercise this form of 
limited control.26 The fact that peacekeeping forces possess this dual nature does not have an 
immediate bearing upon the question of responsibility, as the attribution of conduct has to be 
distinguished from the applicable legal framework.27  
The dual nature of peacekeeping operations results from the  
historical development of international law, its primary subjects are States. It is on States that most 
obligations rest and on which the burden of compliance principally lies. For example, human rights 
treaties, though they confer rights upon individuals, impose obligations upon States. If other legal 
                                                          
23
 Cinquième Commission [R. Higgins], ‘The Legal consequences for member-states of the non-fulfilment by 
international organizations of their obligations towards third parties’, (1995) 66 Part I Yearbook Institute of 
International Law, 249, 257. 
24
 Infra, Chapter II. 
25
 In practice, one would normally first of all examine the attribution of conduct to an entity, in order to 
establish its responsibility, and then seek to determine the infringed legal norm. However, as the methodology 
of this study is a top-down approach according to which the analysis of specific case-studies is at the very end, 
it appears preferable to analyse the applicable law in peacekeeping operations at this point.  
26
 Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 252. 
27
 As a set of secondary rules, the attribution of conduct is based on the violation of primary rules in the form of 
the applicable legal framework to peacekeeping operations.  
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persons have obligations in the field of human rights, it is by derivation or analogy from the human 
rights obligations that States have.
28 
Thus, the emergence of international organisations led to the continuing transfer of competences 
from states to these bodies, but in the majority of cases, states retain some form of control as they 
are unwilling to completely transfer certain aspects of their sovereign rights. It is particularly in the 
context of their armed forces and the broader but related areas of defence and security that states 
are inclined to safeguard their sovereignty, and thereby also their national interests.  
Consequently, it is not surprising that several arguments brought forward and theories developed to 
determine the law applicable to international organisations, particularly in the human rights law 
context, rely on derivation or analogy; binding the international organisation indirectly through the 
obligations of states.  Other approaches seek to bind international organisations directly, on the basis 
of their own international legal personality. In addition to human rights law, international 
humanitarian law is also relevant insofar as it may be applicable during the specific context of a 
peacekeeping operation.29 The next part examines the application of human rights law to 
international organisations.  
2.  Application of International Human Rights Law to International Organisations 
 
1. International organisations as bound by the human rights obligations of their 
members 
 
There are different doctrinal approaches used to argue for international organisations to be bound 
by the human rights of their member states’ obligations. The majority of states have ratified 
international and regional human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the ECHR, the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.30 The above-
mentioned doctrinal approaches seek to overcome the principle of relativity as it applies to 
international treaties on the basis of Article 34 VCLT and thus also for the various human rights 
                                                          
28
 J. Crawford, ‘The system of international responsibility’ in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility (2010), 17, 17. 
29
 Refugee law might also be relevant, but its scope of application is limited to people having fled their home 
countries and it contains obligations for these states on whose territories these people have fled. It could 
therefore only be applicable if people were to have fled to a country on which a peacekeeping operation is 
deployed and unless the peacekeeping operation in question were to administer this country, the 
peacekeeping operation could simply not be bound by the provisions contained of refugee law which 
presuppose the exercise of governmental authority, see Article 1 and, e.g. Article 18 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 
30
 Another relevant instrument is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which although it is not a treaty 
has at least partially become customary international law, see, infra 3.2.2.4. 
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treaties of which states exclusive are members.31 One doctrinal approach is to consider international 
organisations as successors or substitutes for the international human rights instruments to which 
their member states are parties.32 In other words, the question is whether international 
organisations can be and are bound by the existing international obligations of their members or 
“whether, since they are separate subjects of international law, they may in principle disregard any 
such pre-existing obligations.”33 In its judgments in the cases of Kadi and Yusuf, the Court of First 
Instance ruled on this very specific question that  
unlike its Member States, the Community as such is not directly bound by the Charter of the United 
Nations and that it is not therefore required, as an obligation of general public international law, to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of that Charter. 
The reason is that the Community is not a member of the United Nations, or an addressee of the 
resolutions of the Security Council, or the successor to the rights and obligations of the Member States 
for the purposes of public international law
34
 [Emphasis added]. 
The Court then concluded that the obligation to implement the Security Council Resolutions is not 
derived from the basis of general international law, but from internal EU law.35 Another problem with 
                                                          
31
 As a fundamental principle of international law, it is also arguably in any case valid on a customary law basis. 
32
 See, in this regard, T. Ahmed, I. de Jesùs Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An International 
Law Perspective’, (2006) 17 The European Journal of International Law, 771-801; Critical of this theory, F. Naert, 
‘Binding International Organisations to Member State Treaties or Responsibility of Member States for Their 
Own Actions in the Framework of International Organisations’ in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis (eds.), 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (2010), 129, 132. 
33
 O. De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations : The Logic of Sliding Scales in the 
Law of International Responsibility in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations by International Organisations (2010), 51, 58. 
34
 T-135/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, [2005], para. 192; T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yussuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, [2005], para. 242. The legal 
office of the United Nations held an identical view regarding the question as to whether the United Nations is 
bound by the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948), 
Legal Aspects of the Establishment of a Trade Union at the Geneva Office of the United Nations, United Nations 
Juridicial Yearbook (1973), 171, 171, para.2. Interestingly, the Legal Office however, submits that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is “an instrument that is, as far as relevant, applicable to the United Nations 
itself.”, ibid., 171, para.3. This primary facie contrary argumentation is arguably due to a different legal 
underpinning of the UDHR which was adopted as a Declaration by the General Assembly and is therefore also 
part of internal UN law. Generally, any binding effect upon the United Nations necessitates an act of 
implementation as is evident from Judgment no.15 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal to which the 
memorandum refers, Robinson v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgment no. 15 (1952), paras. 
11-12. Moreover, the right to assembly concerns the relationship between the United Nations and its 
personnel, the internal sphere of the organisation, which corresponds to the classic relationship between state 
and its citizens. It leaves unanswered the question of obligations of members of staff of the UN which includes 
peacekeeping forces toward third persons and thereby the external sphere. 
35
 Yassin Abdullah Kadi, ibid., para. 207; Ahmed Ali Yussuf, ibid., para. 257. To this end “the Community may not 
infringe the obligations imposed on its Member States by the Charter of the United Nations or impede their 
performance and, second, that in the exercise of its powers it is bound, by the very Treaty by which it was 
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the theory of succession is that it requires all member states of a given organisation to be bound by 
the very same obligations which are supposed to be imposed on the organisation; a requirement 
which becomes more and more theoretical, the more members a given organisation has.36 
Otherwise, there might be cases in which the nationality of the peacekeeper, be it for example 
French or Nigerian, would determine the applicable law. This theory is also problematic as it does not 
resolve the problem of international organisations not possessing territories of their own. 37 
Another attempt to make the obligations of member states applicable to international organisations 
is on the basis of the principle of nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet.38 The idea is that 
“as no one can transfer more powers than he has, the Member States were not competent to 
transfer any powers conflicting with (…) treaties”  concluded prior to the establishment of the 
international organisation.39 As such international organisations never had the power to contravene 
the respective treaty or to act against it.40 However, this argument is problematic for the following 
                                                          
established, to adopt all the measures necessary to enable its Member States to fulfil those obligations”, ibid., 
para. 204, respectively para. 254. 
36
 P. Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des 
gens (1998), 342; in favour of this opinion, see M. Forteau, ‘Le droit applicable en matière de droits de l’homme 
aux administrations territoriales gérées par des organisations internationales ’, in Société française pour le droit 
international/Institut International des droits de l’homme, Journée d’études de Strasbourg. La soumission des 
organisations internationales aux normes internationales relatives aux droits de l’homme (2009), 7, 25-8 ; An 
opposing opinion was issued, e.g. by the Venice Commission, European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo : Possible Establishment of Review Mechanisms, 
Opinion no. 280/2004, CDL-AD (2004)033, 15, para.78. 
37
 L. Cameron, ‘Human Rights Accountability of International Civil Administrations to the People Subject to 
Administration’, in (2007) 1 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 267, 279. 
38
 Forteau, ‘Le droit applicable en matière de droits de l’homme aux administrations territoriales gérées par des 
organisations internationales’, supra note 36, 7, 24. He specifies that according to this theory  an international 
organisation can either be directly bound or at least be obliged to exercise due diligence which implies an 
interdiction to put their member states in a situation contrary to their treaty obligations ; See also De Schutter, 
‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations’, supra note 33, 51, 62; Dold, supra note 19, 53-54; 
A. Peters, ‘Article 25’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A 
Commentary. Volume I (2012), 787, 820 mn. 105. 
39
 H.G. Schermers, ‘The European Communities Bound by Fundamental Human Rights’, (1990) 27 Common 
Market Law Review, 249, 251; H. G. Schermers, N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (1995), 988 § 
1578. The very same opinion as applying in respect of the United Nations was expressed by Judge Fitzmaurice 
in his dissenting opinion to the Namibia Advisory Opinion:  “[F]or derived powers cannot be other or greater 
than those they derive from.”, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion (21 June 
1971) (Judge Fitzmaurice, Dissenting Opinion), para. 65. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice refers to 
the previous case-law of the Court, especially its decisions in the Voting Procedure and the Oral Petitions case, 
but the statement has nevertheless to be read with caution as all these cases concern powers of the United 
Nations as deriving from the League of Nations which is either, depending on one’s perspective, a case of 
succession or a case of an indirect transfer of competences by the member-states – via the previously 
established League of Nations. 
40
 The same position is taken by Tondini who equally writes that “it is logically sound (…) that an international 
organisation should be held accountable in respect of the violations of the human rights standards it promotes 
and universalizes.”, M. Tondini, ‘The ‘Italian Job’ : How to Make International Organisations Compliant With 
Human Rights and Accountable For Their Violation by Targeting Member States’ in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis 
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reasons. First of all, it applies only when the respective international organisation is established after 
the ratification of the treaty in question. 41 Even more crucial is that this doctrine “should correspond 
to any international obligation of any Member State of the organisation, without it being necessary 
that all Member States are bound by the said obligation.”42 It is, as a result, not working in practice, 
especially for those organisations with an evolving membership such as the European Union.43 
Supporters of this theory argue, however, that international organisations – as entities of delegated 
power – cannot dispose of a decision-making authority to define autonomously their position 
regarding the application of general international law.44 
In the Reparations case, the ICJ also held that “the subjects of law in any legal system are not 
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights.” 45 Moreover, on the basis of the 
principle of speciality (infra 3.1.), there will be cases in which international organisations simply lack 
the competence to act in the field of human rights.  Explicitly referring to the principle of speciality, 
the ICJ declared that “international organizations (…) do not, unlike States possess a general 
                                                          
(eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (2010), 169, 192-3. He 
criticizes, however that “this theory hardly explains the concrete level of protection to be granted and does not 
eventually solve the problem, i.e. the exercise of accountability, not simply the mere confirmation of its 
existence.” (ibid., 193); For the latter, see also E. Abraham, ‘The Sins of the Savior: Holding the United Nations 
Accountable to International Human Rights Standards for Executive Order Detentions in its Mission in Kosovo’, 
(2002-2003) 52 American University Law Review, 1291, 1312-3; H. Ascensio, ‘Le Règlement des différents liés à 
la violation par les organisations internationales des normes rélatives aux droits de l’homme’, in Société 
française pour le droit international/Institut International des droits de l’homme, Journée d’études de 
Strasbourg. La soumission des organisations internationales aux normes internationales relatives aux droits de 
l’homme (2009), 105, 119-20; L. Condorelli, ‘Conclusions générales’, in Société française, ibid., 127, 129. 
41
 Forteau, ‘Le droit applicable en matière de droits de l’homme aux administrations territoriales gérées par des 
organisations internationales’, supra note 36, 7, 25. 
42
 De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations’, supra note 33,  51, 64; also F. Naert, 
‘Binding International Organisations to Member State Treaties’, supra note 32, 129, 134; Forteau, ibid., 7, 25. 
Forteau also points out that this theory has not been accepted in jurisprudence so far (ibid., 24). 
43
 De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations’, supra note 33, 51, 65-66. It is also 
argued that the principle of relativity of treaties as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (Article 34 and also 
Article 35) finds itself in tension with the application of this principle. However, as rightly pointed out by Klein, 
this Convention applies only to international agreements concluded between international organisations and 
states or concluded between international organisations, Article 2 (1) a. of the Convention; Klein, supra note 
36, 344. The Convention leaves, however, unaffected any customary rule as pertaining to the principle of 
relativity of treaties as applying to international organisations; furthermore it has not (yet) entered into force. 
44
 Klein, supra note 36, 346; Also B. Rouyer-Hameray, Les compétences implicites des organisations 
internationales (1962), 12 ; also N. B. Krylov, ‘International Organizations and New Aspects of International 
Responsibility’, in W. E. Butler (ed.), Perestroika and International Law (1990), 221, 221-2; This view seems to 
be based on the view that sovereignty corresponds to “freedom within the law (including freedom to seek to 
change the law”, cf. J. Crawford, ‘Sovereignty as a legal value’, in J. Crawford, M. Koskenniemi (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012), 117, 122. Also for a broader discussion of sovereignty of 
international organisations, M. Singer, ‘Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights 
and Functional Necessity Concerns’, (1995) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law, 53, 61-65. However, as an 
actor in its own right under international law, it appears questionable why an international organisation could 
not persistently object to be bound by a specific rule. 
45
 Reparation, supra note 16, 8. 
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competence. International organizations are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is to say, 
they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of 
the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them.”46 Finally, this theory is 
completely impractical in its concrete application, as the nationality of a peacekeeper would also 
determine the applicable law.47 
The problems related to these particular theories support the analysis of the obligations of 
international organisations by human rights obligations through other methods.  
2. The specific case of accession to human rights treaties 
 
The accession of international organisations to human rights treaties48 also raises its own problems. 
 The absence of a real territorial basis, and of an administrative structure similar to governmental 
structures and the general limitation of powers of international organisations to those necessary for 
the fulfillment of their mandates, renders the conformity of action by the international organisation 
with conventional requirements very difficult, if not impossible.49 It means that “whereas the 
organisation may be obliged to adopt certain measures, to the extent that human rights treaties 
impose certain positive obligations, it would only have to do so to the extent that this does not lead 
the organisation to go beyond the principle of speciality.”50 It is debated in the doctrine what kind of 
obligations an accession to an international human rights treaty would entail for an international 
organisation.  
On the one hand, it is suggested that accession to an international human rights instrument would 
not lead to a transfer of additional powers to the international organisation, however it could affect 
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 Legality of the Use, supra note 17, para. 25 
47
 Cameron, supra note 37, 267, 279. 
48
 So far, it is only possible for the European Union under the European Convention on Human Rights. It is 
suggested that “[t]he fact that human rights conventions are not open to international organisations shows the 
persistence of the conviction that international organisations are not concerned by the questions of violations 
of fundamental rights of individuals”, L. Condorelli, ‘Le Conseil de Sécurité, les sanctions ciblées et le respect 
des droits de l’homme’, in L. Boisson de Chazournes, M. Kohen (eds.), International Law and the Quest for its 
Implementation/Le droit international et la quête de sa mise en oeuvre. Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas 
(2010), 73, 75. 
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 Klein, supra note 36, 319. This is also an argument raised by the UN against its non-accession to the Geneva 
Conventions, notwithstanding the question of the possibility for non-states to accede to these instruments 
(ibid.). A specific argument raised by the UN is its incapacity to satisfy the requirement as regards the 
repression of grave violations of the Conventions, however as argued also by other authors, the United Nations 
could establish a judicial organ charged with that function similarly to the ICTY and the ICTR (ibid., 320); See R. 
D. Glick, ‘Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations Armed Forces’, (1995) 17 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 53, 68-9. 
50
 De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations’, supra note 33, 51, 114. On this 
specific point see also, infra 3.2.2.6. 
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the exercise of any powers which had been attributed by the states to the extent that the 
organisation has positive obligations to protect the human rights which are enshrined in the treaty.  
The other view is that due to the principle of specialty, the accession to human rights treaties would 
only impair negative obligations on the acceding international organisation as it should not lead to 
the transfer of additional powers to the organisation.51 The argument made for the second view is 
that otherwise the international organisation would exercise powers which were not attributed to it, 
and that it should also only use the powers for the purposes for which they have been attributed.  
According to this view, the accession is equivalent to a change of the mandate of the organisation.52 
 
In the near future, the EU will accede to the ECHR and it can be expected that the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights will shed some light on these briefly mentioned and other 
related issues, (see also infra 3.2.2.6.2.2.).  
3. Human rights obligations of international organisations as part of general international 
law 
 
Apart from the theories which rely on binding international organisations through the obligations of 
their respective members, international organisations can be bound directly by human rights 
obligations as part of general international law. This includes, “general principles of (international) 
law” as well as customary international law.  In contrast to the previously analysed theories, this 
approach has the advantage that the respective norms are directly applicable and that there is no 
need to use analogies or other legal methods. In contrast to the Bulletin on International 
Humanitarian law issued by the Secretary-General, there is not such a bulletin on human rights law 
which would have also facilitated the identification of certain human rights norms which could be 
applicable to peacekeeping forces.53  
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 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Report from Chairman of Working group II “Incorporation of the 
Charter/accession to the ECHR to Members of the Convention”, CONV 354/02 (2002), 115. 
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 De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations’, supra note 33, 51, 115-6; Similarly, 
while referring explicitly to the EU,  A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a human rights organization? 
Human rights and the core of the European Union’, (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review, 1307, 1317. One 
has, however, to keep in mind that In order to accede to a Human Rights treaty, the international organisation 
does not need to possess competence in this specific area. Moreover, this argumentation fails to oversee the 
principle of implied powers as applicable to international organisations. 
53
 K. Grenfell, Applicability/Application of Human Rights Law to IOs involved in Peace Operations’, in S. 
Kolanowski (ed.), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium. International Organisations’ Involvement in Peace 
Operations: Applicable Legal Framework and the Issue of Responsibility (2011), 57, 58. Statements by political 
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4. Human rights obligations of international organisations on the basis of customary 
international law 
  
In order for a customary law norm to exist, there has to exist state practice and the belief that certain 
conduct is obligatory due to the existence of a rule of law requiring this very conduct (opinion iuris 
sive necessitatis).54 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that  
this opinion juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia (…) the attitude of 
States towards certain General Assembly resolutions (…) The effect of consent to the text of such 
resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a ‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the treaty 
commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of 
the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves.
55 
Specifically in the field of human rights, it has also been suggested that official declarations and 
participation in the negotiation of human rights conventions should be included as practice of 
States.56 In favour of this proposition, it is suggested that one can hardly distinguish between the 
state practice and opinion iuris; the relevant state practice is legally significant as testifying to the 
emergence of a rule and the opinio iuris can only be detected and recognised on the basis of the 
state practice.57  
                                                          
Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305 and S/2000/809 
(2000), 14 para. 81. 
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 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany 
v. the Netherlands), Judgment (20 February 1969), para. 77. 
55
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment (27 June 1986), para. 188. One has to note, however, that in this case, the Court was dealing with the 
identification of a negative customary law obligation: the prohibition of the use of force (ibid.), for which the 
examination of opinio iuris is more important as state practice cannot consist in active acts. 
56
 Cf. also, for a similar theory, Tondini, ‘The ‘Italian Job’: How to Make International Organisations Compliant 
With Human Rights’, supra note 40, 169, 191-192. 
57
 De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations’, supra note 33, 51, 69. As explained 
by Dupuy: ”La seconde observation est celle de l’interdépendance manifeste sinon même de l’union 
inextricable entre l’un et l’autre élément [du droit coutumier]. La pratique n’est, dans la grande majorité des 
cas, qu’abstraitement et artificiellement distinguable de l’opinio juris. Elle en est, elle-même, la manifestation 
tangible : l’élément matériel n’est pas un préalable à l’apparition de l’élément psychologique parce que, lui-
même, il constitue la preuve de la conviction juridique des Etats. La coutume est l’expression d’une opinio juris 
manifestée dans et par une pratique”, P.-M. Dupuy, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, Cours général de 
droit international public, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 297 (2002), 9, 166. In the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ effectively accepted votes and statements made by states in the GA condemning the 
use of force as both state practice and opinio iuris, H. Charlesworth, ‘Law-making and sources’, in J. Crawford, 
M. Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012), 187, 194. In the end, as 
Charlesworth asserts, the definition of opinion iuris is circular as “it seems to require that states believe 
(mistakenly) that something is already law before it can become law”, ibid. 
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Besides, human rights are traditionally concerned with the relationship between states and their 
nationals. The international community, and thereby the other states,  have therefore normally  
reacted less frequently to violations of these rights than to violations of rules directly pertaining to 
inter-state relations as the latter directly touch upon their interests.58 This argument might have lost 
a degree of its pertinence due to the development of the concepts of humanitarian intervention and 
the responsibility to protect.  
Other authors argue for a shifting of the importance of state practice or opinio iuris; the more 
strongly one is identified, the weaker the other may be.59 
Several human rights have without doubt a customary status, such as the prohibition of torture or 
prolonged arbitrary detention. Equally, the UDHR, or at least part of it, has been transformed into 
customary law.60 
The proof of an existing customary norm on the basis of state practice and opinio iuris is nevertheless 
problematic in the context of the present study. As human rights primarily address states and have 
attained customary status because of State practice and opinio iuris, “the question (…) remains 
whether an international organisation can be bound by customary norms, which have become 
binding because of State practice.”61 One can argue that the substance of each customary norm 
indicates its addressees; human rights law was conceived as binding states in the exercise of their 
power towards their citizens so that it would be – following this doctrine – not applicable to 
international organisations which are not in direct contact with human beings.62  In response, it can 
be said that this doctrine blurs the difference between customary and treaty norms, as it applies the 
principle of relativity de facto to the formation of customary law. It therefore appears that, in 
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 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice. General Course on Public International Law, Recueils 
des cours de l’Académie de La Haye, Volume 178 (1982), 12, 334. Schachter also writes that “Arbitral awards 
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 F. Kirgis, ‘Customs on a Sliding Scale’, (1987) 81 The American Journal of International Law, 146, 149. 
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 E. De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights Accountability of International Administrations : Theory and Practice in East 
Timor’ in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International 
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Brems, S. Smis (eds.), ibid., 1, 6;  Tomuschat, supra note 58, 4. 
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Council’, in P. H. F. Bekker, R. Dolzer, M. Waibel (eds.), Making Transnational Law work in the Global Economy 
(2010), 71, 79-80. 
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 A. Bleckmann, ‘Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen Völkerrechts für internationale Organisationen’, (1977) 
37 Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 107, 110-13.  
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practice, customary law is binding on all legal entities, including international organisations as long as 
there is no formal objection.63  
Moreover, evolutionary interpretation has always been used in international law and it is now 
accepted that international organisations are bearers of rights and obligations under international 
law and this includes customary international law.64 The fact of their coming into being later than 
states, and their resulting non-participation in the formation of certain rules, should not be 
decisive.65 Any newly created state, such as the recent example of South Sudan shows, would be 
deemed bound by the whole body of customary law and there is no reason why it should be different 
for an international organisation.66 The only legitimate argument to restrict the application of 
customary human rights law to international organisations cannot be derived from the customary 
nature of the norm, but is based on the principle of speciality; international organisations operating 
in specific fields which do not come into contact with individuals may not be bound by human rights. 
If their constituent instruments do not contain competences to operate in such a field,67 the 
international organisation will be prevented to act68 and it is on the basis of these internal rules of 
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organisations, J. E. Alvarez, ‘International Organizations: Then and Now’, in (2006) 100 American Journal of 
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 Against such a view, J. Klabbers, ‘International Institutions’, in J. Crawford, M. Koskenniemi (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012), 228, 235. 
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 The same argument is also made by G. Porretto, S. Vité, The Application of International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law to International Organizations, Research Paper Series No.1, CUDIH, Geneva (2006), 45-
46, and N. Quénivet, ‘Human Rights Law and Peacekeeping Operations’, in M. Odello, R. Piotrowicz (eds.), 
International Military Missions and International Law (2011), 99, 125. Cf also F. Mégret, F. Hoffmann, ‘The UN 
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in (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly, 314, 317. For a contrary view, Peters, ‘Article 25’, supra note 38, 787, 824 
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the organisation that human rights law would not be wholly or partially applicable.69 In other words, 
it is argued that, human rights can only bind an organisation so far as it has relevant competences.70 
It also has to be strongly emphasised that in peacekeeping operations another limitation arises in the 
form of the mandate handed out by the Security Council. More broadly, and taking into account 
domestic legal theory, this interpretation also conforms to the idea of “Funktionsnachfolge.”71 
Another approach in doctrine relies on an argument similar to the transfer of power of states to 
international organisations, stating that customary law applies to all subjects of international law, 
and consequently to international organisations which possess international legal personality.72  
Moving away from the application in abstracto of human rights law, it is noted that an international 
organisation is only bound in a specific situation to the extent that the organisation “exercises 
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functions in a way that can be equated with the exercise of jurisdiction by a State.“73 This is less 
problematic for international organisations which administer a territory because they exercise 
functions and powers which are traditionally prerogatives of states and these comprehensive powers 
facilitate the establishment of jurisdiction.74 In contrast, the establishment of jurisdiction for 
situations in which an international organisation is not administering a territory is complex.75 It is also 
important to consider customary human rights norms as being part of the customary law of the 
international organisation itself, and particularly of the United Nations. This proposition is however 
problematic as the relevant practice by international organisations since the foundation of the UN is 
limited, and comprises only two cases of international administration.76 
Further controversy has arisen from the identification of the specific norms which are part of 
customary human rights law. In some parts of legal scholarship it is opined that the whole corpus of 
human rights law as incorporated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is applicable,77 while 
others are of the view that only a few specific fundamental norms are part of customary human 
rights law.78 In any case, it is not disputed that the most fundamental norms are deemed to be of a 
customary nature, for example, violations of the rights of life through murder, torture and arbitrary 
detention.79 Other authors suggest that even the right to an effective remedy is of a customary 
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nature and applicable to international organisations, which would presuppose a previous violation of 
another right.80 
5. Human rights obligations of international organisations on the basis of general 
principles of law 
 
Human rights obligations also stem from general principles of law. Although they are not a subsidiary 
source of international law81, they are less relevant in practice due to their often rather vague nature. 
Indeed, legal certainty is lacking in “elementary considerations of humanity.” 82 Furthermore, many 
norms considered as falling in this category will simultaneously constitute customary norms, so that 
the consideration of general principles of law in the present study will rather be limited.83 The 
acceptance that general principles are one of the foundations of international law also leads to the 
conclusion that certain equally fundamental human rights norms must play an equal part.84 Other 
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arguments present general principles of international law as a tool to fill gaps in the law, so-called 
non liquet situations, equating them therefore with something akin to a technique juridique than with 
primary rules of international law.85  
It is suggested that general principles are used to promote “values that international law seeks to 
promote and protect,”86  focusing on human dignity and its position under international law.87  
Other approaches suggest that certain procedural rights, for example the presumption of innocence 
and the right to a fair trial, are included, but it remains unclear what this entails.88  Oswald suggests 
that there are certain criteria to comply with in relation to the treatment of detainees, including 
dignity and humanity.89 However, as has been pointed out, these principles are derived from various 
human rights and IHL treaties.90  
Arguments of legal theory are equally important while trying to connect general principles and the 
United Nations Charter as the constitution of the international order.91 Brownlie submits that the 
Security Council is limited in its actions under Chapter VI and Chapter VII as human rights “form part 
of the concept of international public order.”92 
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Facing all these difficulties and taking into account that these principles are inferred from human 
rights and humanitarian law, it is therefore preferable to discard any further attempt to apply human 
rights norms as being solely based on general principles. As it was pointed out, general principles are 
often intertwined with customary law, so that an implicit application to the conduct of international 
organisations, particularly in the field of human rights and humanitarian law cannot be excluded, but 
legal certainty, which itself could possibly be considered as a general principle, supports a restrictive 
approach. Therefore, the analysis of the applicable law to international organisations will be limited 
to customary international law. The analysis also showed that customary international law contains 
some problematic features such as the identification of state practice and opinio iuris, but there is 
general agreement concerning the most fundamental human rights norms which are also accepted in 
practice by international organisations. 
6. The “territorial problem” of human rights application and their extraterritorial 
application 
 
The application of human rights to international organisations is problematic for another reason 
which is the application ratione loci or the territoriality of human rights. Human Rights were 
traditionally granted by states to their citizens to give those rights against the state and also 
protection by the State, and thus they are based on a vertical relationship between the bound 
human rights granting entity and the individual on the basis of the territory over which states 
exercise jurisdiction. A state may also have to respect its human rights obligations outside its own 
territory if it 
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of 
military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that 




With regard to the application of human rights law to international organisations, 
large areas of international law are patently inapplicable to international organizations, which have no 
territory, confer no nationality and do not exercise jurisdiction in the same sense as States. Other rules 
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Consequently, the traditional application of human rights ratione loci is impossible in the context of 
international organisations, which per se are aterritorial, and rather operate on the territories of 
states, except in circumstances where there is territorial administration by an international 
organisation in which they exercise competences and rights similar to a state.95  
Nevertheless, “the territorial-extraterritorial divide [of states] (…) [is] useful, since it concerns a 
situation where states do not exercise the same powers that relate to their own territories – a 
situation similar to that of international organizations leading peace operations.”96  
It is therefore that the exercise of jurisdiction by international organisations under human rights law 
can be compared to the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction under human rights law by states. 
Excluding the scenarios of complete occupation of another territory by a state or international 
administration of a territory, both a state and an international organisation consequently exercise 
jurisdiction in very specific circumstances if they operate extraterritorially; the extent of their power 
over the population is limited.  
Thus, it appears possible to apply the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals for the 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by states in analogy to international organisations. However, it 
has to be emphasised that it is unclear whether this nexus in the form of “jurisdiction” applies first of 
all under customary law and secondly to international organisations. Engdahl suggests that the 
practice of the European Court of Human Rights perhaps reflects – at least – regional customary law 
and that “[t]he applicability of human rights for international organizations would most certainly 
require some form of nexus towards individuals, and possibly also a requirement established with 
regard to some sort of effective control in customary law.”97   
The question is how to apply “jurisdiction” as it has developed in a territorial context to international 
organisations. One possibility is to interpret “jurisdiction” in a functional sense. As argued by Besson, 
jurisdiction is both a normative threshold, triggering the application of human rights, but it also 
provides the conditions for the corresponding obligation to be feasible for the duty-bearer 
(functional element), although it has territorial, temporal and personal dimensions which are derived 
from the exercise of jurisdiction.98 Peacekeeping operations normally operate in certain defined 
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areas of a state and although they do not normally assume all governmental powers in these areas 
they will exercise these functions under their mandate to guarantee peace and security for the local 
population. Therefore, as is also suggested by Naert, it has been proposed to equate the territory of 
an international organisation with that of its Member States.99 In addition to this interpretation, 
Naert, however, argues that the notion of jurisdiction in its traditional conception is inapplicable and 
must be replaced by a criterion of functional jurisdiction.100  
The analysis will therefore proceed on the basis of the case-law of international courts and tribunals 
as developed in the contexte étatique. 
1. Extraterritorial jurisdiction under human rights law 
 
Generally speaking, the application of international humanitarian law as well as international human 
rights are triggered through factual considerations on the basis of human interaction, “whenever the 
State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction.”101 
Whereas the threshold for the application of IHL is comparatively simple, consisting in the existence 
of an armed conflict of either an international or an internal character;102 to define the threshold for 
the application of human rights law is more complicated. On the one hand, this is due to conceptual 
misunderstandings, on the other hand it is by reason of divergent judgments between international 
human rights bodies or even within the very same – the European Court of Human Rights offers a 
prime example of the diversity in the  jurisprudence on this issue.103  
Regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, one can distinguish between two principal models of the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Under the first model, extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the factual 
connection between the state and the territory in which the relevant act took place – a spatial 
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connection.104 According to the second model, there is a factual connection between the state and 
the individual – a personal connection due to the exercise of state agent authority.105  Both models 
rely on the specific circumstances in question.106 
In this context, the exercise of jurisdiction in a form of authority or control over the person or a given 
territory has to be distinguished from the attribution of conduct, two different overlapping concepts 
which are often conflated in practice.107 Jurisdiction for the purposes of human rights must also be 
distinguished from state jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its domestic law.108  
Territorial jurisdiction in the form of the first model amounts, according to the ECtHR in Al-Skeini,  to 
“the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it exercises all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that Government.”109  
In contrast, “personal jurisdiction” is tantamount to “the use of force by a State’s agents operating 
outside its territory [which] may bring the individual thereby under the control of the State’s 
authorities.”110  
The European Court of Human Right’s jurisprudence has stretched the spatial model to ever 
diminishing areas including mere places111 and thereby has often even relied on a simultaneous 
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application of both models of jurisdiction. In the case of Medvedyev and Others, involving a captured 
Cambodian ship on the high seas by a French navy vessel, the Court considered that France had “full 
and exclusive control over the Winner [the ship] and its crew, at least de facto.”112 In similar fashion, 
the Court also relied in the previously mentioned Al-Skeini case of a mixed model of jurisdiction, 
adding that “the UK exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such 
security operations.”113 
As regards the detention of Iraqis by British soldiers being part of the Multi-National Force (MNF), 
the Court held likewise that “given the total and exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, 
control exercised by the United Kingdom authorities over the premises in question, the individuals 
detained there, including the applicants, were within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction.”114  
The Court therefore limited the exercise of jurisdiction to cases based on a mixed model of 
jurisdiction;115 on the basis of public powers and in the exercise of specific security operations which 
is not only at odd with previous jurisprudence of the Court but equally illogical116 if “simply shooting 
suspects is apparently immune from scrutiny, so long as you are careful not to arrest them first.”117 
However, in the case of Andreou v. Turkey, the ECtHR was seized by the case of Mrs. Andreou who 
was hit by a bullet in the abdomen during a manifestation outside the UN buffer zone near Dherynia, 
close to the Greek-Cypriot National Guard checkpoint emanating from Turkish Armed Forces. She 
was injured severely and lost one of her kidneys in the following surgery.118 The Court held that 
“even though the applicant sustained her injuries in territory over which Turkey exercised no control, 
the opening of fire on the crowd from close range, which was the direct and immediate cause of 
those injuries, was such that the applicant must be regarded as ‘within [the jurisdiction]’ of 
Turkey.”119 
The threshold for the spatial test also covers a spectrum, “ranging from the more entrenched and 
visible exercise of de facto government, administration, or public powers, to the more borderline 
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cases of less permanent or overt state control as in Issa and Ilascu.”120 The jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction is equally wide and varied which led Milanovic 
to conclude that it “simply boils down to the proposition that a state has obligations under human 
rights treaties towards all individuals whose human rights it is able to violate.”121  
The jurisprudence of the Court further shows that its notion of “jurisdiction” depends on the specific 
circumstances of a case; so the Court decided in Al-Skeini that “in determining whether effective 
control exists, the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of the State’s military presence 
in the area.”122 In Issa, the Court considered that “as a consequence of this military action, the 
respondent State could be considered to have exercised, temporarily, effective overall control of a 
particular portion of the territory of northern Iraq.”123 
According to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, the Covenant can 
be applicable extraterritorially as “it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held 
accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of 
another State.”124 In its General Comment No. 31 the Committee further elaborated the notion of 
jurisdiction and held that “[t]his principle [of jurisdiction] also applies to those within the power or 
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effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a 
national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-
enforcement operation”125 [Emphasis added].  
The distinction between “power or effective control” suggests that the Human Rights Committee 
subscribes to both the spatial and the personal model of jurisdiction, but the Committee has never 
properly elaborated further upon its interpretation of “jurisdiction”.126 The ICJ endorsed the view of 
the Human Rights Committee regarding the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR in its Wall Case 
advisory opinion.127 The Human Rights Committee pronounced itself briefly and indirectly on the 
question of jurisdiction of international organisations in the case of  H.v.d.P. v. the Netherlands, an 
employee of the European Patent Office who had claimed to be a victim of discrimination. The 
Committee said that “the author’s grievance (…) cannot, in any way, be construed as coming within 
the jurisdiction of the Netherlands or any other State party.”128 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights likewise held that jurisdiction “may, under given 
circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person is concerned is 
present in the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state – usually through the 
acts of the latter’s agents abroad.”129 Also in other cases, the Commission has adopted a wide 
approach to jurisdiction. It held in Alejandre that the shooting down of two civilian light aeroplanes in 
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international airspace by a Cuban military aircraft “agents of the Cuban State, although outside their 
territory, placed the civilian pilots (…) under their authority.”130 In a case concerning the US military 
action in Panama, the Commission had decided likewise in a very short and unequivocal comment 
“[w]here it is asserted that a use of military force has resulted in noncombatants deaths, personal 
injury, and property loss, the human rights of noncombatants are implicated.”131 
The border between the exercise of jurisdiction and  the attribution of conduct can be rather fluid as 
“often in order to assess jurisdiction, the link between the acts or omissions at stake and state agents 
needs to be assessed at once and at the same time, hence the difficulty in keeping them apart.”132 
For the purposes of applying the law of responsibility, a distinction is rather simple. Whereas any 
human rights body starts its analysis with establishing whether jurisdiction is given in the respective 
case, the law of responsibility starts with the attribution of conduct and, thus, jurisdiction will be 
dealt with in the following requirement which is the breach of an international obligation.133 
Jurisdiction under human rights law has also to be distinguished from jurisdiction under general 
international law:134 “It is this notion of jurisdiction—not the jurisdiction to prescribe rules of 
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domestic law and to enforce them, but control over a territory and persons within it—that pervades 
international human rights treaties.”135 Hence, in a certain way, one can apply “jurisdiction” mutatis 
mutandis to international organisations.136 The Draft Accession Agreement of the EU to the ECHR 
likewise foresees the application of the same standard of jurisdiction to the EU for acts outside the 
territories of member states of the EU as for extraterritorial acts of a member state to the 
Convention.137  
In summary, the practice of international courts and tribunals in defining “extraterritorial 
jurisdiction” is very varied and arguably also based on pragmatic reasons. If one bears in mind that at 
least in part of the jurisprudence, “territorial jurisdiction” has been shrunk to include small 
geographical areas or even conflated with the personal notion of jurisdiction, it so appears that 
“jurisdiction” is, indeed, used rather functionally. Consequently, there are no arguments against an 
application of both models of jurisdiction to international organisations whereby the exact threshold 
for the exercise of jurisdiction will depend on the specific circumstances of the case.138 The limitation 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to certain specific circumstances is based on the idea that there has to 
be a sufficient nexus between the state, or in the case of the present study the international 
organisation, and the local population. Therefore, the question arose as to whether the human rights 
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to be protected extraterritorially are also limited to these rights which would be relevant in the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
2. The tailored application of human rights law to peacekeeping forces 
 
1. From Bankovic to Al-Skeini 
 
The applicants in the Bankovic case before the European Court of Human Rights argued that the 
extraterritorial application of human rights obligations of states can be “divided and tailored.” 
Although the Court in Bankovic denied any such application of the European Convention,139 this topic 
has since then been discussed rather extensively in academic writing and the discussion was 
rekindled following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Skeini.140 Referring to 
Bankovic, the Court held that  
whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and 
freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this 
sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored
141 [Emphasis added]. 
Interestingly, the ECtHR had already cited extensively in its Beric judgment142 from a report of the 
Venice Commission in which it was stated “[i]t would have been unrealistic to have insisted on 
immediate full compliance with all international standards governing a stable and full-fledged 
democracy in a post-conflict situation such as existed in BiH following the adoption of the [Peace] 
Agreement”143 so that one might be inclined to think that the Court was slightly testing the water in 
Beric.144 Nevertheless, the cryptic formulation of the ECtHR has already instigated a debate about the 
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interpretation; whether the judgment of the Court allows the “cherry-picking” of rights or not.145 The 
concurrent opinion by Judge Bonello and the follow-up judgment in Hirsi Jamaa confirm that the 
Court did have “cherry-picking” in mind.146 However, if one distinguishes between the obligations of 
a state on a general level and in a specific given case of alleged violations, Al-Skeini fits very well 
within the general practice of the Court as in any given case of alleged violations of human rights, the 
only human rights which actually matter are those which have allegedly been infringed. The Court 
also limited its view to the cases of people being under the authority of a state agent, so that, as it is 
also suggested by Miltner, for cases of control over a territory (territorial jurisdiction), a state party 
still has to guarantee all substantive rights of the Convention.147   
Perhaps the Court had also the pending accession of the EU to the Convention in mind, while 
elaborating its judgment. The accession will extend the jurisdiction of the Court to cover acts of the 
EU and its organs and, as has been established (infra 3.1.), the competences of international 
organisations are limited due to their own respective constitutive framework so that a tailored 
application of human rights is the only feasible option to apply human rights obligations to 
international organisations without exposing them to the risk of acting ultra vires. It is therefore 
submitted that, notwithstanding the cryptic judgment of the ECtHR in Al-Skeini, human rights can 
only be applied in a tailored and divided fashion to international organisations.   
Peacekeeping operations generally elude, in a certain way, the regulation of human rights. They are 
established to promote peace and security, but they are not “human rights protecting operations” 
despite the recent emphasis on the protection of civilians in the mandates of operations. Hence, 
there may be a certain dichotomy between the human rights obligations of the peacekeepers and 
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their mandate on the basis of a Security Council resolution.148 Germany observed in the 
Behrami/Saramati case that “account must be taken of the special difficulties under which such 
operations are normally deployed.”149 Furthermore,  
[m]ore often than not, peace operations start after an armed conflict has brought death and 
destruction. Governmental institutions may not function properly, the infrastructure has suffered 
heavy damage, law and order have broken down, and the economic situation is disastrous (…) 
Accordingly, everyone knows that when a peace operation is launched the situation in the country 
concerned normally does not correspond to the standards of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights or those of the European Convention (…) In conclusion, it must be acknowledged quite 
frankly that at least during a first stage of a peace operation, the standards of the Convention can 
hardly ever be maintained to a full extent.
150
 
Other arguments raised are that a limited application of human rights law would prevent 
peacekeeping forces from being exposed to “unworkable burdens with “undue risk”, thereby 
compromising any “effective protective action” and consequently the whole mandate of the 
operation.151 The very same arguments are invoked for a similar limited application of IHL to 
peacekeeping forces.152 A wider debate has arisen as regards the possibility of a “sliding scale of 
obligations” for armed groups whom, in contrast to states, are unable to respect all rules.153  
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Regarding the precise obligations of international organisations, some authors submit that the 
Security Council, for example, would only have “due diligence” obligations regarding the application 
of human rights law,154 and as such could not be held responsible for a failure to prevent a massacre 
or genocide, but only for the failure to conduct itself adequately.155 In academic writing it is also 
suggested that it is necessary to distinguish between positive and negative obligations depending on 
the degree of control exercised over a given territory; negative obligations can always be respected 
by the control exercised by a state over its agents. 156 
2. Derogations under human rights law as another method to divide and tailor the 
application of human rights law 
 
Other arguments for a limited application of human rights law to international organisations rely on 
the possibility of derogations under human rights treaties. In Al-Skeini, the European Court of Human 
Rights implicitly opened the door for extraterritorial human rights law derogations, referring to the 
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ICJ and its judgment in the Wall Case, stating “the International Court of Justice appeared to assume, 
that even in respect of extra-territorial acts, it would be in principle possible for a State to derogate 
from its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”157 As human rights 
law serves to protect the individual, it would be, indeed, illogical to allow states to further limit their 
obligations on their own territory than when they act extraterritorially.158  
Of course, these arguments can be only transposed to a certain extent from the territorial context of 
states to the “aterritorial context” of international organisations, but the draft accession agreement 
of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights provides likewise that the changes foreseen 
to the Convention “may be interpreted as allowing the EU to take measures in derogation from its 
obligations under the Convention in relations to measures taken by one of its member States in time 
of emergency in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention.”159 Hence, also from the perspective 
of derogations under human rights law, there are good arguments for limiting the application of 
human rights law to international organisations to what is feasible under their mandate and thereby 
also in the context of peacekeeping operations.160 A particular problem is posed by the fact that the 
UN could invoke the Charter and Security Council resolutions “to the extent that they reflect an 
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international law obligation – to justify what might otherwise be regarded as non-compliance.”161 
The general and particularly the recent practice of the UN and regional organisations shows a strict 
adherence to international human rights standards,162 but nevertheless the Security Council could at 
least theoretically derogate from these human rights in a resolution which does not involve rules of 
jus cogens. 
In conclusion, the application of human rights law to international organisations is, indeed, tailored 
and limited to these rights as they are not only relevant in the specific circumstances, but as they 
may also be protected by the powers of the respective international organisations. This division of 
human rights law in its extraterritorial application is intrinsically linked to the question of jurisdiction. 
The following part of this chapter analyses the application of international humanitarian law into 
peacekeeping operations of international organisations. It illustrates very clearly that further 
difficulties arise in determining the applicable law in peacekeeping operations in addition to those 
encountered in the human rights law context. A particular problem is posed by the relationship 
between human rights and humanitarian law.  
3. Application of International Humanitarian Law 
 
International Humanitarian Law regulates the conduct of hostilities in armed conflict. The aim of 
international humanitarian law is to limit the effects of war on people and property and to protect 
particularly vulnerable persons. 
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the protection of civilians, in close cooperation with the UN and as funded by European and other donors, 
Dembinski, Schott, ibid., 286. Interestingly, as noted by both authors, the approach of the AU for the protection 
of civilians “is notably robust” (ibid., 287) which could be seen as further proof of the emerging division of 
labour between the UN, the EU and the AU on the African continent.  
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1. Application ratione personae of IHL to activities of international organisations 
 
The UN and the regional organisations which are part of the present study possess international legal 
personality and they therefore can be addressees of norms of international humanitarian law.163 
Regarding the United Nations particularly, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, its 
mandate for maintaining international peace and security, and its competence to deploy military 
forces, which can become involved in conflict situations amounting to an armed conflict, lead to the 
conclusion that international humanitarian law is applicable.164  
The Institut de droit international started to address in earnest the issue of the application of 
international humanitarian law in the context of the United Nations in 1971. The issued resolution 
considered humanitarian rules of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, 
to be applicable “as of right” to the United Nations, entailing an obligation to comply with 
international humanitarian law in all circumstances when engaged in hostilities.165  
Other international organisations are bound by international humanitarian law if they possess 
international legal personality, have the capacity under their respective constitutive instrument to 
deploy military forces166 and if they do deploy military forces; a corollary of the capacity to use 
                                                          
163
 T. Ferraro, ‘IHL Applicability to International Organisations Involved in Peace Operations’, in S. Kolanowski 
(ed.), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium. International Organisations’ Involvement in Peace Operations: 
Applicable Legal Framework and the Issue of Responsibility (2011), 15, 17. See generally, M. Zwanenburg, 
‘United Nations and International Humanitarian Law’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2008-), online edition, [www.mpepil.com); J. Peck, ‘The U.N. and the Laws of War: 
How Can the World’s Peacekeepers Be Held Accountable?’, in (1995) 21 Syracuse Journal of International Law 
and Commerce, 283-310. 
164
 Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 124. In this regard, it does not matter if force is used; “la capacité 
matérielle d’avoir recours à des forces armées entraîne la capacité subjective d’être destinataire de normes du 
droit international humanitaire”, (ibid., 124-5.); See also Peters, ‘Article 25’, supra note 38, 787, 827 mn. 129 – 
828 mn. 132. 
165
 Institut de Droit International, Resolution (Session of Zagreb – 1971), Conditions of Application of 
Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces May be Engaged, Article 2. 
See also, Institut de Droit International, Resolution (Session of Wiesbaden – 1975), Conditions of Application of 
Rules Other than Humanitarian Rules, of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces May be 
Engaged and Institut de Droit International, Resolution (Session of Berlin – 1999), The Application of 
International Humanitarian Law and Fundamental Human Rights in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities 
are Parties, notably paras. II, IX, and XI. 
166
 K. E. Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations Involved in International 
Missions’, in M. Odello, R. Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (2011), 45, 
53; E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés (2008), 225-26, paras. 1.192–1.193; 234, para. 1.202. Thus, 
IHL applies to peacekeeping forces. Also, J. P. Bialke, ‘United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and 
the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict’, in (2001) 50 Air Force Law Review, 1, 37; The Secretary-General 
reconfirmed that the Bulletin on IHL “is binding upon all members of United Nations peace operations (…) 
[and]signal[s] formal recognition of the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations peace 
operations.”, Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/56/326 (2001), 9, para. 19 ; For the AU, Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) 
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military force is to be titular of rights and obligations of international humanitarian law.167 Therefore, 
the objective capacities of the organisations determine their subjective capacities to be bound by IHL 
and the precise legal content incumbent upon them.168 Nevertheless, the UN Charter has also an 
effect on regional organisations deploying military troops as part of a UN operation or on the basis of 
a Security Council authorisation. The Charter confers on the United Nations both the responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security, and to develop and encourage the respect of human 
rights and fundamental liberties. Therefore, in practice, the mandates provided by the Security 
Council will contain the requirement to respect the applicable human rights and international 
humanitarian law.  
2. Application ratione materiae of IHL 
 
In contrast to human rights law, IHL does not presuppose the exercise of jurisdiction over a given 
territory; it is based on a predominantly horizontal relationship protecting the subjects of the parties 
to the conflict on the grounds of the mutual interest of all parties.  
Depending on the nature of the conflict, different regimes of international humanitarian law are 
applicable. International armed conflicts are – under the Geneva Conventions – conflicts between 
opposing states,169 whereas non-international armed conflicts covers all other cases of armed 
violence.170 The regime applying to international armed conflict is the most developed, establishing 
categories of protected persons which do not exist in internal armed conflict.  
In doctrine it is debated whether the involvement of international organisations in an armed conflict 
leads to a qualification of this particular conflict as international or as non-international. There is 
generally agreement that the law of international armed conflict is applicable if international troops 
                                                          
on the Establishment and Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur Area of the Sudan (CFC) 
(2004), para. 8 a), available online at: http://www.africa-union.org/Darfur/Agreements/soma.pdf ; for NATO, 
M. H. Hoffman, ‘Peace enforcement actions and humanitarian law: Emerging rules for “interventional armed 
conflict”’, in (2000) 82 International Review of the Red Cross, 193, 198-200; A Faite, J. L. Grenier (eds.), Report 
of the Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces (Geneva, 11-12 December 2003), 24-26; Press Conference by NATO 
Spokesman, Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David Wilby, SHAPE, NATO HQ 26 March 1999, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990326a.htm.  
167
 Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 127-8; this was equally recognised by the latest resolution of the Institut 
de droit international, cf. Institut de Droit International, supra note 165, para. II. 
168
 V. Falco, ‘The Internal Legal Order of the European Union as a Complementary Framework for Its Obligations 
under IHL’, in (2009) 42 Israel Law Review, 168, 188. 
169
 And certain specific exceptions under Article 1 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions. 
170
 Such as a state versus an armed group or armed groups against each other. 
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confront a state,171 which would amount to an international conflict sui generis, because in the final 
analysis it is not very different from a group of states involved in an armed conflict against another 
state. 172 
The issue is unresolved if one takes the example of the use of force by an international organisation 
against an organised armed group. The predominant view extends the application of the law of 
international armed conflict in which an international organisation takes part, to the opponent, 
notwithstanding if it is a state or an armed group.173 Some authors agree that the status of an 
                                                          
171
 Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 183; Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International 
Organisations, supra note 166, 45, 63; Faite, Grenier, supra note 166, 63. As states contributing troops to a 
peace-keeping operation or a peace enforcement operation remain themselves bound in their obligations 
under IHL, an involvement in such a military operation will consequently also constitute an armed conflict 
between the troop contributing State and the targeted State, cf. H. P. Aust, ‘Article 2 (5)’, in B. Simma, D.-E. 
Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume I (2012), 235, 247 mn. 
26 with further references. For the general application of IHL to the United Nations and other international 
organisations, see, C. Wickremasinghe, G. Verdirame, ‘Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Human 
Rights in the Course of UN Field Operations’, in  C. Scott (ed.), Torture as Tort. Comparative Perspectives on the 
Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (2001),  465, 473; F. Naert, ‘The Application of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in CSDP Operations’, in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti, R. A. 
Wessel (eds.), International Law as Law of the European Union (2012), 189, 197. 
172
 Another argument made is that under an evolutionary interpretation of Common Article 2, an IAC exists 
“whenever two or more entities endowed with an international legal personality resort to armed force”, 
Ferraro, ‘IHL Applicability to International Organisations Involved in Peace Operations’, supra note 163, 15, 19. 
It is therefore also unproblematic if an International Organisation intervenes in a NIAC in favour of rebel armed 
forces against the government as the respective organisation would be opposed to the government of the 
state. Recent examples include NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo and in Libya, see V. Koutroulis, ‘International 
Organisations Involved in Armed Conflict: Material and Geographical Scope of Application of Humanitarian 
Law’, in S. Kolanowski (ed.), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium. International Organisations’ Involvement in 
Peace Operations: Applicable Legal  Framework and the Issue of Responsibility (2011), 29, 32; ICRC, Update no. 
99/02 on ICRC activities in Kosovo, 24 March 1999, Kosovo crisis: ICRC transfers released detainees, 25 June 
1999, especially last para.; Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Đorđević, Judgment, Case No. IT-05-87/1 “Kosovo”, Tr. Ch. II, 
23 February 2011, 629, para. 1580. In contrast, jurisprudence and the doctrine were quite hesitant regarding 
the application of IHL to the United Nations in the 1950’s, cf. the jurisprudence of troop-contributing countries 
in the Korea Operation from 1950 on the basis of SC Resolution 84, as cited in Schmalenbach, supra note 154, 
187-191; See Security Council Resolution 84, UN Doc. S/RES/84 (1950), Committee on Study of Legal Problems 
of the United Nations, ‘Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?’, in (1952) 46 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 216, 220. 
173
 Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations’, supra note 166, 45, 63. Greenwood 
also speaks of an inherent tension between the understandable desire of the United Nations and contributor 
states to insist upon punishment of those who attack their personnel and the neutrality of the law of 
international armed conflict treating all parties to a conflict equally, C. Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian 
Law and United Nations Military Operations’, in (1998) 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3, 26. 
This view excludes the potential simultaneous application of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel but it is nevertheless a valid argument which is relevant for other international and 
regional organisations. However, the ICTY in Tadić held that: “The customary international law doctrine of 
recognition of belligerency allows for the application to internal conflicts of the laws applicable to international 
armed conflict, thus ensuring that even in a non-international conflict individuals can be held criminally 
responsible for violations of the laws and customs of war”, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, Decision on 
the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1, Tr. Ch., 10 August 1995; See also, T. Meron, ‘International 
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, in (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law, 554, 564-65; A. Aust, 
Handbook of International Law (2010), 237-38. 
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international organisation is sufficient to elevate the conflict to an international armed conflict.174 
This view is popular from a human rights point of view as it increases the level of protection for all 
parties involved in the conflict.175  
This approach might better be suited to accommodating the reality of a peacekeeping operation. 
Modern peacekeeping operations often operate in conditions between war and peace where there 
might be fighting in one part of a country and relative peace in other parts of the country perhaps 
with only very few skirmishes.176 Therefore, under the law of internal armed conflict, one would 
arrive at the paradoxical situation that IHL might be applicable in one part of the territory, but not in 
the rest of the country.177  
The opposing opinion is that  “there is no reason to think that the involvement of a UN force in a 
situation of armed conflict will of itself render the conflict ‘international’ for the purpose of the 
application of the ius in bello.”178 They therefore argue for an application of the law of internal 
                                                          
174
 Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 184; Schmalenbach, supra note 154, 363. With regard to the two 
opposing opinions and with further arguments, see the debate between David and Engdahl, E. David, O. 
Engdahl, ‘How does the involvement of a multinational peacekeeping force affect the classification of a 
situation?’, in (2013) 95 International Review of the Red Cross, 659-679. 
175
 But, as “attractive [it is] in terms of protection, since it means that victims of the armed conflict would 
benefit from the more detailed provisions of the law governing international armed conflicts, it may however 
be inconsistent with the operational and legal realities. In particular, it would require the assignment of duties 
to parties that are unwilling or unable to comply with some of those duties; to give just one example, there is 
nothing to suggest that international forces involved in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) would be 
willing to grant prisoner of war status to captured members of organised non-State armed groups, as would be 
required under IHL applicable in international armed conflict (IAC)“, C. Beerli, ‘Keynote address’, S. Kolanowski 
(ed.), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium. International Organisations’ Involvement in Peace Operations: 
Applicable Legal Framework and the Issue of Responsibility (2011), 9, 11.   
176
 M. Odello, R. Piotrowicz, ‘Legal Regimes Governing International Military Missions’, in M. Odello, R. 
Piotrowicz (eds.), International Military Missions and International Law (2011), 25, 41; Contrary Ferraro, ‘IHL 
Applicability to International Organisations Involved in Peace Operations’, supra note 163, 15, 19. 
177
 Geographically limited armed conflicts can, of course, also arise in conflicts not involving international 
organisations on either side. Under the law of international armed conflict, the application of IHL is not 
restricted to the vicinity of actual hostilities, but it applies, arguably, to the whole territory of the parties to the 
conflict on the basis of Article 6 (2) Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 3 (b) of Additional Protocol 1, which 
both speak of “the territory of Parties to the conflict.” Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International 
Organisations’, supra note 166,  45, 65; ICTR decided in Akayesu that “Common Article 3 must be also applied 
in the whole territory of the State engaged in the conflict”, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, 
Case no. ICTR-96-4-T, T. Ch. I, 2 September 1998, paras. 635-636. 
178
 H. McCoubrey, N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations (1997), 
172. However David argues that the governments as well as the rebels, being as they are part of the 
population, are constitutive elements of a state, so in a NIAC they can both claim to represent the state as the 
de facto government. Therefore there is some appeal for such a view in a case where the conditions on the 
ground do not allow a decision as to which side is effectively representing the government, David, supra note 
166, 160-61, 179-80. This view can nevertheless also be problematic as Libya illustrates. France, Italy, Germany 
and Australia recognised the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate government of Libya (until 
July 2011), whereas other NATO members had not done so, giving rise to questions whether the conflict had 
multiplied on the level of the troop contributing states, to the NATO operation, depending on whether they 
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conflict if the conflict involves an international organisation on one side and an armed group on the 
other side.179 Thus, one must analyse “each belligerent relationship to determine [the] applicable 
law.”180 Once again, it is however questionable whether such a view is compatible with modern 
armed conflicts.  Such a distinction would lead to an obligation of any international organisation to 
provide different standards of treatment depending on the adversaries, which is impractical in 
modern armed conflicts. It would also emphasise the separation of the two legal regimes which is 
less relevant in customary humanitarian law.181 On the other hand, if an armed conflict involves a 
state and an international organisation as a coalition and an armed group as an opponent, members 
of the latter would be exposed to different treatment depending on whether they are in the hands of 
                                                          
had already accepted the rebels as the new government or not, Koutroulis, ‘International Organisations 
Involved in Armed Conflict’, supra note 172, 29, 34-35. 
179
 David, supra note 166, 177; J. Cerone, ‘Legal responsibility framework for human rights violations post-
conflict’, supra note 143, 42, 69. This view should be qualified and the example should rather be an 
international organisation and a state involved jointly in an armed conflict against an armed group. Recent 
peacekeeping practice suggests that the United Nations and regional organisations rely on the consent of the 
host-state and act with its agreement if not in support of the government, cf. e.g. South Sudan or Mali. Naert 
subscribes to this view. He argues that the opponent of a peacekeeping operation defines the applicable law, if 
it is a state, it will be an international armed conflict, Naert, supra note 63, 483-484. In many NIAC between a 
state and an armed group, an international organisation will intervene on the government’s side but they may 
limit their support to logistic support or intelligence activities as well as participation in the planning and 
coordination of military operations carried out by the government. The legal dilemma has been how to align 
these functions with the law of armed conflict. The ICRC therefore developed a functional approach of 4 
conditions which complements the classic criteria for the determination of a NIAC: 
1. There is a pre-existing NIAC, 
2. The multinational forces’ intervention is carried out in support of one of the parties engaged in the pre-
existing armed conflict, 
3. The support consists of actions objectively displaying the involvement of multinational forces in the 
collective conduct of hostilities, 
4. The actions in question reflect the decision by the concerned TCCs or the IOs to support a party involved in 
the pre-existing NIAC 
Ferraro, ‘IHL Applicability to International Organisations Involved in Peace Operations’, supra note 163, 15, 21; 
Cf. also M. Zwanenburg, ‘International Organisations vs. Troops Contributing Countries: Which Should Be 
Considered as the Party to an Armed Conflict During Peace Operations?’, in S. Kolanowski (ed.), Proceedings of 
the Bruges Colloquium. International Organisations’ Involvement in Peace Operations: Applicable Legal 
Framework and the Issue of Responsibility (2011), 23, 25. 
180
 Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations’, supra note 166, 45, 63; Faite, 
Grenier, supra note 166,  63-64.The ICRC has consistently taken this position, ICRC, International Humanitarian 
Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, Report for the 31
st
 International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, Doc. 31IC/11/5.1.2. (2011), 31, last para.; also Ferraro, ‘IHL Applicability to 
International Organisations Involved in Peace Operations’, supra note 163, 15, 17-18; Naert acknowledges that 
a conflict opposing an international organisation and an armed group “does not really fit” within the categories 
of international or internal armed conflict, but that such conflict would fall within the category of an internal 
armed conflict, Naert, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, supra note 
171, 189, 197-98. 
181
 Cf. also Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations’, supra note 166, 45, 63; also 
R. Kolb, Droit humanitaire et opérations de paix internationale (2006), 57-58. 
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forces of the organisation or of the state and there would be an application of the traditional rules of 
intervention by a third state.182 
The practice seems to favour the application of the law of international armed conflict, thus the 
bulletin of the Secretary-General, which foresees the application of international humanitarian law, 
refers to the law of international armed conflict in Article 1 of bulletin.183 In the same regard, the 
Convention on Safety of United Nations Personnel (1994), speaks of the law of international armed 
conflict (Article 2, para.2).184 This disposition was specifically  accepted during the negotiations as “il 
a été généralement admis qu’il était impossible à l’Organisation d’être impliquée dans un conflit 
armé interne, car une fois qu’elle ou le personnel associé s’engage dans un conflit contre une force 
locale, le conflit prend, par définition, une envergue ‘internationale.’“185 Other examples of practice 
are less clear. With regard to Somalia, the United Nations and the United States argued that the law 
of non-international armed conflict was applicable, but one has to keep in mind that Somalia was a 
so-called “failed state” with no effective government so that the armed opposition resembled an 
armed group rather than a government.186 Concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United 
Nations considered itself bound by the whole body of international humanitarian law.187 However 
this particular question of the nature of an armed conflict between an international organisation and 
an armed group might be left undecided, as many treaty rules applicable in international armed 
conflicts, especially concerning the conduct of hostilities, are equally applicable in non-international 
conflicts on the basis of customary humanitarian law.188 
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 Sams, ibid., 45, 63-64; Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 55, para. 219; Prosecutor v. Dario 
Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004, para. 320. 
183
 See also Article 2 (2). Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 186; Statements by several states during the 
elaboration of the 1994 Convention also indicate that a conflict involving UN troops falls under the regime of 
the law of IAC, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work Carried Out During the Period from 28 March to 8 
April 1994, UN Doc. A/AC.242/2 (1994), 43, paras. 166-170. 
184
 The application of both the bulletin as well as the Convention is not mutually exclusive. The legal 
determination whether an armed conflict exists is a factual consideration and taking into account the saving 
clause of the Convention in Article 20(a)), both regimes can apply. 
185
 P. Kirsch, ‘La Convention sur la sécurité du personnel des Nations Unies et du personnel associé’, in C. 
Emanuelli (ed.), Les casques bleus : policiers ou combatants ?/Blue helmets : policemen or combattants? (1997), 
47, 56. 
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 Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 187-188. 
187
 Greenwood, supra note 173, 3, 26; Kolb, Porretto, Vité, supra note 15, 187-188; D. W. Bowett, United 
Nations Forces: A Legal Study (1964), 509-10. 
188
 For instance, Article 3 is applicable in international as well as in non-international armed conflicts, Military 
and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 55, para. 218; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1, App.Ch., 2 October 1995, para. 102. 
Sams, ‘IHL Obligations of the UN and other International Organisations’, supra note 166, 45, 63. Bothe does not 
even specify whether the law of international or internal armed conflict is applicable to the United Nations, but 
simply deems IHL applicable, M. Bothe, ‘Peacekeeping’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The 
Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume I (2012), 1171, 1190 mn. 28; Beerli, ‘Keynote address’, 
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3. The relationship between human rights and international humanitarian law 
 
In peacekeeping operations, situations may arise in which peacekeepers find themselves confronted 
with attacks involving the use of potentially deadly force. Such a scenario is independent from the 
question as to whether a peacekeeping operation has a mandate to use military force for purposes 
other than self-defence,189 and it may trigger the application of international humanitarian law which 
therefore raises the question of the ways in which the two bodies of law, human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, can be reconciled in such a situation. 
Although Grotius recognised that certain laws are not applicable in “the midst of Arms, provided they 
are only those Laws that are Civil and Judicial, and proper for Times of Peace”, he nonetheless 
recognised that “there are some Things which it would be unlawful to practise even against an 
Enemy”190 thereby “depicting international law as the graduate development of universal principles 
of justice.”191 Grotius referred to Seneca,192 which illustrates that the legal regulation of warfare is 
not a particularly recent invention of mankind but can be traced back to ancient times. Justice is also 
one of the arguments presented to explain why human rights law is applicable in times of armed 
conflict. It is now generally understood that both IHL and human rights law are applicable during 
armed conflict; they are complementary and not alternative.193 Whereas, mostly in Europe this view 
is not only accepted but also supported, in contrast the American and Israeli position is that human 
rights law does not or should not apply in times of armed conflict.194 In cases of overlap, the 
American perspective is that IHL applies as lex specialis.195In the past decades, an approximation and 
                                                          
supra note 175, 9, 11. Beerli qualifies her statement, asserting that there are differences in the law applicable 
to persons deprived of their liberty in the law applicable to IAC and NIAC, ibid.  As the Geneva Conventions are 
not open to ratification by international organisations the majority of the legal analysis is based, should 
international humanitarian law be applicable, on the application of the customary humanitarian law study by 
the ICRC. 
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 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (1625) in the edition of R. Tuck (ed.), The Rights of War and Peace. Book 1. 
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 Crawford, supra note 15, 7. 
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 Grotius, supra note 190, 102-103, para. XXVII. 
193
 Crawford, supra note 15, 654; O. Ben-Naftali, ‘Introduction: International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law – Pas de Deux’, in ’O. Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law (2011), 3, 4 – 6. 
194
 G. D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict. International Humanitarian Law in War (2010), 24; F. J. Hampton, 
‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the perspective of a 
human rights treaty body’, in (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross, 549, 550; L. Doswald-Beck, S. 
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 Solis, ibid., 24; M. J. Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation’, in (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law, 119, 133. The U.S. 
position seems to be adjusting; the Operational Law Handbook refers to an emerging view according to which 
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partial convergence of IHL and human rights law occurred;196 both fields of law are concerned with 
the protection of the human person197 which has become a major issue in international law, as well 
as in international relations.198 This is despite the different origins of both fields. Human Rights have 
grown out of constitutional, and thereby domestic, law in contrast to international humanitarian law 
which has a firm foundation in international law.199 
The International Court of Justice elaborated at length on the relationship between human rights law 
and international humanitarian law in the Wall Case:  
                                                          
the application of both regimes is overlapping and complementary, A. Gillman, W. Johnson (eds.), Operational 
Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School (2012), 46-47, paras. B. 1. – 3. A similar 
assessment was included in the Fourth Periodic Report of the USA to the United Nations ICCPR Committee: 
“Under the doctrine of lex specialis, the applicable rules for the protection of individuals and conduct of 
hostilities in armed conflict are typically found in international humanitarian law, including the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, the Hague Regulations of 1907, and other international humanitarian law instruments, as 
well as in the customary international law of armed conflict. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that 
international human rights law and the law of armed conflict are in many respects complementary and 
mutually reinforcing”, Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee 
on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2011), para. 507. 
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affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law’, in (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross, 501, 548. 
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of warfare and therefore includes many prohibitive norms, in other words, obligations for individuals. Whereas 
human rights law is also made up largely of general principles, IHL consists mainly of specific norms. Regarding 
their application, human rights law applies to all, within the territory and under the jurisdiction of a state, and 
IHL establishes different layers of protection depending on nationality, as well as special statuses such as 
combatant or civilian; Solis, supra note 194,  26. 
198
 A noticeable paradigm shift can be traced within the United Nations, the concepts of “Human Security” and 
“Responsibility to Protect” made their appearance, General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (2005), paras. 138, 143. The latter was endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 1674 (2006), 
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Security Council Resolution 1874, UN Doc. S/RES/1874 (2009). The Council also increasingly recognised the 
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Resolution 1738, especially paras. 5-6, Security Council Resolution 1296, UN Doc. S/RES/1296 (2000), Security 
Council Resolution 1738, UN Doc. S/RES/1738 (2006). See also, N. Krisch, ‘Article 39’, in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, 
G. Nolte et. al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume II (2012), 1272, 1284 mn. 22 – 
1285 mn. 24. On human security, cf. C. True-Frost, The Security Council and Norm Consumption’, (2007) 40 
New York University Journal of International Law & Politics, 115, 138 – 74. 
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 A. A. Cançado Trindade, ‘Desarrollo de las relaciones entre el derecho internacional humanitario y la 
protección internacional de los derechos humanos en su amplia dimensión’, in (1992) 16 Revista Instituto 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 39, especially 45-49; R. Murphy, ‘United Nations Military Operations 
and International Humanitarian Law: What Rules Apply to Peacekeepers?’, in (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum, 
153, 156-157; J.-M. Henckaerts, ‘Concurrent Application of International Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law: Victims in Search of a Forum’, in (2007) 1 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 95, 
97-100. See also Henckaert for a compilation of state practice and UN practice acknowledging the application 
of human rights in times of armed conflict, ibid., 106-09; Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Administration of Justice, Rule of Law and Democracy, Working 
paper on the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law by Francoise 
Hampson and Ibrahim Salama, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14 (2005), 12-14, paras. 41-50. 
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the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of 
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some 
rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters 
of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order 
to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”
200
 
This slightly cryptic judgment did not elucidate the position of the ICJ, but instead created 
confusion.201 It was interpreted as a statement on the relationship between the two regimes per se 
and not as a pronouncement on how to establish the applicable legal framework in a specific context. 
In that regard, the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Case was clearer. The Court explicitly examined the relationship between one specific norm, the right 
to life under the ICCPR, and its application in times of armed conflict under international 
humanitarian law.202 This norm-by-norm approach is well justified, as one cannot automatically 
presume that a specific norm of international humanitarian law will be lex specialis as regards the 
corresponding human rights norm.203 Given that there are different human rights instruments, one 
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of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to 
be determined by the applicable lex .specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities." 
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 One example of where human rights law is lex specialis and thereby complementing the application of IHL is 
as follows: A detailed analysis of case-law shows that human rights law as informing IHL necessitates an arrest 
whenever possible, as well as to plan a military or police operation in a way which will increase the success of 
an arrest. As such, human rights law goes beyond the tests of necessity and proportionality in international 
humanitarian law. Lethal force has been seen as excessive when the suspects were seen as harmless, even in 
situations where arrest was not possible, but this test of proportionality is also intrinsic to IHL, L. Doswald-Beck, 
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might also allow derogation in specific cases which would allow the application of IHL, whereas in 
another instrument the same right might be regulated more restrictively.204 Furthermore, depending 
on the norms in question, an interpretation might also allow an alignment of the two norms, 
preventing a norm conflict according to which one norm is superseded by another.205 Therefore, the 
norm deemed to be lex specialis is the norm with the “more precise or narrower material and/or 
personal scope of application that prevails”, in other words the one which has the larger “common 
contact surface area” with the given situation.206 
The nature of the armed conflict is also determinative for the relationship between two specific 
norms. Human rights are more likely to fill the lacunae in respect to the protection of persons in non-
international armed conflict than in international armed conflicts.207 There are also other areas of law 
which can be identified as falling more squarely under IHL or human rights law.208 In relation to 
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between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in 2010 (14) Journal of Conflict & Security 
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CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 3; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (80), supra note 
104, para. 11;  
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matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’, in (2008) 90 
International Review of the Red Cross, 599, 604. 
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killing and wounding of innocent human beings not directly participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian 
victims of lawful collateral damage (…) As long as rules of the game are observed, it is permissible to cause 
suffering, deprivation of freedom, and death.”, T. Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, in (2000) 
94 American Journal of International Law, 239, 240; Naert, supra note 63, 622-624; Krieger, supra note 203, 
265, 274-75. 
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 Roberts considers the concurrent application of IHL and HR to be relevant in occupations or with respect to 
detention rather than in armed conflicts, A. Roberts, ‘Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of 
War and Human Rights’, in (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law, 580, 594-95, 599-601. Watkin, 
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peacekeeping, it is argued that human rights apply in non-coercive operations and both bodies of law 
apply in coercive operations; however the correct criterion is an assessment of whether an armed 
conflict exists.209  
The competences of all international organisations are determined by their constitutive instruments, 
and these may contain only limited competences in the area of human rights law, so that it is even 
more important to determine the normative relationship between IHL and human rights law on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Finally, an issue which has been more or less neglected in academic writing is the distinction 
between jurisdiction under human rights and humanitarian law for international organisations. It 
appears from the very few publications on this topic that the application of the regime of human 
rights law may be simply dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction under human rights law, which would 
leave IHL as the only applicable body of law.210  
Naerts also asserts – on the basis of an analysis of the situation in Iraq in 2003 – that the Security 
Council can, by passing a resolution, set aside some provisions of IHL on the basis of Article 103 of 
the UN Charter.211 
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European Security Law (2007), 102, 118. 
210
 The example provided by Lattanzi is the Bankovic case. She argues that the case did not deal with the 
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system, F. Lattanzi, ‘La frontière entre droit international humanitaire et droits de l’homme’, in E. Decaux, A. 
Dieng, M. Sow (eds.), From Human Rights to International Criminal Law. Studies in Honour of an African Jurist, 
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899. 
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In summary, the relationship between IHL and HR has to be analysed in the context of a specific 
norm and the application of both fields of law may also be dependent on external factors – in terms 
of the respective norms – such as jurisdiction or the superseding powers of the Security Council. 
4. Application of the law of occupation to peacekeeping operations 
 
The law of occupation as a specific regime of international humanitarian law applies to situations in 
which a state exercises control and powers over a territory amounting to those of the government 
whose territory it occupies. As there have been instances where the United Nations has administered 
international territories,212 the question of whether an international organisation could be falling 
under this particular regime of law is relevant. The application of the law of occupation is triggered 
by Article 42 of The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,213 
according to which a “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
of the hostile army.”214 The occupier assumes the role of sovereign of the territory but he is barred 
from changing the law in force and has to take all measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far 
as possible, public order and safety according to Article 43 of the Convention.215 
These two articles demonstrate why it is highly doubtful that the law of occupation can be applied to 
an international organisation. First of all, international administration by an international 
organisation is normally based on cooperation with and consent of the government of the respective 
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state.216 Therefore, under normal circumstances, an international organisation is not forcefully taking 
over a territory against the wishes of the government;217 it is a situation of occupatio pacifica in 
contrast to occupatio bellica.218  
Moreover, the mandate of an international organisation, for example, the mandate of UNMIK, 
expressly includes a mandate of transformative authority which goes beyond safeguarding the status 
quo.219 Consequently, a large part if not the majority of doctrine denies an application of the law of 
occupation to international organisations.220 As a reply to that argument, one can say that relying on 
“consent” corresponds to relying on an argument derived from jus ad bellum, and that the 
application of the law of occupation is determined by a factual analysis under jus in bello. This 
counter-argument is valid,221 however many organisations are legally not able to occupy a territory in 
the absence of competences under their internal law;222 any such act would correspond to the 
international organisation acting ultra vires.223 It is also not convincing in this regard to argue that an 
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international organisation may be bound by Security Council Resolutions and Article 103 of the 
United Nations Charter similarly to a state.224 Under such an argument, the United Nations could – on 
the basis of a resolution under Chapter VII – compel another international organisation to act even if 
the act would be in violation of its own internal law.225  
Furthermore, taking the example of UNMIK in Kosovo, the law of occupation simply does not cover 
ratione materiae cases of civil administration of a territory through peaceful means by an 
international organisation. On the basis that these administrations are civil, they already exclude the 
application ratione materiae of the law of occupation and the consent of the government on whose 
territory the operation is deployed would not amount to an argument jus ad bellum against the jus in 
bello body of the law of occupation.226 
In practice, the United Nations has never acknowledged the application de jure of the law of 
occupation nor applied this body of law in practice, including situations where, arguably, the 
conditions for the application of the law of occupation were fulfilled. 227 A report of an expert 
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meeting of the ICRC also showed the incertitude in legal scholarship regarding the application of the 
law of occupation to peace operations. Although the majority of experts agreed that in certain 
circumstances the law of occupation might be applicable to operations under UN command and 
control, they were equally divided on the details.228  
In summary, the arguments against an application of the law of occupation to peacekeeping 
operations are convincing and in practice, the law of occupation has equally never been applied in 
the peacekeeping context.  
3.3. Conclusions 
 
The inquiry into the applicable law in respect to peacekeeping operations has shown that the legal 
framework is rather complex. Both international human rights and international humanitarian law 
can be applicable whereby both fields of law raise certain issues. Besides the debate over the 
applicable body of humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations, the exercise of jurisdiction by 
international organisations under human rights law is also problematic. It was argued that the two 
models of jurisdiction developed in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals are also 
applicable to international organisations.  The unclear customary status of many dispositions further 
complicates the picture.  
These two models of jurisdiction under human rights law may have a connotation in the context of 
the question of joint responsibility of international organisations for peacekeeping operations. It is 
imaginable that in the context of a specific peacekeeping operation deployed in the field, one 
organisation may be exercising territorial jurisdiction over a given area, whereas a second 
international organisation is exercising personal jurisdiction over one or several people within this 
area. Nevertheless, this exercise of jurisdiction by both organisations already presupposes that the 
conduct in violation of international law was in fact also attributed to both organisations. It therefore 
increases the potential for joint responsibility of two or several organisations as the attribution of 
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conduct could also be based on different violations of primary norms.  In other words, one could 
imagine a scenario in which the Security Council – and thereby the UN – was bound to prevent a 
certain conduct based on an exercise of territorial jurisdiction and in which a regional organisation 









“In law we must beware of petrifying the rules of yesterday and thereby 
halting progress in the name of process. If one consolidates the past and 
calls it law, he may find himself outlawing the future.” 
- Judge Manfrech Lachs, President of the ICJ.1  
The present study started with an examination of legal framework for the maintenance of 
international peace and security under the United Nations Charter. The analysis showed that the 
legal framework is construed around a careful compromise between a universalist and a regionalist 
perception of collective security, in which the United Nations is the central pillar, although in practice 
roles can be reversed.  This study inquired into the concept of peacekeeping as it was developed 
under the United Nations Charter, as well as cooperation with regional organisations, and it placed 
emphasis on this “collective security compromise”, as it is echoed within each of the chapters of the 
United Nations Charter analysed.2  The Security Council is very adept at handling the legal framework 
with its corresponding margin of appreciation and has shown a high degree of flexibility and 
pragmatism in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, as well as in its relations with regional 
organisations. 
Finally, cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations has become a reality and 
a fact. All indications point towards even more cooperation between the United Nations and regional 
organisations, both on a vertical and on a horizontal level. This was last illustrated during the open 
debate organised under the Rwandan presidency of the Security Council in July 2014.3 Based on a 
concept note prepared by Rwanda,4 the members of the Security Council, representatives of other 
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 “The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the International Law Commission”, speech delivered at a Special 
Commemorative Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (12 October 1973). 
2
 It has to be clarified that under Chapter VII it is due to the practice of the Security Council which has 
established the concept of peacekeeping.  
3
 Security Council, 7228
th
 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7228 (2014). See, in particular the statements by the 
Secretary-General, the EU, the AU and NATO, 2-4, 4- 6, 6-9,  56-57. See also M. Brosig, D. Motsama, ‘Modeling 
Cooperative Peacekeeping. Exchange Theory and the African Peace and Security Regime’, in (2014) 18 Journal 
of International Peacekeeping, 45, 51. 
4
 Concept note, July 2014 Security Council open debate on the theme “United Nations peacekeeping 
operations: the United Nations and regional partnership and its evolution”, Annex to Letter dated 3 July 2014 
 




member states and international organisations debated about necessary steps for strengthening the 
relations between the UN and regional organisations with regard to peacekeeping operations and 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
In the unanimously adopted Resolution 2167 following a long debate the Security Council expressed 
“its determination to take effective steps to further enhance” its relationship with regional and 
subregional organisations.5 More importantly this resolution proves that the Security Council has 
truly embraced the loose security system based on the triangle of organisational relations between 
the UN, the AU and the EU (infra 2.6). In its resolution, the Security Council welcomed recent 
developments regarding cooperation between the UN, the AU and the EU, as well as the “strong 
cooperation initiatives” on an operational level between these three organisations.6  It went even 
further and requested the Secretary-General to produce, in close consultation with both the AU and 
the EU, an assessment report and recommendations on the progress of the partnerships between 
the UN and relevant regional organisations in peacekeeping operations no later than 31 March 
2015.7  Therefore, this resolution may well be the starting point for further enhanced cooperation 
between international organisations in peacekeeping operations which will ultimately also increase 
the likelihood of joint responsibility of international organisations for violations of international law 
committed during the deployment of peacekeeping operations. The Security Council underlined that 
there is also a need to enhance the UN and regional organisations’ joint planning and joint mission 
assessment processes.8 Another measure envisaged is an increased exchange of staff members 
between the UN and the AU in order to enhance the capacities of the latter, for instance, in mission 
planning and management.9  
Another trend that can be observed with respect to the cooperation between the UN and regional 
organisations is the increase in the deployment of multiple simultaneous peace operations in the 
same conflict, which rose from 10% of all peace operations in 1992 to 70% of all peace operations in 
                                                          
from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN 
Doc. S/2014/478 (2014), see in particular 6-7. 
5
 Security Council Resolution 2167, UN Doc. S/RES/2167 (2014), 4, para. 2. See also Secretary-General’s remarks 
at Summit on UN Peacekeeping, available at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8060.  
6
 Ibid., 4, para. 7; 5, para. 11. The Secretary-General also set apart these three organisations from other 
organisations by speaking of “We – the United Nations, the AU and the EU, together with other key partners”, 
Security Council, 7228
th
 meeting, supra note 3, 3. Cf also the statements of the EU and of Ireland, ibid., 5, 52. 
7
Security Council Resolution 2167, supra note 5, 7, para. 28. 
8
 Ibid., 5, para. 14. See also the statements of the Secretary-General and the EU, Security Council, 7228
th
 
meeting, supra note 3, 2, 4. 
9
 Security Council Resolution 2167, supra note 5, 6, paras. 18-19. 




2007.10 The time-frame for the evolution of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations 
in peacekeeping operations has been remarkably short, and the presented facts suggest that 
cooperation between the organisations will continue to develop at such a pace that the necessity for 
legal regulation of the joint responsibility of international organisations will be even further 
enhanced. Whereas the EU started deploying troops in crisis management operations in 2003, the 
African Union, although the legal successor of the OAU, has existed only since 2000, so that it is to be 
expected that these two organisations in particular will further enhance and institutionalise their 
cooperational framework with other organisations, as well starting a new wave of activism. This 
assessment is made against a background in which one cannot see any trend in international 
relations toward a decrease of threats to international peace and security, nor a decrease to internal 
or international armed conflicts. In particular, the African continent unfortunately remains a nursery 
for conflicts, as the recent examples of Mali and the Sahel Region and the Central African Republic 
underline.11 
The analysis further highlighted the problems and challenges existing in this particular domain of 
international law. One can truly say that certain areas of international law resemble something of a 
terra incognita when it comes to their application to international organisations.12 There are several 
reasons, which include the lack of practice by international organisations in the period of the Cold 
War. The opposing two blocs in the Security Council prevented the system of global collective 
security from operating as it was supposed to.  
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 A. Ballas, ‘It Takes Two (or More) to Keep the Peace: Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations’, in (2011) 15 
Journal of International Peacekeeping, 384, 385. In Bosnia Herzegovina, for example, four international 
organisations deployed their own peace operations at overlapping time-periods from 1995 onwards: The 
United Nations with UNPROFOR and UNMIBH, NATO with SFOR and IFOR, the OSCE’s Mission to Bosnia-
Herzegovina as well as the EU with EUPM and EUFOR. 
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 In 2012, the SC held 90 meetings on African issues which account for 68% of the Council agenda, Highlights of 
the Security Council Practice 2012, available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/highlights/2012.pdf. 
The percentage was exactly the same for the year 2011, Annex to the letter dated 2 April 2013 from the 
Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Concept note 
for briefing in the Security Council: Prevention of conflicts in Africa: addressing the root causes, Monday, 15 
April 2013, UN Doc. S/2013/204 (2013), 2, para. 2. Africa is also the continent in which cooperation between 
the United Nations and regional organisations have been “most tested” and the nature of the UN’s experience, 
in particular the failures of Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s has influenced significantly the general approach 
of the UN to peacekeeping operations, J. Boulden, ‘Introduction, in J. Boulden (ed.), Responding to Conflict in 
Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organizations (2013), 1, 3. Another continent, South America is now 
coming of age regarding its contributions to international peacekeeping; for a good overview, cf. K. M. Kenkel 
(ed.), South America and Peace Operations. Coming of age (2013). 
12
 One may cite in this context Brownlie, who declared in 2005 in his chapter on the responsibility of states for 
the acts of international organisations that “[t]he subject chosen for this contribution meets the need of 
brevity because not very much is known about it. Most works of reference ignore it”, I. Brownlie, ‘The 
Responsibility of States for the Acts of International Organizations’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International 
Responsibility Today. Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (2005), 355, 355. 




Moreover, the “humanisation” of international law, in the form of the emergence of international 
human rights law, expanded the reach of norms protecting the individual to the areas of activities of 
international organisations.13 However, these norms are transported from the homogeneous 
“contexte étatique” to the heterogeneous area of international organisations. The lack of 
adjudicative power by International Courts and Tribunals over international organisations likewise 
prevented further elucidation of the applicable legal rules. The consolidation of peacekeeping 
operations, and the multiplication of tasks, functions and actors, contributed to the difficulty in 
dismantling and analysing these operations, and in determining the applicable legal framework, as 
well as the responsible entities. A further factor is the uniqueness of each of the organisations; each 
of them is an organisation sui generis. Thus, their relations with other organisations are based on 
their unique legal make-up, complicating any attempt to draw conclusions of general validity outside 
of their specific context. The assessment on an inter-organisational level is also true on an 
operational level for each and every peacekeeping operation.  
It is against this comprehensive background that the study approaches the legal framework of 
international responsibility applicable to international organisations, as well as the practice of the 
United Nations therein. It is necessary to address whether the developed rules are appropriate to 
regulate the specific context of international organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operations. 
It was concluded in Chapter II that the cooperation between international organisations in 
peacekeeping operations has reached a level where cases of joint responsibility are not only likely to 
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 Cf. generally T. Meron, International Law in the Age of Human Rights. General Course on Public International 
Law, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 301 (2003), 9-489; T. Meron, The 
Humanization of International Law (2006). Regarding the practice of international organisations to compensate 
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property of civilian population during hostilities as well as by considerations of equity and humanity which the 
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competences and powers regarding the maintenance of international peace and security might interfere with 
an individual’s rights, C. Tomuschat, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’, in A. 
Føllesdal, B. Peters, G. Ulfstein (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global 
Context (2013), 334, 335; M. Bothe, ‘Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions against Presumed Terrorists’, in 
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occur,14 but where international organisations are acting as equal partners, and therefore not in a 
subordinate-superior relationship. 
1. The Law of Responsibility of International Organisations and the practice of the United 
Nations 
 
As peacekeeping was invented by the UN as a tool for conflict regulation, most of the existing 
practice in this particular area, which has been likewise analysed by the ILC for the elaboration of the 
ARIOs, derives from UN operations.  
Activities in the domain of international peace and security and particularly peacekeeping 
operations, have a great impact on the lives of the people, especially in the case of deployment of 
troops on the ground. Violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law and 
international responsibility of international organisations for these acts are consequently not a mere 
hypothetical possibility, but part of the reality. These acts may be committed in a private or in an 
official capacity, alone or by a group of individuals and they can include acts such as sexual 
exploitation, arbitrary detention or murder, or even the unintentional killing of civilians in the 
exercise of the mandate of an operation. 
Sixty-seven United Nations peacekeeping missions have taken place since the establishment of the 
UN in 1945. Consequently, there has been a certain practice and some cases dealing with the 
responsibility arising for peacekeeping missions.15 The United Nations declared at an early stage that 
it would be responsible for all damages occurring during the deployment of peacekeeping forces16 
and that it would pay for any damages caused,17 despite emphasising that this is only motivated by 
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 Cf. A. Clapham, ‘The Subject of Subjects and the Attribution of Attribution’, in L. Boisson de Chazournes, M. 
Kohen (eds.), International Law and the Quest for its Implementation/Le droit international et la quête de sa 
mise en oeuvre. Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (2010), 45, 58. 
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 As the UN Legal Counsel wrote on 3 February 2004 to the Director of the Codification Division, it is “in 
connection with peacekeeping operations where principles of international responsibility (…) have for the most 
part been developed in a fifty-year practice of the Organization”, cf. G. Gaja, Second Report on responsibility of 
international organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/541 (2004), at 16 fn.52. 
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 M. Hartwig, Die Haftung der Mitgliedstaaten für Internationale Organisationen (1993), 233. As one example, 
cf., the agreement concluded between the United Nations and the United Arab Republic (now: Arab Republic 
of Egypt) concerning traffic accidents involving either UAR or UNED vehicles, Exchange of Letters constituting 
an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the United Arab Republic concerning the 
Settlement of Claims between the United Nations Emergency Force and the Government arising out of Traffic 
Accidents. Gaza, 14 October 1959 and Cairo, 15 September and 17 October 1960, United Nations Treaty Series 
388, 144-8.   
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 According to U.N.E.F. Regulation 15 the Secretary-General “shall make provisions for the settlement of claims 
arising with respect to the Force”. In practice, claims arising against U.N.E.F. and the United Nations Force in 
the Congo were settled by the U.N., cf. F. Seyersted, ‘United Nations Forces Some Legal Problems’, (1961) 37 
British Yearbook of International Law, 351, 420; also M. Tondini, ‘The ‘Italian Job’: How to Make International 
Organisations Compliant With Human Rights and Accountable For Their Violation by Targeting Member States’ 
 




the “moral responsibility” of the organisation and underlining that it was not under a legally binding 
obligation.18 Although later on certain statements speak of “liability”, others mention that the 
practice emerged from a “policy” or from “considerations of equity and humanity.”19  
Several arguments can be made against any generally applicable legal rule which could be derived 
from the practice of the United Nations. First of all, the practice of one single organisation cannot 
fulfil the requirements necessary to ascertain a rule of customary law applicable to all international 
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Organisations (2010), 169, 180. 
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 The International Law Association also stated that “[t]here is no evidence of a presumption in law that the 
UN bears exclusive or primary responsibility for the tortious acts of peacekeeping operations and the law 
remains underdeveloped”., International Law Association, New Delhi Conference (2002), Committee on 
Accountability of International Organisations, Third Report consolidated and enlarged version of recommended 
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already published two reports by ILC Special Rapporteur Gaja, International Law Association, Berlin Conference 
(2004), Accountability of International Organisations, 21; Further criticism came from the IMF, International 
Law Commission, Responsibility of international organizations, Comments and observations received from 
international organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/582 (2007) (International Monetary Fund), 7. 
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third parties, has given risen to claims against the United Nations” [Emphasis added], Text of the Exchange of 
letters Dated 20 February 1965 between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Belgium concerning the Settlement of Claims lodged against ONUC by Belgian Nationals, 
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policy of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, to compensate individuals who have 
suffered damages for which the Organization was liable. This policy is in keeping with generally recognized legal 
principles and with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In addition (…) it is 
reinforced (…) by considerations of equity and humanity which the United Nations cannot ignore”, also in UN 
Doc. S/6597. For the French version, cf. J. J.A. Salmon, ‘Les Accords Spaak – U Thant du 20 Février 1965’, (1965) 
XI Annuaire français de droit international, 468, 495-97. In this context, it was expressed that “[t]he 
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compensation. In recognition of its international responsibility for the activities of its forces, the United Nations 
has, since the inception of peacekeeping operations, assumed its liability for damage caused by members of its 
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organisations, even if one were to presume that the required element of opinio iuris were to be 
present within the other organisations.20 
Moreover, the practice of the United Nations consists mostly of compensation cases under the 
domestic law of individual states; under which the conditions for a settlement, including the criterion 
of attribution, may differ from those applying under international law. Many of these cases under 
domestic law also included qualifications and limitations such as the use of statutes of limitation, 
restricting the period to present claims.21 The United Nations often only assumed responsibility on 
the international, external level, towards the victims, while recovering the compensation paid from 
the respective troop contributing states.  
Under circumstances such as “loss, damage, death or injury [arising] from gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct of the personnel provided by the Government”22, one has to distinguish between 
attribution of conduct and attribution of responsibility; whereas the UN might assume the 
responsibility on an international level, the conduct would have been attributed to the member state 
and not the organisation. It is even questionable whether the practice of the UN is in conformity with 
the rules laid down in the ARIO.23 The practice is also centred on the relationship between the United 
Nations and individual Member States. 
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 A contrary view on this issue is taken by Larsen who argues that the UN practice has been extensive and 
consistent enough as well as carried out with opinio iuris to qualify as international customary law, K. M. 
Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (2012), 101. 
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How Does It Work Concretely?’, in S. Kolanowski (ed.), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium. International 
Organisations’ Involvement in Peace Operations: Applicable Legal Framework and the Issue of Responsibility  
(2011), 126, 130-32; General Assembly Resolution 52/247 Third-party liability: temporal and financial 
limitations, UN Doc. A/RES/52/247 (1998), particularly, 2-3, paras. 8-11; Administrative and budgetary aspects 
of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: financing of the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, UN Doc. A/51/903 (1997), particularly, 5-11, paras. 12-46. 
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It has also been pointed out that the lack of practice in a given area may be an indication that a 
“particular situation cannot be covered by a general rule due to the diversity of international 
organizations.”24 The Special Rapporteur of the ILC himself acknowledged the lack of practice. It is 
partly in consequence of the fact that only 18 international organisations reported their practice, and 
he therefore commented that the practice did not add to the previous knowledge.25  
2. The ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations  
 
The following part analyses the question as to whether the articles developed by the International 
Law Commission are suitable to be applied in the context of peacekeeping operations. Bearing in 
mind the enhanced cooperation between international organisations, it is important to analyse and 
to ascertain whether the different possibilities of the attribution of conduct and of responsibility to 
international organisations as contained in the articles of the ILC are suitable to regulate the conduct 
of international organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operations. The sixty-five Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organizations as adopted by the International Law Commission in 2nd 
reading in 2011 contain several dispositions which set out the various methods to attribute conduct 
or simply responsibility to international organisations. The first article which will be examined is 
Article 7 which deals with the attribution of conduct to international organisations in the case of 
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organs of states or organs or agents of international organisations seconded to another international 
organisation. 
1. Article 7 of the Articles on the International Responsibility of International Organizations 
 
Article 7 prescribes that “[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international 
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered 
under international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control 
over that conduct.”26  
As explained in the previous chapter (infra, 3.2.1.), states retain a certain amount of control over 
peacekeepers which are not fully seconded to an international organisation so that peacekeeping 
operations are deemed to fall under the provision of Article 7.27 Although this article also covers the 
conduct of an organ of an international organisation placed at the disposal of another international 
organisation, the practice in this area is rare; the commentary to the article lists one example.28 All 
cases in the context of peacekeeping operations dealing with the international responsibility of a 
state or an international organisation have been decided on the basis of a criterion of control, but 
the jurisprudence is varied to say the least.  
The controversial Behrami case deviated completely from the criterion of “effective control” but held 
that “the United Nations Security Council retained ultimate authority and control so that operational 
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 For a good general overview of the origins, history and content of Article 7, see B. Montejo, ‘The Notion of 
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command only was delegated.”29 The European Court of Human Rights set out the chain of command 
in detail: 
Accordingly, UNSC Resolution 1244 gave rise to the following chain of command in the present cases. 
The UNSC was to retain ultimate authority and control over the security mission and it delegated to 
NATO (in consultation with non-NATO member states) the power to establish, as well as the 
operational command of, the international security presence, KFOR. NATO fulfilled its command 
mission via a chain of command (from the NAC, to SHAPE, to SACEUR, to CIC South) to COMKFOR, the 
commander of KFOR. While the MNBs were commanded by an officer from a lead TCN, the latter was 
under the direct command of COMKFOR. MNB action was to be taken according to an operational plan 
devised by NATO and operated by COMKFOR in the name of KFOR.
30
 
On the basis of this analysis, the Court concluded that “[t]his delegation model demonstrates that, 
contrary to the applicants' argument (…), direct operational command from the UNSC is not a 
requirement of Chapter VII collective security missions.”31 The Court thus attributed the conduct of a 
UN authorised operation to the United Nations contrary to the “practice” of the United Nations.32 
The Court confirmed its jurisprudence in Kasumaj v. Greece33 and Gajic v. Germany.34  In Berić and 
others v. Bosnia,35 the Court, although quoting extensively from Behrami, relied on the notion of 
“effective overall control”.36 In yet another case, Stephens v. Cyprus, Turkey and the United Nations, 
the European Court first of all denied the attribution of the alleged violations to the two respective 
states and then carried on to declare that as to the complaints directed against the UN “UNFICYP, 
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formalistic criteria to determine responsibility”, J. Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part (2013), 198. 
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which has control over the buffer zone, is a subsidiary organ of the UN created under the UN Charter 
and is under the exclusive control and command of the UN”37 [Emphasis added]. 
In the UK, the House of Lords was seized by a case regarding the actions of British troops after the 
Iraq Invasion in 2003. In Al-Jedda,38 the Court distinguished the facts of the case presented to it from 
the Behrami/Saramati Decision before the European Court of Human Rights, and held that it could 
“not realistically be said that US and UK forces were under the effective command and control of the 
UN, or that UK forces were under such command and control when they detained the appellant.”39   
Mr. Al-Jedda then seized the European Court of Human Rights which returned to some extent to the 
“effective control” criterion. The Court considered that “that the United Nations Security Council had 
neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops 
within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention was not, therefore, attributable to 
the United Nations.”40 This approach seems to create yet another test of attribution, a blend of Berić 
with Behrami/Saramati. 
On the domestic level, the Dutch Courts were engaged with claims against the Dutch Government for 
conduct arising out of the actions of the Dutch batallion “Dutchbat” of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica. The 
District Court in The Hague made only a general reference to the articles on international 
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UK, 61-64, paras. 141-149.  
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responsibility of international organisations, and concluded that “these acts and omissions should be 
attributed strictly, as a matter of principle to the United Nations.”41 
In July 2011, the Court of Appeal in The Hague delivered its judgment in the same affair and reversed 
the attribution of conduct, judging that the Netherlands would be responsible. The Court based its 
judgment on the notion of “effective control” as derived from international law literature and the 
work of the ILC, including Article 6 [now: 7] of the articles on Responsibility of International 
Organisations.42 More important however, the Court held that “the possibility that more than one 
party has 'effective control' is generally accepted, which means that it cannot be ruled out that the 
application of this criterion results in the possibility of attribution to more than one party.”43 
However, the Court did not substantiate this particular finding.44 The Court also distinguished 
between two criteria to determine if an entity exercises “effective control”, first of all “whether that 
conduct constituted the execution of a specific instruction” and “if there was no such instruction, the 
UN or the State had the power to prevent the conduct concerned.”45  
On 6 September 2013, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands rendered its judgment in the two 
affairs, confirming the judgments of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court confirmed not only that 
conduct can be attributed to both an international organisation and a state if they “exercise effective 
control”46, but also that “all factual circumstances and the special context of the case must be taken 
into account.”47 
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The Court of First Instance of Brussels was seized in a civil law case for compensation for acts of war 
crimes in the conduct of operation UNAMIR in Rwanda. The Court attributed the conduct to the 
Belgian State and not to the United Nations. The Belgian soldiers were withdrawn from UNAMIR and 
were therefore under the authority of the Belgian state. The Court did not itself pronounce on any 
rule of attribution applicable under international law.48 
This overview of jurisprudence shows that there is no discernible rule under international law for the 
attribution of responsibility of an organ seconded to an international organisation by another state 
or another international organisation. In other words, there is no consensus regarding the variant of 
control required to attribute conduct to an international organisation. The European Commission 
expressed a similar view:  
The question must be asked whether the international practice is presently clear enough and whether 
there is identifiable opinio juris that would allow for the proposed standard of the International Law 
Commission (which thus far has not been followed by the European Court of Human Rights) to be 
codified in the current draft. There is no doubt that this remains a controversial area of international 
law, in relation to which one can expect a steady stream of case law not only from the European Court 
of Human Rights, but also from domestic courts, in addition to voluminous academic writings.
 49
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Further critique came from the United Nations which emphasised that the test of “effective control” 
has never been used to determine the division of responsibility between the organisation and its 
troop contributing states50 but that the test of effective control is used on a horizontal level in joint 
operations to distinguish between a United Nations operation under UN command and control and a 
United Nations authorised operation conducted under national or regional command and control.51 
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It is even less clear – in the framework of the articles – under which conditions international 
organisations could be jointly responsible. The Special Rapporteur remarked that there are cases of 
joint attribution of conduct, but one could also consider “that the infringing acts are attributed to 
either the State or the United Nations, while omission, if any, of the required preventive measures is 
attributed to the other subject. Similar conclusions may be reached with regard to infringements by 
members of peacekeeping forces that affect other areas of the protection of human rights.”52  
Dealing with the particular case of the European Community, he expressed the view that “joint, or 
joint and several, responsibility does not necessarily depend on dual attribution (…) in case of an 
infringement (…) that does not distinguish between the respective obligations of the EC and its 
member States – either directly, or by referring to their respective competencies – responsibility 
would be joint towards the non-member State party to the agreement.”53 Specifically referring to 
military operations, he declared that “one may argue that attribution of conduct to an international 
organization does not necessarily exclude attribution of the same conduct to a State, nor does, vice 
versa, attribution to a State rule out attribution to an international organization. Thus, one possible 
solution would be for the relevant conduct to be attributed both to NATO and to one or more of its 
member States, for instance because those States contributed to planning the military action or to 
carrying it out.”54  
One other author even suggests that the UN has no “real authority or means to control the 
peacekeepers, absent the TCC’s concurrence.”55 It is also questionable whether the distinction 
between organs made available under Article 6 and organs seconded under Article 7 is not simply 
artificial and somehow redundant. Article 6 stipulates that the  
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conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of functions of that 
organ or agent shall be considered an act of that organization under international law, whatever 
position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization. 
The ILC relied on the jurisprudence of the ICJ, making reference to the UN, to define the content of 
agent under this article. In this context, “agent” has to be interpreted “in the most liberal sense” as it 
was held by the ICJ in the Reparation case56 and the notion “refers not only to officials, but also to 
other persons acting for the United Nations on the basis of functions conferred by an organ of the 
organization.”57 Therefore this disposition is supposed to cover also organs of states which are 
“absorbed” by the organisation to the extent that the sending State does not retain any form of 
control. 
Nevertheless, any transferring entity, be it a state or an international organisation, will always retain 
a “substantial degree of authority over any organ” as they would otherwise cease to be organs of the 
transferring entities. Thus there is a necessity for the transferring entities under their domestic or 
internal law to keep a certain oversight over their transferred organs.58 Therefore, the difference 
between the two articles is “at best one of degree [of retained and transferred control], but not of 
principle.”59  
The ILA recognises the possibility of joint responsibility and differentiates between joint 
responsibility per se and cases of aid and assistance of an international organisation in the 
commission of other wrongful acts.60 The ILC commentary does not state whether cases of joint 
responsibility could fall under Article 7, but it seems to suggest that Article 7 is a disposition which 
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decides whether conduct has to be attributed to the contributing State or organisation or to the 
receiving organisation61 which implicitly excludes joint responsibility under this article.62  
2. Aid and assistance – compatible with cooperation in peacekeeping operations?  
 
Article 14 of the ARIO states as follows:  
An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international organization in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organization is internationally 
responsible for doing so if: 
(a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization. 
This article is based on Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility.   
The commentary does not provide a single example of a case in which an international organisation 
has aided or assisted another international organisation and incurred responsibility under 
international law.63 However, the Commentary refers to the example of MONUC, the previous 
peacekeeping operation in the DRC, assisting the security forces of the government, and thereby a 
state:  
An example of practice of aid or assistance concerning an international organization is provided by an 
internal document issued on 12 October 2009 by the United Nations Legal Counsel. This concerned the 
support given by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) to the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and the risk, to 
which an internal memorandum had referred, of violations by the latter forces of international 
humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law.
 64   
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MONUC was told to stop all support to the FARDC in the case of violations of IHL, human rights or 
refugee law, including logistic or service support. The United Nations specified that MONUC was a 
case where (solely) “the possibility of United Nations aid or assistance being used to facilitate the 
commission of unlawful acts arose (…) [a]nd [that] it remains a unique example.”65 As stated by the 
UN, it must be made clear that responsibility for aid and assistance is entailed not for the wrongful 
act itself, but for the organisation’s own conduct, which has been the cause of or contributed to that 
wrongful act.66 Nevertheless, as it was also declared by the UN in its comments upon the ARIO: 
“[T]he Secretariat wishes to underscore the fundamental difference between States and 
international organizations, whose aid and assistance activities in an ever-growing number and 
diversity of areas, often constitute their core functions.”67  
Thus, whereas cooperation may be one of the core functions of international organisations, it is 
highly questionable whether the application of this article properly reflects the reality of cooperation 
between international organisations in peacekeeping operations which goes beyond cases of mere 
assistance. Assistance implies that an organisation acts in an auxiliary function to another 
organisation.68 Subject to the specific arrangements in each operation,69 the reality of cooperation 
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between international organisations in recent peace-keeping operations is reminiscent of co-
perpetration of these internationally wrongful acts rather than of cases in which an international 
organisation is subordinated to another one. Furthermore, under Article 14, it is necessary that the 
aiding or assisting organisation has “knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act” and that the organisation intended “by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of 
the wrongful conduct and the internationally wrongful conduct is actually committed.”70 These strict 
requirements regarding the intention of the aiding or assisting organisation also do not reflect the 
reality of cooperation between international organisations in peacekeeping operations.71 On the 
contrary, there are no cases in which international organisations cooperate intentionally in 
peacekeeping operations to commit violations of international law, but the cooperation agreements 
and particularly the existing control arrangements, such as the reports to be submitted to the 
Security Council, seek to prevent or at least minimise the risk of violations of international law. In the 
majority of academic writings, this intent requirement has also been criticised as “unwarranted”.72  
The comments and observations received by international organisations focused on the practice of 
International Financial Institutions of lending funds to states,73 especially in the context of 
development assistance.74 In Chapter II an inquiry was made into the financing of AU peacekeeping 
operations by the EU and the UN. It was stressed that the element of control exercised by both the 
UN and the EU on the basis of these financial arrangements is substantial. Both organisations could 
actually block the deployment of an AU peacekeeping operation by refusing to provide funds or at 
least demand that certain specific requirements are fulfilled so that, on the one hand, they would 
facilitate the occurrence of an internationally wrongful act, but on the other hand, the amount of the 
control they have seems to surpass a case of aid or assistance and thereby the application of Article 
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14 – in fact, one can say, that they actually are dominating the relationship with the AU if they decide 
to provide funds. Consequently, as international organisations cooperate in various areas in 
peacekeeping operations and if financial assistance provided in the peacekeeping context could 
already surpass the application of Article 14, it results, a fortiori, from their cooperation on various 
other levels that their interaction does not correspond to “aid and assistance” and cannot legally be 
regulated by the application of Article 14.75  
3. Article 15: Direction and control 
 
Another article which has to be mentioned is Article 15, which deals with the direction and control of 
an international organisation over the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another 
international organisation. The only example the ILC refers to is KFOR based on the submission by the 
French government. Assuming that KFOR is an international organisation, it is “an example of two 
international organizations allegedly exercising direction and control in the commission of a wrongful 
act”76, whereas “NATO is responsible for the ‘direction’ of KFOR and the United Nations for ‘control’ 
of it.”77 The ILC remarked that “[a] joint exercise of direction and control was probably envisaged.”78 
The UN Secretariat itself states that it “knows of no practice supporting the rule on “direction and 
control” (…) and doubts the propriety of applying it by analogy from the articles on the responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts” as also “[m]any aspects of this rule, the threshold (…), its 
nature (…) remain unclear.”79  
It is also questionable if this article can be applicable to international organisations cooperating in 
peacekeeping operations besides the alleged example of KFOR. This article presupposes a very one-
sided relationship between two international organisations, “’cases of domination over the 
commission of wrongful conduct and not simply the exercise of oversight, still less mere influence or 
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concern.’”80 In that context, “’the word ‘directs’ does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion 
but rather connotes actual direction of an operative kind.”’81 The directed or controlled organisation 
has to be seen as being given no discretion to conduct itself in a specific manner.82 
4. Assessing the ARIO 
 
Thus, an analysis of the relevant Articles from the ILC leads to the conclusion that the concept of joint 
responsibility is only covered in the form of auxiliary functions by one organisation, aid and 
assistance, or for situations in which one organisation is clearly dominating the conduct of another 
through direction and control. For any other potential cases, the concept of joint responsibility does 
not fit under the articles of the ILC.83 The articles therefore contain a lacuna with respect to cases of 
joint responsibility. Indeed, although Article 48 of the Articles holds that one or several international 
organisations may be responsible for the same wrongful act, it “fails to define when and how this 
would operate.”84 The ILC has even specifically mentioned – early in the process of elaborating the 
articles – the possibility that two international organisations will be simultaneously responsible as 
equals, but once again without providing any indication of the applicable criterion of attribution.85 
The reason may be that the current view in legal doctrine, and in at least some parts of judicial 
practice is still, that cases of dual or multiple attribution are rare, so that “the system of international 
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responsibility would be fundamentally ill-equipped to deal with issues of shared responsibility.”86 
Furthermore, as the system of international responsibility was originally conceptualised with bilateral 
relations and obligations in mind, it would be therefore also “ill-equipped to deal with the multiple 
attribution of conduct to more than one actor at once.”87 It is true that the idea of a breach of an 
obligation owed to the whole community (erga omnes) was not foreseen, but developed in practice 
in the progress of the rise of international human rights law and the increased recognition of the 
individual in international law,88 but it nevertheless does not pose a problem as the invocation of 
responsibility towards each party to which the alleged conduct is attributed, remains possible.89 It is 
therefore necessary to look beyond the law of responsibility for inspiration.90 
3. The quest for a new criterion of attribution 
 
Instances of joint responsibility of international organisations may have been rare thus far in 
practice; nevertheless this does not mean that they do not arise or that they will not arise more often 
in future. The articles of the ILC hold on to the traditional understanding of the law of international 
responsibility as being derived from bilateral relations existing between entities possessing 
international legal personality.91 However, this study has shown that in the specific area of 
                                                          
86
 F. Messineo, ‘Multiple Attribution of Conduct’, SHARES Research Paper No. 2012-11, available at: 
www.sharesproject.nl, 3. According to Nollkaemper and Jacobs, the dominant approach in international law is, 
indeed, based on the idea of individual or independent responsibility of states and international organisations, 
A. Nollkaemper, D. Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Concept Paper’, ACIL Research Paper 
No 2011-07 (SHARES Series), finalized 2 August 2011 (www.sharesproject.nl), 10. One can possibly trace this 
conception of the law of responsibility to the principle of sovereignty, states being thereby independent and 
pares inter pares, cf. Nollkaemper, Jacobs, ibid., 14. See also Ö.F. Direk, ‘Responsibility in Peace Support 
Operations: Revisiting the Proper Test for Attribution Conduct and the Meaning of the ‘Effective Control’ 
Standard’, in (2014) 61 Netherlands International Law Review, 1, 9. 
87
 Messineo, ibid., 23-24. See also the statement of Mr. Riphagen in the ILC, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (1978) Volume I, Summary records of the thirtieth session, 233, para.7. 
There is also a clash between the concept and peacekeeping operations as one could see in Behrami/Saramati; 
while the decentralisation of military force is undisputed, the regime of responsibility remains –  according to 
the ECtHR in this case – centralised, cf. L. Boisson de Chazournes, V. Pergantis, ‘À propos de l’arrêt Behrami et 
Saramati: Un jeu d’ombre et de lumière dans les relations entre l’ONU et les organisations régionales ’, in M. 
Kohen, R. Kolb, D. L. Tehindrazanarivelo  (eds.), Perspectives of International Law in the 21st 
century/Perspectives du droit international au 21e siècle (2011), 191, 222. Cf. also L. Boisson de Chazournes, 
‘United in Joy and Sorrow : Some Considerations on Responsibility Issues under Partnership among 
International Financial Institutions’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of International Organizations. Essays in 
Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie (2013),  213, 214. 
88
 See e.g. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), 
Judgment of 5 February 1970, Second Phase. 
89
 Cf., Messineo, supra note 86, 24. 
90
 This includes the danger that the Articles will be demoted “to a cosmetic instrument”, D’Aspremont, supra 
note 84, 15, 24. 
91
 Crawford also came to the conclusion that “[n]one of this shows that the doctrine of joint and several 
responsibility is already established under that name at the international level, and the reticence of other 
judges suggests that a cautious approach is appropriate”, Crawford, supra note 29, 331. 




peacekeeping operations, international organisations engage in cooperation arrangements which 
derogate from the general rules that the ARIO seek to codify as they are outside the scope of the 
scenarios of joint responsibility regulated in the articles. In short, legal regulation of peacekeeping 
operations from the point of view of international responsibility requires a new criterion of 
attribution to allocate responsibility to two or more international organisations. 
Article 64 of the ARIOs contains the possibility to derogate from the articles in the case of an existing 
rule of lex specialis. Such special rules “may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable 
to the relations between an international organization and its members.” As the wording shows, 
these special rules92 are not limited “to rules contained in the internal law of the organisations and 
applicable to the relations of the organisations and its members.”93 Furthermore, Article 65 provides 
that “the applicable rules of international law continue to govern questions concerning the 
responsibility of an international organization (…) for an internationally wrongful act to the extent 
that they are not regulated by these draft articles.” The rules of an organisation include its practice.94 
The practice of cooperation in peacekeeping operations can therefore constitute a rule of lex 
specialis according to Article 64 ARIO, drawing inspiration from and being based on other existing 
rules of international law. It is therefore in line with both articles 64 and 65.95 Moreover, as it was 
pointed out in the General Commentary to the ARIO:  
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The fact that several of the present draft articles are based on limited practice moves the border between 
codification and progressive development in the direction of the latter. It may occur that a provision in the 
articles on State responsibility could be regarded as representing codification, while the corresponding 
provision on the responsibility of international organizations is more in the nature of progressive 
development. In other words, the provisions of the present draft articles do not necessarily yet have the 
same authority as the corresponding provisions on State responsibility.
96
 
In the end, the attribution of acts of peacekeepers to the international organisation they are 
seconded to as enshrined in Article 7 ARIO is also based on considerations of practice. Due to their 
institutional status as a subsidiary organ of the respective organisation, their conduct is generally 
deemed to be attributable to the latter. The transfer of operational command over the troops, 
however, leads to the formulation of another presumption which is that the international 
organisation is exclusively responsible for their conduct.97  Thus, nothing in the articles contravenes 
an articulation of a specific criterion of attribution in the context of cooperation of international 
organisations in peacekeeping operations. 
1. The need for a special rule on attribution for peacekeeping operations and 
discussions to this effect  
 
Due to the specific context of peacekeeping operations, it is suggested that the new criterion of 
attribution will be used exclusively for the purposes of this present study. In contrast, it is not 
submitted that the articles of the ILC are inappropriate to the regulation of any conduct of 
international organisations outside of the specific context of peacekeeping operations and 
particularly cooperation between international organisations during peacekeeping operations. 
Indeed, as the ICJ stated in the Genocide case “logic does not require the same test [on attribution] 
to be adopted in resolving (…) issues which are very different in nature.”98 It is also not even argued 
that any future peacekeeping operation which is conducted under the auspices of one international 
organisation without any external participation by other organisations will not fall under the Articles 
of the ILC.99   
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Regarding the present subject matter, the suggestion that a specific rule or even a regime sui generis 
is necessary is not new. Article 7 of the articles of the ILC was drafted in recognition of the need to 
create a separate article, and thus a specific rule of attribution, applicable to situations such as 
peacekeeping operations.100 The ILA remarked that “In some areas, such an attempt [of attribution of 
conduct to an international organisation] can only be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, e.g. 
incidents occurring during operations of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Traditional 
peacekeeping operations are organs of the UN and normal principles of attribution apply”101  
[Emphasis added]. Moreover, several members of the International Law Commission raised the 
question of whether, given the difficulties encountered in the area of peacekeeping operations, it 
would not be preferable to either study further the practice of the United Nations or, preferably, a 
separate rule applicable to peacekeeping operations.102 Other authors suggest an application of 
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Articles 64 or 44 ASR generally for the conduct of armed forces based on considerations arising under 
international humanitarian law. 103   
The recommendation of a special rule for peacekeeping operations was to a certain extent examined 
as the ILC considered the inclusion of a specific disposition specifying that a contributing state or 
organisation could derogate from the general rule of attribution in its relations with the host 
organisations under the form of an agreement.104 However, in the end, the Commission decided 
against it, following the opinion of the Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, who was opposed to a 
specific rule for peacekeeping operations for two reasons, the first one being purely methodological - 
namely that such a specific rule would have been “at odds with the pattern of the articles on State 
responsibility.”105 Secondly, any such rule would be difficult to establish due to the lack of an agreed 
definition of “peacekeeping operation”.106 
In doctrine it is, inter alia, argued that it is impossible to construe a general rule for attribution of 
conduct in UN peacekeeping operations.107 The difficulty with which the ILC was faced in developing 
the articles was that the rules needed to be wide enough to take into account the diversity of 
international organisations, while simultaneously being universally applicable.108 
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2. Defining the new rule of attribution 
 
Two main points have to be addressed for the establishment of a new criterion of attribution. First of 
all, it would be preferable if the new criterion were to have an ascertainable legal basis. Secondly, the 
threshold of control over the conduct has to be determined.109 In this regard, one has to distinguish 
between the levels in the chain of command for the attribution of conduct to two or more 
international organisations. As the present study examines the possibility of joint responsibility of 
international organisations, it is concerned with the highest level in the chain of command within the 
organisations, the organisations to which responsibility is ultimately attributed. Thus, force 
commanders of a peacekeeping operation might exercise “effective control” over a given specific act, 
whilst the Security Council as the organ on top of the chain exercises a different kind of control, 
which also has political connotations.  This argument is even more relevant in the context of two or 
more international organisations.110 The criterion needs to be construed in such a way as to reflect 
the “equal standing” of two or more international organisations. 
A new criterion of attribution has to take into account particularly the “organisational element”. 
International organisations are complex entities with different organs, chains of command and 
control mechanisms, and this also affects peacekeeping operations carried out by international 
organisations, especially modern, integrated operations. If two or more organisations then decide to 
cooperate in this complex matter, it is evident that these internal organisational arrangements, as 
well as the inter-organisational arrangements, do not only have to be taken into account, but they 
also have to be part of the basis of the criterion of attribution. An excellent remark was made by 
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Bodeau-Livinec in this context. Commenting on the position of the ILC regarding the notion of 
“control”, he stated:  
La position de la CDI paraît plus conforme aux prescrits classiques du droit international en la matière, 
qui se fondent sur l’emprise exercée sur un comportement plutôt que sur l’autorité exercée sur une 
personne ou une entité : la responsabilité est déterminée à raison de faits, et non de liens entre 
sujets.
111 
This is exactly the crux of the problem with the current notion of “control”, that it still adheres to this 
very limited view of control over the specific conduct in a specific moment, while completely ignoring 
the fact that such a notion cannot be operational in a system which becomes gradually more 
institutionalised and complex.112 Although the notion is well established in international law, it has 
not been fully explored yet in a theoretical manner.113 Control is also a requirement of the internal 
law of an international organisation, e.g. the UN, “and must not be confused with control as a 
distinct basis of attribution of conduct.”114 But it is exactly through these institutionalised 
mechanisms and channels that international organisations also contribute to, and exercise control 
over, conduct amounting to a violation of a rule under international law.115  
Furthermore, the importance of the element of control has to be questioned particularly in the 
context of the responsibility of international organisations, which operate as international legal 
entities without being sovereigns of any territory. As explained, e.g. by Eagleton: ”[R]esponsibility 
derives from control. The responsibility of a state rests largely upon a territorial basis, but behind this 
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territorial basis lies the broader concept of control.”116 The attribution of extra-territorial conduct to 
a state developed later, particularly also in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
is limited to specific circumstances. International organisations, however, neither act territorially nor 
extraterritorially, but “unterritorially” from their point of view and “territorially” from the point of 
view of the state in whose territory they are engaged. Therefore it is also important that the criterion 
of control in its traditional understanding has to be less decisive in determining the responsibility of 
an international organisation.117   
Indeed, even in the early writings of modern international law, one can find arguments for taking 
into account other factors for the attribution of conduct and responsibility. Grotius not only 
acknowledged the possibility of the attribution of conduct to several actors,118 but he also 
emphasised as a determinative factor that their action gave a determinative cause to the whole 
violation and the resulting damage or parts of both.119 Emphasising the element of contribution to 
injury instead of the very same wrongful act, would allow one to articulate responsibility based on 
the idea of a single, undivided injury, an avenue which was closed in the articles of the ILC.120 
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The following example may helpfully illustrate the issues at stake:121  
An ECOWAS peacekeeper, in an operation XY with the authorisation to use all necessary means to 
defend the mandate, due to misinterpreting the ROEs and unclear circumstances on the ground and 
faulty communication equipment, shoots and kills a civilian on the ground. The operation was paid 
for by the EU through the African Peace Facility Fund. The Soldier was trained as part of the ASF in a 
joint training exercise of the AU in cooperation with ECOWAS and in coordination with the EU and 
NATO. Logistical support to the operation was provided by the United Nations in the form of a 
Support package based on “assessed contributions.” The mission plans were developed in 
cooperation between the AU, ECOWAS and the United Nations. The mandate of this operation is 
based first of all on the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism, which was authorised by the 
AU, which itself was authorised by the United Nations Security Council.  
So, why would one break down this whole structure and simply look at which entity was exercising 
“effective control” over a specific act if the whole mission is based on cooperation and interaction 
between several actors? Even the ICJ in its Nicaragua decision spoke of “effective control of the (…) 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.122 The more complex the 
situation in which responsibility for an internationally wrongful act arises, the more artificial it 
becomes to ignore all pertinent circumstances for the establishment and execution of the 
peacekeeping operation, and it would become even more important to respond to and to develop a 
norm which takes into account these complex circumstances, also from the perspective of justice and 
equity.123 The very same argument is made for the responsibility of troop-contributing countries 
(TCC) and international organisations for peacekeeping operations. Leck states that “TCCs can 
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scrutinise and consent to the minutiae of the employment of their peacekeepers prior to 
deployment, provide input to the development of concept of operations and [rules of engagement]; 
and, through the NCCs, can disagree with (or have to agree to) any changes in employment of their 
peacekeepers in-mission. This suggests that peacekeepers are not under the effective control of the 
UN, but are perhaps under the dual or joint control of both the UN and the TCC.”124 Tomuschat 
argues similarly on the organisational level, and contends that the UN may also entail responsibility 
for an authorised operation (of several states) if “the Security Council may be so tightly involved in 
the activities endorsed by it that the operation concerned may become legally attributable to the 
UN.”125 
Consequently, in order to further define the new criterion of attribution it appears necessary to look 
to other areas of law for inspiration. In this context, Judge Simma described in his separate opinion in 
the Oil Platforms case the difficulty of establishing the responsibility of multiple tortfeasors as a 
“textbook situation calling for (…) an exercise in legal analogy.”126 In particular, criminal law and 
international criminal law may provide useful guidance for the present purposes.127 
3. Drawing inspiration from other international legal rules: (international) criminal 
law 
 
As with international criminal law, the law of international responsibility can also only promote 
compliance and exude a deterrent effect if responsibility is attributed to those entities which are 
truly responsible, thereby preventing an actor from taking a free ride on account of another entity 
being held responsible unjustly on its own.128 Taking a wider perspective, there are other 
undertakings on the international level that have the aim of limiting the exercise of powers on an 
international level and by international organisations, for example, the emergence of global 
administrative law.129 There are also arguments put forward for a constitutionalisation of 
international law, according to which acts need to be in conformity with the constitutional values of 
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the international legal order which includes, for example, human rights, and are therefore also 
binding international organisations in their actions.130 
In its Tadić decision, the ICTY stated: 
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that the 
State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by 
coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity.131 
The clear chain of command in peacekeeping operation, as in any military operation, appears in that 
context as beneficial for the exercise of command and control in the complex circumstances of 
peacekeeping operations.  Consequently, it seems to be justified, as it was ultimately held by the 
ICTY to inquire whether the nature and degree of organisation of an organ, over which control is 
exercised, is relevant for the purposes of attributing control and justifies adapting the required 
degree of control.132  
But Tadić is also a good example of cognisance of the interweaving (Verpflechtung) of international 
actors for the purposes of the attribution of conduct.133 This case is even more relevant as it also 
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established the notion of “joint criminal enterprise” under international law.134 According to this 
concept: 
[T]o hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who materially performs the criminal act 
would disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the 
perpetrators physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the 
circumstances, to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of 
their criminal responsibility.135 
The aim of this concept of liability in criminal law is to prevent crimes from going unpunished which 
have been committed in very complex organisational settings. As explained in the Amicus Curiae 
Brief in the Duch Case: 
When such crimes are committed, it is extremely difficult to point out the specific contribution made 
by each individual participant in the collective criminal enterprise because (i) not all participants acted 
in the same manner, but rather each of them may have played a different role in planning, organizing, 
instigating, coordinating, executing, or otherwise contributing to the criminal conduct, and (ii) the 
evidence related to each individual’s conduct may prove difficult if not impossible to find (…) To 
obscure responsibility in the fog of collective criminality and let the crimes go unpunished would be 
immoral and contrary to the general purpose of criminal law.
136
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Particularly in domestic law, one can compare it with the notion of “co-perpetration”137, although the 
concept of co-perpetration is also another method of criminal responsibility under international 
criminal law.138 In international criminal law, another concept is derived particularly from German 
criminal law, according to which an individual can be held legally responsible for inducing others to 
commit crimes through a hierarchically structured organisation under his or her control, thereby 
acting as “der Täter hinter dem Täter”, the perpetrator behind the perpetrator,139  has been applied 
by the ICC.140 Especially relevant for the present purposes are the instances in which the individual 
acts by means of “control over an organisation” (Organisationsherrschaft), often also in a military 
context.141 As pointed out by the ICC, this approach can be distinguished from the notion of joint 
criminal enterprise.142 Moreover, it covers cases of “political and military leaders, who are each of 
them in control of a different hierarchical organisation (…) [and who] direct their different 
organisations to implement in a coordinated manner a common criminal plan.”143 Interestingly, it 
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was even held in the Eichmann trial that the blameworthiness and responsibility of an individual 
increases with depending on their position within the organisation and thus, the complexity of the 
structure of the latter.144 
4. A new notion of control: normative control 
 
It is not to suggest that the new notion of control for the purposes of attribution will be based on 
something similar to the idea of a “crime of states.” 145 However, the new notion of attribution will be 
based on the idea that international organisations are jointly responsible in peacekeeping operations 
because they cooperate in various areas and that this “cooperative effort” is also causal for violations 
of international law in a given case.146 This is precisely why the notion of control has to be broader 
than “factual control”.147 As explained, factual control alone is also not sufficient due to the territorial 
differences between states and international organisations. Also important is “normative control” 
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based on institutionalised relations between the international organisations.148 In the WTO 
Geographical Indications Dispute, the Panel accepted the view of the EC that Member States were to 
act as de facto organs of the Community for the implementation of its law. The dependence of the 
states on the EU and the control of the latter are based on a transfer of competences to the EC and 
thus on control derived from legal instruments, which amounts to normative control.149 This case is 
particularly relevant as it involves normative control based on the transfer of competences over 
other entities possessing independent legal personality in contrast to the transfer of competences by 
the Security Council to a UN Peacekeeping operation.  
The ICJ, in the Genocide case took into account these alternative bases for establishing control, 
declaring that “the physical acts constitutive of genocide (…) have been committed by organs (…) 
[and] were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or under its 
effective control”150 [Emphasis added]. Effective control pervades as an alternative through the 
whole judgment151 and the “wholly or in part” also suggests that other criterion are determinative for 
the attribution of conduct. 
The new proposed criterion does not touch upon the question of whether member states could, in 
individual cases, also be (jointly) responsible, which is outside of the focus of the present study.152  As 
                                                          
148
 For the purposes of the present study, “normative control” is meant to encompass not only control based 
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instance, that the French troops shall use all necessary means to support UNOCI and “intervene at the request 
of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened, ibid., 157-58; Security Council 
 




states equally increase coordination on a bi- and multi-national level outside of an international 
organisation, the complexity of an examination of attribution of conduct to states will increase, as 
well as the amount of cases of joint responsibility of states.153 In contrast to these cases, however, it 
should not be apprehended that the attribution of responsibility to two or more international 
organisations instead of one will diminish the willingness of member states to contribute troops to 
military operations of international organisations as it is argued pursuant to a “utilitarian approach” 
which “emphasises the end-goal (…) rather than the intrinsic fairness of the regime.”154 In contrast, 
the benefits of a regime of shared responsibility are that it prevents “behavioural externalities and 
other undesirable consequences.”155  
Responsibility under criminal law necessitates an element of intent (mens rea) which can also be 
found in the articles of the ILC which presuppose “knowledge” by the organisation in aiding or 
abetting another international organisation. But one cannot completely reconcile the law of 
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PMSCs for logistical support and demining is nearly completely outsourced by the UN, R. Buchan, H. Jones, N.D. 
White, ‘The Externalization of Peacekeeping: Policy, Responsibility and Accountability’, (2011) 15 Journal of 
International Peacekeeping, 281, 286. Although the treaties concluded by the UN specify that the employees of 
these companies will not in any form be considered as agents of the UN and it also appears highly unlikely that 
the UN will exercise “effective control” over them, the issue per se is problematic ibid., 293-296). For an 
excellent overview of how private companies are also influencing training and planning of UN peacekeeping 
operations, see, A.G. Østensen, ‘In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security 
Companies on UN Peacekeeping’, in (2013) 20 International peacekeeping, 33-47. Kofi Annan had already 
proposed to hire a private security company to control the camps in Rwanda in 1994, S. Brayton, ‘Outsourcing 
War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping’, in (2002) 55 Journal of International Affairs, 303, 317. 
In 2013, MONUSCO decided to run a selection process for a contractor to run the deployment of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the whole operation. So far there are no plans to arm the drones, but there are 
requests for further high technology weaponry and other equipment, Briefing by Lieutenant General dos 
Santos Cruz, Force Commander MONUSCO to the UN Security Council, Security Council 6987
th
 meeting, UN 
Doc. S/PV.6987 (2013), 2-3. 
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under which the cooperation between the two countries in the field of defence will be increased; e.g., their 
Mobile Brigade will be put under the control of the German Division of Rapid Forces (Division Schnelle Kräfte). 
The German Minister of Defence spoke of a unprecedented  level of cooperation, German Ministry of Defence, 
‘Smarte Militärkooperation mit den Niederlanden‘, 29 May 2013, available at: 
https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDcRBPXW0ovXImi9pW0IK022rJv20o83OTgD7z
CPwTeWJrdRcEqc3IIvHCa6jTuMcQvw4SxlhUiJvuqFcsRn_cweJk5eK9UnpcIgTllgZdGlmixSDNCMg7Fda6z5xx7Xy7l
59Maeunvb4xpj8wNupiMx/, H. Kiesel, ‘Deutschland will für Europas Sicherheits-Rahmen sorgen’, 28 May 2013, 
available at: http://www.dw.de/deutschland-will-f%C3%BCr-europas-sicherheits-rahmen-sorgen/a-16842457 . 
154
 Ryngaert, supra note 41, 151, 164. Nevertheless, States also have a legitimate interest in accepting 
responsibility, the refusal of which would be tantamount to admitting that the State in question has no control 
whatsoever about its troops placed at the disposal of an international organisation, ibid., 165. 
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responsibility and international criminal law as regards their inherent systemic functions.156 Both 
bodies of law contain an inherent aspect of deterrence to prevent further violations of norms, but 
whereas criminal law sanctions individuals to serve a sentence in prison, the law of responsibility 
allows for different forms of reparation as one finds in domestic civil law.157 It is actually, the 
requirement or non-requirement of “intent” which circumscribes the two fields of law. Whereas 
willful damage of property falls under criminal law and is appropriate for claims of compensation 
under civil law, as regards unintentional damage of property, compensation is only possible under 
civil law.158  Moreover, one can distinguish between “intent” and “wrongful intent” and the law of 
responsibility is simply neutral regarding the requirement of the latter. 159 It so appears that despite 
the possibility of drawing inspiration from criminal law in the form of a criterion of attribution, one 
has nevertheless to differentiate between the two bodies of law in respect of the element of 
“intent”.160 However it also remains possible to argue that such an element of mens rea could be 
found in the conduct of international organisations. It can be argued that the United Nations and 
regional organisations have voluntarily entered into various agreements of cooperation for the 
purposes of the conduct of peacekeeping operations, in the knowledge that despite all efforts, 
violations of human rights, humanitarian law and other potentially applicable norms by 
peacekeepers may occur and, as a result, they therefore possess the necessary degree of mens 
rea.161  
The advantage of this proposed criterion is equally that it disposes of the distinction between UN 
authorised and United Nations operations,162 as cooperation between the organisations is 
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independent of the question whether it is an authorised or a United Nations operation.163  Article 17 
of the Articles equally allows for an international organisation to be responsible for any binding 
decisions it has adopted which were implemented by its member states or international 
organisations (para. 1), as well as for authorisations acted upon accordingly (para.2).  
5. The challenges regarding the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 
 
In this context it was also argued that authorisations for the use of force by the Security Council are 
exceptional. They might therefore not be suitable for the establishment of a general rule of 
attribution for several reasons, including the question of how to interpret a Security Council 
resolution as well as their legal nature.164 As the ICJ stated in its Kosovo advisory opinion, “the rules 
on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties may provide guidance”, but “differences between Security Council Resolutions and treaties 
mean that the interpretation of Security Council resolutions also require that other factors be taken 
into account.”165 These differences result from the different drafting process of Security Council 
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ibid., 47. 
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resolutions, as well as from their different legal effect, as they can be binding on all members of the 
United Nations notwithstanding their possible non-participation in the formulation of the 
resolution.166 Consequently, it may be necessary to examine the travaux préparatoires of the 
resolutions; statements made by members of the Council at the time of the adoption of the 
resolution, other resolutions on the same issue, but also “subsequent practice of relevant United 
Nations organs and of States affected by those given resolutions.”167 The differences result from the 
different legal framework of constituent instruments of international organisations. On the one 
hand, they are international treaties concluded between sovereign states; on the other hand they 
form the “constitutions”168 of different, independent legal entities with their own legal orders.169 
                                                          
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion (21 June 1971), p. 53. The 
predecessor Court, the PCIJ was seized in the case of Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia 
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Drawing from national constitutional law, it is therefore that constituent instruments of international 
organisations disallow contracting parties to act as Herren der Verträge (masters of the treaties).170 
On the contrary, these instruments acquire a life of their own,171 the primacy of interpreting any such 
treaty lies with the institution and its organs and they are therefore “living instruments”.  
Consequently, any such interpretation cannot be “intended to respect residual national sovereignty” 
of member states.172 Both the interpretation of resolutions of an international organisation as well as 
the interpretation of founding documents may cause problems in practice.173  
6. Distinguishing the new criterion of attribution from cases of other forms of 
responsibility (e.g. aid and assistance) 
 
A clear line of distinction between cases falling under the new criterion of attribution for cases of 
joint responsibility and cases of auxiliary responsibility is necessary. It is suggested that the 
distinction between these two notions can be best achieved by the form of a causal, cumulative 
criterion; if the cooperative involvement of one organisation in the peacekeeping operation of 
another organisation penetrates the operation on all structural levels and over the whole period, 
thereby including planning, pre-deployment and deployment, the two organisations should be held 
jointly responsible on the basis of this new specific criterion of attribution which includes elements 
used in Nicaragua and Tadić. Causality is included insofar as this involvement of the contributing 
organisation allows a piercing of the institutional veil of the control of the other organisation under 
whose aegis the operation is conducted. The contributing organisation would be responsible by 
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virtue of its position or functions - on the basis of the new criterion of attribution and similar to the 
principle of joint criminal enterprise and co-perpetration as developed in international criminal law.  
The cumulative criterion shall include, for example, contributions of a normative and factual nature: 
normative and legal control also through the exercise of political “soft power” which cannot be truly 
legally ascertained, factual elements such as support in the training of troops, financing, logistical and 
other operational support, mission planning and the operation plan, and general involvement in the 
oversight and implementation of the operation. Bearing in mind the complexity of the topic and the 
fact that each organisation and each peacekeeping operation is unique, a clear-cut distinction will 
not be legally feasible, and the particularly strong involvement of one organisation through one 
specific element such as financing may remedy weaker involvement in another area.  
Two authors suggest that the impact of the theory of the delegation of powers on the law of 
responsibility merits further exploration.174 Indeed, it is also possible to partially conceptualise this 
new notion of attribution from the perspective of other international organisations as a contribution 
to implementing the powers of the Security Council. Implementation through the various 
cooperation mechanisms in peacekeeping operations would constitute a method of delegation.  
The case-studies will therefore not only serve to verify the need and the relevance of such a new 
criterion of attribution, but they will also help to further delimit it from other cases of attribution of 
conduct and/or responsibility. 
The difficulty resides in conceptualising a rule which is both defined and confined enough to qualify 
as a “rule” in a legal understanding, but simultaneously flexible enough to accommodate the 
different and unique cooperation arrangements and mechanisms in peacekeeping operations. As 
with any other legal rule, the only possibility to correspond to these requirements is in the form of a 
general and abstract rule.175  
Moreover, any wide interpretation might lead to more international organisations becoming 
implicated in internationally wrongful acts. Participation in internationally wrongful acts might 
appear as the norm rather than the exception which reduces the respect for international law and 
the willingness of international organisations to obey international rules.176  
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The conceptual nature of the new criterion of attribution adds another layer of difficulty. Similarly to 
the rules of complicity such as aid and assistance under Article 14,177 it has some features of primary 
rules; it does not only address the consequences of an internationally wrongful act, but it extends 
their application to international organisations which would – in other circumstances – not incur 
responsibility.178  
It could be helpful to resort to the criterion of “intent” to distinguish between acts falling under the 
new joint criterion of attribution and cases of complicity. Another possibility would be to rely on a 
negative definition similar to the definition of “civilian” in IHL; any cooperative interaction between 
two or more international organisations which exceeds an act of complicity would be falling under 
the new criterion of attribution.179 In other words, a contribution of such substantial character that it 
oversteps the threshold for joint commission would be necessary.180  This matter was actually 
debated within the ILC during its 1978 session in the context of the definition of “aid and assistance”. 
Ushakov, the member from the USSR, described the problem of definition in the following terms:  
[P]articipation must be active and direct. It must not be too direct, however, for the participant then 
became a co-author of the offence, and that [goes] beyond complicity. If, on the other hand, 
participation [is] too indirect, there might be no real complicity.
181  
However, the exact contours of complicity in international law remain equally unclear.182 In his 
extensive treatise, Aust concludes that “aid and assistance” is a normative and case-specific concept, 
meaning that its content will have to be determined in the specific situation.”183 
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Another helpful way of narrowing the distinction between “aid and assistance” and “joint 
responsibility” could be to analyse which “entity (…) is best positioned to act effectively and within 
the law to prevent the abuse in question.”184 
7. Application of the new criterion of „normative control“ in practice: Problems and 
Obstacles 
 
Chapter I of the ARIOs contains the provisions pertaining to the invocation of responsibility. Article 
48, which is not a substantive rule of responsibility,185 stipulates the principle of separate or 
individual responsibility: “Where an international organization and one or more (…) other 
international organizations are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the 
responsibility of each (…) organization may be invoked in relation to that act.” Thus, this article 
accommodates the primarily bilateral nature of international dispute settlement; the “plurality [of 
responsible actors] is reduced to bilateral relationships where issues of invocation of responsibility 
are concerned.”186 
Paragraph 2 further stipulates that “[s]ubsidiary responsibility [of another international organisation] 
may be invoked insofar as the invocation of the primary responsibility has not led to reparation.” The 
Commentary fails to define precisely which categories of states and international organisations 
would fall under the notion of subsidiary responsibility, but it states that the responsibility of a state 
member of an international organisation according to Article 62 ARIO belongs in this category.187 It is 
rather likely that cases of aid and assistance and of direction and control would also fall into this 
category as they presuppose the breach of an international obligation by another organisation. Thus, 
their responsibility cannot be invoked without a previous determination as to the breach of an 
international obligation by the other international organisation(s).  The vague framework providing 
for the invocation of international responsibility in the ARIOs therefore allows an accounting for the 
different arrangements of international dispute settlement in cases involving a plurality of actors. 
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Finally, Article 48 (3) contains a without prejudice rule permitting the organisation paying reparation 
to have a right of recourse against the other responsible international organisations.   
In the literature, this article has been criticised as failing to provide for “inherent differences that 
exist between situations with one responsible (…) international organisation and situations involving 
a plurality of responsible (…) organisations.”188 Indeed, “[r]equiring the individualisation of 
responsibility leads to particular complexities in cases involving aid and assistance, coercion, the 
creation of joint organs, direction and control.”189 Nevertheless, these are problems which are 
intrinsic to and inherent in the different systems for the settlement of international disputes, for 
whose application the ARIOs only provide a general and vague framework.   
Article 49 ARIO increases the circle of international organisations and states which may invoke 
international responsibility beyond injured states or international organisations. In the case of erga 
omnes violations, all states are entitled to invoke international responsibility, whereas only the 
international organisations can invoke responsibility in the case of a breach of an erga omnes 
violation if “safeguarding the interest of the international community as a whole underlying the 
obligation breached is within the functions of the international organisations invoking responsibility” 
(Article 49 (3)). Such a limitation upon international organisations is in conformity with the principle 
of speciality (infra 3.1.), but it could be questioned whether it is appropriate within the context of the 
present study. Unless one were to argue that the maintenance of international peace and security by 
regional organisations, such as those examined in this study, is also in the interests of the 
international community, regional organisations such as the AU or the EU would be precluded from 
invoking the international responsibility of the UN, whereas the latter could invoke the responsibility 
of the regional organisations.  
In practice, several problems arise if one were to attempt the invocation of international 
responsibility in respect of of a plurality of actors. These problems relate to the procedural and the 
substantive law applicable in international dispute settlement, and in particular to the admissibility 
of claims, issues of jurisdiction and standing, as well as the applicable substantive law.   
Taking up the sketch of a breach of an international obligation arising during the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation, as it was presented (infra pages 266-267), the following analysis will briefly 
address the main obstacles encountered, as well as suggest potential solutions and remedies with 
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regard in particular to the application of the criterion of normative control. Any further analysis 
would go beyond the scope of the present study.  
In the fictitious, but not unrealistic sketch of a case-scenario, a civilian was killed, which would 
amount to an alleged violation of the right to life. It was established earlier in Chapter III (infra, 3.2.2. 
and 3.2.2.6.2.2.) that the EU will in the near future accede to the ECHR, whereas no other 
international legal bodies with jurisdiction to hear cases of violations of human rights or international 
humanitarian law thus permit claims against international organisations. Thus, assuming that the EU 
had already acceded to the European Convention of Human Rights, the European Court of Human 
Rights could be seized of the dispute by the family of the victim.190  
The main problem which would arise is in which circumstances the ECtHR could assess the alleged 
breach of an international obligation by the EU under the Convention bearing in mind that the 
peacekeeping operation XY was deployed in a cooperative setting, involving various contributions by 
the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, as well as NATO. Generally speaking, any international organisation that is 
part of a group of responsible actors, but not part of the judicial proceedings invoking international 
responsibility, finds itself simultaneously both at an advantage and a disadvantage: 
The advantage is that its responsibility and its contribution to the injury will not be identified. The 
disadvantage, though, is that it will be unable to argue its position, or bring additional evidence, and so 
on, to clear its name without compromising its position as a non-participant in the procedures.
191 
As mentioned earlier, the system of international dispute settlement is essentially bilateral in 
character, involving a claimant and a respondent. It is also derived from a conceptualisation of 
international law as a system of independent, sovereign actors whose consent is a requirement for 
the exercise of jurisdiction over them. To this end, the ICJ formulated the famous Monetary Gold 
principle, according to which the Court is barred from adjudicating the case “if the vital issue to be 
settled concerns the international responsibility of a third State [as] the Court cannot, without the 
consent of that third State, give a decision on that issue” if the third state’s “legal interests would not 
only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision.”192 In 
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contrast, the Court held in the Nauru case that it is not banned from exercising its jurisdiction if “the 
determination of [third states’] responsibility [is] not a prerequisite for a decision to be taken” and 
their “interests (…) do not constitute the very subject matter of the judgment to be rendered.”193 It is 
however doubtful whether the Monetary Gold principle is also applicable to international 
organisations. Indeed, the explicit reference to a third state suggests an application of that principle 
solely to states.194  Nevertheless, such an application of the principle was acknowledged by Judge 
Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in the Lockerbie case.195 In the case relating to the Application of 
the Interim Accord, the ICJ did not immediately reject the application of the principle to NATO, but 
distinguished the facts from those in the Monetary Gold case, thereby leaving the door open to its 
application to international organisations.196 Nollkaemper nevertheless argues against an application 
of the principle to international organisations; he perceives the principle as deriving from consent. 
Consequently, in his view, it can only apply to these entities that have consented to the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction.  If the Court does not exercise jurisdiction over an entity, it can also not pronounce itself 
– from a technical point of view – upon the rights and obligations of that given entity. Moreover, he 
sees the risk that an application to international organisations could be the first step to a wider 
application of the principle beyond states and international organisations.197 
In the ECtHR Statute and rules of procedure, there is no inherent prohibition on claims against more 
than one state.  The ECtHR has decided cases against more than one state and even held one or both 
states responsible.198 But the ECtHR always follows the law of international responsibility approach 
by isolating the conduct of each state and trying to establish its individual responsibility. The analysis 
in the previous chapters demonstrated that such a breakdown of responsibility is precisely not 
possible in the circumstances of cooperation between international organisations in peacekeeping 
operations. Moreover, on the basis of the principle of the relativity of treaties, the ECtHR can in any 
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case not exercise jurisdiction over states or international organisations which are not parties to the 
Convention.199 The Monetary Gold principle is generally not applied by the ECtHR,200 but an 
application of the principle would also, arguably, preclude the European Court of Human Rights from 
rendering a judgment with regard to the sketch of a fictitious case scenario, unless the other, 
involved international organisations were also part to the proceedings. 
There is only one feasible and legal option that allows not only to accommodate the (legal) interests 
of the other international organisations involved, but also to consider their contributions to the 
internationally wrongful act in question – a third party intervention by these organisations under 
Article 36 (2) of the Convention. Intervenors can thereby present evidence and defend their legal 
interests. In the Behrami/Saramati case, the UN intervened as a third party201 and the Draft 
Accession agreement of the EU likewise foresees such as possibility for other international actors. 202 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR could only pronounce, even in the case of a third party intervention, upon 
the individual responsibility of the EU, unless the intervening involved international organisations 
were also to become members to the ECHR; a situation which would be not possible without further 
major changes to the Convention, in particular with regard to the espace juridique of the Convention, 
at least for the AU and ECOWAS. 
Quite surprisingly, a departure from the principle of individual responsibility is contained is also 
contained in the Draft Accession Agreement with regard to the new co-respondent mechanism. 
Article 3(7) of the Protocol on the EU accession to the ECHR stipulates that the joint responsibility of 
the EU and member states is envisaged under the new co-respondent mechanism as the normal rule: 
If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party has become a co-respondent to the 
proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall be jointly responsible for that 
violation, unless they have jointly requested the Court that only one of them be held responsible and 
the Court decides that only one of them be held responsible.  
Although that disposition was included in order to prevent “a risk that the Court would assess the 
distribution of competences between the EU and its member States”203 it could also be seen as an 
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acknowledgement of the fact that “the traditional attribution rules and the principle of independent 
responsibility are ill-suited”204 for cases of joint responsibility, particularly when the actions of 
international organisations are very intertwined.  The fact that the criterion of normative control is 
construed precisely for those cases in which the attribution of individual organisations to a single 
injury cannot be distinguished adds an additional lawyer of difficulty to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the ECtHR, which establishes the individual responsibility of each respondent in a given case. This 
problem is, however intrinsic to the general conceptualisation of the system of international dispute 
settlement.  
However, the EU and the other involved organisations could contribute to reach a halfway 
satisfactory solution –in terms of transparency in global governance, the rule of law, and the sanctity 
of international obligations. The EU could accept the responsibility before the ECtHR; the other 
international organisations involved in the peacekeeping operation would intervene as third parties; 
and the EU and the other organisations would agree that the EU could recover an equal share of any 
reparation paid on the basis of a separate agreement concluded between all organisations or on the 
basis of a specific disposition in the SOMA in conformity with Article 48 (3) ARIO.205  
This assumption of responsibility by the EU would operate similar to the practice of the United 
Nations, which generaly assumes international responsibility for the conduct of UN peacekeeping 
operations with regard to the troop-contributing countries. Thus, if the degree of cooperation 
between international organisations during a peacekeeping operation is of such a degree as to fall 
under the criterion of normative control, it would be automatically assumed that one international 
organisation should assume the responsibility, on behalf of the involved organisations, in any case 
pending before a competent international body.  
Generally speaking, the UN should assume a leading role. The analysed practice of the regional 
organisations has demonstrated that they increasingly seek authorisation for the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation from the Security Council which is the ultimate guardian for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, thus it is highly unlikely that a peacekeeping 
operation which contains elements of cooperation with other international organisations will be 
deployed without any contribution by the United Nations. Returning to the sketch of a fictitious case 
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scenario, the EU would assume responsibility and it would arrange internally with the other involved 
organisations for compensation of the reparation paid. Another theoretical option would be to use 
cross-judging in situations of shared responsibility.206 This technique also presupposes that other 
courts and tribunals could exercise jurisdiction over the other international organisations involved in 
the fictitious case scenario. But despite the benefits that this option presents – such as the 
prevention of double-dipping, access to evidence, and the prevention or mitigation of jurisdictional 
disputes207 – it creates problems of its own.208  
Nevertheless, there is one advantage of an application of the criterion of normative control before an 
international court over an application of other rules for a plurality of responsible actors, such as aid 
and assistance. If the application of the criterion of normative control has been triggered, the 
application of jurisdiction under human rights treaties will be comparatively easy in comparison to a 
situation in which international organisations cooperate in a peacekeeping operation, but at least 
one organisation would be only aiding and assisting. In the former case, the fact that the criterion of 
normative control is applicable signifies that all involved organisations generally also exercise 
jurisdiction under human rights law jointly,209 whether it is under the personal, the spatial or a 
combined personal-spatial model of jurisdiction. In the case of at least one international organisation 
aiding and assisting one or more international organisations, the exercise of jurisdiction under 
human rights law would not only have to be established individually, but their human rights 
obligations might also be different. The aiding and assisting organisation might only exercise 
jurisdiction under the personal model, whereas the other organisation(s) could be exercising 
jurisdiction under the spatial model; the aiding and assisting organisation could then only be bound 
by negative obligations under human rights law, whereas the other organisation(s) could be bound 
by positive human rights obligations.  
In summary, the invocation of international responsibility in the context of cooperation of 
international organisations in peacekeeping operations raises several problems, which do, however, 
not only derive from the specific context of the present study, but primarily from the inherent 
inaptitude of the system for the settlement of international disputes to accommodate sufficiently for 
the intrinsic specific features of cases involving a plurality of actors.  
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4.2. Outlook for the case studies 
 
The case studies in the next part will explore and define this new notion of “normative control”, on 
the firm general foundation of the Articles of the International Law Commission.  The focus of the 
case studies is on recent and on-going peacekeeping operations for two reasons. First of all, they 
display a higher degree of cooperation between international organisations, and they continue to 
evolve. Secondly, on-going peacekeeping operations allow the application of the law as it is and 
stands nowadays. Bearing in mind the findings in particular of Chapter II, as well as taking into 
account the nature of the specific peacekeeping operations whose geographical focus is the African 
continent, the following propositions can be made: 
NATO, with the exception of KFOR, might find itself in an auxiliary role regarding the attribution of 
conduct and/or responsibility. The EU entertains strong institutional ties with both the AU and the 
UN, but its engagement on the African continent is more limited. Nevertheless, these three 
organisations might be jointly responsible. ECOWAS is probably situated somewhere in between the 
EU and the UN and the AU on the basis of the fact that it is also part of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture. 
In peacekeeping operations in other geographical and political settings, the involved organisations 
might display a different kind of cooperation and they would then potentially, also be held 
responsible in a different way. 
Chapter V: The case studies 
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Chapter V: The case-studies  
 
This Chapter introduces the four different case-studies which are part of this study. They analyse the 
attribution of conduct to international organisations for internationally wrongful conduct committed 
by peacekeepers in Kosovo (KFOR), Darfur (UNAMID), South Sudan (UNMISS and UNISFA), and finally 
in Mali (AFISMA and MINUSMA). The chronological order of their examination was chosen as it 
allows us to highlight once again the continuously developing character of the relations among these 
organisations which are becoming increasingly institutionalised. In addition, this approach might also 
be beneficial for the purpose of further defining the criterion of attribution as the development 
towards more cooperation simultaneously takes place on the intra-mission level. Therefore, whereas 
the framework for coordination is rather limited in the case of KFOR and UNMIK, the case-study of 
Mali demonstrates the full integration of the whole mission within a cooperative framework.  On the 
one hand the case-studies serve as representative examples of peacekeeping operations; on the 
other they provide a basis for a circumscription of the criterion of normative control. Furthermore 
they might allow a certain generalisation of the criterion for future peacekeeping operations. 
On the basis of the chronological approach, it is possible not only to trace the development of intra-
mission cooperation, but also to identify these particular features which constitute the required 
nexus justifying the attribution of conduct to two or several international organisations. 
Nevertheless, the analysis will also demonstrate that intra-mission cooperation is unique in each case 
and that there is no tangible blueprint for categorising it. Any application of law requires an analysis 
of the specific circumstances of a given case. The fact that there is a vast diversity of intra-mission 
cooperation arrangements underlines the necessity to thoroughly analyse the individual 
circumstances in each and very case-study with the aim to further circumscribe the suggested special 
criterion of attribution.  
  





5.1. The Attribution of Conduct and the difficulty to classify intra-mission 
cooperation  
1. Attribution of Conduct of KFOR 
 
Throughout Kosovo, and bearing in mind its operational 
Mandate, KFOR is cooperating with and assisting the 
UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, 
to support the development of a stable, democractic, 
multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo 




KFOR constitutes the first of four case-studies of this chapter. The decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Behrami/Saramati to attribute the conduct of KFOR troops to the UN, despite being 
a NATO-led operation raises implicitly the question whether the conduct of KFOR troops could not 
have been attributed both to the United Nations as well as to NATO.2 Indeed, some authors suggest 
that the conduct of KFOR can be generally attributed to the UN and NATO: “’Nato [sic] is responsible 
for the ‘direction’ of KFOR and the United Nations for ‘control’ of it.”3 Another author suggests “[t]he 
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Court could have examined in the first place KFOR’s legal status and, had it satisfied itself that KFOR 
was a subsidiary organ of NATO, perhaps attributed its conduct to NATO.”4 Tomuschat asserts that  
[t]here could be no doubt that the political direction of the operation in Kosovo remained in the hands 
of the UN. KFOR was meant to ensure public safety and order until UNMIK could take responsibility for 
that task. It was enjoined to support UNMIK and cooperate with it; thus, it was part of a concerted 
action by the UN.
5 
This quick overview shows that several arguments are made to determine the legal status of KFOR, as 
well as which entity is responsible for the conduct of KFOR: political control vs. operational control, 
direction vs. control, and also the legal status of KFOR. As the present study argues that acts 
committed in a peacekeeping operation under the operational command and control can be also 
attributed to another organisation which is outside of the military chain of command of the latter, 
the element of “political control” or “normative control”, based on the exercise of influence through 
institutional relations, is particularly important. Moreover, it is important as the conduct is ultimately 
attributed to the organisations through their respective organic structure and their political organs 
are at the top of the echelons.  In this regard, it is preferable to focus primarily on the first phase of 
the provision of security in Kosovo. According to the UNMIK Report submitted to the Human Rights 
Committee in 2006,  
[t]he provision of security on Kosovo was designed to undergo three phases: 
• In the first phase, KFOR was responsible for ensuring public safety and order until the international 
civil presence could take responsibility for this task. Until the transfer of that responsibility, UNMIK's 
civilian police advised KFOR on policing matters and established liaison with local and international 
counterparts; 
• In the second phase, UNMIK took over responsibility for law and order from KFOR and UNMIK 
civilian police carried out normal police duties and had executive law enforcement authority; 
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• In the third phase, which is being implemented currently, UNMIK is in the process of transferring 
responsibilities for law and order and border policing functions to the Kosovo Police Service. UNMIK 
civilian and border police are reverting to training, advising and monitoring functions.”
6
 
Consequently, the incentives for cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK were the greatest in this 
first phase of deployment and it is thereby most interesting for the purpose of analysing the 
distribution of international responsibility. 
The European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Behrami seems to have been inspired by the 
writings of Sarooshi.7 In his book, Sarooshi argued that the adoption of resolution by the Security 
Council authorising the use of military force by an international organisation amounts to a delegation 
of powers of the Security Council to this particular organisation. Thus, in his view, the Council would 
have temporarily given away some of its own powers, instead of having simply authorised the use of 
force, a view which is taken by other scholars.8  
The distinction between the two concepts has been highly debated in legal scholarship,9 but it 
appears in any case correct that the Court failed to distinguish between the act conferring authority 
to act, Security Council Resolution 1244, and the actual exercise of authority by KFOR and UNMIK.10 If 
the Security Council decides to authorise a peacekeeping operation under the authority of another 
international organisation and then “retreats into its shell” and abstains from exercising from any 
form of supervisory control or influence over the execution of the mandate by the peacekeeping 
operation, there would be no nexus at all to attribute conduct and/or responsibility to the UN.  
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Apart from the scenario, in which the Security Council does not exercise any supervision over a 
peacekeeping operation deployed by a regional organisation, circumstances may even arise under 
which there would be de facto no delegation of powers by the Security Council. If one bears in mind 
that regional organisations are allowed under Article 53 of the UN Charter (infra 1.3) to deploy 
peacekeeping operations without an authorisation of the Security Council, provided that the use of 
force is limited to cases of self-defence, in such circumstances any authorisation of the Security 
Council would not add or transfer any additional powers to the regional organisation, at least from 
the perspectives of the internal law of the regional organisation and from the perspective of 
international law.11 However, under internal UN law, one could arguably consider the Security 
Council authorisation as effectively delegating some of the powers of the Council to these member 
states of the UN who are simultaneously members of the authorised regional organisation.12   
 The degree of force authorised by the Security Council would then actually be decisive to determine 
if powers of the Security Council have been delegated to the regional organisation or not. In this 
context, one also has to recall that in practice there have been cases in which the distinction 
between peacekeeping and peace enforcement has been effectively blurred (infra 1.2.3.). Thus, any 
attempt to determine as to whether powers of the Security Council have been effectively delegated 
to a regional organisation on the basis of the use of force authorised appears at least to be 
questionable.  
The law of international responsibility has also adopted a different approach to determine if an 
authorisation by an international organisation will give rise to international responsibility of the 
organisation.13 It is very unlikely that the Security Council will adopt a resolution authorising conduct 
which would be internationally wrongful if committed by it. 
On the contrary, as the previous Chapters of this thesis illustrated and as the other case-studies will 
further demonstrate, the recent practice of the UN and regional organisations illustrates that the UN 
is not limiting its role to solely handing out authorisations without any element of cooperation in the 
planning or deployment of the operation. This enhanced input of the UN, in the form of cooperation 
arrangements and mechanisms, in peacekeeping operations operated by regional organisations is 
also possibly precisely a reaction to judicial decisions with regard to peacekeeping forces, including 
the judgments from Dutch courts and the Behrami/Saramati decision of the ECtHR. In fact, it is rather 
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ironic that the criticised decision in particular of the ECtHR in Behrami/Saramati which arguably 
might not have involved any delegation of powers by the Security Council, has boosted an increase in 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations which might justify holding the 
organisations jointly responsible on the basis of their framework of cooperation. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the previous Chapter, there may of course be cases in which the 
amount of cooperation by the UN in the deployment of a peacekeeping operation by a regional 
organisation would not justify to consider it jointly responsible under the criterion of normative 
control. The basis to determine whether the normative control criterion is applicable, is if the 
involvement of the respective “external organisations”, the organisations cooperating with the 
organisation which was entrusted with the mandate by the Security Council is of such an intensity as 
to justify the application of the normative control criterion. If the analysis leads to the conclusion 
that the normative control criterion is not applicable, there is, indeed, a lacuna in the ARIO, as acts of 
aid and assistance require the element of intent, which under normal circumstances could not be 
established on behalf of the UN (infra 4.1.2.2.).  
Should the ECtHR, however, continue to rely on its approach as developed in Behrami/Saramati and 
further developed in Al-Jedda (infra 4.1.2.1.), the UN would possibly even then not be able to escape 
responsibility.14 
Generally with regard to the distinction between UN and UN authorised operations, it has been 
argued in Chapter IV, that this distinction is not truly relevant as cooperation between the UN and 
regional organisations has generally emerged as part of the division of labour between these 
organisations. Therefore, the case-study analyses whether the conduct of KFOR troops can be 
attributed to both the UN and NATO on the basis of the newly proposed criterion of attribution. The 
following section introduces to the application of the law of international responsibility.   
1. The attribution of conduct of acts and omissions of KFOR under the law of 
international responsibility of international organisations 
 
1. The application of the law of international responsibility 
 
The analysis of the law of international responsibility is conducted following a two-step procedure. 
According to Article 4 of the ARIO, there is an internationally wrongful act of an international 
organisation when conduct consisting of an action or omission: 
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(a) is attributable to that organization under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organization. 
The analysis will therefore start with the question as to which international organisation(s) the 
conduct of KFOR is attributable. As a principle, “the command and control framework of all 
peacekeeping operations is similar, no matter whether under OPCON of the United Nations, NATO, 
the European Union, (…) accordingly, equivalent legal considerations apply.”15 
Also relevant for the analysis are resolutions of the Security Council and other documents pertaining 
to the mandate, structure and functioning of the operation e.g. the rules of engagement,16 as well as 
documents being part of the internal law of the respective organisations. 
2. Attribution of Conduct of KFOR – the institutional and normative framework 
 
1. KFOR Mandate 
 
KFOR’s mandate is derived from Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO was not directly authorised 
to establish “the international security presence” which would become KFOR, but the Council 
authorised “Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its 
responsibilities under paragraph 9 below.”17 One day prior to the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1244, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had decided to implement the “Joint Guardian” 
operation order concerning the deployment of KFOR; the deployment was authorised on 11 June 
1999, the day following the adoption of the resolution by the Security Council.18 Paragraph 9 
stipulates that the responsibility of the international security presence (KFOR) include: 
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and 
ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic 
military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; (…) 
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(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home 
in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be 
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility 
for this task;  (…) 
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, 
and other international organizations;19 
According to Point 4 of Annex 2 to the Resolution, “[t]he international security presence with 
substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified 
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to 
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.”20 In addition, NATO 
concluded a military-technical agreement (MTA) with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which 
further defines the powers and competences of Yugoslavia.21 So it contains an authorisation also by 
the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Serbia to use all 
necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.22 Both 
countries authorised KFOR:  
 
(a) To monitor and ensure compliance with this agreement and to respond promptly to any violations 
and restore compliance, using military force if required. This includes necessary actions to: 
(i) Enforce withdrawals of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces; 
(ii) Enforce compliance following the return of selected Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
personnel to Kosovo; 
(iii) Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the implementation or 
otherwise authorized by the Security Council;23 
Military command of KFOR was initially conferred on the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) who delegated it to the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), 
the former was responsible to the NAC. The KFOR commander was appointed by NATO and he is 
responsible to CINCSOUTH.24 The operation per se is not part of the NATO military command 
structure but rather resembles an ad hoc force, comprising 35 states, including 12 non-NATO 
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members whereas the majority of positions at KFOR headquarters are held by personnel from NATO 
member states. As mentioned, KFOR is NATO-led and a de facto NATO-commanded operation.25  
2. Cooperation between UNMIK (UN) and KFOR (NATO) 
 
The following parts analyse the cooperation between UNMIK (UN) and KFOR (NATO) on various 
levels to ascertain whether the cooperation arrangements on a practical and an operational level 
justify a joint attribution of conduct to both organisations or whether the UN might rather be held 
responsible as an accessory.   
1. Political Level 
 
KFOR and UNMIK established various consultation mechanisms on the political level to ensure the 
coordination and cooperation of the international civil and the international military presence.  
On the echelon of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,26 the Joint Planning Group of 
the Executive Committee of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General works with a Senior 
Representative of KFOR on military-civilian issues.27 The Special Representative himself also oversees 
coordination with KFOR directly through the Executive Committee.28 The Joint Planning Group 
Secretariat serves to provide political guidance to KFOR and the four components; whereas working-
level staff from KFOR and the four components “provide operational requirements for planning and 
policy implementation (…), the political officers from the Office of the Special Representative 
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contribute political guidance.”29 Meetings cover a wide range of issues, promoting and enhancing 
cross-competent coordination, including “information management, border control (…) and joint 
UNMIK/KFOR security issues.”30 The Secretariat is the main mechanism responsible for the formation 
of task forces and workings groups “which develop strategy and policy recommendations and plans 
for the implementation of mission priorities.”31  
On 5 December 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued the first version of 
the UNMIK Strategic Planning Document which provided “a basis for periodic joint UNMIK-KFOR 
Strategic Planning Conferences, where the Special Representative, the Commander of KFOR and their 
respective Deputies synchronize aims, capabilities and support.”32 The Advisory Unit on Security, 
established in March 2001 is, inter alia, “directly involved in the coordination of policy issues in 
respect of KFOR and UNMIK Police.“33 Liaison and exchange of information on security-related 
measures between the UN and KFOR occurs on a daily basis.34  
On the lower regional level, the Regional Security Supervisor who acts as the principal security 
advisor to the Regional and Municipal Administrators is responsible for laising with the KFOR 
multinational brigade with responsibility for the Region Centre.35 
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On a local level, UNMIK municipal administrative teams coordinated the activities of UNMIK 
components and “maintain[ed] close liaison with KFOR with respect to security and law and other 
matters, at the municipal level”36 during the first phase of the mission.37 
The Security Council itself is the recipient of monthly reports of the activities of KFOR on the basis of 
Resolution 1244; however, the reports with an average length of 3-4 pages provide only a summary 
of the activities of KFOR within the past month, so they are solely provided for the Security Council’s 
information. However, it should be noted that there were at least instances in which the Security 
Council was kept very well-informed of KFOR’s activities; the Russian delegate mentioned in a 
statement on 6 April 2001 the arrest of Major Saramati, “the commander of a KPC brigade accused of 
undertaking activities threatening the international presences in Kosovo.”38 Nevertheless, it is not 
evident from his statement how he had become aware of that arrest.39 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 orders KFOR personnel to respect “the laws applicable in the 
territory of Kosovo and regulations issued by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
insofar as they do not conflict with the fulfillment of the mandate given to KFOR under Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999)”40 which suggests, on the one hand, a more profound subordination 
of KFOR under the authority of the UN. On the other hand, this regulation also indicates that KFOR 
enjoyed some form of autonomy from the UN as the Special Representative was only authorised to 
issue directives to KFOR as long as they do not contravene KFOR’s mandate.41 Stahn consequently 
concludes that the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General towards KFOR was 
limited to mere tasks of coordination.42 Indeed, an analysis of the available documents on KFOR and 
UNMIK does not suggest that the cooperation on the political level surpassed the level of 
coordination and included essential elements of control by UNMIK and thereby the UN over KFOR.43   
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2. Strategic Level 
 
On a strategic level, an UNMIK liaison officer is deployed as the strategic and operational planner and 
liaison officer with the KFOR planners.44 Furthermore, UNMIK had deployed military liaison officers 
to the headquarters of KFOR, at regional and at the five KFOR multinational brigades level.45 As KFOR 
representatives took part, “as necessary, in the work of UNMIK”, and UNMIK, in turn, participated “in 
KFOR’s Joint Implementation Commission (JIC), which liaised with both the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).46 As there are no further 
documents publicly available, it is difficult to assess whether these liaison officers transmit any form 
of control on the strategic level over the conduct of KFOR troops.  
3. Operational/Mission Level 
 
Operational cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR is centered on the conducting of joint patrols 
between UNMIK (police) and KFOR troops. In period up to 30 June 2002 alone UN Civilian Police had 
conducted 11,161 joint patrols with KFOR.47 In 2000, KFOR decided to establish joint operations 
centres with UNMIK police at brigade and battalion levels, with “the aim of fostering closer 
cooperation between both organizations.”48 In this context, a Political Violence Task Force staffed by 
senior staff of UNMIK police and KFOR was established to coordinate activities at the local, regional 
and central levels. On 2 July 2002, UNMIK police and officials of KFOR signed a memorandum of 
understanding which established a process to transfer the responsibility of KFOR over general public 
security, management of demonstrations and other related tasks in the Mitrovica region to UNMIK.49  
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Therefore an analysis of the cooperation on the operational level on the basis of the available 
documents does not allude to any exercise of control by UNMIK over the operation of KFOR on the 
ground. However, it cannot be excluded that the UN and NATO could be jointly responsible, under 
specific circumstances, for the conduct of UNMIK (police) and KFOR troops during their joint patrols.  
One specific joint patrol which gave reason to serious criticism by Serbia underlines this assessment.  
A monthly report of KFOR to the UN Security Council notes the following: 
On 17 March, after a formal request for support from UNMIK to KFOR, an operation to retake the 
courthouse was launched by UNMIK police supported by KFOR. Seven platoons of the UNMIK formed 
police unit took part. UNMIK police arrested 35 Kosovo Serb protesters, while KFOR blocked off nearby 
roads. With KFOR assistance to clear the route, UNMIK police delivered the detainees to the detention 
facility in Pristina. However, as UNMIK attempted to transport the detainees to Pristina for processing, 
a large crowd gathered and started to throw stones, Molotov cocktails, grenades and other objects at 
the security forces; AK-47 rifles and pistols were also fired. UNMIK police and KFOR responded to the 
violence using tear gas, baton rounds and warning shots using live rounds in accordance with the 
agreed rules of engagement. In the end, 48 KFOR soldiers, 7 officers of the Kosovo Police Service and 
35 UNMIK police officers were wounded, including a Ukrainian police officer who later died of his 
wounds.
50  
As noted by the Secretary-General in his report from 18 September 2000, “the level and 
sophistication of the joint security operations conducted by UNMIK police and KFOR continued to 
develop in many regions.”51 The Security Council Mission to Kosovo reported likewise that “[t]he 
level of cooperation and coordination between UNMIK Police and KFOR is extremely high.”52 UNMIK 
police also arrested Mr. Saramati on KFOR orders, and, as a result, it is worthwhile to inquire 
whether UNMIK could not have aided and assisted KFOR for the purposes of the law of international 
responsibility. 
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2. Assessment of the cooperation arrangements and implications for the attribution of 
conduct 
 
It has been stressed previously that the element of “normative control” based on institutional 
relations between the involved organisations is particularly important in the determination of the 
attribution of conduct and responsibility.53  The analysis showed that the degree of cooperation on a 
political level between KFOR and UNMIK is certainly high and that arguably UNMIK is exercising some 
form of control on a political level via “political guidance”, but that element of control has not 
penetrated the strategic or operational level of cooperation.  
Bearing in mind, that joint responsibility as envisaged in this present study presupposes that one 
organisation makes more than a “substantial contribution” to surpass “aid and assistance” under 
Article 14 ARIO, any attribution of conduct of KFOR to the UN would require that there is a strong 
nexus between the control exercised on a political level, outside the military chain of command, and 
the control exercised on strategic and operational levels.  
There must be an intimate link between the control exercised on a political level and on the other 
levels to justify holding both organisations jointly responsible, precisely because the UN is not part of 
the chain of command of NATO. Otherwise, one cannot hold both organisations jointly responsible, 
at least on the basis of the suggest criterion of normative control. The disjuncture between these 
elements in the present case of KFOR is underlined by the hybrid base of authority of KFOR; on the 
one hand, its authority is derived from Security Council Resolution 1244, and on the other hand, it 
stems from the MTA.   
One therefore has to conclude that the responsibility for the conduct of KFOR lies at least primarily 
with NATO and to a lesser extent with the UN.54 There are, indeed, instances, in which KFOR and, 
consequently, NATO act independently from any UN involvement by virtue of its powers granted 
under the MTA. For example, the Security Council welcomed “the decision taken by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to authorize the commander of KFOR to allow the controlled 
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return of forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Ground Safety Zone as defined in the 
military-technical agreement.”55  
In conclusion, the conduct of KFOR troops can generally not be attributed jointly both to the UN and 
NATO on the basis of an analysis of the cooperation arrangements. As the Articles of the ILC 
articulate the requirement of intent for one organisation to be aiding and assisting another, UNMIK 
would also not be responsible for having aided or assisted KFOR.  Nevertheless, there may be specific 
circumstances which warrant the attribution of conduct to both the UN and NATO. The question one 
could ask now is whether there is another lacuna in the Articles of the ILC regarding such cases. As 
cooperation generally becomes more institutionalised between international organisations, it is at 
least questionable whether the focus on individual acts and intent and knowledge is always 
appropriate. The next case-study, UNAMID illustrates that particular point as well. The wider political 
process to resolve the conflict in Darfur is intrinsically linked to the deployment of the peacekeeping 
operation and so is the control of the political actors over the operation.   
2. Attribution of Conduct of UNAMID 
 
The Hybrid Operation is not a joint force. Let there be no confusion about it. 
We are not talking about any joint force by the United Nations and the African Union 
 
- Ambassador Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem of Sudan
56
 
In fact, the hybrid nature of the Mission has optimized the level of 
complementarity between the UN and AU. 
 





The deployment of AMIS and later on UNAMID came as the reaction of the international community 
to military clashes between the Sudanese government and the Arab Janjaweed militia against the 
Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) who claim 
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to represent the black Darfurians.58 It is undisputed that the situation in Darfur amounts to an armed 
conflict for the purposes of international law. Indeed, there was no operative peace agreement in 
Darfur when AMIS formally handed over to UNAMID, meaning the operation was deployed in an “as-
yet-unresolved war.”59 
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union decided “to endorse the conclusions of the Addis 
Ababa High Level Consultation on the Situation in Darfur (…) which provided for a three-phased 
support to the African Union Mission in Sudan”60 at its meeting in November 2006.  The foreseen 
three-phased support included in addition to a light and a heavy support package a hybrid operation 
with the United Nations.61  As the AU operation evolved into a complex peacekeeping operation and 
owing to “uncertainty regarding its financial sustainability”, the AU supported the transition to a UN 
operation.62 The envisaged three-phased plan was preceded by the vigorous opposition of the 
Sudanese government to an autonomous UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur as envisaged in 
Security Council Resolution 1706.63 The compromise was a UN-AU hybrid operation the 
establishment of which was supported by the Sudanese government.64 UNAMID is a particularly 
important case-study as it is not only the first hybrid peacekeeping operation deployed by 
international organisations, but the findings regarding UNAMID could also help in the analysis of 
potentially envisaged hybrid AU-UN operation for Somalia.65 Furthermore, as a hybrid operation, on 
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a first glance, at least, one would presume that its acts are attributed jointly to the UN and the AU.66 
Besides, UNAMID is an interesting experiment of marrying universalism and regionalism”67 and can 
therefore also serve to elaborate further upon the wider debate addressed in the present study upon 
the relationship between universalism and regionalism under the framework of the United Nations 
Charter.  
This intervention by invitation also leads to questions concerning the existing or non-existing 
enforcement character of Security Council Resolution 1769 which constitutes the legal basis for 
UNAMID. The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII, but the records of the meeting leading to 
the resolution suggest that there was a clear majority for the position that the mandate of the force 
would not be of an enforcement nature which corresponds to the Chinese statement that “the 
purpose of the resolution is to authorize the launch of the hybrid operation, rather than to exert 
pressure or impose sanctions”.68 In the rare cases of intervention by invitation with the right to 
enforcement action by the intervening party this right was formally granted through treaty 
ratifications as in the cases of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone (2000) and Togo (2005-
2006).69 
2. Attribution of Conduct 
 
1. Mandate of UNAMID 
 
According to Security Council Resolution 1769, the mandate of UNAMID is as set out in paragraphs 
54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission on UNAMID.70 Under the report, UNAMID has the general aim to contribute to the 
restoration of security conditions in Darfur allowing the deliverance of humanitarian assistance as 
well as the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence while 
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supporting the political process and the AU-UN joint meditation. Paragraph 54 of the Report sets out 
the broad goals which include, inter alia: 
(b) to contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent  threat of physical violence and 
prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment (…)  
(d) To assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union-United 
Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; (…) 
In order to achieve these goals, the operation’s talks include: 
(a) Support for the peace process and good offices:  
(i) To support the good offices of the African Union-United Nations Joint  Special Representative for 
Darfur and the mediation efforts of the Special Envoys of the African Union and the United Nations;  
(b) Security:  
(i) To promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in monitoring and 
verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement, (…) 
(vii) In the areas of deployment of its forces and within its capabilities, to protect the hybrid 
operation’s personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of 
movement of United Nations-African Union personnel (…);
71
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,72 the Security Council also adopted a mandate to protect 
civilians within paragraph 15 of Resolution 1769.73 The Security Council further elaborated upon the 
“protection of civilians” mandate in Resolution 2003, declaring that UNAMID shall make full use of its 
mandate for the protection of civilians across Darfur, “including through proactive deployment and 
patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, securing IDP camps and adjacent areas, and implementation 
of a mission-wide early warning strategy and capacity.”74 In Resolution 2113, the Council added 
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another qualification according to which UNAMID shall make “enhanced efforts to respond promptly 
and effectively to threats of violence against civilians.”75 Furthermore, the Council urged UNAMID to 
deter any threats against itself and its mandate.76 Reviews of UNAMID’s mandate are conducted by 
the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the AU.77 Accordingly, UNAMID military and police 
units are operating on the basis of a very robust mandate regarding the use of military force. Both 
components of the operation were instructed that attacks upon UNAMID patrols “are to be 
responded to robustly and in accordance with the rules of engagement, proactive measures are to be 
taken to protect civilians.”78 The updated strategy for the protection of civilians outlines among the 
four main objectives the protection of civilians from physical acts of violence.79  
2. The political process to resolve the conflict in Darfur and political oversight of UNAMID 
 
The deployment of UNAMID is directly linked to the political process to resolve the conflict in Darfur 
under the leadership of both the AU and the UN. The Political Process is managed by Joint AU and UN 
Mediation Activities in respect of talks between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory 
movements80 on the basis of the AU-UN Roadmap81 which was later replaced by the Framework for 
African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process.82 In 2011, the Government 
and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) signed the Agreement for the Adoption of the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur.83  
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The Joint Chief Mediator reports to both the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission through the Under-Secretary-General of the DPKO and the Commissioner for Peace and 
Security. According to his mandate he is entrusted with the AU/UN-led political process and 
mediation efforts between the parties to the Darfur Conflict, in the exercise of which he maintains 
“close liaison” with the Joint Special Representative.84  
The most interesting feature is, however, that the implementation of the political process is generally 
managed directly by UNAMID. The Darfur political process secretariat, which was established at 
UNAMID headquarters, is responsible for “strategic planning and management of the Darfur political 
process, overseeing its implementation (…) and monitoring and maintaining an overview of 
substantive discussion during the process.”85 For that purpose, Darfur political process sub-units 
were established at each sector office. In the exercise of its duties, the secretariat directly reports to 
the Joint Special Representative and the chair of the AU High-level Implementation Panel. 86 
As to the political oversight by the respective organs of the AU and the UN, the AU Peace and 
Security Council requested the AU Commission to ensure that there is regular interaction with 
UNAMID, including briefings to the Peace and Security Council every 90 days.87 A review exercise of 
UNAMID uniformed personnel by the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat was conducted in 
February 2012, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2003.88 The Mandate of UNAMID is 
extended by both organisations through decisions of the AU PSC and the UN Security Council.89 
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The Tripartite Coordination Mechanism on UNAMID which includes representatives of both the AU 
and the UN as well as of the Government of Sudan serves as another instrument to resolve issues 
and challenges related to UNAMID deployment and operations.90 
3. Strategic Control 
 
Strategic guidance of UNAMID is provided from New York from both the UN and the AU.91 The 
military concept of operations was developed jointly by the AU and the UN focusing on three core 
complementation functions: protection, liaison, and monitoring and verification.92 The same 
procedure was used for the elaboration of various other strategic and legal documents, including the 
military command directive for the Force Commander of UNAMID and the UNAMID rules of 
engagement.93 
4. The Chain of Command and Operational Control 
 
The distribution of tasks between the two organisations foresees that whereas “the [m]ission shall 
benefit from United Nations backstopping and command and control structures and systems”94, the 
African Union shall merely decide upon the size of the force and should also appoint the force 
commander.95 
As support, command and control structures for UNAMID are provided by the UN alone, the overall 
management of the operation is likewise based on UN standards, principles and established 
practices. To compensate the AU for the United Nations’ dominance in that area, it was agreed 
between both that “all efforts will be made to ensure that the peacekeeping force will have a 
predominantly African character” regarding the force and personnel generation.96 In order “to 
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maintain the joint nature of the mission, and to ensure joint decision-making and input into 
operational decisions and procedures for UNAMID, it was agreed that the Secretary-General and the 
Chairperson of the African Union would appoint a joint special representative and that strategic 
guidance would be jointly provided by the United Nations and the African Union.”97 This decision was 
also taken as a reaction to the fact that the daily operational command and control of the mission, 
however, resides with the United Nations. 
The Joint Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General 
of the UN has overall authority over UNAMID, overseeing the implementation of its mandate and 
being responsible for the operation’s functioning and management.98 He is in charge of analysing and 
implementing the strategic directives issued by the Under-Secretary-General of the DPKO of the UN 
and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and he reports, through them, to the UN 
Secretary-General as well as to the Chairperson of the AU Commission.  
The Force Commander and the Police Commander were both appointed by the AU in consultation 
with the UN and report to the Joint Special Representative while exercising command and control 
over the military and police activities, respectively.99  
The important feature of the command and control arrangements on an operational level is that the 
deployment of UNAMID is coordinated through the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism 
(JSCM) established in Addis Ababa and “tasked with empowered liaison” between the DPKO and the 
AU Peace and Security Department.100 Another part of the mandate of the JSCM is the coordination 
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and support of the implementation of the mandate of UNAMID in the form of operational directives 
as well as deepening “the current collaboration between the two institutions.”101  
3. Assessment of the Control Arrangements  
 
The analysis of the command and control structures of UNAMID on the basis of the available 
documents showed that in contrast to the first case-study, the deployment of UNAMID as a 
peacekeeping operation is directly included in and part of the wider political framework for a 
peaceful resolution of the Darfur crisis. In fact, the political process is not only intrinsically connected 
to the deployment of UNAMID, but the latter is actually steering the implementation and 
management of the process. The cited report of the Secretary-General indicates that the strategic 
planning of the peace process is also part of the therefore established secretariat at UNAMID 
headquarters. Then again, the overall authority over UNAMID is exercised by the Joint Special 
Representative whose functions include the supervision of UNAMID’s mandate and the 
implementation of strategic directives issued by the AU and the UN.   
It was stressed in the previous case-study that in order to justify that two international organisations 
are held jointly responsible on the basis of the proposed criterion of attribution, there has to be a 
strong nexus between the control exercised on the political level by the organisations and the control 
performed by the responsible organs in the peacekeeping operation. In the present context of 
UNAMID, it appears that the set-up of the operation actually transcends the required intimate link; 
part of the wider political control has been allocated to the peacekeeping operation itself, although 
ultimately under the authority of both organisations. UNAMID can, to a certain extent, navigate the 
political process autonomously.  This fact also raises the question as to whether there is a heightened 
responsibility of the UN and the AU. The attribution of responsibility to international organisations 
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cannot only be seen as a sliding scale upon which the amount of control exercised by international 
organisations reflects the likelihood of the attribution of conduct to that organisation. In contrast, 
another factor is the autonomy of the respective organ (the peacekeeping operation); not autonomy 
in the sense of a lack of control by the organisation, but autonomy due to a transfer of certain tasks 
to the organ whose implementation by the organ binds the organisation. This corresponds to a more 
“mature” relationship between the organ and the organisation, as the latter has actually done more 
by entrusting certain specific functions to that organ. One author speaks in this context of the 
“hierarchy of influence” which is more about auctoritas than potestas, a very fitting description for 
this particular cooperation arrangement in UNAMID.102 
One can draw two conclusions here. Firstly, UNAMID reconfirmed the particular relevance of political 
control, as well as of the translation of that control over the mission. Secondly, it became evident 
that a comprehensive approach towards the political peace process and the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation, involving the same institutional actors, reinforces the control and oversight 
executed over the operation. 
Regarding the distribution of responsibility between the UN and the AU, the analysis highlighted that, 
notwithstanding the provision of backstop and command and control structures solely by the UN, all 
decisions regarding the deployment, the operations on the ground, the appointment of personnel, 
the revision of operational directives and other issues are taken jointly by both organisations. 
Therefore, even if the UN enjoys greater control and influence over UNAMID than the AU due to an 
advantage in resources and experience,103 it does not compromise the fact that all decisive stratic 
and operational decisions are taken jointly by both operations.104 Thus, the daily operational 
command and control of the mission by the UN does not impair the essential and predominant 
hybrid character of the operation.  
The available documents do not give any indication that the UN exercises any more supplementary 
control by paying for the budget of the operation; neither does the financing of the operation by the 
UN affect the decision-making processes within the operation.  
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Furthermore, the UN and the AU are not only acting together in the operation of UNAMID, but all 
political activities are equally led jointly by the two institutions, through their joint Chief Mediator 
and in coordination – when necessary – with the Government of Sudan.  
Naturally, the United Nations is in a slightly stronger moral position than the AU due to the Security 
Council being at the forefront of the international system of collective security. Another factor is the 
extensive experience of the organisation in the deployment of peacekeeping operations. In the end, 
the UN and the AU cooperate on the political, strategic and operational levels as equals so that any 
conduct of UNAMID personnel, in violation of international law is to be attributed jointly to the AU 
and to the UN. 
The next section, on South Sudan, will highlight in particular the relevance of not only the political 
process but also of inter-mission cooperation as another contributing factor to the analysis of the 
responsibility of international organisations in the context of peacekeeping operations. 




Since the beginning of the Sudan and Darfur crisis, the African Union has led the international 
community in dealing with the situation.105 That leadership of the AU on the political level is 
undisputed by all other international actors; the AU Roadmap for the settlement of the unresolved 
issues between Sudan and South Sudan of April 2012, following hostilities between the two states 
along the border, and as adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council was not only accepted by the 
Parties, but endorsed by the Security Council just one week later in Resolution 2046.106 In that 
Resolution the Council, while determining that the prevailing situation along the border between 
Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security, decided that 
both states shall, inter alia, immediately cease all hostilities, including aerial bombardments and 
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withdraw all of their armed forces to their side of the border.107 The Council also legally obliged both 
governments to resume negotiations under the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on 
Sudan (henceforth: AUHIP).108 
The Agreements signed between the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan on 27 September 
support the primacy of the political role of the AU in dealing with the crisis involving the two 
states.109 The Security Council in a press release, following the conclusion of the agreements, stated 
that it “look[s] forward to President Mbeki’s recommendations on these matters after he reports to 
the African Union Peace and Security Council and to the report of the Secretary-General.”110  
A division of labour between the AU and the UN has been established, whereas the former focuses 
on direct interaction with the two governments and the facilitation of new agreements between 
them, the UN concentrates on the correct implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.111 
The United Nations is engaged with two operations in South Sudan, UNISFA and AFISMA which have 
different tasks and responsibilities under their mandate. As the available documents demonstrate, 
there is a rather close linkage between the deployment and execution of their mandates between 





UNISFA was established on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1990 in 2011 in order to support 
the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan’s People 
Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the disputed Abyei area, including the 
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protection of civilians and the peaceful administration of that area.112  The Security Council acted in 
that instance under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.113 Referring explicitly to Chapter VII later in the 
Resolution, UNISFA is authorised, “within its capabilities and its area of deployment to take the 
necessary actions to” protect UNISFA and United Nations personnel, installations, and equipment as 
well as to protect civilians and to ensure security in the Abyei area.114 UNISFA’s protection of civilians 
mandate “includes taking the necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence, irrespective of the source of such violence.”115 
2. Political Control/Chain of Command 
 
The Temporary Arrangements Agreement for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area 
signed in June 2011 established various mechanisms “which hinge on the effective and efficient 
cooperation between the AU and the UN.”116 It is particularly important to mention the Abyei Joint 
Oversight Committee (AJOC) consisting of an AU official, the UNISFA Force Commander and 
representatives of the two countries.117 In this regard, the AU commended the UN and in particular 
its Special Envoy and as well as UNISFA for their continued support to AU-led efforts.118 
UNISFA was deployed consisting of Ethiopian soldiers under its own command structure on the 
insistence of Ethiopia which was represented the only third party that both sides would accept as an 
intervening agent.119  
3. Inter-mission cooperation 
 
Following the adoption of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism implementation 
plan by the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, UNISFA, UNMISS and UNAMID held a joint 
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meeting in Juba on 30 November 2012 “[f]or the purpose of establishing necessary operational and 
strategic mechanisms.”120 In this context, UNISFA also conducted a series of reconnaissance missions 
with UNMISS support.121 UNISFA draws “significantly on existing logistical arrangements and support 
structures in UNMISS.”122 
Bearing in mind that the deployment of UNISFA is coordinated with the deployment of UNMISS, it 





The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established as the follow-
up operation to UNMIS. As its name mission instead of operation suggests, it is an integrated 
operation whose head the Special Representative for the Republic of South Sudan coordinates all 
activities of the whole United Nations System in the Republic of South Sudan.123The overall mandate 
is to consolidate peace and security and to help establish the conditions for development in South 
Sudan.124  
The government of South Sudan protested in a letter to the Security Council that the adoption of the 
mandate for UNMISS in 2011 under Chapter VII was not appropriate,125 but as it was established in 
Chapter I, the recent practice of the Security Council has been to resort to Chapter VII for mandating 
peacekeeping operations.  The mandate includes a strong “protection of civilians” component, which 
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might also explain and justify the adoption under Chapter VII by the Council despite the criticism of 
the South Sudanese government.  
According to Paragraph 3, UNMISS shall support the South Sudanese government in a twofold 
manner to protect civilians. First of all, UNMISS is charged with the responsibility to advise and assist 
the Government, including the military and police at national and local levels, in order to protect 
civilians in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law. As such, the 
language used in the resolution resembles strongly “the responsibility to protect” concept.126 
Moreover, UNMISS is authorised to deter the conduct of violence including through proactive 
deployment and patrols “in areas at high risk of conflict, within its capabilities and in its areas of 
deployment, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”127 Paragraph 4 
authorises UNMISS to “use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas 
where its units are deployed to carry out its protection mandate as set out in paragraphs 3(b) (iv), 3 
(b) (v), and 3 (b) (vi).”128 In the follow-up resolution 2057, the Security Council emphasised the 
importance of UNMISS’ mandated tasks for the protection of civilians.129 
2. The political level and the political process 
 
The political process between South Sudan and Sudan is led by the African Union.130 Under the 
auspices of the AUHIP, both governments signed a memorandum of understanding on non-
aggression and cooperation.131 The AU cooperates in its political mediation activities regarding these 
two countries with the UN.132 According to the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission of 
23 September 2013, a close working relationship has therefore been forged with then UN through 
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the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy.133 Following the failure of both Governments to reach an 
agreement on all issues until the deadline of 2 August 2012, the AU PSC decided to grant an 
additional six weeks extension of the deadline, a decision which was endorsed by the Security 
Council subsequently.134 UNMISS ensures strategic and operational coordination with other 
international partners, “in particular the African Union (…) the European Union and the World Bank”, 
on a political level UNMISS is charged with “bringing together international actors to speak with one 
voice in helping the new Government to address its peace consolidation challenges.”135 Under its 
mandate UNMISS is also obliged to provide a summary of cooperation and to share information with 
UNAMID, MONUSCO and regional and international partners in addressing the threat posed by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).136 In that context, once could ask as to whether the sharing of 
information which might be used to facilitate military attacks against the LRA could engage the 
responsibility of UNMISS. 
3. Inter-mission cooperation 
 
Under its mandate, UNMISS shall share information with UNAMID, MONUSCO and regional and 
international partners in support of addressing threats.137 Following the escalation of combats in 
South Sudan, the Secretary-General decided to transfer troops to UNMISS from MONUSCO, UNAMID, 
UNISFA, UNOCI and UNMIL including five infantry battalions and three attack helicopters,138 a 
decision which was approved by the Security Council in resolution 2132.139 
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Despite the scarcity of available documents regarding UNISFA and UNMISS one can draw several 
conclusions regarding the attribution of conduct. First of all, whereas the African Union is the leading 
political actor in South Sudan, its political influence on the peace process and on the peacekeeping 
operations, especially on UNISFA, is not mirrored in the strategic and operational control 
arrangements. In contrast, the division of labour between the UN and the AU is quite distinct. The 
lack of any “input” or “control” of the AU on the strategic or operational level of both operations is 
rather surprising. A possible explanation might be that the UN as the ultimate authority for 
maintaining international peace and security is unwilling, on the basis of its special position, to allow 
any external contribution by the AU towards the operations under its authority, outside of the 
political framework and the context for conflict resolution.  
The following case-study of Mali will allow a verification as to whether this hypothesis is true or not. 
A particular feature of UNISFA and UNMISS is the emphasis on inter-mission cooperation. However, 
the lack of further information and the extent of inter-mission cooperation do not justify any 
suggestion that the AU could be jointly responsible with the UN for the conduct of AFISMA and/or 
UNMISS via the back-door of inter-mission cooperation with UNAMID. Nevertheless, it underlines 
that for future peacekeeping operations, the network of cooperation between the involved actors is 
enriched by another layer. Consequently, it proves that the main hypothesis of this present study, 
the need for a criterion of joint attribution is valid and warranted. Furthermore, it cannot be 
excluded that during the deployment of future peacekeeping operations, responsibility may also 
arise on the basis of inter-mission cooperation.140  
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4. Attribution of Conduct of AFISMA and MINUSMA 
 
In Mali, the efforts by the two organizations [the AU and the UN] have 
focused both on the political and the peacekeeping aspects of the crisis 
 
- Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, 23 September 2013141 
 
1. Introduction   
 
In January 2012, a Tuarag rebellion led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(NMLA) began in Northern Mali which quickly took over control of the Northern part of the country. 
Islamist groups saw their chance to take over control of a part of the country themselves and turned 
against the NMLA after having helped to defeat the Malian government and started to introduce the 
Sharia law in the territory under their control.  
A coup d’état against the legitimate Malian government increased the anxiety of the international 
community that the situation in Mali would spin completely out of control and threaten international 
peace and security within the whole region. A major concern was the fact that the Sahel region 
extends over the Northern part of Mali which has been used for a longer period for “drug cartel 
operations, cross-border banditry, smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping-for-ransoms and money-
laundering”142 as well as a hide-out for Al-Qaida’s Northern African branch which is active within the 
region. The prospects of increased terrorism, migration and destabilisation led the international 
community to adopt a harmonised approach from the very beginning to confront the political as well 
as the Security crisis in Mali: “advocat[ing] a double strategy based on two axes of action, one a 
political process and the other military action, if necessary.”143 In this context, it was emphasised that 
the UN and other international organisations operate, indeed, “in a new geopolitical context (…) 
fac[ing] threats that have not been encountered before in a peacekeeping context.”144 The Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations spoke in a similar vein of “a peacekeeping operation 
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in a geopolitical context characterized by asymmetrical threats not previously encountered in a 
United Nations peacekeeping environment.”145 
The response of the international community to the coup d’état in Mali and the wider security crisis 
was coordinated from the early hours, primarily between the UN, the AU and ECOWAS.146 Following 
the gain of territory by the Islamist armed groups in Northern Mali; it was decided to curtail the 
mandate and the deployment of AFISMA in favour of the quickest possible deployment of MINUSMA. 




1. Establishment and Elaboration of the Mandate 
 
The occupation of the North of Mali by armed groups, “including terrorists, drug traffickers and 
criminals of every sort” led to a severe security crisis in Mali, prompting the Government to request 
help by ECOWAS as well as to request the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing 
the intervention of an international military force under Chapter VII.147 
Originally, ECOWAS and the AU had requested a Security Council mandate authorising the 
deployment of an ECOWAS stabilization force and the Council expressed its readiness to further 
examine the request once additional information had been provided. This decision followed the 
positive response of the AU PSC to a request by ECOWAS to deploy elements of its Standby Brigade 
in Mali.148 The Security Council then requested that the Secretary-General supports the Commissions 
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of ECOWAS and AU in “preparing such detailed options.”149 The plans for the ECOWAS operation 
MICEMA, however, never went beyond the planning stage, due in particular to the absence of 
consensus within ECOWAS on the approach to be taken for resolving the crisis and particularly also 
with regard to financial and logistical constraints.150 
 An initial planning conference was held in Abidjan from 11 to 15 June 2012 for which the UN 
provided advisory and planning support.151 The following technical assessment mission with 
representatives of ECOWAS and the AU – under ECOWAS leadership – included also a 
multidisciplinary UN team in advisory capacity as well.152 A further planning conference held from 9 
to 13 August 2012 including representatives of the AU, the UN, and the EU further developed the 
concept of operations for the ECOWAS force which was envisaged to be deployed in Mali.153  
 At yet another joint planning conference with participants of all the four organisations, a 
harmonised joint concept of operations was developed and subsequently endorsed by both ECOWAS 
and the AU.154  Thus, the concept of operations for the envisaged operation, which would ultimately 
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become AFISMA, was developed in cooperation between four international organisations: the AU, 
the UN, the EU and ECOWAS. The late reaction of the Security Council with regard to authorising the 
deployment of such an operation led to criticism from ECOWAS155 and ultimately to the French 
intervention with “Operation Serval” for which France was applauded by the Secretary-General.156 
The concept of operations (CONOPS) was revised in mid-February 2013 upon a request of the AU 
PSC157 following developments on the ground by military and civilian experts of the AU and ECOWAS 
Commissions, Mali and other bilateral and multilateral partners.158  
The troop strength of AFISMA was increased159 and the leadership of AFISMA was entrusted to the 
AU which “had overall authority over the Mission.”160 The UN was heavily involved by not only 
providing planning support through UN military planners, but also helping in establishing 
coordination mechanisms as well as supporting the development of key documents for AFISMA, 
including “operational directives, guidelines for the protection of civilians, rules of engagement and a 
code of conduct.”161 The Conclusions of the Meeting of the Follow-up and Support Group and an AU 
report suggest that the EU was also involved in the joint planning, in cooperation with the three 
other international organisations, Mali and other stakeholders, but in a subsidiary role to the three 
                                                          
statements to the press on matters relating to Africa”, which suggests that there is a common interest on 
behalf of both organisations to cooperate further in this activity, Peace and Security Council, 397
th
 Meeting at 
the Level of the Heads of State and Government, New York 23 September 2013, 
PSC/AHG/COMM/1.(CCCXCVII), 3, para. 8 a. v. 
155
 Letter dated 2 December 2010 from the President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West 
African States addressed to the Secretary-General, Transmission of the communiqué of the Council of Ministers 
of the Economic Community of West African States, Enclosure, Communiqué of the Council of Ministers on the 
report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. S/2012/905 (2012), 3, para. 2. See also, ibid., 3, 
para.7; 4, para. 9. 
156
 Statement by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Security Council, 6905
th
 
meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6905 (2012), 2; Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, supra note 
142, 1-2, para. 4. 
157
 Ibid., 8, para. 45. 
158
 Progress Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African-led International Support Mission in 
Mali, Peace and Security Council, 358
th
 Meeting, 7 March 2013, PSC/PR/2(CCCLVIII), 3, para. 9; Solemn 
Declaration of the Assembly of the Union on the Situation in Mali, Addis Ababa, 27 and 28 January 2013, 3, 
para. 7 (a); Peace and Security Council, 358
th
 Meeting, 7 March 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLVIII), Communiqué, 2, paras. 10-12. 
159




 Ordinary Meeting of the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security, Preparatory 
Meeting of Chiefs of Staff, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 – 30 April 2013, RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013, 5, para. 20; 
6, para. 23. Apparently, despite several planning meetings, ECOWAS didn’t succeed in preparing a strategic 
concept for the operation which was satisfactory for the UN Security Council, ECOWAS Peace and Security 
Report, Issue 1 October 2012, Mali: making peace while preparing for war, 5. 
161
 Statement by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Security Council, 6944
th
 
meeting, supra note 144, 4; Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, supra note 142, 9, para. 
47. See also Security Council Resolution 2085, UN Doc. S/RES/2085 (2012), 5, para. 11. 




other organisations.162 The previously existing concept of operations for the international military 
mission, which would become AFISMA, was transmitted to the Security Council “to seek the latter’s 
total support for its effective implementation.”163 
2. Mandate 
 
AFISMA was endowed with a robust, coercive mandate involving an authorisation of offensive 
combat operations, together with the Malian Defence Forces, including simultaneously the strong 
protection of civilians.164 According to the joint strategic concept of operations, the strategic 
objectives include, inter alia, the protection of “the population with respect to international human 
rights and international humanitarian and refugee law” as well as the reduction of threats posed by 
terrorist and transnational criminal groups and the establishment of a safe and secure environment 
in Mali.165 The Security Council authorised AFISMA to “take all necessary measures, in compliance 
with applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law” to carry out, inter alia, the 
following tasks: 
(b) To support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control 
of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, 
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including AQIM, MUJWA and associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate measures to 
reduce the impact of military action upon the civilian population; 
(c) To transition to stabilisation activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and 
consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities; 
(d) To support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population; (…) 
(f) To protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and 
movement of its personnel;166 
3. Political and Strategic Control of AFISMA 
 
Cooperation on a strategic level is exercised through the established Mali Integrated Task Force 
(MITF) based at the AU Commission167 in Addis Ababa which is composed of representatives of the 
AU, ECOWAS and the United Nations and is “responsible for coordination at the strategic level of 
AFISMA”168 in the form of “strategic guidance and advice for AFISMA.”169 It is furthermore 
responsible to “ensure coordinated strategic implementation of the relevant decisions of the three 
organizations on the situation in Mali.”170 The Secretary-General also recommended that the Security 
Council plays an active role in ensuring that the African-led international military operation is “held 
fully accountable.”171 The Security Council encouraged the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and the UN to 
maintain coordination through the task force in its Resolution 2100 establishing MINUSMA,172 as well 
as through the Support and Follow-up Group and it stressed “the importance of continued 
coordination” between the UN, the AU and ECOWAS.173 
4. Operational Control 
 
A joint coordination mechanism (JCM) for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2085  
was established in Bamako at the operational coordinational cell, under the leadership of the AU 
High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, President Pierre Buyoya who was appointed as the 
                                                          
166
 Security Council Resolution 2085, supra note 161, 4, para. 9. The Security Council also emphasised that all 
support provided by the UN, regional and subregional organisations and Member States “in the context of the 
military operation in Mali shall be consistent with international humanitarian and human rights law and 
refugee law” and mandated the Secretary-General accordingly to observe the adherence to IHL and human 
rights law through a to-be-established multidisciplinary UN presence in Mali, ibid., 6, para. 18; 7, para. 23. 
167
 Enclosure I, Revised joint strategic concept, supra note 165, 14, para. 33. 
168
 Progress Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, supra note 158, 2, para. 6; Statement by Mr. Jeffrey 
Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Security Council, 6944
th
 meeting, supra note 144, 4. 
169
 Statement by His Excellency, Mr. Téte António, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United 
Nations, Security Council, 6905
th
 meeting, supra note 156, 8. 
170
 Solemn Declaration of the Assembly of the Union, supra note 158, 3, para. 7 (c). 
171
 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (2012), supra note 151, 21, para. 89. 
172
 Security Council Resolution 2100, UN Doc. S/RES/2100 (2013), 3, Preamble. 
173
 Ibid., 5, para.5. 




Special Representative and Head of AFISMA,174 following consultations with ECOWAS.175 It is co-
chaired by the AU and the UN.176 Its tasks are to facilitate “regular consultations on political 
leadership, resource mobilization and accountability as well as the monitoring and assessment of 
expenditures”177, thereby coordinating support to the mission.178 The ECOWAS Special 
Representative in Mali, Ambassador Cheaka Touré of Togo was appointed to his Deputy position.179 It 
includes representatives of the AU, ECOWAS and the United Nations as well as members from Mali 
and other partners.180 One can only speculate as to why the early plans of an ECOWAS Mali force181 
were changed to an AU-led international military force, but it is reasonable to presume that a wider 
range of capacities and resource acquirement by the AU were a determinative factor. Moreover, the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs as part of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture might have triggered this development. 
5. Chain of Command 
 
The Chain of Command of AFISMA is headed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission who has 
delegated “overall responsibility” for all AU(-led) organisations to the Commissioner for Peace and 
Security. The AU exercises “operational authority” of AFISMA.182 The Special Representative as Head 
of the Mission exercises “overall AUC authority over civilian, police and military components of 
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AFISMA” whereas the Force Commander and the Police Commander have “operational control over 
assigned forces.”183 
6. Operational/Financial support 
 
The Secretary-General emphasised in his report that the UN does not possess neither capability in 
providing logistical support to international military forces deployed in the context of offensive 
combat operations against hostile armed forces.184 Logistical support based on three possible 
alternatives would be funded through UN assessed contributions and comprise the equipment and 
support services as they would be provided to a UN operation.185  The UN Security Council did not 
authorise the financing of AFISMA itself through assessed contributions,186 but requested the 
Secretary-General in Resolution 2085 to establish a Trust Fund for the operation.187 A donor’s 
conference was convened by the AU in close consultation with ECOWAS in January 2013.188 
The EU committed 50 million Euros through the African Peace Facility for AFISMA189 and promised 
further financial and logistical support in close coordination with the AU and ECOWAS190 following 
the activation of the “Clearing House” mechanisms to support AFISMA,191 under the guidance of the 




 The AU had officially requested the authorisation of a support package funded by UN-assessed 
contributions, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Strategic Concept, supra note 148, 1, para. 
2. 
185
 Letter dated 13 December 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN Doc. S/2012/926 (2012), 1, 2
nd
 paragraph; 3, 1
st
 paragraph. A usual support package includes 
“provision of rations, fuel, engineering works, communications and medical support (…) [and] funding would 
also provide for the strategic deployment of new forces, the rotation of existing forces, the movement of 





 The Security Council considered such an option in the Resolution and charged the Secretary-General to 
refine options within a report. Following the report and the development of events in Mali calling for the 
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AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel.192  The AU decided to contribute 50 Million US Dollars 
to the budget of AFISMA which amounts to 460 Million US Dollars.193 
AFISMA also received logistical support from bilateral and multilateral donors “providing funding and 
reimbursement for operations, critical life support (rations, water and fuel), logistical support for 
strategic and in-theatre movements, direct materiel support and the training of enabling units.”194 
7. Training of Troops 
 
EUTM Mali is supporting the training and reorganisation of the Malian Armed Forces.195 The training 
includes sessions on gender and human rights.196 
8. Coordination and cooperation between the international organisations regarding the 
political process 
 
The PSC of the AU established the Support and Follow-up Group at its meeting in Banako, on 20 
March 2012, to facilitate the resolution of the crisis in the North of Mali.197 Early meetings of the 
Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali were hosted by the EU, co-chaired by the AU, 
ECOWAS and the UN.198 Later meetings of the Support and Follow-up Group were convened by the 
AU. The Group brings together ECOWAS, its member states, the AU, the UN, the EU, the 
International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC), all neighbouring countries, countries of the region, all permanent members of the Security 
Council and other bilateral partners.199 
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 Whereas the group should remain “at the heart of international coordination on the situation in 
Mali”200, the international efforts are mainly coordinated by the triumvirate of ECOWAS, the AU and 
the UN,201 also via the High/Special Representatives for the Region of the involved organisations.202 
The UN favoured this close interaction as it “allow[s] the United Nations to focus on its core 
responsibilities”, but it is also due to this close interaction and “the large numbers of actors involved, 
[that] the United Nations mission [MINUSMA] should provide a strong coordination mechanism.”203 
Generally, there is a lot of coordination between the AU, ECOWAS, UN and the EU also through the 
exchange of documents204 and through meetings on various levels.205 
The UN supported the mediation efforts of ECOWAS through the UN Office in Mali (UNOM) and the 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA).206 
9. Assessment 
 
The unprecedented peacekeeping context and the complexity of the security crisis in Mali have not 
triggered, on their own, such a concerted approach by the involved international organisations. 
External constraints, in the form of a lack of financial and logistical resources particularly, were 
influential in the change of plans from an ECOWAS to an African-led operation.207 It is also plausible 
that the lack of time for long-term mission planning for Mali due to the land gain by the Islamist 
armed groups has forced the UN to interact so intensively with regional organisations which are 
better equipped to rapidly deploy troops than the UN. Generally speaking, one can conclude that the 
standard of cooperation of international organisations in the mandating, planning, deployment and 
supervision of AFISMA is, indeed, unprecedented.   
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Surprisingly, the level of cooperation is actually even higher than for the deployment of UNAMID in 
Darfur. The analysis of the various elements of cooperation has demonstrated that one can speak 
nearly of a “monolithic” peacekeeping operation; excluding the chain of command which is directed 
by the AU, all other elements of the operation were determined on the basis of cooperation and 
coordination arrangements between the AU, ECOWAS and the UN. Regarding the attribution of 
conduct, there is consequently no doubt that conduct arising during the deployment of AFISMA, and 
in violation of international law, would have to be attributed to all three organisations. 
As regards the EU, it is suggested that its contributions to the deployment are also more than 
substantial, resulting in responsibility for the EU in partnership with the three other organisations. 
The EU’s role in Mali has focused particularly on the purely political process of resolving the crisis in 
Mali, as well as on the political level of the peacekeeping operation, remaining true to its policy on 
the African continent. Then again, the EU has not only contributed a major part to the budget of 
AFISMA, but deployed a training mission (EUTM Mali) on the ground to train the Malian Armed 
Forces. It may be recalled that AFISMA, under its mandate, is acting also in support of the Malian 
Armed Forces. Furthermore, the EU has made a more than substantial contribution to the continuing 
operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture of the AU who is the leading 
organisation, in terms of the chain of command of AFISMA. Therefore, it is submitted that these 
contributions of the EU remedy its more limited role in the other areas and, consequently, the EU has 
to be considered responsible for the conduct of AFISMA jointly with the AU, ECOWAS and the UN. 
However, it could be possible to retain a certain distinction between the EU and the AU, ECOWAS 
and the UN. The different input of the EU towards the command and control arrangements of 
AFISMA could be mirrored in the exercise of jurisdiction under human rights law. Whereas the three 
other organisations could possibly exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the spatial model of 




ECOWAS recommended the transformation of AFISMA in a UN stabilization operation, “with a robust 
mandate and a parallel rapid reaction force” based on one of two alternatives proposed by the 
Secretary-General.208 The AU similarly requested such a transition.209 According to a report by the 
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International Crisis Group, “the fear of sending an under-equipped African force into an extremely 
difficult environment requiring costly logistical support, because of the lack of reliable support”, led 
the Security Council to quickly transform AFISMA into MINUSMA.210 The authors of the ECOWAS 
report assert that the transformation was “primarily driven by France’s concern”, and also faced the 
logistical and financial constraints encountered by AFISMA.211 
2. (Elaboration of the) Mandate 
 
It was desired by the AU and ECOWAS to transform AFISMA into a UN operation “with an 
appropriate mandate”; in other words, “it should be a peace enforcement mission based on Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter.”212  
The mandate of MINUSMA was developed in cooperation with the AU: “We welcome the fact that a 
number of our concerns with the draft resolution have been taken into account in the current text. 
We are encouraged by the statements made by several parties that our remaining concerns will be 
taken into account when it comes to implementing the resolution.”213 Both organisations noted “that 
the content of the draft resolution broadly reflects the desire of both organizations, as contained in 
the relevant decisions” of the AU PSC and the ECOWAS Authority.214 They emphasised that the 
anticipated resolution shall “fully incorporate[] the contributions that the two organizations will 
continue to make towards the definitive resolution of the security and institutional crisis facing 
Mali.”215  
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As also noted by the Support and Follow-up Group, the Security Council should  “to ensure that the 
envisaged operation strengthen[s] Malian ownership, build[s] on the achievement made with 
ECOWAS and AU support, and foster[s] enhanced and coordinated African and international 
engagement in support of peace and security in Mali.“216 However, following the adoption of the 
Resolution establishing MINUSMA, the AU criticised the lack of consultation by the UN Security 
Council and noted that its concerns were not taken into account.217 The Security Council, in turn, 
noted that the AU, ECOWAS, the Secretary-General and other international partners did not report 
back to the Security Council every 60 days as requested in its previous Resolution 2085.218 Some 
members of the Security Council felt that the AU has been slow on occasions to act on urgent 
matters. Indeed, the limited AU representation in NY and the lack of meetings of the AU PSC 
members in New York mean that the African countries in the Security Council and the Council itself 
may not always be informed and aware of the AU PSC’s decisions.219  
MINUSMA operates in a similar way to AFISMA under robust rules of engagement and most of the 
military and police forces of AFISMA have been absorbed.220 Under the mandate, MINUSMA troops 
will deploy from major cities in northern Mali, conducting patrols both alone and with the Malian 
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defence and security forces whereby all MINUSMA operations “will take into account the need to 
minimize the risk to civilians.”221  
In this context,  
MINUSMA has a mandate to use all necessary means to ensure the implementation of many elements 
of its mandate, including taking active steps to deter and prevent the return of armed elements to key 
population centres. While that does not describe a peace-enforcement or counter-terrorism role, which 
will be undertaken by others who have capacities beyond the scope of and means of the United Nations 
mandate and capabilities, it will require the United Nations to be as robust as possible in implementing 
that mandate in an environment characterized by threats.
 222
 [Emphasis added]  
All AFISMA troops which are re-hatted under MINUSMA will undergo “predeployment training and 
vetting procedures, including in accordance with the requirements of the United Nations human 
rights screening policy, so as to ensure that they (…) have the necessary skills to implement the 
mandate.”223 The transfer of AFISMA personnel to MINUSMA shall be accomplished in close 
coordination with the AU and ECOWAS.224 Other UN operations in the region are required to share 
logistic and administrative support with MINUSMA to the extent possible.225 
The mandate allows implicitly and expressly for the use of military force. First of all, the Resolution 
states that the mandate of MINUSMA shall be “to stabilize the key population centres, especially in 
the North of Mali, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of 
armed elements to those areas.”226 In Paragraph 17 of the Resolution, however, the Security Council 
returns to the traditional formula explicitly authorising “MINUSMA to use all necessary means.”227 
The mandate further specifically includes the protection of civilians and UN personnel: 
(i) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional authorities of Mali, civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capacities and areas of deployment; (…) 
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(iii) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and 
freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
228 
MINUSMA shall also “monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations 
of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali and to 
contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses.”229 
3. Appointment of the Force Commander 
 
ECOWAS and the AU also requested that the Special Representative leading MINUSMA is appointed 
after “appropriate consultations” with both organisations to contribute to the “African ownership of 
this effort and to optimize the efficiency of the Mission.”230 It could not be verified whether this 
request was approved by the UN. 
4. Political Control 
 
The AU emphasised strongly that the central political roles both of the AU and ECOWAS should be 
recognised “in full partnership with the United Nations Mission” and that these two organisations 
“would maintain a strong presence in Bamako to pursue their political commitment in Mali. 
Secondly, the practice of consultations that has characterized all our joint action on Mali to date 
should continue, especially with respect to major decisions, such as choosing contingents and 
selecting military and civilian leadership.”231 Both organisations have, in pursuance of their political 
commitment, “engaged the United Nations on possible areas of support in terms of strategic and 
operational-level communication, in theatre movement, accommodation, medical care and security 
for their personnel.”232 The AU accordingly established the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel 
(MISAHEL) which was also mandated to promote regional security and cooperation.233 On 4 
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November, the AU affirmed at the ministerial meeting held in Bamako “its readiness to work for the 
establishment of a joint secretariat” on the basis of the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel.234 This 
“flexible technical Secretariat” will serve to support coordination efforts within the region, co-chaired 
by the UN and the AU and also comprising the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), ECOWAS, ECCAS, the 
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD), the World Bank Group, the African Development 
Bank (ADB), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the EU and the OIC.235 The Security Council sent a 
mission to Mali from 31 January to 3 February 2014 which was not only an expression of the full 
support of the Council for the peace process, but also a way of gathering information in order to 
exercise political control.236 The AU and the EU have developed own strategies for the Sahel aimed at 
increasing the cooperation with the other international actors; similar efforts have been undertaken 
by ECOWAS.237 In its resolution renewing the mandate of MINUSMA, the Security Council also called 
upon the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and other key actors to coordinate their efforts for the promotion of 
lasting peace with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and MINUSMA.238 
5. Strategic and Operational Level 
 
The UN Secretariat deepened its cooperation with the AU and ECOWAS regarding the transition from 
AFISMA to MINUSMA through meetings of multidisciplinary teams including “the conduct of a joint 
planning session and the subsequent establishment of a joint AFISMA-MINUSMA mechanism in 
Bamako.”239 Cooperation and coordination is also continued through the Mali Integrated Task Force 
which was established for AFISMA. 240  
6. Cooperation with the EU/EUTM Mali 
 
Regarding EUTM, the Security Council called upon the EU, notably its Special Representative for the 
Sahel, “to coordinate closely with MINUSMA (…) to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in the 
Security Sector Reform.”241 
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The analysis of the structure of MINUSMA, from the point of view of control via and by other 
international organisations than the UN, reaffirms the assessment made regarding the UN operations 
in South Sudan. Indeed, it appears that the influence, control and input of other international 
organisations in UN mandated peacekeeping operations is more limited than the respective control 
and influence exercised by the United Nations over authorised operations.  
In comparison to AFISMA, the inter-institutional control and cooperation arrangements are by far 
more constricted. The complaints raised by the AU about the lack of inclusion in the elaboration and 
formulation of the mandate and the reply by the Security Council relating to the non-submission of 
reports, indicates that there are inter-institutional tensions which might derive from the AU and 
ECOWAS not being willing to limit their engagement immediately after the transfer of authority from 
AFISMA to MINUSMA.  Despite these problems, Mali may represent the beginning of a new era in 
peacekeeping operations in which the political process for conflict resolution and the deployment of 
a peacekeeping operation are included within a wide concerted approach by two or more 
international organisations.  The political process and political consultation serve thereby as the 
“focus point” for the development of the strategy for the to-be-deployed peacekeeping operation.  
It is also noticeable that the EU has been completely marginalised in the debate on and in the 
documents relating to MINUSMA. Bearing in mind the general concept of division of labour as it has 
emerged between the AU, the EU and the UN on the African continent, it corresponds to the limited 
engagement the EU plays in peacekeeping operations on the African continent when it comes to 
direct (military) involvement in peacekeeping operations.  
The overwhelming control exercised by the UN over MINUSMA prevents any contribution by and any 
cooperation with other international organisations from reaching the degree of “more than 
substantial” for the purposes of the law of international responsibility such that it is submitted that 
there is no joint, immediate responsibility of the UN in union with other organisations for the 
conduct of MINUSMA. This does not touch upon the question whether the AU and ECOWAS could 
not be responsible as accessories.  
4. The attempt of a typology of intra-mission relationships, its implications on 
international responsibilityand a clarification of the normative control criteria 
 
The inquiry into the six different peacekeeping operations allowed defining further the contours of 
the suggested criterion of attribution in the context of cooperation in peacekeeping operations.  The 




analysis also showed that the cooperation arrangements existing in each peacekeeping operation are 
unique – for a variety of reasons including political and security interests of the involved actors, the 
availability and lack of resources and institutional cooperation agreements. 
Nevertheless, this part of Chapter V will now attempt to establish a typology of possible relationships 
in intra-mission cooperation based on the different levels of control and cooperation as part of the 
operational framework of a peacekeeping operation. Naturally, such an exercise would be more 
probative where an analysis of all peacekeeping operations of the organisations which include a 
cooperative element, was conducted, but such an exercise would go beyond the scope of the present 
study.  
The examination of the six operations showed that the mandate of the operations was developed on 
the basis of cooperation in all operations, aside from UNMISS and UNISFA.242 Regarding the political 
level, five operations, excluding UNMISS, included cooperation arrangements on the political level, 
partially stretching over to the strategic level.  
Once again, the degree of cooperation in this particular field varies, from limited support by the AU 
and ECOWAS to MINUSMA over equal participation of both the AU and the UN on the political level, 
exclusive strategic control of the UN to joint strategic planning of the UN and KFOR or even the 
exercise of a high amount of strategic control directly by the peacekeeping operation, as in the case 
of UNAMID. Regardless of these differences, this comparison confirms the particular relevance of 
cooperation and control on a political level for the attribution of conduct. 
On the operational level, UNMISS and UNISFA are under the exclusive control of the UN and KFOR is 
under the exclusive control of NATO. Operational control over AFISMA was effectively executed by all 
four organisations, whereas MINUSMA is under UN control, but supported by the AU and ECOWAS. 
Bearing in mind the debate surrounding the adoption of MINUSMA’s mandate, when the AU 
ultimately complained of the lack of consultation in the adoption of the mandate, one could prima 
facie reason that this debate has diminished the involvement of both organisations on the 
operational level.  
However, the analysis showed that the AU and the ECOWAS were eager to contribute to MINUSMA 
on an operational level and this fact rather points towards a general distinction between UN and UN-
mandated operations. It appears that the UN is less willing to incorporate the contribution of other 
actors in its own operations than it is willing to participate itself in UN-authorised operations. This 
particular behaviour is, of course, conditioned also by the role of the United Nations in maintaining 
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international peace and security and its long experience, but nevertheless, it could also be an 
expression of a certain chasse gardée the UN maintains, in practice.  
Consequently one can formulate a first clarification to identify a case of normative control triggering 
the joint responsibility of international organisations. If the peacekeeping operation is a UN 
operation, the amount and level of intra-mission cooperation is likely to be more limited than in the 
case of a non-UN operation so that it is consequently also less likely that the required threshold of 
cooperation will be surpassed to justify an application of the normative control criteria. Furthermore, 
one can formulate a general presumption that a partially competitive relationship between two 
international organisations will translate into political cooperation in a peacekeeping operation and 
less operational cooperation.  This nexus between political control and control on other operational 
levels is required to trigger and justify the application of the criterion of normative control. In this 
regard, one can formulate another general presumption. If the deployment of the peacekeeping 
operation and the political process is based on a comprehensive approach steered by the same 
institutional actors, it reinforces the control and oversight executed over the operation by all these 
institutional actors, increasing thereby the likelihood of a case of joint responsibility. The findings of 
the previous Chapters as in this Chapter further allow writing out in full a possible definition of the 
normative control criterion as developed throughout this study: 
(1) Internationally wrongful acts committed during the deployment of a peacekeeping operation 
may be jointly attributed to two or several international organisations if: 
 
a) the international organisation(s), other than the international organisation(s) under whose 
auspices the peacekeeping operation is deployed, effectively exercise the same degree of  
control over the conduct of the peacekeeping operation as the deploying organisation(s) on 
the basis of: 
(i) existing cooperation arrangements and mechanisms on an inter-institutional level 
between the external organisation(s) and the deploying operation(s) with regard to 
peacekeeping operations and; 
(ii) existing cooperation arrangements and mechanisms on the mission level between 
the external organisation(s) and the deploying organisation(s) and; 
(iii) a direct and immediate link between these cooperation arrangements and 
mechanisms on a political level and those cooperation arrangements and 
mechanisms on a tactical and strategic level in existence between the external 
organisation(s) and the deploying organisation(s) so that command and control over 
the operation is effectively shared (normative control). 





(2) That article is without prejudice to the question if one or several member states of the 
international organisation(s) under whose auspices the peacekeeping operation is deployed 
may be also responsible for internationally wrongful acts occurring during the deployment of 
the operation on the basis of the relevant dispositions of the Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations.   
In this context, a direct and immediate link has to be interpreted in the sense that the exercise of 
political control is in fact indivisible from the exercise of control on both strategic and tactical levels 
of command and control.   
To return to Virally’s classification of relations between international organisations (infra, Chapter II), 
all the peacekeeping operations, which were used as case-studies, show that the relations between 
these organisations are based on coordination and cooperation, rather than confrontation. A variety 
of reasons were established throughout this study for this development which is even more evident 
on the institutional level. The lack of resources in various areas is one main reason and it also 
explains why the relations between the organisations are not completely free of competition. 
However, one can even go so far to ask as to whether regional organisations are not even obliged to 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council with regard to the deployment of a peacekeeping 
operation.   
Chapter I traced the mechanisms for cooperation with regional organisations under the UN Charter, 
but en passant the basic fact was mentioned that regional organisations per se as non-members of 
the UN are not directly bound by the Charter. In the analysis presented in this study, we have seen 
the development of institutionalised relations between the UN and regional organisations, both on 
the institutional level, as well as in the operational context so that it does not “[seem] to be 
sufficient” to limit a legal duty under the UN Charter to member states, contrary to what is asserted 
in the Commentary to Article 48 (2) of the UN Charter.243  
Therefore, on the basis of an analysis of the potential legal foundations, it might also be possible to 
shed even more light upon the application of the normative control criterion to peacekeeping 
operations because if regional organisations were obliged to cooperate or even to implement 
decisions of the Security Council, it would raise questions with regard to direction and control in the 
context of cooperation in peacekeeping operations. Could the UN be responsible on the basis of the 
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fact that regional organisations were obliged to carry out its decision regarding the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation and how would that impair the responsibility of these regional 
organisations?  
5. Chapter VIII revisited – regional organisations as being bound by the system of 
collective security 
 
Regarding the question whether the UN Charter and particularly decisions of the Security Council are 
binding upon entities which are non-members of the UN, Article 2(6) of the Charter comes to mind. 
According to that disposition, the organisation “shall ensure that states which are not Members of 
the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” In addition, Article 48 (2) of the UN Charter 
stipulates that decisions of the Security Council for maintaining international peace and security shall 
be carried out by the Members of the UN “directly and through their action in the appropriate 
international agencies of which they are members.” 
The wording and the context of Article 2 (6) do not suggest that the obligations therein do extend to 
other international organisations.244 However, in the Commentary it is argued that the limited scope 
of Article 2(6) does not allow the organisation to adequately address external threats to international 
peace and security and accordingly it has been “superseded by a universal system of collective 
security which is based upon the relevant Charter provisions but does not derive its legal force from 
the Charter as a treaty (…) [i]t subjects all relevant international actors to the authority of the UN, 
and in particular the SC, with regard to measures necessary for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.”245 They are all “under an obligation to give the UN every assistance in any action 
it takes in accordance with the Charter; and in particular to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
SC.”246  The practice of the UN, and States and non-member States confirms that the UN is 
competent to create obligations for members and non-members alike.  
In 1953, the Security had already expressed the view that it can create obligations for non-members; 
in Resolution 101 the Council recalled “to the Governments of Israel and Jordan”, non-members at 
that time, their obligations under Security Council Resolutions and reaffirmed “that it is essential (…) 
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that the parties abide by their obligations under (…) the resolutions of the Security Council.”247  Since 
the adoption of Resolution 418 in 1977, the Security Council has addressed all resolutions containing 
binding obligations regarding sanctions to all states, although at that time, there were still more than 
10 States which were not members of the organisation.248 The Security Council made clear in that 
resolution that it is binding upon all states.249  
The reference to non-members of the organisation has been continuously replaced over the years 
with references to all international and regional organisations, starting in 1991. Organisations such as 
the EU “have consistently implemented economic and other sanctions decisions of the SC, indicating 
an intention to be bound.”250 Talmon argues that, although the EU is not bound by the UN Charter 
per se, it is “subject to the universal system of collective security and thus bound to comply with the 
decisions of the SC”,251 a view which seemed to be confirmed in Declaration 13 annexed to the Treaty 
of Lisbon, according to which the EU per se, as well as its Member States remain bound by the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.252  
Member-States of the UN have expressed repeatedly over the years the opinion that the powers of 
the UN with respect to maintaining international peace and security apply also to non-members.253 
The ICJ in the Namibia advisory opinion held that non-members of the UN were not bound by Art. 24 
and 25 of the Charter, but that certain decisions of the SC are “opposable to all States (…) [and] that 
it is for non-member States to act in accordance with those decisions.”254 Although the Court’s 
advisory opinion was given within the specific circumstances of the Namibia case, the termination of 
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the mandate, it nevertheless shows that non-member States are supposed to assist actions taken by 
the UN.  
In the Kosovo advisory opinion, the ICJ had another opportunity to express its views on the issue and 
the judges declared that “it has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on 
actors other than United Nations Member States and inter-governmental organizations”255 [Emphasis 
added]. So it appears, the ICJ considered it to be existing practice that the Security Council would 
adopt resolutions binding also upon international organisations.  
Nevertheless, it raises questions about the legal basis of such a binding regime of collective security 
which transcends the boundaries of the UN Charter. One possibility would be to rely on the dictum in 
the Reparations judgment (infra, Chapter III) regarding “the objective international personality” with 
which the UN was created and to argue that the majority of the international community could 
create an “objective” and universal system of collective security. However, as rightly pointed out by 
Talmon, it is very unlikely that the ICJ intended to attribute general-law making power to the UN in 
its advisory opinion.256 Moreover, such an interpretation does not provide an answer regarding a 
valid source of international law for such a system.  The lack of a recognised basis in international law 
is the same problem encountered by arguments of constitutionalism which perceive the Charter as 
the constitution of the international community. Under this theory, the rules of the Charter 
supersede ordinary rules and are binding on all members of the international community.257 The 
problem with this theory is also that its legal source is the preconceived idea on which it is based, so 
that in the end it is a circular argument. 
The only realistic and legally sound argument is that on the basis of practice of the UN and the SC, 
the opinions expressed by member states and the practice of non-member States and regional 
organisations, “at least since the 1990s, the provisions of the Charter dealing with international 
peace and security have acquired the status of customary international law that are binding on non-
members, both States and non-State actors alike, independently of the Charter.”258 
                                                          
255
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, para. 116. 
256
 Talmon, ‘Article 2(6)’, supra note 244, 252, 277, mn. 70. 
257
 Ibid., 252, 278, mn. 72-73. 
258
 Ibid., 252, 279 mn. 75. See also A. Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council. Countermeasure against 
Wrongful Sanctions (2011), 78; T. M. Franck, ‘Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution ?’, in J.A. Frowein, K. Scharioth, 
I. Winkelmann et al. (eds.), Verhandeln für den Frieden – Negotiating for Peace. Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel 
(2003), 95, 97. Klein, writing in 1992, held that “it is unanimously held today that the United Nations may direct 
sanctions against non-members as well as against members”, E. Klein, ‘Sanctions by International Organizations 
and Economic Communities’, in (1992) 30 Archiv des Völkerrechts, 101, 104. 




The present study has demonstrated that there is an abundance of interaction, practice and 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. In this context, the primary responsibility 
for maintaining international peace and security of the Security Council has been emphasised by all 
regional organisations which are part of this study in official documents, as well as in practice. The 
clear trend of regional organisations to seek the authorisation for the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations also suggests that regional organisations consider themselves to be bound by the 
provisions of the UN Charter, on a customary law basis.259 One could therefore say that regional 
organisations have voluntary submitted themselves to the legal obligations which exist under the 
collective system for maintaining international peace and security. 
Are there any implications for the distribution of responsibility between international organisations 
for the purpose of the present study? 
Firstly, in the context of resolutions of the Security Council, it is necessary to distinguish between 
non-binding provisions and provisions which – by the language and the context of the resolution – 
are binding upon regional organisations. Mere recommendations do not create legal obligations and 
they could therefore also not hold the SC responsible if they are acted upon by a regional 
organisation.260 However, the question is, whether specific obligations in mandates of peacekeeping 
operations would legally bind the regional organisations which are mandated. It is now standard 
practice of the Security Council to include dispositions regarding the protection of civilians in the 
mandates as well as dispositions such as “during the deployment of operation X, organisation Y shall 
ensure the respect of the applicable human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law.”  
The Security Council emphasised again the importance of the protection of civilians in the context of 
peacekeeping operations, in a Presidential Statement accompanied by a 78 pages long aide-memoire 
in February 2014.261 Thus, the question arises as to what the implications regarding the law of 
responsibility would be if a binding obligation by the Security Council addressed to a regional 
organisation is either not executed or violated in practice. This question has to be seen in the wider 
context of a breach of an international obligation which will be analysed in the following part of the 
thesis. First of all, one has to distinguish between the different kinds of obligations; the conditions for 
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a breach of a due diligence or an obligation of means by a regional organisation are different from 
the conditions for a breach of an obligation of result. Moreover, if one accepts the view that regional 
organisations are bound by the system of collective security of the UN Charter on the basis of 
customary international law, would the breach of an obligation owed to the Security Council on the 
basis of a mandate amount automatically to a breach of international law or would it be a breach of 
UN internal law only? 
5.2. Breach of an international obligation  
1. Breach of an international obligation in the form of a mandate of a peacekeeping 
operation 
 
Article 10 (2) ARIO stipulates that a breach of an international obligation by an international 
organisation “includes the breach of any international obligation that may arise for an international 
organization towards its members under the rules of the organization.” The Commentary of the ILC 
to Article 10 explains that Paragraph 2 of the disposition includes generally – contrary to that which 
its wording might suggest – all rules of the organisation which may form part of international law.262 
Consequently Article 10 (2) has to be interpreted as covering also cases of breaches of an 
international obligation by an organisation under its own rules towards other legal entities than than 
its members. 
Resolutions of organs of an organisation are considered to be part of the rules of the organisation 
according to Article 2 b) ARIO.263 Thus, it can be questioned whether the breach of a mandate in the 
form of a Security Council Resolution by a peacekeeping operation would amount to a breach of an 
international obligation. According to the Commentary of the ILC, it is disputed which or whether 
rules of international organisations are part of international law or can only be seen as part of the 
“internal” law of the organisation.264  
The ICJ observed in the Kosovo advisory opinion that “[t]he Constitutional Framework derives its 
binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law” 
and concluded that “Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework form 
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part of (…) international law.”265 Mandates of the Security Council, in the form of a resolution, are 
nowadays rather lengthy documents containing various, specific obligations. Therefore, it appears 
first of all that it would be necessary to determine not whether the resolution is part of international 
law, but rather whether one or several specific dispositions are part of international law.  
Regarding the specific context of peacekeeping operations, recent mandates, in particular, contain 
dispositions for the protection of civilians, based on ideas derived from human rights and 
humanitarian law. Article 10 (1) stipulates that the breach of an international obligation exists 
“regardless of the origin or character of the obligation concerned.” Therefore, any breach of a rule of 
international law as enshrined in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation would be a breach of an 
international obligation, without prejudice to the question as to whether the potentially 
corresponding human rights obligation of the international organisation was also breached.266  
Thus, if a United Nations mandated peacekeeping operation breaches an obligation owed to the 
Security Council, which is also part of international law, there are two consequences. Firstly, it 
establishes responsibility under international law for these entities and the conduct could be 
attributed to them. In this context, the question arises as to whether the fact that the obligation was 
also owed to the United Nations and the Security Council impairs upon the attribution of conduct. If 
one were to argue that the Security Council, binding the peacekeeping operation to adopt a certain 
specific conduct was bound itself to monitor the implementation of that resolution, it would, indeed 
influence the attribution of conduct and responsibility, by distinguishing the positive obligations of 
the SC to monitor the conduct and the negative obligation of the peacekeeping operation to abstain 
from certain conduct.267 
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Returning to the distinction between an obligation under the mandate of a peacekeeping operation 
and an independently existing obligation under human rights law, a derogation from human rights 
law by the peacekeeping operation would per se not constitute a violation of human rights law as it 
contains a separate obligation under international law.  
This particular issue became, however, relevant in the case of Al-Jedda before the ECtHR and in the 
form of Article 103 of the UN Charter.  The Court concluded that there was no contradiction between 
human rights law and Security Council Resolution 1546 and did not, accordingly, pronounce itself on 
the potential effect of Article 103 of the Charter.268  
However, in the present context of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, Article 
103 is generally not relevant.269 First of all, it applies to the member states of the UN and to 
agreements concluded by them which are contradictory to their obligations under the UN Charter. 
Moreover, at least the most fundamental human rights norms are considered to be part of jus cogens 
and they would prevail over Article 103 at least, arguably, on their customary law basis.  
Nevertheless, if one takes the view that Article 103 applies equally to the UN itself, it would allow the 
organisation to invoke that disposition to justify non-compliance with an international obligation, 
also with regard to Article 32 ARIO which stipulates that ““[t]he responsible international 
organization may not rely on its rules as justifications for failure to comply with its obligations under 
this Part.”270  
The most interesting aspect is that such an application of Article 103 could even have an impact upon 
the distribution of responsibility between the UN and regional organisations in the context of 
peacekeeping operations. If conduct arising during the deployment of a UN mandated operation 
were to be attributed jointly to the UN and a regional organisation and the Security Council would 
have explicitly derogated in the resolution from a specific human right,271 the subsequent analysis of 
the breach of an international obligation would lead to the paradoxical situation that the UN could 
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rely on Article 103 as a derogation in breach of any violation, whereas the regional organisation 
would, potentially, be responsible on its own,272 despite the fact that the conduct was attributed to 
both of them.   
It is not likely to arise in practice as the mandates given out by the Security Council do not generally 
contain obligations which would derogate from human rights law – rather the opposite – nor be so 
concise and specific to correspond to a particular human rights.273 Although the mandate of recent 
peacekeeping operations are more precise regarding the competences and powers granted to the 
peacekeeping forces, the Security Council continues to rely likewise on the formula of “all necessary 
means”.274 
But this theoretical argument nevertheless underlines not only the complexity of the whole issue, but 
also the importance of the internal law of international organisations in applying the law of 
responsibility. In summary, if regional organisations are considered to be bound by the system of 
collective security as established by the United Nations, specific obligations handed out to these 
organisations by the UN Security Council could also impair the distribution of responsibility between 
the organisations. 
2. Breach of an international obligation in the form of the obligations arising under 
the Internal Law of the organisations 
 
Breaches of international obligations of international organisations in the context of peacekeeping 
operations may also arise in the form of violations of the internal law of these organisations if these 
rules are also part of international law. The following part contains a brief analysis of the internal law 
of the AU, the UN and the EU on the basis of their particular relevance and involvement in all 
examined case studies. 
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1. African Union 
 
Since 2009, the African Union has prioritised the development of a protection of civilians approach 
for AU-mandate peacekeeping operations275 leading in 2010 to the adoption of the Draft Guidelines 
for the Protection of Civilians in African Union Peace Support Operations. According to the 
guidelines, the protection of civilians includes “to ensure the full respect for the rights of (…) the 
individual recognised under regional instruments including the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (…), international law, including humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.276 In 
the same year, the Commission decided to mainstream the draft Guidelines for the Protection of 
Civilians in Peace Support Missions.277 For the further elaboration of the Guidelines, the AU has 
consulted on a regular basis with the UN “to ensure that the development of the Guidelines (…) is 
aligned to the UN approach as closely as possible.”278 Regarding the specific case of detentions in 
peacekeeping operations, one official document suggests that the ASF policy documents do not 
contain any official AU detention policy.279 
Regarding specifically the application of IHL, the status of mission agreement of the African Union for 
the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur region states that the African Union shall ensure that the 
operation is conducted with full respect of the principles and rules of the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols.280   The same disposition is inserted in the SOMA for AMISOM281 so that one can 
probably conclude that it is the current practice of the AU now to demand respect for the principles 
and rules of the Geneva Conventions. In short, the internal documents of the AU confirm the 
application of human rights law and international humanitarian law without containing further 
specific rules regarding the application of these two areas of international law. 
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2. United Nations 
 
Specifically regarding the United Nations, it is suggested that this organisation is bound by human 
rights on the basis of its internal law. The Charter of the United Nations contains several references 
to the promotion and promulgation of human rights. These references are however, very generic and 
do not contain specific substantive obligations for the United Nations.282 On the contrary, the human 
rights provisions in the United Nations Charter are rather “scattered, terse, even cryptic”283, so that 
one cannot read in the Charter what is not there.284 But it is uncontroversial that international 
organisations “may be bound by obligations arising under its constituent instrument.”285 So it is 
beyond doubt that without the activities of the United Nations, human rights would not have 
become a “subject of international interest” and it seems difficult to imagine if not illogical or 
immoral to consider the United Nations not to be bound at least by the most fundamental human 
rights and obligations it is promoting.286 The Capstone document, defines international human rights 
as an integral part of the normative framework of peacekeeping operations, but emphasises 
simultaneously that peacekeeping operations “should be conducted/should act in accordance with 
(…) international human rights law.”287  
As confirmed by the Secretary-General in his report of 2011, the Bulletin on Observance by United 
Nations forces of international humanitarian law is “binding upon all members of United Nations 
peace operations (…)[and]signal[s] formal recognition  of the applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to United Nations peace operations.”288 The bulletin covers the quintessential 
dispositions of international humanitarian law, including some which might not yet be deemed of 
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enjoying a customary law character.289 But it is not applicable to UN authorised operations, and the 
responsibility “to protect and ensure the respect” for international humanitarian law in the latter 
case rests with the state or regional organizations conducting the operation.290 The Bulletin is 
applicable in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.291 It 
provides particularly that the UN force shall “make a clear distinction at all times between civilians 
and combatants (…) Attacks on civilians (…) are prohibited.”292 It is binding only on an internal level, 
but does not possess a binding effect on the external sphere.293  
3. European Union 
 
Article 6(1) TEU states that EU is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, and thereby it lays the ground for the incorporation 
of IHL into the European legal order, it would be a misnomer if principles “so fundamental to the 
respect of the human person” would not fall under this formula.294 Regarding the particular field of 
the CFSP, Article 21 TEU stipulates that “the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided 
by the principles which have inspired its own creation (….) the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity.”295 
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Further human rights obligations of the EU derive from the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights296 
which has the same legal value as the EU Treaties. Naert argues that the EU is already bound by the 
ECHR in substance on the basis of an operation of Article 6 TEU.297 In contrast, Gaja argues that the 
status of the ECHR under EU law is not completely clear. Article 6 (3) speaks of fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the ECHR which points towards a binding effect within EU law, and suggests a status 
of the ECHR under EU law equivalent to other provisions in the treaties.298 
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Regarding the application of IHL under the EU’s internal law, it is submitted that the updated EU 
Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) cannot be considered 
as binding the EU, by a unilateral act, to comply with IHL.299 But it can be argued that, indirectly, 
although on a policy-level, they induce a behavior of compliance of the EU per se with IHL.  EU Heads 
of Mission as well as Commanders of EU civilian and military operations are obliged to include an 
assessment of the IHL situation in their reports about a given State or conflict. Furthermore, the 
importance of preventing and suppressing violations of IHL by third parties shall be considered, 
where appropriate in the drafting of mandates of EU crisis management operations.300 Therefore, 
this strict policy, which may also include sharing information for the purposes of criminal prosecution 
by the ICC,301also puts pressure on EU staff to comply with IHL. Furthermore, the EU should 
cooperate, where appropriate, with the United Nations and relevant regional organisations for the 
promotion of compliance with IHL.302 As the United Nations and other international organisations 
have adopted a similar policy, monitoring and ensuring the compliance of IHL by third parties, there 
is an overlapping network of policy mechanisms to ensure compliance with IHL, also ensuring respect 
of IHL by the staff of international organisations.303  
In summary, the protection of human rights and humanitarian law has been incorporated in the 
internal law of the majority of the examined international organisations. By this fact, it may give rise 
to international responsibility, potentially independent of other violations of human rights or 
humanitarian law, and purely on the basis of international law.  
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5.3. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
 
The Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations contain a set of provisions, entitled 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness, which similarly to dispositions in criminal law justify 
internationally wrongful acts or simply preclude their wrongfulness. Regarding the subject of this 
study, two articles are particularly relevant: consent and self-defence. 
1. Consent – Article 20 ARIO 
 
As the commentary to the ARIO states: “”What is generally relevant is consent by the State on whose 
territory the organization’s conduct takes place. Also with regard to international organizations, 
consent could affect the underlying obligation, or concern only a particular situation or a particular 
course of conduct.”304 
In all recent peacekeeping operations, consent of the host-state is a requirement for the deployment 
of the operation, notwithstanding the possibility that the Security Council could authorise the 
deployment of an operation under a Chapter VII mandate with the consent of the host-state.  
The UN observed in its comments that  
the consent of the host State is not necessary a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of conduct, 
but rather a condition for that conduct, as it is, in fact, a condition for the deployment of any United 
Nations presence in a State’s territory (i.e., a United Nations conference, a United Nations Office, a 
peacekeeping operation (other than a Chapter VII non-judicial accountability mechanism). A State’s 
consent for the presence of the United Nations or for the conduct of its operational activities in its 




Consequently, consent under the ARIO is not a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, which ex-post 
facto remedies the wrongfulness of a certain act, but it prevents the act from being wrongful in the 
first place. The UN also therefore further pointed out in its comments that “in the practice of the 
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United Nations there are no instances of an unlawful act or conduct of the Organization consented 
by, or remedied by consent of, the “injured” entity.”306  
Consent of the host state on whose territory the peacekeeping-operation is deployed cannot be 
invoked as an excuse for human rights or any other violations of international law committed by the 
peacekeeping operation.  The consent of the host state is given bona fide towards the deployment of 
the peacekeeping operation and not as a form of carte blanche regarding all potential violations of 
international law by the operation.307 In fact, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or the Status of 
Mission Agreement (SOMA) which are normally concluded between the peacekeeping operation and 
the host-state regulate the questions of compensation and complaint procedures for violations which 
might arise during the deployment of the operation. In summary, consent of the host state prevents 
the deployment of the peacekeeping operation on the territory from being unlawful, but it does not 
touch upon any potential violation of human rights or humanitarian law as it might arise during the 
deployment of the troops. 
2. Self-Defence – Article 21 ARIO 
 
From a conceptual point of view, self-defence like consent should be seen as a primary, permissive, 
rule rather than as a secondary rule or as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, a fact which was 
also recognised by the ILC. The Commission nevertheless decided to include a specific disposition in 
order to state that “the principle that the use of force in self-defence precludes the wrongfulness of 
the acts in which force is so used.” 308 
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Article 21 of the Articles of the ILC stipulates that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of an international 
organization is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-
defence under international law.” This article therefore relegates to the primary rules of 
international law.309  The commentary to the corresponding article on self-defence in the articles on 
state responsibility further explains that 
the term ‘lawful’ implies that the action taken respects those obligations of total restraint applicable in 
international armed conflict, as well as compliance with the requirements of proportionality and of 
necessity inherent in the notion of self-defence. Article 21 simply reflects the basic principle for the 
purposes of Chapter V, leaving questions of the extent and application of self-defence to the 
applicable primary rules referred to in the Charter.
310 
Special Rapporteur Gaja therefore also proposed the deletion of such a specific disposition in his 
seventh report.311 As this proposal was not accepted by the majority of the commission312, Mr. Gaja 
abstained from reiterating it in the 8th report.313 
Self-defence under Article 21 has to be distinguished from “self-defence” as it is used in the context 
of peacekeeping operations. The Commentary of the ILC explicitly acknowledges that, in the practice 
of UN forces, self-defence “has often been used in a different sense” and it stipulates that it covers 
those cases other than when an international organisation responds to an armed attack by a state.314 
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First of all, it appears correct to observe that self-defence by international organisations in 
peacekeeping operations is closer to “self-defence” as defined in national law, governing principally 
“interindividual relations.”315 Secondly, in the practice of the UN, references to self-defence “have 
been made also in relation to the ‘defence of the mission’”316 or to “the defence of the safe areas and 
the civilian population in those areas.”317  So, in these references, “the term is given a meaning that 
encompasses cases other than those in which (…) an international organization responds to an armed 
attack by a State” and they do therefore not fall under Article 21; “the question of the extent [and 
the conditions] to which United Nations forces are entitled to resort to force depends on the primary 
rules concerning the scope of the mission.”318 
Thus, Article 21 is not applicable to the conduct of peacekeeping operations, unless the 
peacekeeping forces respond to an armed attack in the sense of Article 21. Otherwise, their mandate 
as well as the applicable provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law provide the 
conditions under which they may resort to military force in “self-defence”. 
5.4. Assessment of Chapter V  
 
Starting with the different case-studies with regard to the attribution of conduct, followed by an 
analysis of breach of an international obligation and an examination of relevant circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness, this Chapter highlighted the complexity of the topic of the present study, as 
well as the legal uncertainties associated with many aspects, e.g. the question if and under which 
conditions regional organisations are directly bound by the UN Charter. 
The case-studies confirmed the previously formulated view that any appraisal of the attribution of 
conduct hinges on the specific circumstances of the case. In this context, in order to attribute the 
conduct of a peacekeeping operation to organisation(s) that are not part of the chain of command, 
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an intimate link in the form of a strong nexus between the political control they exercise and control 
over the operational conduct of the operation is necessary.  The existence of such a link could also 
serve as a main sign that the required threshold for an application of the criterion of normative 
control is reached and that one of the involved organisations would assume the responsibility on 
behalf of the other involved organisations in any possibly existing case in court.319  
The case-studies confirmed furthermore that there is, indeed, a division of labour emerging between 
the different organisations regarding the deployment of peacekeeping operations, particularly with 
regard to the African continent. Depending on the specific situation, the involvement of each 
organisation varies in conformity with its defined “niche” within the established division of labour. 
The EU, which is deploying a training mission in Mali, has announced the deployment of a civilian 
mission in Mali in mid-February 2014.320  In Somalia, the EU deployed a training mission, whereas in 
the Central African Republic, it will deploy a limited military operation.  
With regard in particular to AFISMA, the question is also raised if the traditional distinction between 
not only peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, but also UN and UN-authorised 
operations is still valid or already out of date.321 The cooperation mechanisms in AFISMA illustrated 
an involvement of the UN, and also other organisations, on various levels of command and control. 
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 To “promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security” and “to 
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security” - these were the wishes of the 
founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations – and universal peace remains a desirable 
ideal.1 Peacekeeping operations deployed by the United Nations and regional organisations have 
become a major tool for conflict regulation in the 21st century.  
Universalist and regionalist positions, with regard to maintaining international peace and security, 
have converged in the practice of international organisations. Cooperation between international 
organisations has emerged as the key driver in defining roles or niches in the system of collective 
security and in establishing a division of labour for the mutual benefit of the involved organisations. 
This development included the institutionalisation of relations among the actors, as well as an 
increase in cooperation in the operational context – during the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations. This process benefited from the wide margin of discretion provided for the Security 
Council under the United Nations Charter. International law has played a double role with regard to 
cooperation between international organisations and the maintenance of international peace and 
security. On the one hand, peacekeeping operations as a tool for conflict resolution could not have 
been “invented” without the recognition of the concept of “implied powers” as applicable to 
international organisations. On the other hand, the non-existence of established international legal 
rules regulating the conduct of international organisations and questions of their responsibility under 
international law resulted in a decades long purely practice driven approach, which in turn created 
further legal uncertainties.  
The bon mot that international humanitarian law is always one war behind concerning the regulation 
of armed conflict, as referred to in the introduction of this study, is most certainly also applicable to 
the context of the international responsibility of international organisations. For several centuries, 
following the Westphalian peace, the system of international law was based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of states, and characterized by a purely bilateral conception of the relations 
among states. The possibility that several actors could be jointly responsible was absolutely 
systemfremd (alien to the system). The Articles on State Responsibility, as codified, in 2001 therefore 
only admit the possibility of joint responsibility in the limited circumstances of aid or assistance, 
direction and control, or coercion. In addition, an article on plurality of responsible states was 
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inserted in the project, without, however, defining the necessary criteria for a joint attribution of 
conduct. The 2011 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations did not contain any 
assimilation of the criteria for the attribution of conduct on recent practice, but they were 
transferred from the previous set of articles on state responsibility. They are therefore an expression 
of several centuries of practice within a state-centric system, at least to the extent that they define 
the rules on the attribution of conduct.  
As it was rightly acknowledged by the ILC and its Special Rapporteur, the practice of international 
organisations is sparse in some areas due to the fact that they are new entities in the international 
arena, at least in comparison to states. Moreover, the feedback or enthusiasm of international 
organisations in commenting on the project was not overwhelming, which is per se not surprising; 
from an organisational point of view, the legal uncertainties associated with the non-existence or at 
least non-codification of applicable rules on responsibility were outmatched by the liberty of conduct 
it afforded them. One could even raise the question whether the cooperation among international 
organisations, and in particular the high intensity of cooperation in the area of the maintenance of 
international peace and security had taken place if legal rules with regard to the responsibility of 
international organisations would have existed when the UN and the first regional organisations 
were founded.   
The central research question, this study endeavoured to explore, whether international 
organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operations can be jointly responsibility for violations of 
international law occurring during the deployment of such operations can be responded to 
affirmatively. In particular the case-studies illustrated that there are instances, in which 
internationally wrongful acts can be attributed not only to one, but to two or several international 
organisations.   
An analysis of the applicable legal framework to peacekeeping operations, illustrated that the 
complex interplay of cooperation mechanisms and arrangements is accompanied by a complicated 
network of applicable norms which multiplies the potential for joint responsibility of international 
organisations. The fact that internationally wrongful acts of peacekeepers could possibly be 
attributed jointly to international organisations – applying the normative control criterion – on the 
basis of violations of different primary norms increases the flexibility and the likelihood that 
international organisations can be hold responsible under international law. 
In the end the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations have proven to be 
unsuitable for regulating the responsibility of international organisations in the context of 
peacekeeping operations as they are based on the premise that cooperation among international 
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organisations is the exception rather than the rule.  Whereas, on the one hand, it could be seen as a  
lacuna, on the other hand, it was already highlighted in the discussions within the ILC that the 
context of peacekeeping operations might be too specific to fall under any general rule of attribution 
(infra,  4.1.3.1.). The decision of the commission to abstain from including any specific disposition on 
peacekeeping operations therefore allows for an elaboration of an applicable rule by other actors, as 
well as in practice.  The present study proposed the creation of a new criterion of attribution, namely 
“normative control” based on the intertwined cooperation arrangements between international 
organisations on various levels of command and control in a peacekeeping operation and in 
conformity with the lex specialis rule contained in Article 64 ARIO. 
Nevertheless, the present study has illustrated that the evolution of relations among the UN and 
regional organisations was also induced by several external and internal factors, among which are 
scarcities of resources and competition for legitimacy, which also led the organisations to develop 
their competences in complementary areas and based on different doctrines to deploy peacekeeping 
operations. These non-legal, external factors also add to the difficulty in defining the applicable legal 
framework. In addition, the relations among international organisations, and particularly, in the area 
of maintaining international peace and security are continuously evolving and non-static. In the 
course of their evolution, there may be other instances of confrontation or repositioning of certain 
organisations which would also affect some of the specific findings of this study, such as the 
emerging division of labour for maintaining international peace and security on the African 
continent. Furthermore, another obstacle exists in the form of a casuistic approach taken by 
international organisations in cooperating in peacekeeping operations.  A thorough study and 
analysis of other case-studies of peacekeeping operations might allow shedding more light on the 
criterion for the attribution of conduct in peacekeeping operations.   
However, two new obstacles are already on the horizon, which concern the further multiplication of 
actors involved in peacekeeping operations. On the one hand, inter-mission cooperation between 
peacekeeping operations is increasing; on the other, peacekeeping operations have now started to 
use private contractors for certain tasks such as guard duties around camps.2 Furthermore, states 
have resorted to deploying troops in peacekeeping operations which are part of bi- or multinational 
cooperation arrangements, thus following the concepts of smart defence or sharing and pooling. In 
mid-February 2014, France and Germany announced the deployment of parts of the Franco-German 
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brigade to Mali as part of EUTM Mali.3 The brigade itself is under joint French-German command, but 
it is incorporated into the command structure of Eurocorps.  This new multiplication of involved 
actors will further increase the likelihood for joint responsibility and consequently will also increase 
the likelihood that the threshold for the application of the normative control criterion will be 
surpassed. 
The development towards more cooperation between international legal entities and the 
multiplication of actors, however, is not confined to the particular field of peacekeeping operations, 
but appears in all areas of activities regulated by international law. Thus, even on a larger scale, it is 
necessary to reflect upon the current state of the development of the law and mechanisms of 
international responsibility in order to prevent a further disconnect between the legal framework 
and reality. The more power international organisations have, the more important the effective 
regulation of responsibility of international organisations is.4 Arguments of legal certainty also 
warrant the formulation of such a recommendation. As it was pointed out by Thomas Franck:  
The fairness of international law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first by the degree to 
which the rules satisfy the participants’ expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits 
and secondly by the extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with what the 
participants perceive as right process.
5 
Any alternative approach focusing solely on a specific field of international law could possibly also 
contribute to a further fragmentation of international law.  
A start would be to adapt the framework for international dispute settlement which in its current 
state is based on a bilateral conception.  As the analysis in Chapter IV illustrated, the invocation of 
international responsibility also raises certain problems which are in similar fashion an expression of 
the bilateral conception of international dispute settlement. In doctrinal writings, it has been 
suggested that it could be possible to establish an international or World Court for Human Rights 
which would have the competence to review the conduct of peacekeeping operations.6  
However, this is an idea which would possibly cause more problems than it would solve, including a 
further fragmentation of international law. In any case, it is unlikely that states would subscribe to 
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such an idea, as the opposition of a considerable group of states towards a ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC demonstrates. One could rather envisage the Security Council requesting an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the application of human rights 
law to international organisations, as well as the criterion for the attribution of conduct to two or 
more international organisations. An advisory opinion of the ICJ would have the advantage over a 
World Court for Human Rights that it would be universally accepted, without being, legally binding, 
therefore safeguarding also a margin of discretion for states and international organisations.  
The question is, however, whether such a proposal would correspond to the interests of the UN, 
other international organisations and states alike. Major changes to the international legal system 
are not possible without the involvement and the agreement of states. Although, in practice, the UN 
assumes that it is exclusively responsible for the conduct of UN Peacekeepers, it is unlikely that the 
United Nations would voluntarily subscribe to an acceptance of responsibility for the conduct of UN 
authorised forces or for any conduct of other international organisations under the concept of joint 
responsibility. It is also implausible that other international organisations would voluntarily accept 
joint responsibility. 
Of course, a UN internal attempt of regulation would also be feasible, for instance, within the Sixth 
Committee of the GA which is the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in the GA, 
or even within the SC – Article 64 ARIO refers expressly to the existence of lex specialis rules. With 
regard to the Security Council, however, the Latin expression of “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?”  
(Who guards the Guardian?) comes to mind. Bearing in mind the mandate of the Security Council, it 
could be questioned as to whether the Security Council could possibly elaborate a just and fair rule of 
attribution or as to whether such an attempt at regulation would not correspond to putting the fox in 
charge of the henhouse. The wider participation in the GA might be better suited to accommodate 
any such concerns.   
The law of international responsibility in its current state of development also enhances the 
probability of a further augmentation of cooperation among states and international organisations 
alike. As long as they do not enter into cooperation arrangements with the intent of committing 
violations of international law, the existing legal framework will not allow joint responsibility.  
The dispositions under the ARIO, as well as under the Articles on State Responsibility, require an 
element in the form of intent to allow the attribution of conduct also to one or more other actors 
and as indicated above, they do not define the criterion under which states or international 
organisations could otherwise be held responsible. Therefore, the lack of effective regulation creates 
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some leeway for international organisations and states to enhance their cooperation arrangements 
without a real or substantial risk of being held accordingly responsible.  
Consequently, although international organisations might be unwilling to contribute to the regulation 
of cases of joint responsibility, their involvement in any attempt at regulation, be it in the form of 
cooperation agreements specifying the distribution of responsibility or via a request of an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ, would be, from their point of view, beneficial as it would allow them to influence 
and even steer the outcome. In any case, they could contribute their expertise to the regulation 
attempts. The alternative is that courts and tribunals will attempt to regulate this question insofar as 
they have jurisdiction. Bearing in mind the forthcoming accession of the EU to the European 
Convention of Human Rights, further judgments not only on the responsibility of international 
organisations but also on joint responsibility, can be expected.7   
The role of states with regard to potential further regulations of joint responsibility appears to be 
unclear. On the one hand, the elaboration of rules on the joint responsibility of international 
organisations will possibly increase their protection from being held responsible for acts of organs 
which were seconded to these organisations.  On the other hand, the development of rules on the 
joint responsibility of international organisations could trigger the development of similar rules for 
states; the ARIO were also based upon the Articles on State Responsibility. An important aspect in 
this discussion is the arrangement for financial restitution within the different international 
organisations. So far, there is no standard model for international organisations to process claims for 
financial restitution and to pay compensation, including for damages arising in the context of 
peacekeeping operations. Of course, reasons of legal certainty and transparency support a proposal 
of a standardised regulation of financial damages by international organisations. The problem is that 
states, despite being generally willing to cooperate with international organisations, could be 
opposed to any regulation at the organisational level as it could be perceived as a transfer of 
competences and a loss of sovereignty.8  
According to Article 40 ARIO, a responsible international organisation “shall take all appropriate 
measures (…) to ensure that its members provide it with the means for effectively fulfilling its 
obligations under this Chapter” and the “members of a responsible international organization shall 
take all the appropriate measures that may be required (…) in order to enable the organization to 
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fulfil its obligations.” Thus, depending on the nature of arrangements for financial restitution in an 
international organisation, the main contributors to the budget of the organisation might be opposed 
to any efforts or undertakings which would increase the likelihood of international organisations 
being responsible, if compensation would be paid by the general budget of the organisation and not 
primarily or entirely by those states whose agents or organs might have contributed to or caused the 
internationally wrongful act. Thus, it appears that within the wider framework of the international 
community, any attempt or undertaking to further regulate the responsibility of international 
organisations can only be carried out effectively if states agree.9  
Focusing once more on the specific subject of the present study, several practical recommendations 
can be made.  
First, with regard to the fields of human rights and humanitarian law, it would be commendable if the 
UN and regional organisations were to engage in activities regarding the clarification of rules 
applicable in peacekeeping operations. The United Nations could, for example, adopt a bulletin on 
human rights obligations to be observed while deploying peacekeeping operations.10 Legal 
uncertainty, particularly in the form of diluted responsibility, can also negatively impair the efficiency 
and performance during the deployment of a peacekeeping operation “as the various actors involved 
might not feel fully in charge.”11 
Moreover, bearing in mind in particular the complex cooperation arrangements for AFISMA, it is 
recommended that the UN and regional organisations include dispositions regarding the distribution 
of responsibility in their respective agreements if they cooperate in peacekeeping operations.12 It is 
even more relevant and necessary to prevent blame shifting between the various involved actors as 
in the Srebrenica cases where both theNetherlands denied responsibility and the UN claimed 
immunity, which in the end, also corresponds to a denial of responsibility.13 
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Regarding the wider question of the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, it is 
recommended to elaborate upon a standard model agreement which may be used to expand and 
formalise consultation and cooperation between the UN and regional organisations for the specific 
context of the maintenance of international peace and security.14 It could even include articles 
regarding the question of international responsibility. The AU had also recommended enhanced 
consultations between the AU PSC and the UN Security Council.15 
As noted by the Security Council itself, there is a need “for a comprehensive analysis of lessons 
learned from practical cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union”16 and this 
statement is equally valid for the practical cooperation between the United Nations and other 
regional organisations. 
Regarding the interaction and the relations with the AU, the Security Council needs to address in a 
systematic manner the issue of the funding of AU peace support operations undertaken with the 
consent of the UN, through the use of UN assessed contribution.17 Such an engagement is not only 
necessary to increase the effective maintenance of international peace and security on the African 
continent, but also in order to address the legal implications of the power wielded by the UN over 
the AU with regard to the payment of AU peacekeeping operations. Naturally, the EU is also advised 
to do so accordingly for the financial mechanisms on the basis of its African Peace Facility. 
The example of Mali showed that the UN and regional organisations have to adapt to new security 
challenges and that includes increasing the rapid deployment capacities of all international 
organisations.18 
Finally, it is recommended that NATO institutionalises its relations with the UN and establishes a 
permanent mission to the UN in New York.19 It would allow the Alliance to be more actively involved 
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 meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6903 (2013), 52. 
19
 Such a proposition was already contained in the report NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. 
Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 17 May 2010, 
25. The AU decided to strengthen its Permanent Mission to the UN in New York in September 2013, “including 
through the establishment of a dedicated standby team to support African members on the Security Council”, 
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in debates at the UN and it would prevent that NATO is further sidelined regarding the deployment 
of peacekeeping operations. 
The limited scope of this study only permitted an insight into the specific field of cooperation of the 
United Nations and four regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. The study confirmed the 
original premise it was set out to explore, the question as to whether the existing legal framework 
would be appropriate to regulate the conduct of international organisations cooperation in 
peacekeeping operations. But it also became evident that a major transformation of international 
law is currently taking place towards a less state-centric, multi-actor network of institutionalised and 
multifarious relations which poses questions with regard to the general regulation of international 
responsibility under international law, as well as the general direction and conception of 
international law as a system. This study might serve as a stepping stone for further studies and 
inquiries with regard to these complex questions the international community is confronted with. 
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Cooperation of International Organisations in Peacekeeping 
Operations and Issues of International Responsibility – Summary 
 
Cooperation between international organisations in peacekeeping operations has emerged as a 
major tool in the past few years to maintain international peace and security, in various forms and 
including different actors. In Sudan, the UN and the AU deployed a hybrid peacekeeping operation, 
whereas in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, NATO and the UN used the so-called “dual key” arrangements for 
the authorisation of airstrikes. Nevertheless the potential implications of these cooperation 
arrangements between international organisations in terms of the law of international responsibility 
had been neglected nearly entirely until recently. Various studies and reports by international bodies 
such as the ILA or the Institut de droit international opted for a state-centric approach, focusing on 
the responsibility of international organisations per se or in connection with their respective 
members. In similar fashion, the doctrinal approach was predominated by publications with regard 
to the responsibility of member-states with international organisations or for acts of the latter, also 
following the adjudication of several cases such as Behrami/Saramati before the European Court of 
Human Rights.  The Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) adopted by 
the International law Commission (ILC) of the UN in 2011 also only provide for joint responsibility of 
international organisations in very limited circumstances, for instance, aid and assistance. 
This study therefore sets out to explore – as the main research question – whether international 
organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operations could be jointly responsible for violations of 
international law occurring during the deployment of the operation.  For various reasons, including 
the geographic origin of the institutional actors and their prominence in deploying and contributing 
to peacekeeping operations, the scope of this study shall be limited to the UN and four regional 
organisations, NATO, the EU, the AU and ECOWAS.  
The study follows to a certain extent, the approach taken for the implementation of the law of 
international responsibility by starting the analysis with the consideration of the question if acts of 
international organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operations could be attributed to more than 
one international organisation. In this regard, it is necessary to analyse the legal framework 
applicable to the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter (Chapter 
VII), for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations (Chapter VIII), as well as the 





Chapter I of this thesis commences with a short analysis of the drafting history of these two chapters 
of the UN Charter at Dumbarton Oaks and the “re-activation” of the Security Council following the 
end of the Cold War during which the effective implementation of the mandate of the Council was 
hindered by the two opposing blocks within the Security Council and their veto rights, i.e. the USA 
and the USSR.  The drafting history of the Charter portrays the relevant Chapters of the UN’s 
constituent instrument as a compromise between supporters of a regionalist and universalist 
conception of the system of collective security. This balanced approach towards the maintenance of 
international peace and security is an incentive for cooperation between the UN and regional 
organisations. Indeed, the ensuing examination of the practice of the UN following the end of the 
Cold War, and the legal framework for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations shows that 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in matters pertaining to international peace 
and security has risen dramatically following the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping operations have 
been transformed from small lightly armed ceasefire-monitoring forces to massive, multidimensional 
operations with mandates involving both military and civil objectives such as state-building.  
In this regard, several observations can be made. First of all, there is an emerging division of labour 
between the UN and regional organisations with regard to peacekeeping operations. The former 
focuses on the deployment of multidimensional, traditional operations, whereas more “robust” 
operations are put on the ground by regional organisations. However, the inquiry into the practice of 
the UN shows that the Security Council has on various instances handed out mandates which 
effectively blur the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The very 
latest examples of practice seem to indicate a tentative trend towards an abolishment of the 
distinction between these two concepts.  
This aspect is particularly relevant as depending on the qualification of a military operation as either 
a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, an authorisation by the Security Council for a 
regional organisation could be necessary under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.  The following section 
consequently analyses the legal framework for cooperation between the UN and regional 
organisations under Chapter VIII of the Charter. It became evident that the compromise between 
regionalism and universalism within the whole UN Charter is mirrored within the specific dispositions 
of Chapter VIII of the Charter. Article 52 of the UN Charter gives priority to regional organisations for 
the settlement of local disputes, whereas Article 53 itself is a compromise itself between the 
universalist and the regionalist perception of collective security. On the one hand, the UN may use 
regional organisations for enforcement action under its authority; on the other, regional 
organisations may not take enforcement action on their own without an authorisation by the 




restrictive in practice; the Security Council may rely on regional organisations for any kind of 
enforcement action including non-military measures. In contrast, should regional organisations 
decide to act on their own, an authorisation of the Security Council is only necessary for these 
enforcement actions involving the use of military force. It is therefore only traditional peacekeeping 
operations by regional organisations with a mandate limited to the use of force in self-defence that 
would not fall under the authorisation requirement of Article 53. 
In reality, nowadays the Security Council relies exclusively on Chapter VII to mandate regional 
peacekeeping operations and invokes Chapter VIII solely with regard to the institutional relations 
between the UN and regional organisations. 
Overall, a complex structure for maintaining international peace and security has emerged between 
the UN and regional organisations in which the gap between universalism and regionalism is bridged 
by flexible and pragmatic cooperation between these actors. The emerging division of labour 
between the UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping operations based on cooperation is an 
impetus for a scenario in which the UN and regional organisations might be jointly responsible.  The 
casuistic approach taken in practice by the Security Council also requires that any criterion of 
attribution is capable of capturing this varied nature of interaction between the involved 
organisations.  
The following Chapter II proceeds with the top-down approach of analysis chosen for the topic of the 
present study and tries to ascertain whether the findings of Chapter I can be further corroborated by 
examining the relations between the UN and regional organisations.  Therefore, having explored the 
wider legal framework under the UN Charter in Chapter I, Chapter II of the study seeks to verify and 
reappraise the findings of Chapter I by analysing the evolution of the institutional relations between 
the different international organisations. 
The analysis shows that an increasing complexity of institutionalised relations between the UN and 
regional organisations, involving elements of check and balances and mutual interdependencies has 
developed.   
Furthermore, a certain division of labour not only between the UN and one regional organisation, but 
also between the UN and several regional organisations is emerging. Following the end of the Cold 
War, NATO has transformed itself into a global security actor with an array of various partnership 
programmes around the globe, while simultaneously limiting core strategic interests and its 
engagement in peacekeeping operations to the Euro-Atlantic area.  NATO’s engagement in 
peacekeeping operations on the African continent is limited to small-scale support of air transport 




the fact that the former colonial powers which are members of NATO and the EU alike prefer to act 
in Africa through the various instruments at disposal of the latter. In contrast to NATO, the EU is very 
active in peacekeeping efforts on the African continent and a loose triangle of security actors has 
emerged for that purpose. Whereas the UN will provide and mandate multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations with a rather traditional mandate, in terms of the use of force, the AU has 
stepped up as the organisation focusing on providing troops for operations with more tangible 
mandates, pending a potential transformation later on to a UN operation. The EU itself focuses on 
two issues in particular.  First of all, the EU provides financial and other support, such as training of 
troops for the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the 
legal framework of the AU. This activity also includes for instance the funding of AU peacekeeping 
operations such as AMISOM.  Moreover, the EU has taken up to deploy short-term and small-scale 
operations under a Security Council mandate in support of UN operations or in the form of a bridging 
operation until a UN operation can be deployed. These short-term deployments comprise civil or 
training missions, for instance EUTM Mali.  
The ongoing collaborative efforts to operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture have 
seen ECOWAS prevented from developing substantial relations with the UN, NATO or the EU. On the 
contrary, as part of the APSA, the attention of the non-African organisations has focused on the AU 
as the organisation with a mandate to maintain international peace and security on nearly the whole 
African continent. However, as the example of Mali illustrates, ECOWAS is also emerging as a 
somehow independent security provider in its region alongside the AU and in cooperation with the 
other international organisations. 
 Several external and internal factors have induced these involuntarily and voluntary developments. 
Scarcities of resources and competition for legitimacy have driven the organisations to develop their 
competences in complementary areas for the deployment of peacekeeping operations. On an 
internal level, an acquired awareness of the fact that today’s conflicts require complex solutions 
which cannot be carried out by a single actors, has led them to seek cooperation with other 
organisations.  
The analysis of the various cooperation agreements, partnerships and declarations also allows the 
shedding of light upon the potential distribution of responsibility among the international 
organisations with regard to violations of international law occurring in peacekeeping operations. 
The extensive analysis shows that cooperation between international organisations in peacekeeping 
operations now covers all levels of an operation from the training of troops to pre-planning to the 
deployment on the ground. This fact increases the likelihood that two or several international 




the form of the African Peace Facility – and the UN – by assessed contributions – for AU 
peacekeeping operations has underlined the influence and control that one organisation can also 
exercise over another due to specific cooperation arrangements. Both financial mechanisms provide 
for a request by the AU for funding which has to be approved by either the Political or Security 
Committee of the EU or the UN Security Council, as well as reporting requirements. The denial of 
funding by the organisations could effectively prevent an AU peacekeeping operation from being 
deployed and it therefore furnishes both organisations with an effective tool in order to make their 
political aims for any AU peacekeeping operation to be effectively heard.  
With regard to the question of joint responsibility, the analysis of cooperation arrangements and 
mechanisms in Chapter II demonstrates an increasingly interplay between all organisations. This 
continuing institutionalisation of relations among these organisations indicates that it is, in fact, 
rather likely that conduct arising in the context of a peacekeeping operation and in violation of 
international law will entail the responsibility of two or more international organisations. The triangle 
of relations between the UN, the EU and the AU suggests that it is quite likely that these three 
organisations will be jointly responsible in the context of a peacekeeping operation on the African 
continent. In contrast, it emerges that ECOWAS and NATO play more of a supporting role in the 
context of African peacekeeping operations and that accordingly their responsibility might be limited 
to a supportive role.  Nevertheless Chapter II demonstrates once more the pragmatic and casuistic 
approach taken by all involved actors and it underlines the necessity to critically analyse the specific 
cooperation arrangements and mechanisms within a given peacekeeping operation. 
In order to hold an international organisation responsible, it is required that conduct is not only 
attributable to that given organisation, but that the latter is also in breach of an international law 
obligation. Chapter III therefore serves to shed some light on the material law applicable to 
peacekeeping operations. It starts with a brief overview of the concept of legal personality which is a 
requirement to hold any international entity responsible under international law. It is then followed 
by a short section on the dual nature of peacekeeping operations, as organs deployed by an 
international organisation, but also consisting of troops whose sending states have normally only 
transferred operational command and control to the international organisation. 
Depending on the mandate of a peacekeeping operation and circumstances on the ground, both 
human rights and international humanitarian law might be applicable to international organisations. 
As international organisations are not contracting parties to conventions in either of these fields of 
law, it is necessary to examine other foundations for primary obligations under international law.  It 




human rights and international humanitarian law which specifically concern the scope ratione 
materiae, ratione loci  of these bodies of law.  
With regard to human rights law, several theories have been advanced to justify the application of 
human rights law to international organisations including arguments binding international 
organisations on the basis of human rights obligations of their member states. The exercise of 
jurisdiction by international organisations and the question of the application ratione loci of human 
rights law are notably problematic. As international organisations are per se aterritorial entities 
without territory of their own, it is argued that they could only exercise jurisdiction under human 
rights law in circumstances similar to a state acting extraterritorially.  
International jurisprudence generally accepts two models of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
control over a territory (spatial model) or based on control over a person (personal model of 
jurisdiction), although both models have been also conflated in practice. On the basis of their limited 
international legal personality, international organisations can be only bound by these specific 
human rights, which are pertaining to activities they are operating in under their constituent 
instruments.  
The application of international humanitarian law to international organisations is insofar less 
problematic than human rights law as it is not bound to a specific territory and as it is triggered 
automatically by any active participation in a conflict. However, the scarcity of practice by 
international organisations is the cause of other problems. Thus, whereas the general application of 
IHL to international organisations is not disputed, there is no agreement in legal scholarship and 
jurisprudence as to whether peacekeepers would be qualified as civilians or combatants under 
international law and whether the law of international or non-international armed conflict would be 
applicable if a peacekeeping operation of an international organisation becomes directly involved in 
a specific conflict, depending also on which side of a conflict an international organisation intervenes.  
Violations of international law as they occur during the deployment of peacekeeping operations are 
normally violations of the most fundamental norms which are equally protected under the law of 
international armed conflict, the law of non-internal armed conflict, as well as under human rights 
law. Human rights law is nowadays deemed also to apply in times of armed conflict which raised the 
question how to determine the applicable law in times of a conflict of norms of IHL and human rights 
law. Following the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion and in particular in its Legality of the Threat or Use of 




norm on a case-by-case basis whereby it should generally be tried to interpret conflicting norms 
harmoniously.  
The common feature throughout the analysis of the law applying to peacekeeping operations is that 
its application is always dependent on specific circumstances and in that regard its application 
corresponds well to the casuistic approach of peacekeeping operations. This actually increases the 
likelihood that two or more international organisations can be jointly responsible for violations of 
international law occurring in a peacekeeping operation.  
One possibility is that the joint attribution of conduct to international organisations is based on 
violations of different primary norms. Whereas the UN might have been exercising jurisdiction on a 
territorial basis in a given situation and was bound to prevent a certain conduct, another regional 
organisation could have been exercising jurisdiction on a personal basis and was obliged to abstain 
from a certain conduct.  
The final section of Chapter III looks into the application of the law of occupation to peacekeeping 
operations.  The application of this body of law requires that a peacekeeping operation has to 
exercise a degree of control over a given territory similar to that of the national state – which has 
only happened rarely in practice, such as in the case of UNMIK. Moreover, the international 
administration of a territory by a peacekeeping operation aims at rebuilding a state and functioning 
government structures and the maintenance of peace and security which is not in conformity with 
the law of occupation whose aim it is to safeguard the status quo of a given territory. Bearing in mind 
other arguments, such as the practice by the UN, it therefore argued that the law of occupation is 
not applicable to peacekeeping operations.  
Chapter IV examined the law of international responsibility to ascertain whether the articles on the 
responsibility of international organisations as developed by the International Law Commission are 
adequate and fit to regulate the cooperation of international organisations in peacekeeping 
operations, bearing in mind the results of the analysis conducted in Chapters I to III. It starts with an 
analysis of the specific circumstances provided for in the ARIO to hold international organisations 
jointly responsible for violations of international law. Article 7 ARIO regulates the attribution of 
conduct to international organisations in cases of organs placed at their disposal by other 
international organisations or states. It stipulates that if the receiving international organisation is 
exercising effective control over the seconded organ, acts of the latter are considered as acts of the 
international organisations and are attributed to it accordingly. This disposition is the gateway to an 
analysis of the law of responsibility for peacekeeping operations as it is deemed generally applicable 




organisation itself is responsible for the conduct of the peacekeeping operation. However an analysis 
of case-law by national and international courts and tribunals demonstrates that in practice there is 
no discernible rule under international law for the attribution of an organ seconded to an 
international organisation by another international organisation or by a state. In fact, although 
Article 48 ARIO and comments by the Special Rapporteur of the ILC stipulate that two or more 
organisations may be jointly responsible, the ARIO fail to provide any indication of the required 
conditions outside the context of two other specific dispositions contained in the ARIO. Article 14 
and 15 allow for the attribution of conduct to an international organisation which is aiding or 
assisting another international organisation in the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
(Article 14) or exercising direction and control over another international organisation committing an 
internationally wrongful act (Article 15). These articles, however, operate on the presumption that 
one organisation is acting in an auxiliary capacity (Article 14) or that the acting international 
organisation is completely dominated by another organisation (Article 15). They are therefore simply 
not appropriate or nor capable of regulating the cooperation of international organisations in 
peacekeeping operations based on cooperative contributions by various international organisations 
on different levels and in varied forms depending on the specific circumstances of the case. 
The suggestion is therefore, in accordance with Articles 64 and 65 ARIO, to elaborate a lex specialis 
criterion of attribution for the specific context of cooperation in peacekeeping operations, referred 
to as normative control in order to remedy for the existing lacuna under the ARIO. The argument is 
that the network of cooperation between international organisations in this particular area 
necessitates a different approach than contained in the articles of the ILC, according to which the 
attribution of conduct to an international organisation is not based upon a contribution to a specific 
single act, but stems from the exercise of control over the operation via several components of the 
whole framework under which a peacekeeping operation is set up. It is emphasised that such a 
criterion has to be applied depending on the specific circumstances, last but not least, because each 
peacekeeping operation is unique in its mandate and with regard to the political circumstances.  An 
important feature of the criterion of normative control is the exercise of influence and control on the 
basis of the institutional ties existing between the involved organisations, both on the inter-
institutional, as well as on the mission level. 
The applicability and suitability of this newly suggested criterion of attribution in the context of 
international organisations cooperating in peacekeeping operations is reviewed in Chapter V which 
included several case-studies. These case-studies consist of KFOR in Kosovo, UNAMID in Sudan, 
UNMISS and UNISFA in South Sudan and AFISMA and MINUSMA in Mali. Using this chronological 




among these organisations which are becoming increasingly institutionalised. Another benefit of this 
approach is that it allowed to further define the suggested criterion of normative control based on 
the fact that the evolution towards more cooperation between international organisations in 
peacekeeping operations takes place simultaneously on the intra-mission level. Therefore, whereas 
the framework for cooperation is rather limited in the case of KFOR and UNMIK, the case-study of 
both operations in Mali demonstrate the full integration of the whole mission and the linked political 
process within a cooperative framework. KFOR as the first case-study confirms the hypothesis that an 
intimate link between the control exercised on a political and on the other levels is necessary to 
justify holding one or several organisations responsible for the acts of a peacekeeping operation 
formally deployed by another international organisation. This is based on the fact that the 
cooperating organisations are not part of the military chain of command of the respective 
peacekeeping operation. The documents published with regard to KFOR did not justify holding both 
the UN and NATO jointly responsible for the acts of KFOR, in contrast to the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Behrami/Saramati in which acts of KFOR were considered to be 
attributable to the UN. 
UNAMID in Darfur is unique as a peacekeeping operation as it was set up from the beginning as a 
hybrid operation by both the UN and the AU. A main difference to KFOR is that the deployment of 
UNAMID is directly linked to the management of the political process in Darfur. In fact, UNAMID was 
even responsible itself for steering the implementation and the management of the peace process. 
With regard to the required nexus between political control based on the institutional relations 
among the organisations and control on operation-related levels, UNAMID’s organisational make-up 
surpasses this threshold so that it appears justified to submit that both organisations would normally 
be jointly responsible for violations of international law occurring during the deployment of the 
operation. UNAMID further allows the formulation of the assumption that the involvement of the 
same actors within the political peace process and on the operational level is likely to result in a 
reinforced exercise of control and oversight over the peacekeeping operation by all actors, thereby 
increasing the potential for joint responsibility.  
A different picture presents itself in South Sudan. UNISFA and UNMISS were both deployed under UN 
auspices. Whereas the peace process in South Sudan is led by the AU, its influence and political 
control over the peacekeeping operation is not mirrored in the strategic and operational control 
arrangements. South Sudan therefore confirms the presumption formulated in the context of 
UNAMID that a situation where the same institutional actors are steering both the political process, 
as well as the operational and strategic levels of a peacekeeping operation is likely to lead to a joint 




of international law occurring during to the deployment of UNISFA and UNMISS to both the UN and 
the AU. However, it is possible to formulate yet another assumption: As the UN is not only the 
international organisation with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security but also the organisation with the highest amount of related practice, it appears that it is 
less willing to accept external cooperation than peacekeeping operations deployed by the regional 
operations which are part of the present study. A final interesting feature of UNMISS and UNISFA is 
the inter-mission cooperation mechanisms with UNAMID. The lack of detailed information on these 
arrangements does not warrant to consider even the possibility that the AU may be jointly 
responsible for the conduct of UNMISS or UNISFA through this yet additional layer of cooperation. 
AFISMA which was deployed in Mali before being transformed to MINUSA can be seen as the prime 
example for cooperation among the UN and regional organisations. The level of cooperation 
between the UN, the AU, ECOWAS and also the EU surpasses all other previously examined 
peacekeeping operations and justifies the consideration of all organisations to be jointly responsible 
with the qualification that the more limited operational engagement of the EU could be 
compensated by its more substantial involvement and control by providing funds through the African 
Peace Facility.    
MINUSMA confirms the previously formulated assumption that the degree of cooperation between 
the UN and regional organisations appears to be more restricted in operations under UN auspices. 
Nevertheless, MINUSMA and Mali generally may represent the beginning of a new era in 
peacekeeping operations in which the political process for conflict resolution and the deployment of 
a peacekeeping operation are included within a wide concerted approach by two or more 
international organisations. The overwhelming degree of control of the UN exercised over MINUSMA 
prevented any contribution by and any cooperation with the other international organisations from 
reaching the degree which would trigger and justify the application of the criterion of normative 
control.  
The following attempt of a typology of intra-mission relationships illustrates again the casuistic 
approach taken to peacekeeping operations by international organisations. However, all 
peacekeeping operations demonstrate an approach based on coordination and cooperation, rather 
than confrontation. The section afterwards scrutinises anew Chapter VIII of the UN Charter from the 
point of view that the practice of the UN and regional organisations has created a customary law 
basis under which the regional organisations could be directly bound themselves by the UN Charter. 
Indeed, bearing in mind, in particular the abundance of practice examined in this study and the fact 
that regional organisations increasingly seek the authorisation of the Security Council for the 




directly bound by the UN Charter on a customary law basis. The implication of this argument is that it 
creates an additional layer of obligations by regional organisations which could give rise to the 
responsibility of international organisations in the form of precise obligations contained in a Security 
Council Resolution authorising the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, it 
increases once again the likelihood of joint responsibility as one could consider the UN to have 
breached its obligation under human rights law and a regional organisation to have breached an 
obligation under the mandate of the operation, presupposing that a violation of a UN mandate and 
thereby UN internal law also corresponds to a violation of international law. This particular question 
is analysed in the subsequent part of Chapter V and responded to affirmatively.  In addition to 
creating an additional layer obligations in the form of primary norm for regional organisations, there 
are other consequences, for instance, a derogation from human rights law in the mandate of a 
peacekeeping operation would not correspond to a derogation from human rights law per se, as the 
mandate has to be considered independently of the corresponding human rights obligation.  The 
regional organisations which are part of this study also possess further obligations under their own 
internal law prescribing obligations based on considerations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, a quick overview of which is presented in the final part of Chapter V. The very end 
of the final Chapter of this thesis also deals with circumstances precluding wrongfulness which could 
justify internationally wrongful acts similar to dispositions in criminal law. The consent of a host-state 
to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation regularly constitutes the legal basis for the 
deployment of the operation in the first place, but it cannot be seen as a carte blanche by the host-
state consenting to all potential violations of international law occurring during the deployment of 
the operation as also follows from the Status of Force Agreements or Status of Mission Agreements 
concluded regularly between the international organisations and the host-state.  The wording of 
Article 20 ARIO likewise stipulates that the wrongfulness of the act in question would be only 
precluded in relation to the international organisation or State which has given its consent, meaning, 
the host-state. 
Self-defence under Article 21 ARIO has to be interpreted in the traditional understanding under 
international law as a reaction involving the use of force to an armed attack so that it generally has to 
be distinguished from the understanding of “self-defence” in the context of peace operations. Self-
defence in peacekeeping operations is understood to cover acts for the defence of the mandate and 
is primarily conceived as covering “interindividual relations”. However, should a peacekeeping 





The final Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recommendations. Cooperation between 
international organisations has emerged as the key driver in defining roles or niches in the system of 
collective security in this study. International Law was two-fold beneficial for this development. The 
non-existence of established international legal rules applicable to international organisations 
resulted in a decade long, purely practice driven approach, which, although creating legal 
uncertainties, might not have been possible if legal rules applicable to international organisations 
were to have existed when the UN was founded. Peacekeeping operations per se would not have 
been possible without the recognition that international organisations possess “implied powers”.  
The evolution of cooperation between international organisations cannot be seen as purely 
voluntary, but was also a result of external factors providing urgent incentives such as the scarcity of 
resources or claims for legitimacy. New further obstacles might arise resulting from the further 
multiplication of actors. Peacekeeping operations are increasingly deploying private contractors for 
specific purposes such as guard duties and states have started to deploy binational or multinational 
brigades such as the French-German brigade of which parts are deployed to EUTM Mali.  The 
development towards more cooperation between international actors as encountered in this study is 
not limited to the particular field of peacekeeping operations, but rather part of a general 
development within international law. It is therefore generally necessary to further develop the law 
of international responsibility to prevent a further disconnect between the legal framework and 
reality. A lacuna remains in the ARIO as international organisations entering into cooperation 
arrangements without the intent to commit violations of international law cannot be hold 
responsible.  
A starting point might be an attempt to reform the system of dispute settlement, but any such 
undertaking requires the support of states and international organisations alike. Doctrinal 
propositions include a World Court of Human Rights, but it is unlikely that states would support any 
such idea. An alternative would be to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the application of 
human rights law to international organisations and the required criterion for the attribution of 
conduct to two or several international organisations. The persisting obstacle with all suggestions for 
an enhancement of the regulation of conduct by cooperating international organisations is that the 
involved actors would refuse any ideas that are contrary to their interests.  External pressure such as 
the accession of the EU to the ECHR may therefore beneficial as it might motivate international 
organisations and state alike to participate in any undertaking of regulation which can also be 
appealing for these actors as it would allow them to influence or possibly even steer the outcome.  
In similar fashion, there are arguments for and against states to get involved in any attempt of 




possibly increase their protection from being held responsible for acts of organs seconded to 
international organisations, such as peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless there are two reasons 
why they might to refuse to support such a measure. First of all, any further development of the 
rules of international organisations could trigger the development of similar rules for states. 
Secondly, in particular the main contributing countries to a budget of an international organisation 
might be also opposed to any efforts which would increase the likelihood of international 
organisations being responsible. Effective changes therefore require the participation of states and 
international organisations alike. 
With regard to the specific topic of the study, some specific recommendations can be made. The UN 
and regional organisations should engage in activities clarifying the application of IHL and human 
rights law to peacekeeping operations. One possibility would be for the UN to adopt a bulletin on the 
applicability of human rights law. The UN and regional organisations should include dispositions 
regarding the distribution of responsibility in their respective agreements if they engage in 
cooperation activities in peacekeeping operations. The UN should also give thought to developing a 
standard model agreement which may be used to expand and formalise consultation and 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. Finally, the issue of reliable funding for AU 




Samenwerking tussen internationale organisaties tijdens 
vredesoperaties en vraagstukken rond internationale 
aansprakelijkheid – Samenvatting 
 
De laatste jaren is de samenwerking tussen internationale organisaties tijdens vredesoperaties 
opgekomen als een belangrijk middel om de internationale vrede en veiligheid te bewaren, in 
verscheidene vormen en met inbegrip van verschillende actoren. Zo hebben hebben de VN en de AU 
in Soedan een hybride vredesoperatie uitgevoerd, en hanteerden de NAVO en de VN in de jaren ’90 
in Joegoslavië het zogenaamde “twee-sleutelsysteem” om toestemming te geven voor het uitvoeren 
van luchtaanvallen. Aan de potentiële gevolgen van deze samenwerkingsafspraken tussen 
internationale organisaties voor het internationaal aansprakelijkheidsrecht is tot voor kort echter 
weinig aandacht besteed. Diverse studies en rapporten van internationale instanties zoals de ILA en 
het Institut de droit international hebben de staat als uitgangspunt genomen en zich geconcentreerd 
op de aansprakelijkheid van de internationale organisaties of van hun respectieve leden. Het debat 
werd eveneens gedomineerd door publicaties over de aansprakelijkheid van lidstaten voor het 
handelen van internationale organisaties, bijvoorbeeld na de uitspraak van het Europees Hof voor de 
Rechten van de Mens in de zaak Behrami/Saramati. De Artikelen inzake de Aansprakelijkheid van 
Internationale Organisaties (AAIO), die in 2011 werden aangenomen door de Commissie voor 
Internationaal Recht (ILC) van de VN, behelzen ook een beperkte aansprakelijkheid van 
internationale organisaties in een zeer beperkt aantal gevallen, bijvoorbeeld in geval van steun en 
bijstand. 
Deze studie stelt daarom de vraag of internationale organisaties die samenwerken in vredesoperaties 
gezamenlijk aansprakelijk kunnen zijn voor schendingen van het internationaal recht die plaatsvinden 
tijdens het uitvoeren van de operatie. Om verschillende redenen, waaronder de geografische 
oorsprong van de betrokken instellingen en hun rol in het inzetten van en het bijdragen aan 
vredesoperaties, zal deze studie zich beperken tot de VN en vier regionale organisaties: de NAVO, de 
EU, de AU en ECOWAS.  
De studie volgt in zekere mate dezelfde benadering die gebruikt is voor de toepassing van het 
internationaal aansprakelijkheidsrecht, en begint de analyse met de vraag of de daden van 
internationale organisaties die samenwerken bij vredesoperaties kunnen worden toegerekend aan 
meer dan één organisatie. Hiervoor was het nodig om het juridisch kader te analyseren dat van 
toepassing is op de handhaving van de internationale vrede en veiligheid onder het Handvest van de 




alsmede de ontwikkeling van interinstitutionele samenwerkingsregelingen tussen de VN en regionale 
organisaties. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift omvat allereerst een beknopte analyse van de 
ontstaansgeschiedenis van deze twee hoofdstukken uit het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties, 
tijdens de Conferentie van Dumbarton Oaks, en de “reactivering” van de Veiligheidsraad na het einde 
van de Koude Oorlog, waarin de effectieve uitvoering van het mandaat van de Raad gehinderd werd 
door de twee conflicterende machtsblokken die zitting hadden in de Veiligheidsraad en daar een 
vetorecht hadden, namelijk de VS en de Sovjet-Unie. Uit de ontstaansgeschiedenis van het Handvest 
kan worden afgeleid dat de relevante hoofdstukken van dit oprichtingsverdrag van de VN een 
compromis zijn tussen aanhangers van een regionalistisch en een universalistisch concept van 
collectieve veiligheid. Deze evenwichtige benadering ten aanzien van de handhaving van de 
internationale vrede en veiligheid stimuleert de samenwerking tussen de VN en regionale 
organisaties. Uit de hieropvolgende analyse van de handelwijze van de VN na het einde van de Koude 
Oorlog en van het juridische kader voor vredeshandhavings- en vredesafdwingingsoperaties blijkt 
inderdaad dat de samenwerking tussen de VN en regionale organisaties in zaken betreffende 
internationale vrede en veiligheid aanzienlijk is toegenomen na het einde van de Koude Oorlog. 
Vredeshandhavingsoperaties zijn veranderd van lichtgewapende troepen die toezicht houden op een 
staakt-het-vuren naar omvangrijke, multidimensionale operaties met mandaten die zowel militaire 
als civiele doelstellingen omvatten, zoals inspanningen om staten op te bouwen. 
Hierbij kunnen een aantal waarnemingen worden gedaan. Allereerst neemt de arbeidsverdeling 
tussen de VN en de regionale organisaties bij vredesoperaties toe. Terwijl de VN zich concentreert op 
het inzetten van multidimensionale, traditionele operaties, worden de “robuustere” operaties 
uitgevoerd door regionale organisaties. De analyse van de handelwijze van de VN heeft echter 
getoond dat de Veiligheidsraad meermaals mandaten heeft gegeven waarin het onderscheid tussen 
vredeshandhavings- en vredesafdwingingsoperaties vervaagd was. De meest recente 
praktijkvoorbeelden duiden op een lichte tendens tot het afschaffen van het onderscheid tussen de 
twee concepten.  
Dit aspect is in het bijzonder relevant omdat de aanduiding van een militaire operatie als een 
vredeshandhavings- dan wel een vredesafdwingingsoperatie bepaalt of een regionale organisatie 
toestemming van de Veiligheidsraad nodig heeft krachtens Hoofdstuk VIII van het Handvest van de 
VN. Daarom analyseert de volgende paragraaf het juridisch kader voor samenwerking tussen de VN 
en regionale organisaties onder Hoofdstuk VIII van het Handvest. Het werd duidelijk dat het 
compromis tussen regionalisme en universalisme in het gehele Handvest van de VN weerspiegeld 




van de VN geeft voorrang aan regionale organisaties voor het behandelen van lokale geschillen, 
terwijl Artikel 53 in zichzelf een compromis is tussen de universalistische en de regionalistische 
benadering van collectieve veiligheid. Aan de ene kant kan de VN regionale organisaties gebruiken 
voor handhavingsmaatregelen onder haar eigen verantwoordelijkheid, aan de andere kant kunnen 
regionale organisaties zelf geen handhavingsmaatregelen treffen zonder toestemming van de 
Veiligheidsraad. In het eerste scenario worden en werden de handhavingsmaatregelen gezien als 
minder beperkend in de praktijk; de Veiligheidsraad kan een beroep doen op regionale organisaties 
voor allerlei handhavingsmaatregelen, niet alleen militaire maatregelen. Indien regionale 
organisaties daarentegen besluiten om zelf actie te ondernemen, is toestemming van de 
Veiligheidsraad alleen vereist wanneer de handhavingsmaatregelen gebruik maken van militair 
geweld. Om die reden vereisen alleen de traditionele vredeshandhavingsoperaties, uitgevoerd door 
regionale organisaties wier mandaat alleen toestemming verleent voor het gebruik van militair 
geweld in geval van zelfverdediging, geen toestemming krachtens Artikel 53. 
In de praktijk baseert de Veiligheidsraad zich altijd op Hoofdstuk VII om een mandaat te verlenen 
voor regionale vredeshandhavingsoperaties, en doet het alleen een beroep op Hoofdstuk VIII 
wanneer het de institutionele betrekkingen tussen de VN en regionale organisaties betreft. 
Globaal gesproken is er een complexe structuur voor de handhaving van de internationale vrede en 
veiligheid ontstaan tussen de VN en regionale organisaties, die de brug slaat tussen universalisme en 
regionalisme door een flexibele en pragmatische samenwerking tussen deze partijen.  
De opkomende arbeidsverdeling gebaseerd op de samenwerking tussen de VN en regionale 
organisaties in vredesoperaties is een impuls voor een scenario waarin de VN en de regionale 
organisaties gezamenlijk aansprakelijk zouden kunnen zijn. De casuïstische benadering die 
voortvloeit uit het handelen van de Veiligheidsraad vereist eveneens dat iedere afweging die leidt tot 
toerekening organisaties rekening houdt met het wisselende karakter van de interactie tussen de 
betrokken organisaties. 
Hoofdstuk II vervolgt de hiërarchische benadering die is gekozen voor de analyse van dit studieobject 
en poogt vast te stellen of de bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk I verder bevestigd kunnen worden door 
middel van een onderzoek naar de betrekkingen tussen de VN en de regionale organisaties. Nadat in 
Hoofdstuk I het bredere juridische kader is verkend, beoogt Hoofdstuk II van deze studie de 
bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk I te verifiëren en opnieuw te beoordelen middels een analyse van de 




De analyse toont dat er geïnstitutionaliseerde betrekkingen met een toenemende complexiteit 
gevormd zijn tussen de VN en de regionale organisaties, waaronder elementen van controle en 
waarborgen, alsmede onderlinge afhankelijkheden. 
Daarnaast is geconstateerd dat er niet alleen een zekere arbeidsverdeling ontstaat tussen de VN en 
één regionale organisatie, maar ook tussen de VN en meerdere regionale organisaties. Na het einde 
van de Koude Oorlog heeft de NAVO zich omgevormd in een mondiale veiligheidsactor met een reeks 
samenwerkingsprogramma’s in de hele wereld, en beperkt ze tegelijkertijd haar centrale strategische 
belangen en haar bijdragen aan vredesoperaties tot het Euro-Atlantische gebied. De betrokkenheid 
van de NAVO bij vredesoperaties op het Afrikaanse continent is beperkt tot kleinschalige steun, zoals 
luchttransporten of andere diensten, op expliciet verzoek. De afzijdigheid van de NAVO kan 
gedeeltelijk verklaard worden door het feit dat de voormalige koloniale machten die lid zijn van de 
NAVO en de EU liever in Afrika ingrijpen met gebruikmaking van de verschillende instrumenten 
waarover de EU beschikt. In tegenstelling tot de NAVO is de EU zeer actief betrokken bij de 
vredeshandhaving op het Afrikaanse continent en een losse driehoek van veiligheidsactoren heeft 
zich ontwikkeld met dit doel. Terwijl de VN multidimensionale vredesoperaties zal voorzien van een 
meer tranditioneel mandaat waar het het gebruik van geweld betreft, is de AU opgekomen als de 
organisatie die zich concentreert op de inzet van troepen met een meer concreet mandaat, in 
afwachting van een eventuele latere VN-operatie. De EU zelf concentreert zich in het bijzonder op 
twee kwesties. Allereerst geeft de EU financiële en andere steun, zoals de opleiding van troepen voor 
de operationalisering van het Afrikaans Vredes- en Veiligheidsbestel (APSA), binnen het juridische 
kader van de AU. Deze activiteit omvat bijvoorbeeld ook de financiering van vredesoperaties van de 
AU, zoals AMISOM. Daarnaast heeft de EU korte, kleinschalige operaties uitgevoerd onder het 
mandaat van de Veiligheidsraad ter ondersteuning van VN-operaties of om de tijd te overbruggen in 
afwachting van de inzet van een VN-operatie. Deze korte operaties omvatten civiele en 
opleidingsmissies, zoals bijvoorbeeld EUTM Mali. 
De huidige gezamenlijke inspanningen om het Afrikaanse Vredes- en Veiligheidsbestel te 
operationaliseren hebben ECOWAS gehinderd in het aangaan van substantiële betrekkingen met de 
VN, de NAVO en de EU. Aan de andere kant hebben de niet-Afrikaanse organisaties zich 
geconcentreerd op de AU, dat deel uitmaakt van de APSA, als de organisatie met het mandaat om de 
internationale vrede en veiligheid te handhaven op vrijwel het gehele Afrikaanse continent. 
Desalniettemin, zoals geïllustreerd door het voorbeeld van Mali, komt ECOWAS op bepaalde wijze 
ook naar voren als een onafhankelijke waarborger van de veiligheid in haar regio, naast de AU en in 




Verscheiden externe en interne factoren hebben geleid tot deze onvrijwillige en vrijwillige 
ontwikkelingen. Beperkte middelen en concurrentie over de legitimiteit hebben de organisaties 
aangemoedigd om hun eigen competenties voor vredesoperaties te ontwikkelen in werkvelden die 
elkaar aanvullen. Op het interne niveau hebben ze meer samenwerking met andere organisaties 
nagestreefd door een toenemend bewustzijn van het feit dat de conflicten van deze tijd complex zijn 
en niet door één enkele partij opgelost kunnen worden. 
Het analyseren van de verschillende samenwerkingsovereenkomsten, partnerschappen en 
verklaringen wierp ook licht op de potentiële verdeling van de aansprakelijkheid onder de 
internationale organisaties met betrekking tot schendingen van het internationaal recht tijdens 
vredesoperaties. De uitvoerige analyse heeft getoond dat de samenwerking tussen internationale 
organisaties in vredesoperaties nu alle niveaus van de operatie beslaat, variërend van het opleiden 
van de troepen tot het voorbereiden van de inzet van deze troepen. Deze ontwikkeling vergroot de 
waarschijnlijkheid dat twee of meer internationale organisaties inderdaad gezamenlijk aansprakelijk 
zullen zijn. In het bijzonder de financiering door de EU – via de Afrikaanse Vredesfaciliteit – en de VN 
– via de vastgestelde bijdragen – van de vredesoperaties van de AU onderstrepen de invloed en de 
controle die de ene organisatie uitoefent over de andere door middel van specifieke 
samenwerkingsovereenkomsten. Beide financiële mechanismes treden in werking na een 
financieringsverzoek door de AU, dat door het Politiek en Veiligheidscomité van de EU of door de VN-
Veiligheidsraad moet worden goedgekeurd, naast rapportageverplichtingen. Indien deze organisaties 
financiering weigeren kan dit feitelijk de uitvoering van de vredesoperatie tegenhouden; dit voorziet 
beide organisaties dus van een effectief instrument om ervoor te zorgen dat hun politieke 
doelstellingen bij een AU-vredesoperatie worden gehoord. 
Met betrekking tot de kwestie van gezamenlijke aansprakelijkheid heeft de analyse van de 
samenwerkingsovereenkomsten en -mechanismes in Hoofdstuk II een toenemend samenspel tussen 
alle organisaties aangetoond. Deze voortgaande institutionalisering van de betrekkingen tussen 
organisaties leidt ertoe dat het in feite redelijk waarschijnlijk is dat een handeling die plaatsvindt ten 
tijde van een vredesoperatie en die het internationaal recht schendt, onder de aansprakelijkheid van 
twee of meer internationale organisaties zal vallen. De driehoek van de betrekkingen tussen de VN, 
de EU en de AU suggereert dat het behoorlijk waarschijnlijk is dat deze drie organisaties gezamenlijk 
aansprakelijk zullen zijn tijdens vredesoperaties op het Afrikaanse continent. ECOWAS en de NAVO 
spelen echter eerder een ondersteunende rol bij Afrikaanse vredesoperaties en hun 
aansprakelijkheid zal daarom ook daartoe beperkt blijven. Hoofdstuk II toont nogmaals de 




noodzaak om de specifieke samenwerkingsovereenkomsten en -mechanismes binnen een bepaalde 
vredesoperatie kritisch te analyseren. 
Om een internationale organisatie aansprakelijk te kunnen stellen is het niet alleen vereist dat de 
handeling toerekenbaar is aan deze organisatie, maar ook dat deze een schending vormt van een 
verplichting onder het internationaal recht. Hoofdstuk III werpt daarom licht op het materiële recht 
dat van toepassing is op vredesoperaties. Het begint met een korte beschrijving van het concept van 
rechtspersoonlijkheid, hetgeen een vereiste is om eender welke internationale entiteit aansprakelijk 
te kunnen stellen uit hoofde van het internationaal recht. Hierna volgt een korte paragraaf over het 
tweeledige karakter van vredesoperaties, als organen van een internationale organisatie die 
tegelijkertijd bestaan uit troepen wier thuisland normaalgesproken ook de operationele bevelvoering 
en controle heeft overgedragen aan de internationale organisatie. 
Afhankelijk van het mandaat van de vredesoperatie en de lokale omstandigheden kunnen zowel de 
mensenrechten als het internationanaal humanitair recht van toepassing zijn op de betreffende 
internationale organisaties. Aangezien internationale organisaties geen partij zijn bij verdragen op 
deze twee rechtsgebieden is het noodzakelijk om te zien of er andere bronnen zijn voor de relevante 
primaire verpflichtingen onder het internationaal recht. Het wordt snel duidelijk dat er veel juridische 
onduidelijkheden zijn bij de toepassing van de mensenrechten en het internationaal humanitair 
recht. Deze onduidelijkheden hebben specifiek betrekking op de materiële en geografische reikwijdte 
van  deze rechtsgebieden. 
Met betrekkingen tot de mensenrechten zijn er verscheidene theorieën geopperd om de toepassing 
van mensenrechten op internationale organisaties te rechtvaardigen, zoals argumenten die 
internationale organisaties verplichtingen opleggen gebaseerd op de verplichtingen van hun 
lidstaten. Het uitoefenen van jurisdictie door internationale organisaties en de kwestie van de 
geografische reikwijdte van mensenrechten waren in het bijzonder problematisch. Aangezien 
internationale organisaties per definitie entiteiten zonder eigen territorium zijn is er wel gesteld dat 
zij alleen jurisdictie konden uitoefenen uit hoofde van de mensenrechten onder omstandigheden die 
vergelijkbaar zijn met een staat die handelt buiten zijn eigen territorium. 
De internationale jurisprudentie accepteert over het algemeen twee modellen voor extraterritoriale 
jurisdictie, gebaseerd op de controle over een territorium (het ruimtelijk model) of gebaseerd over 
de controle over een persoon (het persoonlijk jurisdictiemodel), hoewel beide modellen in de 
praktijk ook zijn samengevoegd. Gebaseerd op hun beperkte internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid 
kunnen internationale organisaties alleen gebonden worden aan de specifieke mensenrechten die 




De toepassing van internationaal humanitair recht (IHR) op internationale organisaties is in dat 
opzicht minder problematisch dan mensenrechten, aangezien het IHR niet gebonden is aan een 
specifiek territorium en het automatisch van toepassing wordt bij iedere actieve deelname aan een 
conflict. Nieuwe problemen worden veroorzaakt doordat er slechts een beperkt aantal voorbeelden 
bestaat warbij welke internationale organisaties deze rechtsgebieden in de praktijk hebben 
toegepast. Hoewel de algemene toepasbaarheid van het IHR niet ter discussie staat, is er dan ook 
geen consensus onder juristen over de vraag of vredeshandhavers volgens het internationaal recht 
als burgers of als strijdenden gelden en of het recht betreffende internationaal of niet-internationaal 
gewapend conflict toepasbaar zou zijn indien een vredesoperatie van een internationale organisatie 
direct betrokken zou raken bij een specifiek conflict, hetgeen eveneens afhankelijk zou zijn van de 
vraag aan welke zijde in het conflict de internationale organisatie zou ingrijpen. 
De schendingen van het internationaal recht die voorkomen tijdens de uitvoering van 
vredesoperaties zijn vaak schendingen van de meest fundamentele normen, die eveneens 
beschermd zijn onder het international humanitair recht, het recht in niet-internationale gewapende 
conflicten en onder de mensenrechten. Mensenrechten worden tegenwoordig ook geacht van 
toepassing te zijn ten tijde van gewapend conflict, hetgeen vragen oproept omtrent het toepasselijke 
recht indien de normen van het IHR en van de mensenrechten conflicteren. Volgens de 
jurisprudentie van het Internationaal Gerechtshof in de zaken Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory en in het bijzonder in zijn advies over de 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, lijkt het de voorkeur te genieten om de 
respectievelijke norm van lex specialis norm voor ieder geval apart vast te stellen, waarbij in het 
algemeen moet worden geprobeerd om conflicterende normen op harmonieuze wijze te 
interpreteren.  
Tijdens de analyse van het recht dat toegepast kan worden op vredesoperaties bleek dat deze 
toepasbaarheid altijd afhankelijk is van de specifieke omstandigheden, en daarmee komt deze 
toepasbaarheid overeen met de casuïstische benadering van vredesoperaties. Dit maakt het nog 
waarschijnlijker dat twee of meer internationale organisaties gezamenlijk aansprakelijk kunnen zijn 
voor schendingen van het internationaal recht tijdens vredesoperaties. 
Het is mogelijk dat de gezamenlijke toerekening van daden aan internationale organisaties gebaseerd 
is op schendingen van verschillende primaire normen. Zo kan het gebeuren dat de VN jurisdictie 
heeft op een territoriale basis en ertoe verplicht is om een zekere handelwijze te voorkomen, terwijl 
een andere, regionale organisatie jurisdictie had op een persoonlijke basis en ertoe verplicht was om 




De laatste paragraaf van Hoofdstuk III bekijkt de toepasbaarheid van het bezettingsrecht op 
vredesoperaties. Om dit rechtsgebied van toepassing te laten zijn is vereist dat een vredesoperatie 
een vergelijkbare mate van controle uitoefent over een gegeven gebied als een nationale staat – 
hetgeen slechts enkele malen in de praktijk voorgekomen is, zoals in het geval van UNMIK. Daarnaast 
beoogt het internationale bestuur door middel van een vredesoperatie in een gebied de staat en zijn 
functionerende regeringsstructuren weer op te bouwen en de vrede en veiligheid te handhaven, 
hetgeen niet overeenkomt met het bezettingsrecht dat juist beoogt om de status quo in een bepaald 
gebied te bewaren. Ook op basis van andere argumenten, zoals de handelwijze van de VN, is 
geconcludeerd dat het bezettingsrecht niet toepasbaar is op vredesoperaties.   
Hoofdstuk IV onderzoekt het internationaal aansprakelijkheidsrecht om te bepalen of de artikelen 
over de aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties, ontwikkeld door het ILC, toereikend en 
geschikt zijn om de samenwerking tussen internationale organisaties in vredesmissies te reguleren, 
op basis van de resultaten van de analyse uit de Hoofdstukken I t/m III. Het hoofdstuk begint met een 
analyse van de specifieke voorwaarden omschreven in de AAIO waaraan voldaan moet worden om 
internationale organisaties gezamenlijk aansprakelijk te kunnen stellen voor schendingen van het 
internationaal recht. Artikel 7 van de AAIO reguleert de toerekenbaarheid van het handelen aan 
internationale organisaties wanneer organen aan hen ter beschikking zijn gesteld door andere 
internationale organisaties of staten. Het bepaalt dat, indien de ontvangende internationale 
organisatie effectieve controle uitoefent over het gedetacheerde orgaan, de daden van deze laatste 
beschouwd worden als daden van de internationale organisatie en als zodanig toerekenbaar zijn. 
Deze bepaling maakt een analyse mogelijk van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht voor vredesoperaties, 
aangezien het over het algemeen gebruikt wordt om te bepalen wie aansprakelijk is voor het 
handelen tijdens een vredesoperatie: een lidstaat van een organisatie die troepen stuurt, of de 
organisatie zelf. Uit een analyse van de jurisprudentie van nationale en internationale hoven en 
tribunalen blijkt echter dat er in de praktijk in het internationaal recht geen duidelijke regel bestaat 
voor de toerekenbaarheid aan een orgaan dat door een internationale organisatie of een staat aan 
een andere internationale organisatie gedetacheerd is. Hoewel Artikel 48 van de AAIO en de 
commentaren van de Speciale Rapporteur van de ILC bepalen dat twee of meer organisaties 
gezamenlijk aansprakelijk kunnen zijn, geven de AAIO geen indicatie van de voorwaarden, buiten de 
context van de twee andere specifieke bepalingen in de AAIO. Artikel 14 en 15 staan toe dat het 
handelen wordt toegerekend aan een internationale organisatie die een andere internationale 
organisatie help of assisteert bij het begaan van een internationaal onrechtmatige daad (Artikel 14) 
of die leiding geeft of controle uitoefent over een andere internationale organisatie die een 
internationaal onrechtmatige daad begaat (Artikel 15). Deze artikelen gaan er echter van uit dat één 




organisatie volledig beheerst wordt door een andere organisatie (Artikel 15). Deze artikelen zijn 
daarom simpelweg niet passend of geschikt om de samenwerking tussen internationale organisaties 
in vredesoperaties te reguleren wanneer deze gebaseerd is op verschillende bijdragen van 
verscheiden internationale organisaties op diverse niveaus en in allerlei vormen, afhankelijk van de 
specifieke omstandigheden van ieder geval. 
Het voorstel is daarom, in overeenstemming met de Artikelen 64 en 65 van de AAIO, om een 
criterium voor toerekenbaarheid als lex specialis uit te werken voor de specifieke context van de 
samenwerking tijdens vredesoperaties. Dit criterium zal worden aangeduid als ‘normatieve controle’, 
om de bestaande leemte in de AAIO te verhelpen. Het argument hiervoor is dat het 
samenwerkingsnetwerk tussen internationale organisaties op dit specifieke werkterrein een andere 
benadering vereist dan de benadering die in de Artikelen van de ILC gevonden kan worden, volgens 
welke de toerekenbaarheid van handelen aan een internationale organisatie niet gebaseerd is op de 
bijdrage aan een specifiek enkel feit, maar wordt afgeleid uit de controle die wordt uitgeoefend over 
de operatie via verscheiden componenten van het hele kader waarin de vredesoperatie is opgezet. 
Het dient te worden benadrukt dat de toepassing van een dergelijk criterium afhankelijk zou moeten 
zijn van de specifieke omstandigheden, niet in geringe mate vanwege het feit dat elke vredesoperatie 
uniek is in haar mandaat en politieke context. Een belangrijke eigenschap van het criterium van 
normatieve controle is het uitoefenen van invloed en controle, gebaseerd op de institutionele 
banden tussen de betrokken organisaties, zowel op het interinstitutionele als op het operationele 
niveau. 
De toepasbaarheid en geschiktheid van dit nieuwe aanbevolen toerekeningscriterium in de context 
van internationale organisaties die samenwerken tijdens vredersoperaties wordt besproken in 
Hoofdstuk V dat ook verscheidene casestudies omvat, namelijk de KFOR in Kosovo, UNAMID in 
Soedan, UNMISS en UNISFA in Zuid-Soedan en AFISMA en MINUSMA in Mali. Door het gebruik van 
deze chronologische benadering was het mogelijk om opnieuw het voortdurend veranderende 
karakter van de betrekkingen tussen de betrokken organisaties, en het feit dat ze steeds meer 
geïnstitutionaliseerd raken, te belichten. Een ander voordeel van deze benadering was dat deze het 
mogelijk maakte om het aanbevolen criterium van de normatieve controle verder te definiëren, op 
basis van het feit dat de ontwikkeling van steeds meer samenwerking tussen internationale 
organisaties tijdens vredesoperaties tegelijkertijd ook op het operationele niveau plaatsvindt. Terwijl 
het samenwerkingskader nog redelijk beperkt was in de gevallen van KFOR en UNMIK, toonden de 
case studies van de twee operaties in Mali een volledige integratie binnen de operatie en het 
daaraan verbonden politieke process binnen het samenwerkingskader. De KFOR, als eerste case 




en andere niveaus noodzakelijk is om als rechtvaardiging te dienen om één of meerdere organisaties 
aansprakelijk te kunnen stellen voor de daden van een vredesoperatie die formeel uitgevoerd wordt 
door een andere organisatie. Dit is gebaseerd op het feit dat de samenwerkende organisaties geen 
deel uitmaken van de militaire bevelslijn van de betreffende vredesoperatie. De documenten die 
gepubliceerd zijn over de KFOR rechtvaardigden niet de gezamenlijke aansprakelijkheid van zowel de 
VN als de NAVO voor de daden van de KFOR, in tegenstelling tot de beslissing van het Europees Hof 
voor de Rechten van de Mens in de zaak Behrami/Saramati, waarin gesteld werden dat de daden van 
de KFOR aan de VN toerekenbaar waren. 
UNAMID, in Darfur, is uniek als vredesoperatie omdat het sinds het begin was opgezet als een 
hybride operatie van zowel de VN als de AU. Eén van de voornaamste verschillen met de KFOR was 
dat het inzetten van UNAMID rechtstreeks gekoppeld was aan het in goede banen leiden van het 
politieke proces in Darfur. Feitelijk was UNAMID zelfs verantwoordelijk voor het sturen van de 
implementatie en het in goede banen leiden van het vredesproces. Wat het vereiste verband tussen 
enerzijds politieke controle op basis van institutionele betrekkingen tussen de organisaties en 
anderzijds controle op het operationele niveau betreft, heeft de organisatiestructuur van UNAMID de 
drempelwaarde gepasseerd, zodat het gerechtvaardigd lijkt om te stellen dat beide organisaties 
normaal gesproken gezamenlijk aansprakelijk zouden zijn voor schendingen van het internationaal 
recht die plaatsvinden tijdens de uitvoering van de operatie. In het geval van UNAMID was het voorts 
mogelijk om de hypothese te formuleren dat de betrokkenheid van dezelfde partijen in het politieke 
vredesproces en op het operationele niveau waarschijnlijk geleid heeft tot een versterkte uitoefening 
van controle en overzicht over de vredesoperatie door alle partijen, waarmee het potentieel voor 
gezamenlijke aansprakelijkheid verhoogd is. 
In Zuid-Soedan ziet de situatie er anders uit. UNISFA en UNMISS zijn beide ingezet onder auspiciën 
van de VN. Hoewel het vredesproces in Zuid-Soedan door de AU geleid wordt, zijn diens invloed en 
politieke controle over de vredesoperatie niet weerspiegeld in strategische en operationele 
controleovereenkomsten. Het geval van Zuid-Soedan bevestigt daarom de hypothese die 
geformuleerd is in het geval van UNAMID, dat een situatie waarin dezelfde partijen een sturende rol 
hebben tijdens het politieke proces en tevens op het operationele en strategische niveau van een 
vredesoperatie waarschijnlijk leidt tot een gezamenlijke toerekenbaarheid van het handelen. In 
tegenstelling tot de situatie rond UNAMID is het tijdens de uitvoering van UNISFA en UNMISS niet 
gerechtvaardigd om potentiële schendingen van het international recht toe te rekenen aan zowel de 
VN als de AU. Het is echter mogelijk om er nog een hypothese uit af te leiden: aangezien de VN niet 
alleen de internationale organisatie is met de primaire verantwoordelijkheid voor het handhaven van 




gebracht, lijkt de VN minder bereid te zijn om samenwerking met externe partijen te accepteren dan 
de vredesoperaties die uitgevoerd worden door de regionale organisaties en die geanalyseerd 
worden in deze studie. Een laatste interessante eigenschap van UNMISS en UNISFA bestond uit de 
samenwerkingsmechanismes met de operatie UNAMID. Het gebrek aan gedetailleerde informatie 
over deze regelingen maakt het niet mogelijk om zelfs maar de mogelijkheid te toetsen dat de AU 
medeaansprakelijk zou kunnen zijn voor het handelen van UNMISS en UNISFA door middel van deze 
toegevoegde samenwerkingslaag. 
AFISMA, dat actief was in Mali voordat het werd omgevormd in MINUSA, kan worden gezien als een 
treffend voorbeeld van samenwerking tussen de VN en regionale organisaties. Het 
samenwerkingsniveau tussen de VN, de AU, ECOWAS en ook de EU overtreft alle eerdere 
vredesoperaties hier geanalyseerd en rechtvaardigt de stelling dat al deze organisaties gezamenlijk 
aansprakelijk waren, met de opmerking dat de beperkte operationele betrokkenheid van de EU 
gecompenseerd kan worden door haar substantiëlere betrokkenheid en controle door het 
verstrekken van de financiële middelen via de Afrikaanse Vredesfaciliteit. 
Het geval van MINUSMA bevestigt de eerder geformuleerde hypothese dat het 
samenwerkingsniveau tussen de VN en regionale organisaties in beperktere mate lijkt plaats te 
vinden wanneer een operatie onder auspiciën van de VN plaatsvindt. Desalniettemin kunnen 
MINUSMA en Mali in het algemeen het begin van een nieuw tijdperk in de vredeshandhaving 
vertegenwoordigen, waarin het politieke proces voor conflictoplossing en het inzetten van een 
vredesoperatie deel uitmaken van een bredere gezamenlijke benadering met twee of meer 
internationale organisaties. Het aanzienlijke niveau van controle dat de VN uitoefent over MINUSMA 
heeft voorkomen dat de bijdragen van en de samenwerking met de andere internationale 
organisaties het niveau bereikten waarin de toepassing van het criterium van normatieve controle 
gerechtvaardigd zou zijn. 
Vervolgens illustreerde de poging om de betrekkingen binnen een operatie te classifiëren opnieuw 
de casuïstische benadering die internationale organisaties hanteren bij vredesmissies. Alle 
vredesmissies toonden echter een benadering op basis van coördinatie en samenwerking, en niet op 
basis van confrontatie. De daaropvolgende paragraaf neemt opnieuw Hoofdstuk VIII van het 
Handvest van de VN onder de loep, vanuit het gezichtspunt dat het handelen van de VN en regionale 
organisaties een gewoonterechtelijke basis heeft gecreëerd waaronder de regionale organisaties 
rechtstreeks gebonden kunnen zijn aan het Handvest van de VN. Inderdaad, in het bijzonder gelet op 
de overvloed aan concrete gevallen uit de praktijk die in deze studie aan bod komen, en ook gelet op 
de tendens dat regionale organisaties steeds vaker toestemming vragen aan de Veiligheidsraad om 




gewoonterechtelijke basis rechtstreeks gebonden zijn aan het Handvest van de VN. Dit argument 
impliceert dat er door de regionale organisaties een laag verplichtingen wordt toegevoegd, hetgeen 
kan leiden tot aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties in de vorm van precieze 
verplichtingen die zijn vastgelegd in de Resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad die de inzet van een 
vredesoperatie toestaat. Bovendien vergroot het nogmaals de waarschijnlijkheid van gezamenlijke 
aansprakelijkheid, aangezien het voor kan komen dat de VN een mensenrechtenverplichting schendt, 
of een regionale organisatie een verplichting onder het mandaat van de operatie schendt, 
veronderstellend dat een schending van een mandaat van de VN en daarbij van intern VN-recht 
overeenkomt met een schending van het internationaal recht. Deze specifieke vraag wordt 
geanalyseerd in het volgende deel van Hoofdstuk V en bevestigend beantwoord. Naast het 
toevoegen van een nieuwe laag verplichtingen als primaire norm voor regionale organisaties, zijn er 
ook andere gevolgen. Een afwijking van de mensenrechtennormen in het mandaat van een 
vredesoperatie zou bijvoorbeeld niet noodzakelijkerwijs overeenkomen met een afwijking van de 
mensenrechten zelf, aangezien het mandaat onafhankelijk van de bijbehorende verplichting op het 
gebied van de mensenrechten beoordeeld dient te worden. De regionale organisaties die in deze 
studie aan bod komen hebben daarnaast verdere verplichtingen onder hun eigen intern recht, 
gebaseerd op overwegingen van mensenrechten en internationaal humanitair recht, waarvan een 
beknopt overzicht in het laatste deel van Hoofdstuk V gevonden kan worden. Ten slotte gaat het 
laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift in op de omstandigheden waaronder geen onrechtmatigheid 
mogelijk is. Deze omstandigheden zouden een internationale onrechtmatige daad kunnen 
rechtvaardigen, op vergelijkbare wijze met bepalingen in het strafrecht. De toestemming van een 
gastland om een vredesoperatie in te zetten vormt vaak de juridische basis voor deze operatie, maar 
kan niet gezien worden als een carte blanche van het gastland om alle potentiële schendingen van 
het internationaal recht toe te staan die plaatsvinden tijdens het uitvoeren van de operatie, zoals 
eveneens volgt uit de overeenkomsten over de status van de strijdkrachten en de overeenkomsten 
over de status van de operatie die vaak gesloten worden tussen de internationale organisaties en het 
gastland. De formulering van Artikel 20 van de AAIO stelt op vergelijkbare wijze dat de 
onrechtmatigheid van de daad in kwestie alleen ongedaan gemaakt kan worden in verband met de 
internationale organisatie of de staat die toestemming heeft gegeven, hetgeen betekent: het 
gastland. 
De zelfverdediging onder Artikel 21 van de AAIO moet geïnterpreteerd worden in de traditionele zin 
van het internationaal recht, als een gewelddadige reactie op een gewapende aanval, zodat het over 
het algemeen onderscheiden moet worden van “zelfverdediging” in de context van vredesoperaties. 
Onder zelfverdediging in vredesoperaties worden de daden verstaan die zijn begaan teneinde het 




Indien een vredesoperatie echter zou reageren op een gewapende inval in de zin van Artikel 21 van 
de AAIO, zou die bepaling toepasbaar zijn.  
Het laatste Hoofdstuk VI bevat de conclusies en aanbevelingen. In deze studie komt de 
samenwerking tussen internationale organisaties naar voren als de belangrijkste factor in het 
bepalen van rollen en leemtes in het collectieve veiligheidssysteem. Het internationaal recht heeft 
deze ontwikkeling op twee manieren bevorderd. De afwezigheid van geaccepteerde internationaal 
rechtelijke bepalingen die van toepassing zijn op internationale organisaties heeft geleid tot een 
benadering die gedurende een decennium slechts door de praktijk gevoed werd, hetgeen – hoewel 
het juridische onzekerheden gecreëerd heeft – niet mogelijk zou zijn geweest indien er juridische 
bepalingen toepasbaar op internationale organisaties zouden hebben bestaan voordat de VN werd 
opgericht. Vredesoperaties zouden in principe niet mogelijk zijn geweest zonder de erkenning dat 
internationale organisaties impliciete bevoegdheden hebben. De voortgang van de samenwerking 
tussen internationale organisaties kan niet geacht worden vrijwillig te zijn geweest, maar ook het 
gevolg van externe, urgente factoren, zoals schaarse middelen en de legitimiteitseis. Nieuwe 
belemmeringen kunnen opkomen als gevolg van de verdere toename van  het aantal actoren. 
Vredesoperaties maken steeds vaker gebruik van particuliere contractanten voor specifieke 
doeleinden zoals bewakingsdiensten, en staten zijn begonnen met het inzetten van bi- of 
multinationale brigades, zoals de Frans-Duitse brigade waarvan delen zijn ingezet in EUTM Mali. De 
ontwikkeling waarbij internationale partijen meer samenwerken, zoals uiteengezet in deze studie, 
beperkt zich niet tot het specifieke terrein van vredesoperaties, maar is een algemene ontwikkeling 
in het internationaal recht. Het is daarom algemeen noodzakelijk om het internationaal 
aansprakelijkheidsrecht verder te ontwikkelen, teneinde een verdere loskoppeling van het juridische 
kader en de praktijk te voorkomen. Er bestaat nog steeds een leemte in de AAIO, aangezien 
internationale organisaties die samenwerkingsregelingen aangaan zonder de intentie om het 
internationaal recht te schenden niet aansprakelijk gesteld kunnen worden. 
Een begin zou kunnen zijn om te proberen het systeem van geschillenregeling te hervormen, maar 
dit streven vereist de steun van zowel staten als internationale organisaties. In de academische 
wereld zijn voorstellen gedaan zoals bijvoorbeeld een Internationaal Hof voor de Mensenrechten, 
maar het is onwaarschijnlijk dat staten een dergelijk idee zouden ondersteunen. Een alternatief zou 
zijn om het Internationaal Gerechtshof om een advies te vragen over de toepassing van 
mensenrechten op internationale organisaties en het vereiste criterium voor de toerekenbaarheid 
van handelingen aan twee of meer internationale organisaties. De hardnekkige belemmering voor all 
deze suggesties om het handelen van samenwerkende internationale organisaties te reguleren is dat 




zoals de toetreding van de EU tot het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens, kunnen 
bevorderlijk werken, aangezien deze druk internationale organisaties en staten kan motiveren om 
deel te nemen aan verdergaande regulering, hetgeen ook aantrekkelijk kan zijn voor deze actoren, 
aangezien het ze in staat stelt om de uitkomst te beïnvloeden of eventueel zelfs te sturen. 
Op vergelijkbare wijze zijn er argumenten voor en tegen de betrokkenheid van staten bij pogingen 
om de gezamenlijke aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties verder te reguleren. Een 
dergelijke verduidelijking zou mogelijkerwijs kunnen voorkomen dat zij aansprakelijk gesteld zouden 
worden voor het handelen van organen die aan internationale organisaties gedetacheerd zijn, 
bijvoorbeeld aan vredesmissies. Desalniettemin zijn er twee redenen waarom staten een verdere 
regulering niet zouden steunen. Allereerst zou een verdere ontwikkeling van bepalingen voor 
internationale organisaties kunnen leiden tot de ontwikkeling van vergelijkbare bepalingen voor 
staten. Ten tweede zouden met name de landen die het grootste deel bijdragen aan de financiering 
van een internationale organisatie gekant kunnen zijn tegen enige poging om het waarschijnlijker te 
maken dat internationale organisaties aansprakelijk zouden worden gesteld. Een werkelijke 
verandering vereist daarom de deelname van zowel staten als internationale organisaties aan dit 
debat. 
Wat het specifieke onderwerp van deze studie betreft kunnen een paar specifieke aanbevelingen 
worden gedaan. De VN en de regionale organisaties zouden deel moeten nemen aan activiteiten die 
de toepassing van IHR en mensenrechten op vredesoperaties verduidelijken. Eén mogelijkheid zou 
zijn dat de VN een bulletin zou aannemen over de toepassing van mensenrechtenwetgeving. De VN 
en de regionale organisaties zouden in hun verschillende overeenkomsten bepalingen moeten 
opnemen omtrent de verdeling van de aansprakelijkheid, indien zij samenwerkingen aangaan tijdens 
vredesoperaties. De VN zou eveneens moeten overwegen om een standaardovereenkomst te 
ontwikkelen die gebruikt kan worden om de raadpleging en de samenwerking tussen de VN en de 
regionale organisaties uit te breiden en te formaliseren. Ten slotte zouden de VN en de EU de 
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